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The  period  of  the  New  Economic  Policy  was  a  time  when  the 
Bolshevik  government  was  forced  to  reconsider  its  attitude 
towards  the  market,  as  NEP  involved  the  introduction  of  market 
elements  into  Soviet  society.  This  thesis  is  a  comparative  study 
of  eleven  Soviet  economic  theorists  from  this  period;  Bukharin, 
Preobrazhenskii,  Strumilin,  Bazarov,  Groman,  Kondrat'ev,  Oparin, 
Sokol'nikov,  Yurovskii,  Chayanov,  and  Blyumin. 
It  asks  two  basic  questions:  how  did  each  theorist  conceive 
of  the  market,  and  how  did  they  relate  this  conception  to 
socialism?  The  primary  source  material  used  is  the  works  of 
these  theorists,  and  in  many  cases  this  material  has  not  been 
previously  discussed  by  scholars.  A  theoretical  framework  places 
these  conceptions  into  a  historical  context. 
The  basic  result  obtained  is  that  there  were  many  diverse 
conceptions  of  the  market  prevalent  in  this  period.  The  bulk  of 
the  thesis  investigates  these  various  conceptions,  and  suggests 
that  their  theoretical  roots  lie  in  various  currents  of  economic 
thought:  classical,  neo-classical,  Marxist,  and  socialist. 
During  NEP  these  currents  were  allowed  to  mix  freely  to  a 
certain  extent,  although  pressure  to  censor  them  began  to  build 
towards  the  end  of  the  1920s. 
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iv CHAPTER  ONE  -A  THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK 
'The  market'  is  one  of  the  terms  most 
frequently  employed  by  economists. 
However,  on  close  scrutiny  it  turns  out 
that  everyone  interprets  the  market  in 
a  different  way  and  that  there  are  many 
rather  vague  associations  connected 
with  it.  ' 
Janos  Kornai 
1.1  -  MEANINGS 
The  Oxford  English  Dictionary  defines  'market'  as  'the 
meeting  or  congregation  of  people  for  the  purchase  and  sale  of 
provisions  or  livestock,  publicly  exposed,  at  a  fixed  time  and 
place'.  Thus  the  word  market  carries  a  'place'  meaning.  But  when 
speaking  of  'the  market'  in  the  abstract,  as  a  mechanism  for 
allocating  scarce  resources,  it  means  something  different.  In 
this  sense  it  is  a  mechanism  for  harmoniously  co-ordinating 
production  and  distribution  in  line  with  certain  efficiency 
criteria,  for  example  Pareto-optimality.  2  The  market  provides  ex 
post  verification  of  product  utility,  and  in  this  sense  planning 
can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  devise  a  system  which  operates  ex 
ante.  In  his  Principles  of  Economics  of  1890  Marshall  uses 
Cournot  to  expound  what  he  thinks  economists  understand  by  the 
term  'market'  -  not  any  particular  market  place  in  which 
products  are  bought  and  sold,  but  a  region  in  which  buyers  and 
sellers  'are  in  such  free  intercourse  with  one  another  that  the 
prices  of  the  same  goods  tend  to  equality'. 
3  Marshall's 
definition  shows  that  the  market  mechanism  is  often  used  as  a 
synonym  for  the  price  mechanism. 
Janos  Kornai  in  Anti  -Equilibrium  analyses  the  market  as  a 
elementary  contracting  process  similar  to  Walras's  tatonnement. 
According  to  Kornai  the  market  for  a  product  is  the  set  of  all 
elementary  contracting  processes  relating  to  that  product,  and 
the  market  of  the  national  economy  is  the  set  of  markets  for  all 
products.  In  this  sense  the  market  is  a  network  of  relations 
functioning  as  a  process  over  time.  4  However,  Kornai  stresses 
that  a  market  regulated  by  free  contract  prices  is  a  special 
kind  of  market,  and  argues  that  the  simplistic  opposing  of 
1 'plan'  to  'market'  misunderstands  the  nature  of  economic  control 
systems.  5 
In  Marxist  and  socialist  literature  a  very  different 
meaning  has  grown  up  around  the  word  'market',  namely  an  unfair, 
irrational  and  spontaneous  mechanism  through  which  workers  are 
exploited  and  are  drained  of  surplus-value,  and  through  which 
capitalism  manufactures  and  partially  overcomes  economic  crises. 
Marxists  may  reject  some  or  all  of  the  'bourgeois'  definitions 
given  above,  claiming  that  they  obscure  the  exploitation 
process,  and  they  contrast  the  anarchy  of  the  market  with  the 
rational  and  superior  economic  plan. 
In  partial  opposition  to  the  neo-classical  view  of  the 
market  as  simply  a  pricing  mechanism,  there  could  be  identified 
a  von  Mises/Hayek  view  which  sees  the  market  as  most  importantly 
a  transmitter  of  knowledge.  The  price  system  in  a  kaleidic 
economy  is  one  among  many  structures  in  which  individuals  make 
use  of  formulas,  rules,  and  inarticulable  knowledge  without 
having  to  consciously  understand  their  full  meaning.  For  Hayek 
the  fundamental  problem  is  how  to  utilize  knowledge  which  is  not 
given  to  anyone  in  its  totality,  ie  is  initially  dispersed  among 
many  people.  According  to  Hayek  the  market  provides  the  best 
mechanism  for  conveying  information  and  registering  change, 
information  which  each  individual  requires  in  order  to  'plan' 
their  activities,  and  thus  the  market  is  a  form  of 
'decentralised  planning'. 
6 
The  first  meaning  of  the  word  'market'  is  reflected  in  its 
etymological  roots.  The  Latin  mercatus  meant  a  place  of  trade, 
and  the  Russian  word  rynok  (borrowed  from  the  Polish)  comes  from 
'ring',  ie  a  place  to  trade.  The  1955  edition  of  the  Bol'shaya 
sovetskaya  entsiklopediya  claims  that  in  a  socialist  society  a 
'radical  revolution'  occurs  in  the  nature  of  the  market  as 
opposed  to  capitalism.  In  socialism  there  are  no  labour  markets 
or  markets  for  the  means  of  production,  only  commodity  markets.? 
This  shows  the  first  meaning  of  'markets'  only,  and  the  market 
as  a  mechanism  in  either  the  neo-classical  or  Hayekian  sense  is 
not  present.  In  much  Soviet  literature  the  phrases  'law  of 
value'  and  'commodity-money  mechanism'  are  often  used  as 
euphemisms  for  the  market  mechanism,  and  much  debate  occurred  in 
2 the  1920s  about  whether  the  law  of  value  existed  in  Soviet 
society.  I  shall  be  examining  this  debate  as  far  as  it  throws 
light  onto  the  notion  of  'market'. 
In  the  sense  of  meanings  the  historical  battle  between 
socialists  and  supporters  of  laissez-faire  can  be  seen  as  an 
ideological  fight  to  attach  their  meaning  to  the  word  'market' 
in  the  heads  of  as  many  people  as  possible.  In  this  battle 
polemical  flourish  has  often  taken  the  place  of  detailed 
empirical  study  and  attempted  verification  or  falsification  of 
propositions.  The  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to  investigate  this 
battle  in  a  specific  context:  the  USSR  in  the  1920s.  In  the  next 
section  I  outline  this  aim  in  more  detail. 
1.2  -  LINES  OF  INVESTIGATION 
In  this  thesis  I  examine  eleven  Soviet  economic  theorists 
who  were  active  in  the  period  of  the  New  Economic  Policy  (1921 
to  1929).  As  I  investigated  their  work  I  had  the  following 
specific  questions  in  mind: 
1)  what  do  they  think  the  market  (and  market  economics)  is; 
2)  what  has  the  market  to  do  with  socialism.  8 
To  find  answers  to  these  two  questions  was  the  primary  aim  of 
this  thesis.  However,  other  secondary  questions  such  as  how  will 
the  market  and  its  associated  phenomena  be  used  in  the 
transition  arose  from  the  nature  of  the  period  itself,  and  thus 
had  to  be  examined  to  some  extent. 
The  reasons  why  I  chose  to  embark  on  an  investigation  of 
this  topic  were  basically  two-fold.  Firstly,  as  perestroika  was 
attempting  to  justify  the  transition  to  a  market  economy  through 
a  reappraisal  of  NEP,  I  thought  it  would  be  useful  and  revealing 
to  go  beyond  the  drawing  of  historical  'lessons'  for  current  use 
from  the  past,  to  see  how  economic  theorists  from  NEP  actually 
viewed  the  market  as  this  time.  9  Secondly,  NEP  was  a  period  when 
those  who  had  condemned  the  market  as  exploitative  and 
irrational  were  forced  to  use  it  for  their  own  ends.  Thus 
interest  lies  in  seeing  if  the  actual  experience  of  governing  a 
semi-market  economy  altered  conceptions  of  the  market  which  the 
Bolsheviks  had  held  previously  on  a  purely  theoretical  level. 
3 The  question  arises  of  why  I  chose  the  particular  theorists 
discussed  in  this  thesis.  I  wanted  to  investigate  the  full  range 
of  opinion  which  had  existed  on  the  market  during  NEP,  and  thus 
I  chose  people  from  disparate  institutions  and  groupings.  I  also 
wanted  a  balance  of  well-known,  somewhat  known,  and  totally 
unknown  theorists.  Bukharin  and  Preobrazhenskii  represent  the 
two  wings  of  the  Bolshevik  party,  and  are  well-known  in  relation 
to  the  industrialisation  debates  which  occurred  in  NEP. 
Kondrat'ev  and  Oparin  were  both  members  of  the  Conjuncture 
Institute.  Kondrat'ev  is  famous  for  his  idea  of  long-waves,  but 
other  aspects  of  his  thought  remain  little-investigated.  Oparin 
is  totally  unknown.  Chayanov,  like  Kondrat'ev,  was  labelled  a 
'neo-narodnik'  by  detractors,  and  is  famous  for  his  analysis  of 
peasant  economy.  Strumilin,  Bazarov,  and  Groman  represent  the 
divergent  currents  which  existed  in  Gosplan  in  the  1920s.  All 
three  are  somewhat  known,  but  the  detail  of  their  economic 
theory  remains  uninvestigated  by  Western  scholars.  Bazarov  and 
Groman  were  both  Mensheviks,  a  fact  which  counted  against  them 
when  NEP  was  abolished.  Blyumin  is  totally  unknown,  and  was  a 
more  orthodox  Marxist  critic  of  market  economics.  Sokol'nikov 
and  Yurovskii,  both  of  whom  worked  in  Narkomfin,  held  perhaps 
the  strongest  pro-market  views  of  those  who  I  examined.  Again 
although  they  are  somewhat  known  because  of  the  fate  which 
befell  them,  the  core  of  their  economic  work  remains  unanalysed 
in  any  detail.  Thus  I  aimed  in  this  work  to  ask  an  original 
question  in  relation  to  a  set  of  economic  theorists  some  of  whom 
had  previously  been  examined  in  relation  to  other  questions,  and 
some  of  whom  had  never  before  been  analysed  in  any  respect. 
1.3  -  OPTIMUM  AND  PLACE 
Perhaps  the  two  most  divergent  meanings  of  'the  market'  are 
as  a  mechanism  in  an  optimal  economic  system  and  as  a  place 
where  trade  is  conducted.  In  the  case  of  the  former  a  number  of 
different  optima  can  be  distinguished.  A  production  optimum  is 
concerned  with  the  optimal  use  of  resources  in  producing  given 
outputs,  and  it  is  achieved  when  it  is  impossible  to  increase 
the  output  of  one  commodity  without  decreasing  that  of  another. 
4 For  a  production  optimum  to  occur  both  optimal  allocation  of 
factors  between  products  and  between  firms  must  obtain.  An 
exchange  optimum  is  concerned  with  taking  exchange  to  its  most 
efficient  point,  and  it  occurs  when  (for  two  goods  and  two 
consumers)  the  ratio  of  the  marginal  utilities  of  the  two  goods 
are  equal.  If  the  above  conditions  are  met  then  one  further 
condition  is  necessary  for  overall  Pareto  optimality  to  be 
attained:  the  ratios  of  the  marginal  utilities  of  two  goods  must 
equal  their  marginal  cost  ratio.  l°  In  the  sense  of  optimality 
the  market  is  thus  a  freely  competitive  economic  system  where 
all  consumers  are  utility  maximisers  and  all  firms  are  profit 
maximisers,  which  according  to  theory  will  result  in  the  optima 
examined  above  being  achieved. 
However,  a  very  different  view  of  the  market  is  given  by 
its  'place'  meaning.  An  organisation  model  of  the  market 
stresses  its  polycentric  nature,  and  the  actions  of  members  in  a 
market  network  are  autonomous  rather  than  centrally-governed.  11 
Johann  Heinrich  von  Thunen's  work  The  Isolated  State  of  1826 
pioneered  the  spacial  approach  to  market  location.  Assume  that 
an  agricultural  product  is  produced  at  a  uniform  rate  throughout 
an  entire  homogeneous  area.  With  a  single  consumption  point  at 
the  city  centre  of  the  region,  the  supply  region  of  this  product 
will  form  a  circular  area  of  radius  z'.  If  p0  is  the  average 
cost  of  production  constant  at  all  production  levels,  if  f  is 
the  average  freight  rate  constant  per  unit  of  distance,  and  if  p 
is  the  delivered  market  price  of  the  product,  then  the  boundary 
of  the  supply  area  is  given  by: 
Z_  {P  -  Pp)/f 
If  competition  between  different  agricultural  products  is 
introduced,  highly  perishable  or  bulky  goods  will  be  produced 
near  the  city  centre,  while  livestock  will  be  located  at  the 
boundary  of  the  region.  In  general  the  market  supply  area  will 
be  divided  into  a  number  of  ring-shaped  zones  of  specialised 
production  regions.  In  each  ring  the  product  is  produced  which 
maximises  net  profit  per  unit  of  area,  thus  maximising  the 
generation  of  ground  rent. 
12  In  this  sense  a  market  is  a  place 
which  is  structured  into  zones  by  the  nature  of  the  goods 
5 competing  for  production  space  and  by  the  location  of  central 
selling  regions. 
1.4  -  MODELS 
This  thesis  will  not  be  asking  the  question:  how  far  is  the 
market  compatible  with  planning?  It  will,  however,  be  asking  the 
question:  how  far  did  x  think  that  the  market  was  compatible 
with  planning?  I  take  as  axiomatic  the  fact  that  Marxists 
believe  that  socialism  requires  a  'planned  economy'  in  some 
undefined  sense,  and  that  Marx  thought  that  'planning'  was  in 
some  sense  opposed  to  the  market.  In  the  thesis  I  hope  to 
clarify  what  these  statements  mean  for  each  theorist  I  examine. 
However,  non-Marxist  socialists  are  not  doctrinally  bound  to 
planning,  and  thus  are  free  to  reject  it  in  any  way. 
In  the  literature  on  comparative  economic  systems  a  sliding 
scale  from  complete  planning  to  full  market  is  sometimes 
employed,  with  centre  variants  such  as  market  socialism  and 
indicative  planning,  and  it  may  prove  useful  to  utilise  this 
framework  in  the  ensuing  chapters  in  order  to  situate  economists 
very  roughly  in  relation  to  their  colleagues.  The  model  which 
Peter  Wiles  employs  in  The  Political  Economy  of  Communism  of 
1964  can  be  set  out  as  follows: 
CC  ------  ICM  ------  CM  ------  CWE  ------  RM  ------  FM 
Central  Command  (CC)  -  perfect  central  allocation  in  physical 
terms  without  money.  Consumer  consumption  and  labour  allocation 
are  totally  planned.  Inverted  Centralised  Market  (ICM)  - 
initiative  lies  with  central  planners,  whose  decisions  as  to  the 
allocation  of  intermediate  resources  determine  the  whole.  Within 
this  sector  money  is  passive,  although  outside  of  it  it  is  used 
to  persuade  consumers  and  factors  of  production  to  conform  to 
plan.  This  is  achieved  by  suitable  wage  differentials  and  a 
varying  rate  of  turnover  tax.  According  to  Wiles  this  is  the 
closest  to  Soviet  reality  after  1928.  Centralised  Market  (CM)  - 
decisions  as  to  intermediate  resource  allocation  are  centrally 
planned,  but  choices  of  consumers,  workers,  and  land/capital 
6 allocation  are  taken  on  free-market  criteria.  Industry 
distributes  resources  on  market  criteria  but  by  central  planned 
administration.  Capitalist  War  Economy  (CWE)  -  planners  choose 
the  pattern  of  final  production,  but  managers  are  free  to  bid  on 
the  market  for  labour  and  materials  to  fulfil  these  plans. 
Regulated  Market  (RM)  -  indirect  controls  on  the  profit  motive 
for  the  purpose  of  combating  monopoly  and  market  failure  etc. 
Full  Market  (FM)  -  no  controls  on  the  profit  motive,  competitive 
markets,  and  decentralised  decision-making.  13 
Wiles  notes  that  he  is  concerned  in  these  models  with 
questions  of  allocating  scarce  resources,  not  with  different 
types  of  ownership.  Thus  the  question  of  ownership  is  not 
directly  raised,  but  in  taking  this  path  Wiles  implicitly 
separates  the  issues  of  ownership  and  economic  efficiency.  Brus, 
for  example,  has  come  to  believe  that  such  a  separation  is 
misleading,  and  thus  the  limitations  of  this  model  require 
recognition-14  Some  may  also  argue  that  presenting  these  models 
as  a  sliding  scale  is  misleading,  since  it  implies  that  anywhere 
along  the  scale  is  equally  feasible.  Opponents  of  this  view 
argue  that  only  certain  points  along  the  scale  can  actually 
exist  as  efficient  economic  systems.  15 
The  point  of  using  this  scale  is  to  be  able  to  state  where 
each  of  the  theorists  I  examine  stands  in  relation  to  it.  It 
could  be  argued  that  this  is  misleading  since  it  projects  a 
scheme  developed  some  time  later  back  onto  theorists  who  could 
not  have  been  familiar  with  it,  and  thus  may  tend  to  push  them 
into  convenient  boxes  in  which  they  do  not  actually  fit.  I 
recognise  this  as  being  a  danger,  but  believe  that  this  can  be 
avoided  and  this  idea  can  give  useful  results. 
Other  theoretical  work  on  markets  provides  useful  ways  of 
categorising  them.  In  'The  Cognitive  Function  of  Markets  in 
Market  Socialism'  of  1990  Don  Lavoie  makes  an  interesting 
differentiation  between  three  cognitive  functions  of  markets. 
The  computational  approach  takes  the  cognitive  function  of 
markets  to  be  strictly  calculative,  eg  Oskar  Lange.  The 
incentives  approach  understands  that  markets  provide  not  only  a 
means  of  spontaneous  calculation,  but  also  of  psychological 
motivation  and  incentive,  eg  Nove.  The  discovery  approach  agrees 
7 with  the  former  approaches,  but  adds  that  the  crucial  function 
is  the  creation,  discovery,  and  communication  of  knowledge 
through  a  social  learning  process,  eg  von  Hayek.  16  This 
discovery  process,  according  to  Hayek,  cannot  be  centrally 
directed  by  a  planning  body. 
Varieties  of  plan/market  models  can  thus  be  characterised 
by  the  function  they  see  markets  fulfilling.  Lavoie  argues  that 
varieties  of  market  socialism  such  as  Nove's  seem  to  neglect  the 
discovery  approach  to  markets  and  thus  fail  to  fully  understand 
their  function.  Would-be  socialists  must  focus  attention  on  a 
replacement  for  or  the  operation  of  markets  as  knowledge 
producers  for  market  socialism  to  be  realistic.  In  fact  the 
Mises/von  Hayek  approach  to  markets  is  perhaps  the  approach 
least  mentioned  in  discussion  of  planning  versus  the  market,  and 
this  is  perhaps  because  it  is  outside  the  main  current  of  neo- 
classical  thought. 
As  I  mentioned  earlier,  there  is  dispute  about  whether 
ownership  relations  are  intrinsically  connected  with  the  market. 
Some  would  claim  that  private  property  is  essential  for  the 
market  mechanism  to  function  efficiently,  while  others  would 
argue  that  the  market  can  (at  least  to  some  degree)  be  separated 
from  private  property  and  thus  could  be  used  in  a  social  system 
where  some  form  of  socialised  property  was  dominant.  Again  this 
is  at  least  partly  a  dispute  about  what  the  market  actually  is. 
On  this  axis  the  far  left  and  the  far  right  are  more  likely  to 
agree  that  private  property  is  intrinsic  to  the  market,  although 
with  totally  opposite  normative  evaluations  of  this  system, 
while  towards  the  centre  there  is  a  greater  tendency  to  separate 
these  two  features  and  allow  them  to  exist  alone.  In  this  thesis 
I  will  examine  this  question  only  as  far  as  the  theorists  I 
discuss  have  views  on  it. 
Another  way  of  approaching  the  study  of  markets  is  provided 
by  Karl  Polanyi.  He  sees  the  market  as  a  type  of  exchange  system 
that  is  only  one  among  various  alternative  structural 
possibilities.  Polanyi  proposes  a  typology  of  three  types  of 
exchange:  reciprocal,  redistributive,  and  market.  Reciprocal 
exchange  occurs  when  individuals  are  reciprocally  obligated  by 
status  to  give  and  receive  goods.  Redistributive  exchange  exists 
8 where  members  of  a  collective  make  contributions  to  a  central 
agency,  which  allocates  these  resources  according  to  given 
principles.  Market  exchange  occurs  where  homo  economicus  acts 
only  through  price  considerations.  17  In  this  conception  the 
market  is  an  institutional  structure  through  which  trade  is 
filtered  rather  than  a  mechanism  which  determines  production 
priorities.  For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis  it  is  also  important 
to  distinguish  between  a  normative  appraisal  of  the  market  and  a 
technical  conception  of  it.  Theorists  may  agree  on  the  former 
but  disagree  on  the  latter,  or  visa  versa,  or  agree/disagree  on 
both.  They  may  also  agree  or  disagree  about  what  their 
understanding  of  the  market  has  to  do  with  socialism. 
1.5  -  AGAINST  THE  MARKET 
This  section  will  examine  the  nature  of  possible  critiques 
of  the  market.  Within  one  framework  there  are  two  possible  types 
of  critique  of  the  market,  internal  (or  immanent)  critiques  and 
external  critiques.  An  immanent  critique  does  not  challenge  the 
assumptions  upon  which  advocacy  of  the  market  is  founded,  but 
rather  follows  these  assumptions  to  their  logical  conclusion, 
showing  either  that  these  assumptions  are  contradictory  or  lead 
to  undesirable  results. 
18  Examples  of  this  type  of  critique  can 
be  subsumed  under  the  general  title  market  failure,  for  example 
asymmetric  information,  externalities,  corner  solutions,  public 
goods,  and  free-riding. 
External  critiques  challenge  the  foundations  upon  which 
conventional  advocacy  of  the  market  is  based.  For  example  by 
challenging  the  notion  that  a  state  of  perfect  competition  could 
ever  exist.  The  basic  Marxist  external  critique  is  centred 
around  the  labour  theory  of  value.  However,  this  is 
interestingly  problematic.  At  the  time  of  writing  the  first 
volume  of  Capital  the  labour  theory  of  value  was  not  a  critique 
of  'bourgeois'  economic  orthodoxy,  it  was  the  orthodoxy.  Thus  a 
part  of  the  Marxist  critique  of  the  market  has  been  transformed 
from  a  generally  accepted  foundation  to  a  generally  rejected 
mistaken  paradigm.  Thus  the  nature  of  critiques  change  as  the 
nature  of  the  assumptions  they  challenge  develop.  In  relation  to 
the  Marxist  version  of  the  labour  theory  of  value,  it  transforms 
9 the  criticism  from  being  immanent  for  most  of  Marx's  lifetime, 
to  being  external  at  the  time  of  NEP.  This  makes  the  time  factor 
important. 
Another  way  to  distinguish  critiques  of  the  market  is  to 
use  a  morality/efficiency  axis. 
19  For  Marx  the  market  was  both 
immoral,  since  it  led  to  alienation  of  humans  from  their 
species-being  (Gattungswesen),  and  inefficient,  since  the 
reserve  army  of  unemployed  and  crises  led  to  massive  resource 
waste,  although  it  may  be  argued  that  this  inefficiency  is 
itself  immoral.  20  However,  in  contrast  to  this  it  is  possible  to 
view  the  Keynesian  critique  and  those  critiques  centred  on 
market  failure  as  being  predominantly  of  the  efficiency  type, 
without  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  moral  dimension.  In  this  thesis 
I  will  attempt  to  demonstrate  what  type(s)  of  critique  of  the 
market  were  prevalent  during  NEP. 
1.6  -  MARX  AND  THE  MARKET 
In  this  section  I  will  examine  Marx's  conception  of  the 
market  and  some  of  his  criticisms  of  it,  as  an  understanding  of 
Marx  is  required  if  later  Marxists  are  to  be  examined.  The 
'place'  meaning  of  the  market  (der  Markt)  is  clearly  present  in 
Marx's  work.  In  the  Grundrisse  of  1857/8  Marx  presents  a 
typology  of  markets  in  which  three  basic  types  of  market  are 
distinguished:  money  markets,  product  markets,  and  raw-material 
markets. 
21  This  can  be  illustrated  as  follows. 
MONEY  MARKETS  PRODUCT  MARKETS  RAW-MATERIAL  MARKETS 
I  I  I  I 
SHARES  GRAIN  FRUIT  FOR  MECHANICAL  INDUSTRY 
BONDS  COLONIAL  PRODUCE  FOR  CHEMICAL  INDUSTRY 
LOANS  PROVISIONS  SPIRITS  METALS  WOOD  ACCESSORIES 
The  idea  of  the  market  as  a  mechanism  for  determining  production 
priorities  is  also  present  in  Marx,  although  he  does  not 
explicitly  use  the  phrase  'market  mechanism'.  Since  Marx  agreed 
that  price  fluctuation  determines  the  flow  of  capital  into 
branches  of  production  -  branches  producing  above-average  profit 
10 receive  an  influx  and  those  below-average  experience  a 
haemorrhage  -  the  question  becomes:  what  determines  price? 
Gouverneur  obtains  the  following  model  of  Marx's  theory  of  price 
determination  from  his  works:  22 
VALUE  -  MONETARY  EXPRESSION  OF  VALUE  -  PRICE  OF  PRODUCTION  -  MARKET  PRICE 
Value  is  the  amount  of  socially-necessary  labour  required  to 
produce  the  product,  and  the  monetary  expression  of  value  is 
this  labour-time  converted  into  money  units.  However,  Marx  notes 
that  actual  prices  do  not  correspond  to  the  monetary  expression 
of  value,  rather  they  correspond  to  cost  of  production  plus 
average  profit.  This  gives  the  price  of  production.  And  when  the 
product  reaches  the  actual  market  where  it  is  sold,  its  price  is 
subject  to  fluctuations  due  to  supply  and  demand,  and  thus  the 
final  price  paid  for  the  product  is  the  market  price. 
However,  while  this  is  a  neat  and  internally  coherent 
model,  it  is  constructed  by  a  third  person,  and  it  is  possible 
to  find  passages  in  Marx  which  contradict  this  interpretation. 
For  example,  in  the  Grundrisse  Marx  writes: 
Supply  and  demand  constantly  determine  the  prices  of 
commodities;  never  balance,  or  only  coincidentally; 
but  the  cost  of  production,  for  its  part,  determines 
the  oscillations  of  supply  and  demand.  23 
Since  according  to  Marx  'cost  of  production'  means  labour-time 
required,  he  seems  to  be  saying  here  that  somehow  labour-time 
determines  supply  and  demand.  However,  in  another  passage  he 
writes  that  'it  is  not  the  cost  of  production,  ie  the  real 
value,  but  the  market  price  which  determines  production'. 
24 
Marx  gives  an  interesting  analysis  of  supply  and  demand  in 
volume  III  of  Capital.  Demand  and  supply  coincide  when  the  mass 
of  commodities  produced  by  a  certain  branch  of  production  can  be 
sold  at  their  market  value.  However: 
If  demand  and  supply  coincide  they  cease  to  have  any 
effect...  If  two  forces  act  in  opposing  directions  and 
cancel  each  other  out,  they  have  no  external  impact 
whatsoever,  and  phenomena  that  appear  under  these 
11 conditions  must  be  explained  otherwise  than  by  the 
operation  of  these  two  forces.  2 
According  to  Marx  the  real  laws  of  capitalist  production  cannot 
be  explained  in  terms  of  the  interaction  of  supply  and  demand, 
since  these  laws  are  realised  in  their  pure  form  only  when  the 
forces  of  supply  and  demand  balance  and  thus  cease  to  have  any 
effect.  Thus  for  Marx  analysing  the  market  in  terms  of  the 
interactions  of  supply  and  demand  was  a  misguided  activity, 
since  the  laws  which  govern  production  for  the  market  are 
revealed  as  they  really  are  only  when  supply  and  demand  balance. 
The  type  of  laws  Marx  has  in  mind  here  are  related  to  concepts 
such  as  the  organic  composition  of  capital  (q  =  c/c  +  v),  the 
rate  of  surplus  value  (s'  =  s/v),  and  the  rate  of  profit  (p  = 
s/c  +  v),  concepts  which  are  absent  from  neo-classical 
economics. 
26  This  shows  that  Marx  viewed  production  for  the 
market  in  totally  different  categories  than  other  economists, 
and  thus  that  simple  comparisons  are  difficult  to  make. 
1.7  -  NEO-CLASSICAL  MARKET  MECHANICS 
In  this  section  I  intend  to  examine  the  neo-classical 
conception  of  the  market  in  more  detail,  to  point  out  some  of 
its  assumptions,  and  to  sketch  how  this  model  evolved  over  time 
particularly  with  reference  to  the  period  which  I  am  focusing 
upon.  The  contemporary  textbook  account  is  roughly  as  follows.  27 
Five  assumptions  are  central  in  getting  the  model  off  the 
ground.  They  are: 
1)  each  participant  has  complete  knowledge  of  market  conditions; 
2)  actions  as  a  result  of  price  changes  are  frictionless; 
3)  no  single  participant  has  the  power  to  affect  the  market 
outcome  in  any  significant  way; 
4)  unrestricted  entry  and  exit; 
5)  homogeneous  products. 
In  the  case  of  a  single  market  for  a  good,  the  supply  and  demand 
curves  are  determined  as  follows.  The  position  of  the  supply 
curve  SS  is  a  function  of  the  price  of  the  product,  the  input- 
output  relationship,  and  factor  prices.  The  slope  of  this  curve 
is  determined  by  the  price  elasticity  of  supply.  The  position  of 
12 the  demand  curve  DD  is  a  function  of  the  price  of  the  good  and 
of  other  goods,  the  income  of  the  purchasers,  and  their  set  of 
subjective  preferences.  The  slope  of  this  curve  will  be 
determined  by  the  price  elasticity  of  demand  of  the  good  in 
question.  The  point  where  the  two  curves  SS  and  DD  cross  is  said 
to  be  the  equilibrium  position  which  determines  both  the  price 
and  the  output  level.  The  market  is  thus  a  self-equilibriating 
mechanism  whereby  any  shifts  in  any  of  the  determining  functions 
of  the  two  curves  SS  and  DD  automatically  results  in  changes  to 
the  equilibrium  position  which  compensate  for  the  shift  and  thus 
return  the  system  to  equilibrium. 
The  above  partial  equilibrium  analysis  shows  how  a  market 
for  one  good  adjusts  in  response  to  certain  changes  in 
determining  functions.  A  general  equilibrium  analysis  shows  how 
all  markets  interconnect  and  adjust  to  shifts  in  any  one 
determining  factor.  However,  one  major  assumption  needs  to  be 
stressed.  General  equilibrium  analysis  shows  how  a  system 
originally  in  equilibrium  responds  to  a  change  in  the  initial 
conditions.  General  equilibrium  analysis  does  not  show  (or  claim 
to  show)  how  such  a  state  of  equilibrium  was  first  achieved.  One 
of  the  results  of  general  equilibrium  analysis  is  to  show  that 
given  the  assumptions  outlined  such  a  model  will  achieve  a 
Pareto-optimal  position  where  all  markets  clear. 
Assuming  a  perfectly  competitive  two  homogeneous  good 
economy  (staples  and  luxuries)  with  two  factors  of  production  - 
labour  and  capital  -  and  two  income  groups  -  capitalists  and 
labourers  -  such  an  analysis  would  go  as  follows.  Assume  that 
consumers'  preference  shifts  away  from  staples  and  towards 
luxuries,  ie  the  curve  DDa  shifts  to  D'D'a  and  curve  DDb  to 
D'D'b.  Assuming  that  profit  maximisation  occurs  when  marginal 
cost  equals  marginal  revenue  (price),  and  that  production  of 
luxuries  is  more  capital  intensive  than  staples,  the  price  of 
staples  would  fall  and  that  of  luxuries  would  rise.  This  in  turn 
would  increase  the  demand  for  capital  (moving  DDd  to  D'D'd)  and 
decrease  the  demand  for  labour  (moving  DDc  to  D'D'c),  producing 
a  shift  in  income  from  labourers  to  capitalists.  Given  this  new 
income  structure,  consumers  will  re-allocate  their  expenditure 
and  thus  further  shift  their  demand  curves. 
13 Given  perfectly  mobile  factors  of  production,  in  the  long 
run  the  supply  curve  of  staples  would  shift  to  the  left  and 
those  of  luxuries  to  the  right,  bringing  prices  back  towards 
their  original  level.  Changing  the  price  structure  in  this  way 
could  also  have  effects  on  other  goods,  depending  on  the 
relevant  cross  elasticities  of  demand.  Other  repercussions  are 
also  likely,  but  the  general  idea  is  clear.  General  equilibrium 
analysis  shows  how  higher-order  repercussions  from  changes  in 
initial  conditions  spread  through  the  economy,  and  in  this  sense 
the  market  is  a  system  whereby  shifts  in  initial  conditions 
which  have  multi-level  repercussions  are  transmitted  from  sector 
to  sector  and  from  market  to  market  in  a  spontaneous  manner. 
However,  it  is  an  assumption  that  such  movement  will  be 
towards  equilibrium,  not  away  from  it.  Cobweb  theory  shows  that 
the  market  price  of  a  good  would  not  converge  to  an  equilibrium 
position  if  its  price  elasticity  of  demand  was  smaller  than  the 
corresponding  price  elasticity  of  supply,  given  all  the 
assumptions  presented  so  far.  In  this  case  the  price  would  move 
away  from  equilibrium.  In  general  it  is  clear  that  these  neo- 
classical  models  of  the  market  depend  on  some  highly  restrictive 
assumptions  which,  although  theoretically  useful  and  elegant, 
are  not  always  realistic.  Even  so  this  model  is  very  powerful 
and  it  has  received  the  greatest  amount  of  elaboration  of  all 
the  various  conceptions  which  have  so  far  been  proposed. 
How  did  this  model  evolve?  This  is  obviously  a  very  complex 
question,  but  some  general  points  will  be  noted  here.  In  the 
last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  Walras,  Menger,  Jevons 
and  Gossen  each  independently  provided  the  general  outlines  of 
this  approach,  with  Walras's  work  often  praised  as  the  most 
mathematically  rigourous.  If  Marshall  stressed  the  partial 
equilibrium  method,  Walras  pioneered  the  general  equilibrium 
approach.  Some  of  the  marginalist  revolution  was  explicitly 
directed  against  the  Marxist  version  of  the  labour  theory  of 
value,  for  example  Bohm-Bawerk,  although  some  of  the  pioneers 
(eg  Walras)  had  socialist  sympathies.  By  the  1920s  the  neo- 
classical  model  had  become  firmly  established  in  Western 
economic  theory  as  the  most  important  and  fruitful  paradigm, 
although  problems  with  it  were  recognised. 
14 1.8  -  MARXIST  DEBATES  ON  'THE  MARKET' 
While  Marshall,  Walras,  Jevons  et.  al.  were  developing  the 
neo-classical  understanding  of  market  mechanics  summarised 
above,  in  Marxist  literature  debate  on  'the  market'  took  a  very 
different  form.  Lenin  wrote  an  article  entitled  'On  the  So- 
Called  Market  Question'  in  1893  in  which  the  question  of  the 
requirements  of  capitalism  for  development  in  terms  of  markets 
was  the  main  topic.  Here  'the  market  question'  meant  the  degree 
to  which  capitalism  could  develop  in  a  non-capitalist  country 
such  as  Russia,  and  the  degree  to  which  this  development  would 
negate  itself  by  destroying  the  very  markets  which  it  required 
to  develop.  28  In  this  work  Lenin  writes: 
...  the  concept  "market"  is  quite  inseparable  from  the 
concept  of  the  social  division  of  labour. 
.  .  The 
"market"  arises  where  and  to  the  extent  that  the 
social  division  of  labour  and  commodity  production 
appear..  .  the  limits  of  the  development  of  the  market 
in  capitalist  society  are  set  by  the  limits  of  the 
specialisation  of  social  labour.  29 
M.  I.  Tugan-Baranovskii  entered  this  debate  with  an  article 
entitled  'Kapitalizm"  i  rynok"'  published  in  Mir  bozhii  in  1898, 
which  was  a  response  to  a  book  by  S.  Bulgakov  entitled  0 
rynkakh"  pri  kapitalisticheskom"  proizvodstve  of  1897.  Tugan- 
Baranovskii  relates  that  some  authors  argued  that  capitalism  did 
not  have  a  future  in  Russia  because  it  demanded  foreign  markets 
for  development,  but  these  were  closed  to  inferior  Russian 
products.  Tugan-Baranovskii  argues  against  this  view,  rather  he 
believes  that  production  itself  creates  its  own  markets  and 
hence  that  additional  markets  are  not  required,  as  long  as 
proportional  distribution  of  new  capital  between  branches  of 
production  is  observed  and  as  long  as  domestic  purchasing  power 
is  not  spent  overseas. 
30  In  his  Promyshlennye  krizisy  v 
sovremennoi  Anglii  of  1894  Tugan-Baranovskii  divides  economists 
into  two  schools  as  far  as  their  understanding  of  markets  is 
concerned.  Say,  Ricardo,  and  Mill  thought  that  general 
overproduction  was  not  possible,  whereas  Malthus,  Sismondi,  and 
Moffat  believed  it  was. 
31 
15 Rosa  Luxemburg  joined  this  debate  in  1913  with  The 
Accumulation  of  Capital,  which  examined  the  work  of  V.  P. 
Vorontsov,  Nikolay-on,  Bulgakov,  Tugan-Baranovskii,  and  others 
on  this  question.  Luxemburg  criticises  Tugan-Baranovskii  for 
slavishly  copying  Marx's  scheme  of  expanded  reproduction,  and 
implicitly  for  assuming  a  version  of  Say's  law  of  markets. 
32 
Luxemburg  argued  against  Marx  that  a  closed  capitalist  economy 
will  break  down  through  its  inability  to  absorb  the  totality  of 
surplus  value  which  it  produces.  The  point  of  this  section  is 
not  to  rehearse  these  debates  in  detail,  but  to  point  out  that 
the  phrase  'the  market'  had  very  different  connotations  for 
Marxists  at  this  time  than  it  did  for  'bourgeois'  economists. 
The  market  was  a  place  where  capitalism  realised  its  products, 
not  a  mechanism  for  ensuring  efficient  production.  During  NEP, 
however,  this  latter  conception  became  more  widespread  in  the 
0  USSR  and  the  former  declined  in  usage,  as  we  shall  see  below.  33 
1.9  -  INSTITUTIONS 
One  way  to  approach  the  study  of  economic  theory  during  NEP 
is  to  locate  it  within  the  prevailing  institutional  and 
theoretical  discussion  structures  which  existed  at  this  time. 
Some  of  the  major  economic  organs  which  existed  during  NEP  were: 
Gosplan,  the  state  planning  agency;  Narkomfin,  the  People's 
Commissariat  of  Finance;  VSNKh,  the  Supreme  Council  of  the 
National  Economy;  STO,  the  Council  of  Labour  and  Defence;  TsSU, 
the  Central  Statistical  Administration;  and  Narkomzem,  the 
People's  Commissariat  of  Land.  The  development  of  NEP  can  thus 
be  seen  as  the  evolving  supremacy  of  certain  organs  above 
others.  From  those  listed  above  this  can  be  seen  most  clearly  in 
the  case  of  the  development  of  Gosplan  and  VSNKh  at  the  expense 
of  Narkomfin  and  the  TsSU. 
Each  organ  had  its  own  propaganda  arm  in  the  form  of  a 
journal.  The  journal  of  Gosplan  was  Planovoe  khozyaistvo,  that 
of  the  TsSU  Vestnik  statistiki,  that  of  VSNKh  Sotsialisticheskoe 
khozyaistvo  (until  1927),  that  of  Narkomfin  Vestnik  finansov, 
and  that  of  Narkomzem  Puti  sel'skogo  khozyaistvo.  Since 
Kondrat'ev's  Conjuncture  Institute  was  part  of  Narkomfin,  its 
16 journals  such  as  the  Ekonomichesky  byulleten'  Kon'yunkturnogo 
instituta  can  be  regarded  as  being  under  the  Narkomfin  wing. 
Other  important  journals  of  this  period  also  had  a  particular 
factional  slant.  The  Bukharinist  group  dominated  Bolshevik, 
Preobrazhenskii  and  the  left  held  Vestnik  kommunisticheskoi 
akademii,  while  Groman  and  Bazarov  held  sway  over  Ekonomicheskoe 
obozrenie  even  though  it  was  a  Gosplan  publication.  A  great  many 
of  the  theoretical  disputes  which  raged  in  the  1920s  were  fought 
in  the  pages  of  these  journals,  and  in  this  thesis  I  shall  often 
refer  to  them. 
The  president  of  Gosplan  between  1921  and  1930  was 
Krzhizhanovskii,  although  Strumilin  also  played  a  major  role,  as 
did  Groman  and  Bazarov  up  until  towards  the  end  of  the  1920s. 
Kuibyshev  was  president  of  VSNKh.  Sokol'nikov  was  People's 
Commissar  for  Finance  between  1921-1926,  although  he  was 
replaced  by  Bryukhanov  for  the  latter  part  of  the  decade. 
Yurovskii  was  head  of  the  currency  section  of  Narkomfin,  and 
Kondrat'ev  played  a  major  role  through  his  Conjuncture 
Institute.  To  a  certain  extent  all  three  of  these  institutions 
were  involved  in  the  process  of  drafting  plans,  often  supporting 
opposing  methodologies  and  versions. 
Carr  &  Davies  note  the  conflict  which  existed  between 
Gosplan  and  VSNKh  on  the  one  hand,  and  Narkomfin  on  the  other. 
This  conflict  developed  during  the  latter  part  of  the  1920s,  and 
the  Second  Congress  of  Gosplan  in  March  1927  provided  the 
occasion  for  an  airing  of  this  conflict. 
34  Strumilin,  as  a 
representative  of  Gosplan,  made  a  report  which  was  attacked  by 
representatives  of  Narkomfin  and  Narkomzem  -  Kondrat'ev  and 
Makarov.  Kondrat'ev  published  his  criticisms  as  articles  in  Puti 
sel'skogo  khozyaistvo  and  Planovoe  khozyaistvo,  the  latter 
journal  still  allowing  some  degree  of  disagreement  to  be 
publically  aired  at  this  time.  In  September  1927  the  opposition 
platform  attacked  the  second  Gosplan  draft  plan  as  pessimistic, 
and  thus  the  planners  where  under  attack  from  both  sides. 
35  This 
climate  of  conflict  led  to  increasing  growth  rates  being  assumed 
in  the  third  Gosplan  draft,  supported  by  VSNKh,  and  in  1928 
Kondrat'ev  and  associates  were  ejected  from  the  Conjuncture 
Institute  of  Narkomfin.  A  campaign  against  the  'ideology  of  the 
17 new  bourgeoisie'  was  instituted,  and  Groman  and  Bazarov,  who  had 
both  been  part  of  Gosplan,  were  linked  to  Kondrat'ev  and  so 
pushed  out  of  official  favour. 
Until  1925  the  budget  had  been  the  basis  for  the  plan,  but 
within  three  years  the  subordination  of  the  budget  to  the  plan 
was  well  advanced. 
36  Narkomfin  argued  that  the  budget  revealed 
planning  possibilities,  but  Gosplan  responded  that  possibilities 
create  the  budget.  The  budgetary  powers  of  Narkomfin  were 
weakened  in  1926  by  changes  in  the  auditing  system,  and  its 
control  of  the  economy  through  the  budget  gradually  ebbed  away 
as  the  decade  progressed.  37  The  subordination  of  the  financial 
system  to  the  emerging  system  of  national  economic  planning 
required  the  weakening  and  final  defeat  of  the  financial  budget 
and  Narkomfin.  Thus  another  way  to  see  the  conflict  which  took 
place  in  the  1920s  is  through  the  relative  positions  of  the 
financial  budget  and  the  economic  plan. 
Another  conflict  occurred  between  Gosplan  and  the  TsSU  over 
the  role  of  the  national  economic  balance  in  the  planning 
process.  The  TsSU,  through  Popov,  argued  that  an  ex  post  balance 
was  a  prerequisite  for  coordinated  planning,  which  should  be 
delayed  until  after  a  satisfactory  balance  had  been  prepared. 
Gosplan  proposed  to  proceed  to  prepare  a  coordinated  national 
plan  before  the  balance  was  available. 
38  In  January  1926  Popov 
resigned  from  the  TsSU,  and  at  the  end  of  1929  the  TsSU  was 
transformed  from  a  separate  government  department  into  the 
statistical  sector  of  Gosplan.  39  Gasplan  thus  ousted  both  the 
TsSU  and  Narkomfin,  a  process  which  signified  the  triumph  of  the 
fantastical  over  the  statistical. 
1.10  -  NEP  AND  COMMERCIAL  LAW 
The  question  of  the  nature  of  commercial  law  during  the  NEP 
period  is  obviously  relevant  to  an  understanding  of  the  types  of 
private  enterprise  which  developed  during  this  period,  but  may 
also  reveal  something  about  how  those  who  drafted  the  laws 
conceived  of  private  enterprise  and  market  forms  of  economy.  In 
this  section  I  examine  a  book  written  by  Kantorovich  entitled 
18 Chastnaya  torgovl  ya  i  promyshl  ennost  'v  SSSR  -  po 
deist  vuyushchemu  zakondatel  'stvu  published  in  1925. 
This  work  by  Kantorovich  has  the  stated  aim  of  gathering 
together  legislative  and  administrative  material  relating  to 
private  trade  and  industry  for  practical  purposes  and  to  present 
this  material  in  a  systematic  manner.  40  Thus  it  was  for  use  by 
those  involved  with  private  business  at  this  time.  It  begins  by 
noting  that  in  a  decree  layed  down  by  VTsIK  (Vserossiiskii 
Tsentral'nyi  Ispolnitel'nyi  Komitet)  on  22  May  1921  concerning 
the  basis  of  private  property  law  of  the  RSFSR,  the  following 
statement  is  found:  it  is  necessary  that  property  rights 
(imushchestvennykh  pray)  for  citizens  of  the  RSFSR  and  for 
foreigners  exist  in  order  to  establish  clear  relations  between 
state  organs  and  ob"edineniya,  and  private  individuals 
(litsa).  41  Kantorovich  thus  notes  that  in  principle  there  exists 
the  possibility  of  private  initiative  and  private  use  of  capital 
in  the  USSR,  although  in  reality  with  such  a  wide  development  of 
state  industry,  development  of  private  industry  is  exceedingly 
difficult.  42 
Laws  established  on  9  March  1923  by  SNK  decreed  the 
creation  of  committees  of  market  traders  (komitety  rynochnykh 
torgovtsev)  with  the  aim  of  regulating  trade  on  markets. 
Registration  is  obligatory  for  all  enterprises,  and  those  which 
evade  registration  do  not  have  the  right  to  trade  on  markets. 
43 
The  tasks  of  such  committees  include: 
a)  establishing  rules  for  trading  on  markets; 
b)  arranging  special  agreements  for  comfortable  and  sanitary 
market  areas; 
c)  influencing  the  actions  of  the  organs  of  administrative 
power,  such  as  taxation  policy; 
d)  presentation  of  statistical  data  concerned  with  market 
trade.  44 
Trading  institutions  such  as  commodity  markets  are  dealt  with  by 
a  decree  of  STO  dated  23  August  1923.  State,  cooperative,  and 
private  enterprises  are  allowed  to  participate  in  commodity 
markets  (birzhi),  and  the  significance  of  such  institutions  is 
to  reveal  the  relation  between  supply  and  demand.  45  Local  organs 
for  the  regulation  of  trade  include  Local  Economic  Conferences 
19 (EKOSO),  the  local  organs  of  Komvnutorg,  Gubfinotdely, 
Gubsovnarkhozy,  and  the  militia.  46 
According  to  a  decree  of  Sovnarkom  dated  20  October  1922 
the  STO  together  with  Narkomfin  are  to  organise  stock  exchanges 
(fondovie  birzh)  for  trading  foreign  currency,  banknotes,  state 
paper,  shares,  and  precious  metals.  47  With  the  existence  of  such 
markets  come  market  brokers  (birzhevie  maklera),  the  activities 
of  which  are  defined  by  a  decree  of  Komvnutorg  on  16  February 
1923.  In  these  instructions  the  maximum  brokerage  fee  is  fixed 
by  the  Market  committees,  and  the  broker  does  not  have  the  right 
to  carry  out  trading  operations  under  another  name.  48  The  lease 
of  state  enterprises  is  governed  by  local  Sovnarkhozy,  but  this 
control  has  the  character  of  observation  only,  and  does  not  give 
the  right  to  interrupt  normal  work  unless  illegal  operations  are 
suspected. 
49  Leasing  of  private  property  from  one  person  or 
organisation  to  another  is  also  allowed,  and  in  such  cases  forms 
of  payment  can  legitimately  range  through  money,  services,  a 
portion  of  the  product,  and  other  forms  of  payment. 
50 
The  rules  governing  joint-stock  companies  (aktsionernye 
obshchestva)  are  outlined  by  Kantorovich  as  follows.  They  must 
establish  a  constitution  in  which  is  specified  the  amount  of 
basic  capital  and  how  it  is  divided  into  a  definite  number  of 
parts  (shares).  This  constitution  must  be  signed  by  not  less 
than  five  constituents,  and  must  also  show  the  aims  and 
operations  of  the  society,  the  organs  of  management  of  the 
society,  and  the  voting  rights  of  shareholders  (civil  code 
324).  51  If  three  months  after  the  publication  of  the 
constitution  less  than  one  quarter  of  basic  capital  has  been 
gathered,  then  the  society  is  declared  insolvent  (civil  code 
327).  52  Each  joint-stock  society  must  hold  two  general  meetings 
of  stockholders  in  a  year  -a  preliminary  and  a  constituent 
meeting  (civil  code  332).  Decisions  relating  to  changing  the 
constitution,  increasing  or  decreasing  share  capital,  the  issue 
of  bonds,  or  company  liquidation  can  only  be  taken  on  a  majority 
of  two-thirds  of  voters,  and  changes  in  the  aims  of  the  society 
by  four-fifths  majority  (civil  code  353).  53  The  basic  capital  of 
such  a  society  cannot  be  lower  than  100,000  gold  rubles,  and  the 
nominal  share  price  cannot  be  lower  than  100  gold  rubles. 
54  When 
20 shares  are  issued  information  as  to  the  quantity  being  issued, 
the  price,  and  the  valuation  of  company  property  must  be  given. 
The  Committee  for  Concessions  and  Joint-stock  companies  has 
the  right,  if  deemed  necessary,  to  carry  out  an  investigation 
into  the  activities  of  the  company  in  question,  checking  the 
inventory  and  the  valuations  given.  55  Every  share  in  such  a 
company  gives  the  owner  the  right  to  participate  in  general 
assemblies  and  the  right  to  a  vote,  as  well  as  the  right  to 
receive  dividends.  Joint-stock  companies  must  publish  accounts 
and  balances  according  to  their  constitutions,  and  they  have  the 
right  to  issue  bonds  (obligatsii).  Liquidation  of  such  companies 
should  be  referred  to  the  liquidations  committee,  and 
distribution  of  the  funds  obtained  from  liquidation  cannot 
proceed  to  shareholders  until  the  demands  of  creditors  have  been 
satisfied. 
56 
In  general  it  can  be  noted  that  such  a  legal  framework  for 
the  operation  of  private  companies  does  not  differ  greatly  from 
the  type  of  legal  code  adopted  in  'capitalist'  countries. 
However,  Owen  notes  that  while  corporations  were  allowed  to 
exist  during  NEP  by  decree  of  10  April  1923,  there  were  certain 
financial  limits  and,  as  under  the  Tsar,  special  permission  was 
required  for  the  creation  of  new  corporations. 
57  He  also  notes 
that  permission  of  the  STO  was  required  if  joint-stock  companies 
with  capitalisation  greater  than  one  million  rubles  were  to  be 
created,  and  that  VSNKh  held  discretionary  power  to  authorise 
syndicates  and  other  types  of  combinations.  In  general  Owen 
concludes  that  there  was  a  strong  element  of  continuity  in  state 
policy  towards  private  enterprises  in  both  Tsarist  and  NEP 
times. 
It  is  also  clearly  questionable  how  far  the  NEP  commercial 
code  was  implemented  in  practice,  and  how  far  those  wishing  to 
embark  on  such  activities  could  trust  the  state  authorities  to 
follow  their  code  or  not  to  change  it  to  allow  greater  state 
control.  Such  a  code  would  evidently  be  ambiguous  at  a  time  when 
state  organs  like  Gosplan  were  creating  plans  to  control  the 
economy  centrally  and  through  planning  decrees.  Although  the 
legal  framework  for  private  companies  may  have  existed  to  some 
degree  in  NEP,  the  trust  which  entrepreneurs  felt  they  could 
21 have  in  this  code  may  have  been  rather  small.  It  is  not 
surprising  then  that  attempts  to  encourage  private  companies, 
for  example  the  foreign  concessions  policy,  were  regarded  as 
somewhat  of  a  failure. 
It  is  worth  stressing  that  although  NEP  legislation  allowed 
greater  state  control  over  commercial  activity,  the  detail  of 
the  law  is  remarkably  similar  to  non-Soviet  commercial  law.  it 
is  clear  from  this  that  the  conceptions  of  the  market  and  of 
private  economic  activity  in  terms  of  technical  content  (not  of 
normative  evaluation)  embodied  within  this  legislation  is 
identical  with  conventional  non-Marxist  notions. 
In  a  collection  of  legal  codes  called  Novoe 
zakonodatel  'stvo  v  oblast  promyshlennosti  i  torgovli  published 
by  the  juridical  section  of  VSNKh  in  1922  there  is  a  code 
entitled  'Polozhenie  o  komitite  tsen'  adopted  on  5  August  1921. 
This  code  sets  out  the  rules  and  functions  of  Price  Committees 
as  follows.  Price  Committees  are  the  highest  inter-departmental 
organs  for  establishing  prices,  and  are  charged  with  the 
following  functions: 
a)  to  establish  wholesale,  and  in  some  cases  retail  prices  of 
all  goods  issued  by  state  institutions  and  enterprises; 
b)  to  establish  limits  on  extra  charges  of  monopoly  goods; 
c)  to  establish  fixed  purchase  prices  for  state  procurement. 
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The  decree  also  states  that  the  Price  Committee  should 
periodically  review  prices  and  introduce  changes  evoked  either 
by  changes  in  the  purchasing  power  of  money  or  by  changes  in  the 
conditions  of  production  and  in  market  conjuncture.  The 
decisions  of  the  Price  Committee  can  be  appealed  against  by  the 
People's  Commissariats,  and  it  is  composed  by  the  People's 
Commissariat  of  Finance  of  representatives  of  VSNKh,  TsSU,  STO, 
Foreign  Trade  organs,  and  VTsSPS. 
This  decree  shows  that  markets  were  free  during  NEP  only  to 
a  limited  extent.  However,  a  passage  following  the  above  decree 
notes  that  in  a  separate  decree  of  27  October  1921  the 
realisation  of  products  is  permitted  at  market  prices. 
59  Thus 
there  is  a  contradiction  between  decrees,  and  it  may  have  been 
the  case  that  the  decree  outlined  above  was  not  followed  in  all 
cases  and  at  all  times.  Even  so,  it  shows  that  the  key  variable 
22 which  free  markets  depend  upon  was  being  regulated  right  from 
the  start  of  NEP  by  state  organs  created  especially  for  this 
purpose. 
1.11  -  CONCLUSION 
I  will  conclude  the  theoretical  introduction  by  repeating 
the  basic  aims  of  this  thesis  and  the  theoretical  elements  which 
are  to  be  traced.  In  what  follows  I  examine  how  each  theorist 
conceived  of  the  market  and  of  market  economics,  and  how  they 
thought  this  related  to  socialism.  To  do  this  I  focus  on  both 
normative  and  technical  conceptions  of  the  market,  and 
differentiate  between  internal  and  external  critiques  of  it.  I 
also  analyse  how  each  theorist  thought  that  markets  could  fit 
into  an  economic  system  by  employing  a  sliding  scale  of  systems 
from  central  command  to  full  market.  In  other  parts  of  this 
introduction  I  have  given  background  information  in  terms  of  how 
ideas  of  the  market  developed  before  the  1920s,  and  also  have 
sketched  a  little  of  the  institutional  and  commercial  structure 
of  the  NEP  economy. 
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26 CHAPTER  TWO  -  BUKHARIN  AND  THE  BUKHARINITES 
2.1  -  INTRODUCTION 
Nikolai  Ivanovich  Bukharin  (1888-1938)  joined  the  Bolshevik 
party  in  1906.  After  being  arrested  in  Moscow  in  1911  he  escaped 
abroad  and  settled  in  Vienna,  where  he  studied  the  Austrian 
school  of  economists  and  wrote  a  critique  of  them  analysed 
below.  Bukharin  returned  to  Moscow  in  May  1917  and  was  elected 
to  the  party's  Central  Committee  three  months  before  the  October 
revolution.  He  edited  Pravda  from  December  1917  to  April  1929. 
In  1918  Bukharin  placed  himself  on  the  left  of  the  party  over 
Brest-Litovsk,  but  after  1921  he  changed  his  position  noticably 
and  became  a  leading  figure  on  the  right.  In  1937  he  was 
expelled  from  the  party  and  a  year  later  he  was  sentenced  to 
death  for  treason. 
Bukharin's  full-length  study  of  'bourgeois'  economic  theory 
entitled  Politicheskaya  ekonomiya  rant'e  was  completed  in  1914. 
This  work  is  of  great  interest  because  it  shows  how  a  Marxist 
untouched  by  experiences  of  controlling  a  state  perceived  the 
theory  in  question.  In  his  introduction  to  this  work  Bukharin 
writes  that  as  research  for  this  book  he  attended  lectures  by 
Eugen  von  Bohm-Bawerk  at  the  University  of  Vienna,  studied  the 
literature  of  the  Austrian  and  the  Lausanne  schools,  made  an 
exhaustive  study  of  the  Anglo-American  economists,  and  traced 
the  theory  of  marginal  utility  to  its  roots.  Although  Bukharin 
had  studied  many  economists  during  this  research  he  chose  as  his 
primary  opponent  Bohm-Bawerk,  the  reasons  for  which  he  does  not 
explicitly  elucidate,  although  he  does  say  that  'it  is  well 
known  that  the  most  powerful  opponent  of  Marxism  is  the  Austrian 
school'.  1  Since  Bohm-Bawerk  is  the  key  'bougeois'  economist 
which  Bukharin  tackles  it  is  worth  exploring  his  work  before 
exploration  of  Bukharin's  critique  begins. 
2.2  -  BOHM-BAWERK'S  VIEW  OF  THE  MARKET 
One  of  Bohm-Bawerk's  major  works  was  entitled  The  Positive 
Theory  of  Capital  and  was  published  in  1891.  Using  the 
27 relatively  new  marginal  utility  doctrine  he  claimed  to 
demonstrate  'how  prices  are  determined  under  the  assumption  that 
exchange  takes  place  exclusively  from  the  motive  of  pursuing 
immediate  economic  advantage'. 
2  One  of  the  main  features  of  this 
work  was  the  method  of  market  price  determination  which  it 
utilized,  and  Bohm-Bawerk's  approach  directly  contradicted 
Marx's  version  of  the  labour-time  theory. 
Bohm-Bawerk  gave  a  number  of  different  cases  of  price 
formation.  In  isolated  exchange  price  is  determined  somewhere 
between  the  subjective  valuation  of  the  commodity  by  the  buyer 
as  upper  limit  and  the  subjective  valuation  by  the  seller  as  the 
lower  limit.  3  In  two-sided  competition  the  market  price  is 
determined  within  a  latitude  of  which  the  upper  limit  is 
constituted  by  the  valuation  of  the  last  buyer  who  actually 
exchanges  (the  last  buyer)  and  that  of  the  most  capable  seller 
excluded  (the  first  excluded  seller),  and  the  lower  limit  by  the 
valuation  of  the  least  capable  seller  who  actually  effects  a 
sale  (the  last  seller)  and  that  of  the  most  capable  buyer 
excluded  (the  first  excluded  buyer).  4  Bohm-Bawerk  summed  this  up 
in  his  Law  of  Price:  the  market  price  is  limited  and  determined 
by  the  subjective  valuations  of  the  two  marginal  pairs.  He  also 
remarks  that  the  'law  of  supply  and  demand'  is  a  looser 
formulation  of  the  Law  of  Price,  since  the  Law  of  Price  results 
in  the  quantitative  balance  of  supply  and  demand.  The  example 
Bohm-Bawerk  gives  is  as  follows: 
BUYERS  SELLERS 
Al  values  at  £30  B1  values  at  £10 
A2  values  at  £28  B2  values  at  £11 
A3  values  at  £26  B3  values  at  £15 
A4  values  at  £24  B4  values  at  £17 
A5  values  at  £22  B5  values  at  £20 
A6  values  at  £21  B6  values  at  £21.10s 
A7  values  at  £20  B7  values  at  £25 
A8  values  at  £18  B8  values  at  £26 
A9  values  at  £17 
A10  values  at  £15 
The  degree  of  capacity  for  exchange  is  given  from  Al  to  A5  and 
from  B1  to  B5.  In  this  example  the  market  price  would  be 
determined  within  the  upper  limit  A5/B6,  and  the  lower  limit 
B5/A6.  Since  in  every  case  it  is  the  narrower  limit  that 
28 decides,  the  market  price  would  be  between  £21  and  £21.10s.  5 
However,  Bohm-Bawerk  is  'perfectly  aware  that  in  practical  life 
this  law  does  not  exactly  obtain',  since  other  motives  appart 
from  pure  economic  advantage,  eg  custom,  vanity,  intervention 
etc,  may  also  be  involved.  6  He  is  also  aware  that  this  type  of 
price  determination  may  not  be  that  common.  Fixed  prices  -  ie 
where  'trying  the  market'  is  dispensed  with  and  sellers 
undertake  to  hit  the  equilibrium  price  at  one  throw  -  are  common 
in  shops.? 
2.3  -  BUKHARIN'S  CRITIQUE  OF  BOHM-BAWERK 
In  his  Pol  i  ti  cheskaya  ekonomiya  rant  'e  Bukharin  examines 
Bohm-Bawerk's  account  of  price  formation  given  above,  and 
contrasts  it  to  Marx's  theory  of  price  formation.  Bukharin 
writes  that,  in  contradistinction  to  Bohm-Bawerk,  'Marx's  theory 
of  value  is  objective,  ie  Marx's  theory  is  a  social  law  of 
prices'.  8  Thus  according  to  Bukharin  Marx's  theory  of  value  is 
supposed  to  be  a  theory  of  price  formation.  It  is  worth  noting 
also  that  for  Bukharin  a  theoretical  law  of  political  economy  is 
a  causal  relation,  for  example  if  A,  B  and  C,  then  D.  9 
Bukharin's  main  criticism  of  Bohm-Bawerk's  account  of  price 
formation  is  that  it  involves  circular  reasoning.  Bohm-Bawerk 
argues  that  buyers  and  sellers  subjectively  form  prices  which 
they  believe  a  commodity  is  worth,  and  then  the  resultant  of 
their  subjective  valuations,  based  on  marginal  pair  evaluations, 
forms  the  price.  Bukharin  asks:  where  do  these  price  evaluations 
come  from?  What  determines  them?  In  fact,  Bukharin  claims,  they 
come  from  prices  of  commodities  already  given  on  the  market,  and 
thus  Bohm-Bawerk's  theory  employs  circular  reasoning  and  fails 
to  explain  price.  A  buyer  evaluates  a  commodity  x  to  be  worth 
£10  because  he  saw  a  similar  item  for  sale  two  weeks  ago  for 
£10.50,  and  thus  all  that  Bohm-Bawerk's  theory  shows  is  that 
price  is  determined  by  price  -a  vacuous  tautology.  Bukharin 
calls  Bohm-Bawerk's  theory  of  price  formation  -  haggling  between 
upper  and  lower  limits  -  an  amplified  formulation  of  the  old  law 
of  supply  and  demand.  10  This  is  worth  keeping  in  mind  when  the 
debates  of  the  1920s  are  examined  and  the  phrase  'law  of  supply 
29 and  demand'  is  used.  At  least  in  Bukharin's  case  it  can  safely 
be  said  that  Bohm-Bawerk's  exposition  is  a  good  account  of  what 
Bukharin  meant  by  it.  11 
In  this  work  it  is  clear  that  Bukharin  is  concerned  mainly 
to  refute  the  subjective  theory  of  value,  and  less  with  what  he 
calls  the  'formal  aspect'  of  the  mechanism  of  competition,  ie 
marginal  pair  determination.  12  In  fact  Bukharin's  argument 
against  Bohm-Bawerk's  marginal  pair  model  is  that  it  is  based 
upon  an  untenable  theory  of  value,  not  that  its  internal 
mechanics  are  false.  Bukharin  writes  that  Bohm-Bawerk  presents 
six  factors  determining  the  level  of  prices  in  accordance  with 
the  marginal  pair  model.  They  are: 
1)  the  number  of  specific  demands  for  the  commodity; 
2)  the  absolute  magnitude  of  the  subjective  value  of  the 
commodity  for  the  prospective  purchaser; 
3)  the  absolute  magnitude  of  the  subjective  value  of  the  price 
money  (sic)  for  the  prospective  purchaser; 
4)  the  number  of  specimens  of  the  commodity  available; 
5)  the  absolute  magnitude  of  the  subjective  value  of  the 
commodity  for  the  seller; 
6)  the  absolute  magnitude  of  the  subjective  value  of  the 
purchase  money  for  the  seller.  13 
In  all  six  cases  Bukharin's  argument  is  that  Bohm-Bawerk  is 
involved  with  'a  vicious  circle,  a  continuous  logical  fallacy', 
which  demonstrates  the  'complete  barrenness  of  modern  bourgeois 
theory'.  14  Bukharin  does  not  offer  any  other  type  of  criticism 
in  respect  to  this  particular  model. 
Although  Bukharin  is  perhaps  best  known  as  an  economist,  he 
does  not  offer  any  alternative  model  of  price  formation  which  is 
presented  in  any  detail.  In  Politicheskaya  ekonomiya  rant'e  he 
is  concerned  with  refuting  the  Austrian  school,  not  with 
presenting  his  own  model.  That  Bukharin  believed  the  labour 
theory  of  value  correctly  explained  prices  is  shown  by  the 
following  passage: 
It  is  an  empirical  observation  constituting  the  basis 
of  the  labour  value  theory,  that  rices  fall  as  the 
productivity  of  labour  increases. 
'5 
30 Unfortunately  Bukharin  does  not  expand  on  this  proposition 
either  theoretically  or  empirically,  but  it  shows  that  he 
believed  that  the  labour  value  theory  must  satisfactorily 
explain  market  prices,  or  fail  in  its  task  as  the  basis  of 
political  economy. 
Bukharin's  Teoriya  istoricheskogo  materializma:  populyarnyi 
uchebnik  marksistskoi  sotsiologii  first  appeared  in  print  in 
December  1921.16  Thus  it  was  written  just  after  the  introduction 
of  NEP.  As  in  the  earlier  Politicheskaya  ekonomiya  rant'e 
Bukharin  in  this  later  work  is  concerned  to  propose  causal 
explanations  of  phenomena.  According  to  him  a  law  of  cause  and 
effect  is  a  'necessary,  inevitable,  invariable,  and  universal 
relation  between  phenomena'. 
17  In  a  chapter  entitled 
'determinism  and  indeterminism'  (where  Bukharin  clearly  supports 
the  former)  he  presents  social  phenomena  as  being  the  resultant 
of  individual  phenomena. 
18  An  example  he  uses  is  that  of  price. 
Buyers  and  sellers  go  to  market: 
Each  of  the  sellers  and  buyers  is  aiming  at  a  certain 
object:  each  of  them  makes  a  certain  estimate  of 
goods  and  money,  ponders,  calculates,  scratches  and 
bites.  The  result  of  all  this  commotion  in  the  market 
is  the  market  price.  This  price  may  not  represent  the 
idea  of  any  individual  buyer  or  seller;  it  is  a 
social  phenomenon  arising  as  a  result  of  the  struggle 
of  various  wills. 
19 
This  formulation  seems  very  close  to  Bohm-Bawerk's  model  where 
market  price  is  a  resultant  of  the  subjective  valuations  of  the 
buyers  and  sellers  involved.  Bukharin  even  goes  so  far  as  to 
propose  the  vicious  circle  which  he  was  so  critical  of  in  1914. 
Assume  that  a  pound  of  carrots  costs  so  much  on  the  market: 
It  is  obvious  that  both  the  new  purchasers  and  the 
new  sellers  already  have  had  this  price  in  mind  in 
advance,  that  they  have  already  been  approximately 
assuming  this  price  in  their  reckonings... 
20 
Thus  a  social  phenomenon  -  price  -  has  a  determining  influence 
on  the  individual  phenomena  -  offers  and  demands.  There  is  no 
bitter  polemical  tone  when  Bukharin  proposes  this  idea  as  there 
was  in  1914.  Bukharin  seems  to  be  taking  a  solution  to  the 
31 circular  reasoning  criticism  in  which  previous  prices  do  exert 
an  influence  on  prices  now,  although  the  estimates  of  those 
involved  (Bohm-Bawerk's  subjective  valuations)  and  the  'struggle 
of  various  wills'  (marginal  pair  determination)  also  play  a 
role.  If  my  interpretation  is  correct,  why  is  there  such  a 
contradiction  in  Bukharin's  thought? 
There  are  a  number  of  possible  reasons.  Bukharin  could 
simply  have  changed  his  mind  in  the  period  between  1914  and 
1921.  Although  this  is  possible,  I  think  it  unlikely  since 
Bukharin  does  not  explicitly  say  that  this  has  happened.  More 
likely  in  my  opinion  is  that  he  simply  did  not  realise  that  he 
was  contradicting  himself  when  he  wrote  Teoriya  istoricheskogo 
materializma.  Price  determination  as  he  presents  it  in  1921 
feels  intuitively  correct  when  it  is  divorced  from  any  of  the 
'theoretical  enemies'  of  Marxism  such  as  the  Austrian  school,  so 
much  so  that  he  does  not  think  twice  about  it.  Perhaps  if 
someone  pointed  out  the  connection  to  Bohm-Bawerk  he  would 
rethink.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  1927  preface  to 
the  American  edition  of  Pol  i  ti  cheskaya  ekonomiya  rant  'e  Bukharin 
wrote  that  'our  opinion  is  still  perfectly  valid  from  the 
theoretical  standpoint'. 
21  Either  he  had  changed  his  mind  a 
second  time  and  returned  to  his  1914  position,  or  (more  likely) 
he  simply  failed  to  see  the  problem. 
Another  economic  'school'  which  Bukharin  examines  in 
Politicheskaya  ekonomiya  rant'e  is  the  Anglo-American  current, 
the  chief  proponent  of  which  Bukharin  takes  to  be  John  Bates 
Clark.  Clark  gets  favourable  treatment  by  Bukharin  compared  to 
Bohm-Bawerk,  since  he  represents  the  American  bourgeoisie,  a 
bourgeoisie  which  is,  according  to  Bukharin,  more  progressive 
than  the  European  variety.  Clark's  major  work  which  Bukharin 
uses  is  The  Distribution  of  Wealth  of  1908,  examination  of  which 
reveals  some  interesting  points.  Clark  writes: 
We  have  spoken  of  the  movement  of  labour  and  capital 
as  though  it  were  spontaneous,  as  though  labour  went 
of  its  own  accord  from  a  place  where  its  productive 
power  was  small  to  a  place  where  that  power  was 
greater.  But  it  is,  in  reality,  entrepreneurs  who  do 
the2iioving,  and  it  is  competition  that  makes  them  do 
it. 
32 For  Clark  the  entrepreneur's  function  was  a  coordinating 
process,  the  coordination  of  labour  and  of  capital,  and  the 
reward  for  performing  this  function  successfully  was  called 
profit.  Some  have  argued  that  the  picture  of  the  'industrial 
capitalist'  which  Marx  painted  in  Capital  neglected  the  active 
role  of  coordinating  labour  and  capital,  as  if  the  correct 
utilisation  of  these  factors  occurred  naturally.  It  follows  from 
this  that  Marx  also  rejected  the  idea  that  profit  could  be  the 
reward  for  this  coordinating  function.  Other  conceptions  of  the 
source  of  the  entrepreneur's  profit  have  been  proposed  by 
economists,  for  example  as  a  reward  for  undertaking  un-insurable 
risk,  but,  it  is  argued,  Marx  neglected  this  side  of  capitalism 
completely  and  hence  does  not  mention  the  idea  of  the 
entrepreneur. 
Returning  to  Bukharin  it  is  clear  that  in  Politicheskaya 
ekonomiya  rant'e  he  has  'picked  up'  the  idea  of  the 
entrepreneur,  although  in  an  interesting  and  revealing  way.  One 
of  the  main  thrusts  of  this  work  was  to  show  how  a  new  sub- 
class,  the  rentier  class,  had  come  into  existence  in  the 
decadent  monopolistic  phase  of  decaying  capitalism,  a  group 
which  lived  on  income  from  securities  and  whose  economic 
activity  was  predominantly  in  the  realm  of  the  circulation  of 
financial  paper. 
23  According  to  Bukharin  the  more  highly 
developed  the  credit  system  becomes,  the  greater  is  the  ease  of 
'growing  fat'  and  becoming  'inactive'  in  this  manner: 
The  capitalist  system  itself  takes  care  of  this 
matter;  by  making  the  organisational  functioning  of  a 
large  number  of  entrepreneurs  (predprinimatelei) 
socially  superfluous...  These  elements  are  secreted  to 
the  surface  of  economic  life  like  the  "circles  of  fat 
... 
24 
on  the  surface  of  the  soup  VI 
Thus  Bukharin  seems  to  be  implying  that  although  in  classical 
capitalism  the  entrepreneur  had  an  important  function,  as 
capitalism  decays  in  its  monopoly  phase  this  function  withers. 
Bukharin  does  not  explain  in  any  detail  how  monopoly  capitalism 
performs  the  entrepreneurial  function. 
By  relegating  the  entrepreneur  to  the  past  Bukharin  can 
have  his  cake  and  eat  it.  By  accepting  that  there  was  such  a 
33 function,  an  act  which  could  be  seen  as  an  implicit  criticism  of 
Marx,  Bukharin  can  say  that  he  has  a  superior  theory,  and  by 
relegating  this  to  the  past  he  can  also  dismiss  any  criticism 
which  might  appear  saying  that  Bolsheviks  neglect  the 
entrepreneurial  function.  According  to  Bukharin  this  function 
has  now  been  superseeded  in  capitalism  through  the  credit 
system,  a  system  which  the  Bolsheviks  later  placed  centre  stage 
in  their  plans  for  constructing  socialism. 
Although  the  notion  of  the  entrepreneur  is  only  a  secondary 
feature  of  Politicheskaya  ekonomiya  rant'e,  Bukharin's  use  and 
acceptance  of  this  idea  reveals  some  interesting  points. 
Firstly,  the  one  aim  of  this  work  was  to  refute  the  subjective 
value  theory  of  the  Austrian  school,  and  Bukharin  uses  every 
possible  type  of  criticism  to  do  this,  even  if  some  elements  fit 
rather  uneasily  with  Capital.  Secondly,  Bukharin's  economic 
theory  of  this  time  was  overwhelmingly  negative,  ie  it  was 
concerned  to  knock  down  any  new  theory  which  seemed  contrary  to 
Marx,  and  thus  to  preserve  the  doctrinal  heritage  of  the  Marxist 
movement  in  a  pure  form.  It  was  not  concerned  with  either 
formulating  new  economic  theories,  nor  was  it  concerned  with 
providing  an  economic  rationale  for  socialism,  since  'cookshops 
of  the  future'  were  petty-bourgeois  in  spirit.  Faith  in  Marxist 
theory  was  the  quality  which  most  Bolsheviks,  Bukharin  included, 
possessed  in  large  quantities  prior  to  1917. 
The  question  which  dominated  the  economic  debates  of  the 
1920s  was  how  to  industrialise  the  Soviet  economy.  The  problem 
of  the  uneven  development  of  industrial  production  around  the 
world  was  first  tackled  by  Bukharin  in  his  Mirovoe  khozyaistvo  i 
imperializm  of  1915.  To  explain  this  uneven  development  Bukharin 
uses  a  combination  of  the  factor  endowment  approach  with  the 
social  development  approach.  There  exists  two  kinds  of 
prerequisites  for  an  international  division  of  labour:  natural 
prerequisites,  conditioned  by  the  difference  in  the  natural 
environment,  and  social  prerequisites,  conditional  by 
differences  in  culture,  economic  structure,  and  the  development 
of  the  productive  forces.  25  Bukharin  gives  more  weight  to  the 
latter: 
34 Important  as  the  natural  differences  in  the 
conditions  of  production  may  be,  they  recede  more  and 
more  into  the  background  compared  to  differences  that 
are  the  outcome  of  the  uneven  development  of 
productive  forces  in  the  various  countries.  26 
In  this  general  thesis  Bukharin  does  not  disagree  greatly  with 
modern  work  on  the  shaping  of  comparative  advantage.  27  In 
relation  to  economic  development  the  major  dividing  line, 
according  to  Bukharin,  was  between  industrial  and  agrarian 
countries.  The  former  imported  agrarian  products  and  exported 
industrial  goods,  while  the  latter  did  the  reverse.  28  This  led 
to  entire  countries  appearing  as  'town'  while  others  appeared  as 
'country'. 
Another  important  element  in  this  work  is  Bukharin's 
description  of  imperialism  as  an  'epoch  of  new  mercantilism'.  29 
A  general  turn  to  protectionism  had  occurred,  according  to 
Bukharin,  from  the  late  1870s,  and  this  was  caused  by  the 
monopolistic  structure  of  modern  capitalism.  Monopoly 
organisations  gathered  additional  profits  through  tariffs,  which 
were  used  in  the  struggle  for  markets  (dumping).  30  Previously 
tariffs  aimed  at  defending  home  industry  which  could  not  stand 
competition,  but  today  they  are  used  to  defend  those  industries 
which  are  most  capable  of  withstanding  competition.  'High 
protectionism'  was  the  economic  policy  of  the  cartels  as 
formulated  by  the  state.  31 
To  conclude  this  section  it  is  clear  that  Bukharin's  notion 
of  market  economics  prior  to  1917,  although  quite  sophisticated 
compared  to  many  other  Bolsheviks,  was  highly  critical  but 
somewhat  simplistic.  The  nature  of  the  critique  was  both 
internal  and  external:  Bukharin  tried  to  show  that  Bohm-Bawerk's 
theory  contained  logical  errors  which  destroyed  it  from  inside, 
as  well  as  arguing  that  only  the  labour  theory  of  value  could 
give  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  price.  He  also  argued  that 
analysis  of  price  formation  in  pure  competition  was  irrelevant 
to  the  current  imperialist  phase  of  capitalism.  I  turn  now  to 
Bukharin's  work  written  during  NEP  to  see  if  any  changes  can  be 
detected. 
35 2.4  -  BUKHARIN  AND  NEP 
Bukharin  is  perhaps  most  famous  as  a  Marxist  for  his  strong 
advocacy  of  'the  market'  during  NEP.  However,  he  never 
explicitely  stated  that  the  market  was  compatible  with 
socialism,  or  that  it  would  be  used  in  any  way  after  the 
transition  period  was  completed.  He  stuck  rigidly  to  the 
doctrine  that  socialism  required  a  planned  economy.  His  only 
criticism  of  those  enthusiastic  for  planning  during  the  1920s 
was  that  it  was  far  too  early  to  be  talking  about  it  now. 
However,  as  to  the  type  of  planning  Bukharin  favoured,  it  is 
possible  to  argue  that  it  was  a  less  rigid  form  than  that  which 
was  finally  adopted.  It  is  also  possible  to  argue  that 
Bukharin's  acceptance  of  the  market  and  the  function  it  performs 
in  an  economy  should  have  led  him,  if  he  was  being 
intellectually  consistent,  to  reject  imperative  planning 
entirely  in  favour  of  some  use  of  the  market  in  socialism.  The 
powerful  grip  which  Marxist  doctrine  had  upon  his  intellect  was 
one  factor  which  must  have  made  such  a  step  extremely  difficult. 
In  the  sections  that  follows  I  outline  the  above  points  in  more 
detail. 
For  the  Bukharin  of  the  mid-1920s  the  key  question,  the 
'Leninist  link'  to  which  all  else  must  be  subordinate,  was  the 
smychka  between  workers  and  peasants.  32  In  order  to  maintain 
Soviet  power  the  smychka  had  to  be  preserved  at  all  costs.  Thus 
the  question  was  how  to  industrialise  and  how  to  build  socialism 
while  maintaining  the  smychka.  NEP  was  obviously  a  response  to 
this  problem.  However,  it  is  important  to  realise  that  the 
policies  of  NEP  had  both  a  political  and  an  economic  rationale. 
If  the  need  to  preserve  the  smychka  was  the  political  aspect  of 
the  argument,  then  the  need  to  accumulate  resources  for 
industrialisation  provided  the  economic  basis. 
The  basic  economic  argument  for  the  policies  of  NEP  was 
expounded  by  Bukharin  in  his  Kritika  ekonomicheskoi  platformu 
oppozitsii  of  1926,  and  it  runs  as  follows.  The  Left  opposition 
see  the  problem  as  a  zero-sum  game.  The  task  is  to  transfer  as 
much  of  a  given  amount  of  resources  as  is  feasible  into  the 
hands  of  the  state,  and  this  is  to  be  done  by  increasing  prices 
of  industrial  products.  However,  according  to  Bukharin  they 
36 neglect  the  central  problem  of  economic  life,  which  is  speed  of 
turnover  of  economic  goods.  The  way  to  maximise  the  accumulation 
fund  in  the  hands  of  the  state  is  to  lower  industrial  prices, 
which  will  increase  the  speed  of  turnover  and  thus  increase  the 
profit  taken  by  the  state. 
33  A  smaller  percentage  profit  taken 
from  a  growing  national  product  was  superior  to  a  larger  profit 
taken  from  a  static  or  even  declining  national  product. 
The  scissors  crisis  of  1922/3  was  central  to  Bukharin's 
formulation  of  this  position.  He  quotes  VSNKh  figures  to  the 
effect  that,  with  a  30%  reduction  in  prices,  industrial 
production  had  increased  by  30%.  34  The  Opposition  neglected  the 
question  of  the  capacity  of  the  peasant  market  (emkost  rynka), 
ie  the  question  of  effective  demand.  Thus  according  to  Bukharin 
lowering  industrial  prices  would  both  increase  the  accumulation 
fund  and  help  to  preserve  the  smychka  between  workers  and 
peasants  simultaneously. 
In  the  same  work  as  Bukharin  argued  for  a  reduction  in 
industrial  prices,  he  criticised  the  conception  of  a  plan 
proposed  by  Pyatakov.  Bukharin  claimed  that  in  a  'plan'  and  the 
'planning  principle'  the  opposition  saw  a  universal  solution  to 
all  economic  problems.  Pyatakov  had  proposed  the  idea  of  a  plan 
for  industry  alone,  since  a  plan  to  cover  the  whole  national 
economy  was  not  feasible  given  the  magnitude  of  the  peasant 
economy.  Bukharin  responds: 
Can  an  economic  plan  be  constructed  without  taking 
taxes  into  consideration?  No.  Can  taxes  be  considered 
without  calculating  the  probable  harvest?  No.  Can  a 
plan  be  constructed  in  industry  without  considering 
the  capacity  of  the  peasant  market?  No.  Can  the 
question  of  market  capacity  be  posed  apart  from 
35 
prices?  No. 
Thus  an  industrial  plan  cannot  be  constructed  without  some  sort 
of  plan  for  agriculture.  The  connection  between  the  two  main 
branches  was  fundamental.  Bukharin  notes  that  in  Khozyaistvo  i 
tsena  Struve  had  argued  that  in  any  economy  there  was  a  basic 
dualism  between  the  principle  of  consciousness  and  the  principle 
of  spontaneity.  Both  principles  were  obligatory,  and  thus  he 
exlcuded  the  possibility  of  a  generally  rationalised  economy,  ie 
socialism.  Bukharin  does  not  agree  that  socialism  is  not 
37 possible,  but  argues  that  rationalisation  must  be  seen  as  a 
process  in  which  the  planning  principle  grows,  ie  is  not 
introduced  suddenly  and  comprehensively.  Every  state 
intervention  represents  a  penetration  of  the  rational  principle 
in  the  spontaneous  course  of  economic  life.  36 
The  question  then  arises  of  how  Bukharin  saw  the 
elimination  of  private  capital  and  capitalist  elements  from  the 
Soviet  economy.  It  was  to  occur  by  way  of  economic  displacement: 
Private  capital  is  not.  .  .  chopped  off  with  a  single 
sweep  of  the  revolutionary  sword...  It  is  overcome  in 
the  process  of  an  economic  struggle  on  the  basis  of 
growth  in  our  state  institutions  and  cooperatives; 
they  sqeeze  out  private  capital  economically...  37 
Thus  Bukharin  proposed  an  econonic  battle  in  which  those  who 
produced  the  best  quality  goods  at  the  lowest  prices  would  be 
triumphant.  He  believed  that  state  economy  would  emerge  as 
victor  in  this  contest.  In  '0  novoi  ekonomicheskoi  politike  i 
nashikh  zadachakh'  published  in  Bolshevik  in  1925  he  asked:  how 
are  private  capitalists  sqeezed  out?: 
By  means  of  competition,  and  economic  struggle.  If 
they  sell  cheaply,  we  must  reach  a  position  where  we 
can  sell  still  more  cheaply. 
38 
In  this  work  Bukharin  calls  Mises  'one  of  the  most  learned 
critics  of  communism',  and  he  seems  to  have  agreed  with  him  on 
at  least  one  point.  The  collapse  of  productive  forces  during  War 
Communism  occurred,  according  to  Mises,  because  the  communists 
'forgot  the  enormous  role  of  private,  individual  incentive  and 
private  initiative'.  Bukharin  responds  that  'there  is  no  doubt 
that  the  system  of  War  Communism...  somewhat  resembled  this 
caricature'.  39  This  partial  acceptance  of  Mises  may  seem  to 
contradict  Bukharin's  idea  that  expanded  negative  reproduction 
was  a  necessary  feature  of  the  revolutionary  period  as  expounded 
in  Ekonomika  perekhodnogo  perioda  of  1920. 
The  question  of  individual  incentive  and  initiative  was 
thus  seen  by  Bukharin  to  be  central,  and  competition  between 
state  and  private  sectors  was  to  be  a  driving  force  of  the 
transitional  economy.  However,  when  it  came  to  socialism  itself 
38 Bukharin,  in  line  with  Marxist  doctrine,  rejected  the  idea  that 
competition  could  still  occur.  In  his  Kritika  ekonomicheskol 
platformu  oppozitsil  Bukharin  warned  against  the  dangers  that 
monopolistic  control  of  production  causes,  claiming  that  'every 
monopoly  bears  within  itself  a  certain  conservative 
principle'.  40  In  capitalism  competition  was  the  force  that 
worked  against  the  monopolistic  tendency,  but  since  'in  our 
country  there  is  no  competition',  what  is  to  be  the  guarantee 
against  the  danger  of  parasitic  decay  and  stagnation?.  Bukharin 
answers  that  'the  pressure  of  the  broad  masses'  will  play  this 
role  in  the  USSR,  since  the  party  expresses  and  reflects  the 
needs  of  the  masses. 
41 
2.5  -  THE  MARKET  IN  THE  TRANSITION 
In  this  section  I  will  examine  how  Bukharin  thought  the 
market  would  be  utilized  in  the  transition  period.  In  Put'  k 
sotsializmu  i  raboche-krest'yanskii  soyuz  of  1925  Bukharin  gives 
a  good  general  statement  on  this  question.  He  writes: 
We  thought  that  we  would  be  able  to  destroy  market 
relations  immediately...  It  has  turned  out  that  we  are 
approaching  socialism  precisely  through  market 
relations.  One  could  say  that  market  relationships 
will  be  destroyed  as  a  result  of  their  own 
development.  42 
Bukharin  reasoned  on  the  self-negating  property  of  the  market  as 
follows.  In  capitalism  it  is  a  general  rule  that  large-scale 
production  drives  out  small,  with  the  market  itself  causing  the 
number  of  competitors  to  decline.  This  is  happening,  and  will 
continue  to  happen,  in  the  USSR.  Since  the  working  class  in 
alliance  with  the  peasantry  has  taken  control  of  large-scale 
production,  private  trade  is  left  with  only  small-scale 
production  and  thus  will  be  ousted  by  large-scale  state 
industry.  As  this  process  unfolds  'the  market  itself  will  sooner 
or  later  wither  away,  being  replaced  by  the  state-cooperative 
distribution  of  everything  that  is  produced'. 
43  The  advantages 
of  large-scale  production  will  become  more  and  more  apparant 
39 with  steadily  growing  economies,  and  benefits  will  accrue  to 
state  economy  from  the  growth  of  planning. 
Parallel  with  the  idea  of  using  the  market  to  reach 
socialism,  Bukharin  developed  his  theory  of  'growing  into' 
socialism  (vrastanie  v  sotsializm).  Such  an  organic  metaphor 
obviously  implied  that  the  process  would  occur  over  some  period 
of  time  and  would  result  in  strong  links  between  the  constituent 
elements.  The  key  question  this  theory  answered  was  how  to  bring 
the  peasant  economy  into  socialism.  In  '0  novoi  ekonomicheskoi 
politike  i  nashikh  zadachakh'  Bukharin  writes: 
... 
if  the  peasant  was  drawn  into  the  system  of 
industrial  and  banking  capital  through  cooperative 
organisations,  then,  given  our  dictatorship  and...  the 
nationalisation  of  the  land,  the  peasant  will  be  able 
to  grow  gradually  into  our  system  of  socialist 
relations  through  cooperation.  44 
Using  the  peasantry's  own  economic  interest,  cooperation  was  to 
attract  the  peasant  by  giving  him  immediate  advantages,  for 
example  cheap  credit  through  the  state  banking  system.  Or,  in 
the  case  of  a  prosperous  peasant  who  wants  to  accumulate  funds, 
by  giving  him  high  interest  rates  in  the  state  savings  bank. 
Thus  the  peasant  becomes  interested  in  the  stability  of  the 
state  bank  and  consequently  the  Soviet  regime,  and  through  such 
economic  links  the  'growing  in'  process  develops.  Bukharin 
emphasises  that  this  process  begins  with  circulation  rather  than 
production,  and  claims  that  cooperation  in  the  sphere  of 
circulation  will  inevitably  lead  to  cooperation  in  production. 
Although  the  'growing  in'  metaphor  was  used  primarily  to 
describe  the  development  of  peasant  economy,  Bukharin  used  it  in 
other  areas  too,  for  example  the  law  of  value  'growing  into'  the 
law  of  labour  outlays.  In  fact  this  process,  according  to 
Bukharin,  was  characteristic  of  the  transition  period  as  a 
whole,  and  it  is  clear  that  this  slow,  organic  conception  of  the 
transition  differed  to  quite  a  large  extent  from  the  conception 
of  'struggle'  favoured  by  the  Left.  This  approach  was  in  concord 
with  Bukharin's  idea  that  pre-revolution  the  Bolsheviks  stood 
for  civil  war,  but  post-revolution  they  must  stand  for  civil 
peace  and  non-coercive  development. 
40 As  I  have  shown  Bukharin  admitted  that  his  conception  of 
the  transition  involved  using  market/capitalist  forms  and 
methods  of  economic  management.  However,  this  did  not  mean  that 
the  economy  could  be  described  as  capitalist: 
...  despite  the  existence  of  the  market  and  capitalist 
forms. 
.  .  we  are  already  beginning  the  transition  from 
a  type  of  economy  led  by  profit  to  one  guided  by  the 
45  necessity  of  satisfying  the  needs  of  the  masses. 
Although  the  form  was  capitalist,  the  content  transcended  the 
market.  This  seems  to  imply  that  capitalist  and  market  forms  can 
be  used  in  a  socialist  manner.  Bukharin  does  not  make  this 
point,  but  I  think  it  follows  from  his  separation  of  form  and 
content  in  this  way.  In  my  opinion  although  Bukharin  explicitly 
denied  that  the  market  could  be  used  in  socialism,  the  logic  of 
his  argument  for  its  use  in  the  transition  implicitly  makes  the 
case  for  precisely  this  combination.  Given  proletarian  state 
control  of  the  market  it  could  be  regulated  in  a  socialist 
manner,  ie  in  order  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  masses. 
2.6  -  THE  LAWS  OF  THE  TRANSITION 
Bukharin  responded  to  Preobrazhenskii's  article  on  the  law 
of  primitive  socialist  accumulation  (examined  in  chapter  three) 
in  a  series  of  Pravda  articles  entitled  'K  voprosu  o 
zakonomernostyakh  perekhodnogo  perioda'  of  July  1926.  Bukharin 
argued  that  the  law  of  value  was  in  fact  a  secondary  law,  a 
historically-specific  manifestation  of  the  law  of  proportional 
labour  outlays,  or  law  of  labour  outlays  (zakon  trudovikh 
zatrat)  for  short.  This  law  of  labour  outlays  was  a  necessary 
condition  for  general  equilibrium  under  all  historical 
formations.  46  In  fact,  in  a  footnote  to  Novaya  ekonomika 
Preobrazhenskii  had  agreed  with  this  point,  but  neither  Bukharin 
or  Preobrazhenskii  went  into  much  detail  about  this  most 
fundamental  law.  According  to  Bukharin,  Marx  had  analysed  the 
law  of  labour  outlays  under  three  conditions: 
a)  in  conditions  of  'natural  production'  of  agricultural  land; 
b)  in  an  association  of  'free  people',  working  with  the  help  of 
41 social  means  of  production  according  to  a  plan,  where 
'socially-planned  distribution'  of  work  time  establishes  the 
correct  proportions  between  various  labour  functions  and 
different  needs: 
c)  in  a  commodity  economy,  where  the  law  of  labour  outlays 
clothes  itself  fetishistically  in  the  law  of  value. 
Thus  for  Bukharin  the  process  of  establishing  socialist  planning 
'is  a  process  of  the  metamorphosis  of  the  law  of  value  into  the 
law  of  labour  outlays',  a  process  which  involved  the 
defetishisation  of  the  basic  social  regulator.  47  Bukharin 
offered  this  proposition  as  his  alternative  to  Preobrazhenskii's 
idea  of  the  transition  period  involving  a  struggle  between  the 
law  of  value  and  the  law  of  primitive  socialist  accumulation. 
Bukharin  even  used  his  favourite  expression  pererastaniya  to 
describe  his  version  of  the  transition  period,  and  argued  that: 
The  process  of  the  law  of  value  growing  into  the  law 
of  labour  outlays  finds  its  expression  in  the  fact 
that  by  way  of  a  plan  prices  are  formed  consciously 
rather  than  spontaneously,  ie  no  longer  as  prices 
operating  from  the  point  of  view  of  'barometric 
market  fluctuations',  and  thus  turn  out  differently 
from  how  they  would  spontaneously. 
48 
Thus  for  Bukharin  the  very  fact  that  prices  were  in  some  sense 
planned  showed  that  the  law  of  value  was  growing  into  the  law  of 
labour  outlays.  This  differs  from  Preobrazhenskii,  who  argued 
that  prices  had  to  be  manipulated  in  a  certain  direction,  ie  to 
favour  socialist  accumulation,  for  the  transitional  logic  to  be 
actually  operating. 
In  this  article  Bukharin  also  criticised  Preobrazhenskii  by 
arguing  that  for  Preobrazhenskii  a  proletarian  plan  meant  the 
systematic  removal  of  equilibrium  from  society,  the  'systematic 
fracture  of  the  socially-necessary  proportions  between  various 
branches  of  production',  which  implied  a  break  in  the  elementary 
condition  of  the  existence  of  society. 
49  However,  since 
according  to  the  Marx  of  Capital  volume  III  prices  do  not  equal 
values,  Bukharin  inserts  another  law  into  his  model  of 
fundamental  regulators.  In  capitalism,  according  to  Bukharin, 
the  law  of  prices  of  production  (zakon  proizvodstvennikh  tsen) 
is  the  mechanism  through  which  the  law  of  value  acts. 
42 Spontaneous  regulation  occurs  through  the  fluctuation  of  prices 
around  values,  through  supply  and  demand,  and  through 
competition  between  producers,  but  prices  do  not  in  fact 
fluctuate  around  value,  but  around  prices  of  production  (costs 
of  production  plus  average  profit).  Thus  in  capitalism  the  law 
of  labour  outlays  is  twice  mediated:  first  through  the  law  of 
value,  and  secondly  through  the  law  of  prices  of  production. 
Bukharin  continues,  since  the  process  of  the  replacement  of 
the  law  of  value/law  of  prices  of  production  by  the  law  of 
labour  outlays  is  not  a  struggle  as  in  Preobrazhenskii,  but 
rather  a  slow  'growing  in'  process,  then  when  we  speak  of  our 
economic  growth  on  the  basis  of  market  relations,  this  disproves 
the  thesis  concerning  the  contradictory  nature  of  socialist 
accumulation  and  the  law  of  value.  In  fact,  the  law  of  value 
'helps  us'  in  this  process.  50  This  view  clearly  contradicts 
Preobrazhenskii's  conception  of  the  transition. 
Bukharin  had  discussed  his  conception  of  'laws'  to  some 
extent  in  his  Ekonomika  perekhodnogo  perioda  of  1920.  According 
to  this  work  the  basic  problem  of  theoretical  economics  was  to 
discover  and  (presumably)  to  analyse  the  law  of  equilibrium 
functioning  in  a  society. 
51  Following  this  approach  the  law  of 
value  was  merely  the  law  of  equilibrium  of  an  anarchic  commodity 
system.  52  In  this  work  Bukharin  does  not  make  a  distinction 
between  the  law  of  value  and  the  law  of  prices  of  production, 
and  thus  he  writes  that  the  law  of  value  is  the  law  of 
equilibrium  of  capitalist  society,  and  it  functions  as  a  natural 
law  'like  the  law  of  gravity,  when  your  house  collapses  about 
your  ears': 
But  just  because  it  is  a  blind  law  of  social  anarchy, 
it  can  only  be  accomplished  by  means  of  continual 
violations.  And  here  the  violation  of  equilibrium  is 
the  sine  qua  non  for  the  establishment  of  a  new 
equilibrium...  The  mechanism  behind  these  oscillations 
is...  competition. 
53 
This  reveals  a  major  difference  between  Bukharin's  notion  of 
'law'  and  the  type  of  law  exemplified  by  (for  example)  Newton's 
laws  of  motion  or  the  law  of  gravity.  The  law  of  gravity  is  a 
'rigid'  law,  no  fluctuations  are  possible  from  it  (in  theory) 
43 and  it  is  not  achieved  by  way  of  its  continual  violation.  In 
this  sense  Bukharin's  analogy  with  the  law  of  gravity  is 
misleading,  since  the  law  of  value  seems  to  be  an  'elastic'  law 
and  could  not  be  called  a  'natural'  law  in  the  sense  that  the 
law  of  gravity  is.  54 
2.7  -  BUKHARIN  AND  PLANNING 
It  is  generally  accepted  that  the  high  tide  of  Bukharinism 
as  the  officical  doctrine  of  the  Bolshevik  party  was  over  by 
1927/8.  At  the  Fifteenth  Party  Congress  the  resolutions  were 
still  clothed  in  Bukharinist  language,  ie  concerning  the  need  to 
preserve  the  NEP,  but  proclamations  about  the  'planning 
principle'  and  the  necessity  of  constructing  a  general  plan  took 
the  party  beyond  the  NEP  model.  Bukharin's  writings  after  this 
time  thus  reflect  his  movement  towards  opposition. 
In  his  'Zametki  ekonomista'  published  in  Pravda  on  30 
September  1928  Bukharin  notes  that  'there  is  a  tremendous 
difference  between  repairing  a  bridge  and  building  a  new  one'.  55 
Bukharin's  policy  yielded  high  growth  rates  in  industry  at  a 
time  when  the  problem  consisted  of  bringing  all  existing  plant 
back  on-line,  but  when  this  had  been  accomplished  and  the 
problem  became  how  to  fund  the  construction  of  new  plant,  doubts 
began  to  arise  as  to  whether  this  policy  was  adequate.  The  Left 
was  arguing  that  lack  of  industrial  investment  was  causing  the 
goods  famine,  and  thus  only  by  increasing  (planned)  investment 
could  this  problem  be  overcome. 
Bukharin  claimed  in  this  work  that  the  growth  of  socialism 
was  accompanied  by  'unique  crises'  which  concavely  mirror  those 
of  capitalism.  Capitalism  has  overproduction  and 
overaccumulation,  socialism  a  goods  famine  and  capital 
shortage.  56  According  to  Bukharin  these  type  of  crises  occurred 
because  of  the  'relative  planlessness'  of  the  economy  in  the 
transition  period,  which  has  its  basis  in  the  existence  of  small 
farms  and  market  forms  of  linkage.  57  Thus  the  'relative 
planning'  which  was  possible  in  the  transition  period  had  a 
special  nature  -  it  was  not  the  completed  plan  of  a  developed 
socialist  society,  since  there  are  many  elements  which  were 
44 spontaneous  and  unpredictable  -  but  it  must  ensure  harmony  of 
the  basic  economic  proportions,  ie  ensure  equilibrium.  Bukharin 
warns  that  major  errors  in  even  relative  planning  could  cause  a 
regrouping  of  class  forces  extremely  unfavourable  to  the 
proletariat. 
Bukharin  stresses  in  his  'Zametki'  that  the  reproduction 
schemes  in  volume  II  of  Capital  should  not  be  condemned  for 
ignoring  the  problem  of  classes.  In  the  transition  period 
classes  still  exist,  but  a  transitional  society  represents  a 
certain  unity: 
For  this  reason  we  can  also  draw  up  'schemes  of 
reproduction'  for  this  society...  ascertaining  by 
analogy  to  volume  II  of  Capital  the  conditions  for 
correct  coordination  of  the  different  spheres  of 
production  and  consumption...  In  other  words  we  can 
establish  the  conditions  of  a  moving  economic 
equilibrium.  Essentially  this  is  what  it  means  to 
work  out  a  national  economic  plan  that  approaches 
ever  closer  to  a  balance  of  the  entire  national 
economy.  Being  consciously  set  out,  such  a  plan 
simultaneously  serves  as  a  prediction  (a  prognosis) 
and  a  directive.  58 
Thus  Bukharin  proposed  that  the  national  economic  plan  be 
calculated  using  a  model  and  a  methodology  derived  in  some 
fashion  from  volume  II  of  Capital.  P.  I.  Popov  at  TsSU  agreed 
with  this  idea  also,  claiming  that  national  economic  balances 
should  be  compiled  using  Marx's  schemes.  In  the  above  passage 
Bukharin  seems  to  be  implying  that  such  a  plan  is  identical  with 
a  balance,  or  at  least  that  the  two  should  somehow  merge. 
Bukharin  discusses  the  reproduction  schemes  of  Marx  in  his 
Imperializm  i  nakoplenie  kapitala  of  1924,  and  is  concerned  to 
show  the  algebraic  condition  for  equilibrium  of  both  simple 
commodity  production  and  capitalism.  The  equation  for 
equilibrium  which  Bukharin  gives  in  the  latter  case  is: 
vl  +  a1  +  Bvl  =  c2  +  Bc2  [11 
where  al  is  that  part  of  surplus  value  which  serves  for  the 
personal  consumption  of  capitalists  (I),  Bvi  is  that  part  of 
surplus  value  which  is  turned  into  variable  capital  (I),  Bc2  is 
that  part  of  surplus  value  which  is  accumulated  as  constant 
45 capital  (II),  and  v1  and  c2  represent  variable  (I)  and  constant 
(II)  capital  respectively-59  Of  course  this  equation  could  not 
be  used  in  its  present  form  for  establishing  equilibrium 
conditions,  since  categories  such  as  'personal  consumption  of 
the  capitalists'  no  longer  correspond  to  the  structure  of  the 
transitional  economy.  Nevertheless,  this  illustrates  the  type  of 
equation  Bukharin  thought  could  be  used  for  this  purpose,  and 
this  also  shows  that  the  criteria  of  equilibrium  was  fundamental 
to  Bukharin's  understanding  of  planning. 
The  fact  that  Bukharin  writes  that  such  a  plan  would  serve 
simultaneously  as  a  prediction  and  a  directive  indicates  that  he 
favoured  a  'genetic'  approach  to  planning.  A  plan  as  simply  a 
list  of  majestic  directives  with  no  base  in  reality  would  serve 
no  useful  purpose.  Bukharin  reminds  the  reader  that  in  his 
debate  with  the  Trotskyists  he  had  argued  against  overestimating 
the  planning  principle,  and  had  stressed  that  planning  could 
only  be  relative  in  nature  at  this  time.  60 
In  'Teoriya  "organizovannoi"  bezkhozyaistvennosti' 
published  in  Pravda  on  30  June  1929  Bukharin  launches  an  even 
clearer  attack  on  the  'totalist'  conception  of  planning  which 
was  then  gaining  popularity.  While  discussing  H.  Bente's 
Organisierte  Unwirtschaftlichkeit,  subtitled  'economic  forms  of 
a  bureaucratised  economy  and  its  transformation  in  the  epoch  of 
capitalist  collective  economy',  Bukharin  criticises 
'teleological'  planning  and  the  bureaucratisation  of  the 
planning  process.  Bente  argued  that  a  transition  to  'collective 
economy'  was  a  characteristic  trend  of  the  day.  But 
organisational  and  economic  rationality  do  not  necessarilly 
coincide,  since  the  essence  of  organised  economic  disorder  is 
that  the  organisation  links,  the  means  of  planning,  become  ends 
in  themselves.  When  leading  economic  levels  of  responsability 
are  separated  from  the  market,  the  pressure  of  the  market  'loses 
its  primary  force  and  does  not  make  corrections  when  they  are 
needed'.  61  When  monopolies  have  exclusive  control  over  the 
market  there  is  no  compulsory  incentive  for  economy  since  the 
price  lever  has  been  blunted,  and  ossification  and  bureaucratism 
inevitably  follow. 
46 Bukharin,  after  presenting  Bente's  theses,  writes  that  he 
has  a  'quaint  entanglement  of  correct  and  original  positions 
with  gaping  apologetic  rubbish'.  62  However,  Bukharin  notes  that 
those  on  centralisation  and  bureaucratisation  are  valid,  and 
writes  that  the  Soviet  reader  will  be  'struck  by  the  formal 
similarity'  between  Bente's  ideas  and  the  Soviet  agenda.  63  Thus 
Bukharin  agrees  with  Bente  that  planning  has  a  tendency  towards 
bureaucratisation,  which  means  economic  inefficiency  due  to  a 
lack  of  market  discipline.  Obviously  Bukharin  is  calling  for  the 
partial  utilization  of  the  market  as  a  mechanism  for  ensuring 
efficiency  in  production.  However,  Bukharin  also  criticises 
Bente  for  presenting  price  as  the  'alpha  and  omega'  of  economic 
rationality.  Complete  organisation,  according  to  both  Bente  and 
Bukharin,  eliminates  the  category  of  price,  but  Bente  does  not 
propose  a  replacement.  Bukharin  claims  that  only  one  measure 
could  be  proposed,  and  that  is  human  labour.  64 
During  Stalin's  rise  to  power  in  the  Bolshevik  party  and 
the  subsequent  programme  of  collectivisation  Bukharin  was 
fatally  weakened  as  a  political  force.  However,  he  kept  working 
theoretically  during  the  early  thirties,  and  much  of  this  work 
was  connected  with  the  question  of  the  nature  of  scientific 
planning.  Clearly,  having  to  tow  the  Stalin  line  on  planning 
makes  this  work  dubious  as  a  source  of  Bukharin's  real  views.  In 
'O  planirovanii  nauchno-issledovatel'skoi  raboti'  of  1931 
Bukharin  contrasts  the  anarchic  and  spontaneous  methods  of 
organisation  of  science  under  capitalism  with  the  planned 
methods  of  organisation  endemic  to  socialism. 
65  Bukharin  also 
notes,  perhaps  with  a  hint  of  irony,  that  in  a  socialist  economy 
the  necessary  scientific  cadres  require  such  qualifications  - 
scientific,  technical,  and  organisational  -  which  were  unknown 
to  capitalism. 
66  All  scientific-investigative  work  should  be 
directed  towards  concrete  planning  problems,  and  the  plan  itself 
should  not  be  a  catalogue  of  problems,  but  a  system  of  'organic 
connections'  between  the  constituent  parts. 
67  This  reference  to 
the  organic  nature  of  planning  is  perhaps  the  strongest  language 
Bukharin  dared  to  use  at  this  time. 
As  I  noted  in  chapter  one  traditionally  the  question  of 
'the  market'  in  Marxist  theory  was  connected  with  Marxist 
47 theories  of  crisis,  and  Bukharin  entered  this  debate  in  the 
1920s  with  his  Imperializm  i  nakoplenie  kapitala,  a  response  to 
Rosa  Luxemburg's  critique  of  her  own  The  Accumulation  of  Capital 
of  1913.  Luxemburg  had  argued  that  capitalism  requires  a  'third 
market'  outside  its  own  boundaries  in  order  to  successfully 
realise  the  surplus-value  contained  within  the  products  it 
produces.  If  such  a  'third  market'  was  not  found  then  capitalism 
could  not  successfully  reproduce  itself  and  was  destined  to 
collapse.  Thus  'the  market'  in  this  discussion  was  conceived  as 
the  place  where  products  are  exchanged  for  money,  ie  the  C-M 
part  of  the  capitalist  process. 
Bukharin  disagreed  with  Luxemburg's  reasoning  to  the  effect 
that  general  overproduction  is  always  present  within  the 
capitalist  process.  He  also  disagreed  with  the  version  of  Say's 
Law  which  says  that  a  general  overproduction  is  impossible. 
Instead  he  argued  that  the  Marxist  position  was  that  general 
overproduction  was  sometimes  unavoidable.  68  The  cause  of  crisis, 
according  to  Bukharin,  was  both  disproportion  between  individual 
branches  of  production  and,  more  importantly,  disproportion 
between  production  and  consumption.  He  writes: 
...  where  is  the  planlessness  of  the  [capitalist] 
economy,  its  anarchy,  expressed?  In  the  fact  that 
there  is  no  proportionality  between  the  individual 
branches  of  production,  and  the  scale  of  production 
and  the  scale  of  personal  consumption. 
69 
However,  it  is  important  to  realise  that  this  argument  was  not 
confined  to  abstract  musings  about  pure  capitalism.  If  a 
planless  economy  does  not  have  proportionality,  then  clearly  a 
planned  economy  must  have  it.  But  since  the  NEP  economy  was  not 
a  planned  economy,  rather  a  mixed  type,  then  a  fortiori 
proportionality  must  be  ensured  if  crises  are  to  be  avoided. 
Continuing  his  discussion  of  planning  Bukharin  quotes  a 
passage  from  a  work  on  crises  by  Tugan-Baranovskii: 
If  production  was  organised  according  to  a  plan,  the 
market  would  possess  a  complete  knowledge  of  demand, 
and  the  power  to  make  a  proportioned  division  of 
production... 
48 Bukharin  agrees  with  this  statement,  but  does  not  say  how  such  a 
'complete  knowledge  of  demand'  will  be  obtained.  Other  features 
of  a  socialist  economy  according  to  Bukharin  are  that  the  share 
of  production  of  means  of  production  will  increase  faster  than 
under  capitalism,  and  that  a  correct  proportion  between  workers' 
means  of  consumption  and  the  total  social  product  will  be 
obtained. 
71  The  search  for  proportionality  and  equilibrium  was 
one  of  the  most  important  features  of  the  early  attempts  at 
planning  in  the  1920s. 
In  this  section  on  Bukharin  and  planning  I  have 
demonstrated  that  Bukharin  conceived  of  planning  in  the  1920s  as 
being  'genetic'  in  nature.  This  means  that  it  should  be  based  on 
market  possibilities  and  forecasts  of  market  equilibrium.  72 
According  to  Bukharin  planning  should  be  introduced  gradually 
into  the  Soviet  economy,  and  for  a  period  of  time  should  work 
alongside  the  market.  This  shows  that  he  did  not  conceive  of  the 
market  and  planning  to  be  total  opposites. 
2.8  -  THE  BUKHARINITES 
Since  Bukharin  was  such  a  major  figure  in  the  Bolshevik 
party  he  attracted  many  supporters,  some  of  whom  form  what  has 
been  described  as  a  Bukharin  'school'  of  theoreticians  who  were 
dedicated  to  expounding  Bukharinist  policy.  This  'school'  wrote 
on  all  topics  of  relevance,  from  literature  to  science  policy, 
as  well  as  economic  theory.  Their  rise  to  positions  of 
prominance  was  linked  to  Bukharin's  position  within  the  party, 
and  thus  when  Bukharin  fell  from  favour  they  also  lost  their 
influence.  However,  at  the  peak  of  their  power  -  the  mid  1920s  - 
they  were  extremely  influential,  as  they  controlled  major  party 
organs  such  as  Pravda  and  Bol  'shevik.  Members  of  this  school 
included  A.  Aikhenval'd,  A.  I.  Stetskii,  A.  Slepkov,  E. 
Gol'denberg,  E.  Tseitlin,  V.  N  and  A.  N.  Slepkov,  D.  P.  and  G.  P. 
Maretskii,  D.  P.  Rozit,  and  A.  D.  Zaitsev.  73 
In  1928  one  of  the  Bukharin  'school',  A.  Aikhenval'd, 
produced  a  textbook  on  economics  entitled  Sovetskaya  ekonomika 
which  covered  areas  of  economic  theory  and  policy  from  a 
generally  Bukharinist  position.  This  book  went  through  five 
49 editions  totalling  100,000  copies,  and  thus  clearly  was  of  some 
importance  as  a  textbook.  74  In  work  criticising  Bukharin  and  the 
'right  opportunist  school'  Aikhenval'd's  textbook  was  sometimes 
mentioned,  and  thus  was  quite  well-known.  75  Aikhenval'd  was  at 
least  taken  by  opponents  to  be  a  close  ally  of  Bukharin,  and 
Bukharin's  short  introduction  to  Sovetskaya  ekonomika  gives  it 
his  full  endorsement. 
This  textbook  is  very  interesting  from  the  point  of  view  of 
characterising  the  transitional  form  of  economy  which 
Bukharinist  policy  prescribed.  Aikhenval'd  claims  that  the 
transitional  Soviet  economy  is  characterised  by  the  'unity  of 
plan  and  market',  ie  the  unity  of  purchase/sale  relations  within 
the  leadership  of  the  centre.  76  The  socialist  plan  is  'expressed 
in  prices',  has  a  'monetary  form',  and  has  a  centralised 
distribution  of  the  general  means  of  production  together  with  a 
utilisation  of  the  market  apparatus:  77 
...  our  transitional  type  of  planning  is  planned 
market  relations.  In  our  conditions  the  basic  part  of 
the  plan  -  calculation  -  is  monetary  in  form,  ie 
price  calculations..  .  this  market  form  of  planning 
compri  es  the  first  special  Soviet  transitional 
plan.  7ö 
However,  it  is  clear  that  Aikhenval'd  saw  this  type  of  market 
planning  as  being  correct  only  for  the  transition  period,  and 
presumably  it  would  be  replaced  by  full  planning  in  communism. 
He  expands  on  what  he  means  by  a  planned  market  as  follows. 
Market  'play'  in  transitional  conditions  is  not  only  the 
result  of  the  un-coordinated  actions  of  independent  commodity- 
producers,  but  also  the  result  of  the  planned  actions  of 
socialist  enterprises.  Thus  the  actions  of  socialist  enterprises 
affect  the  market  conjuncture,  and  their  actions  can  to  some 
extent  determine  and  regulate  this  conjuncture.  However,  even 
outside  of  the  'planned'  sector  the  market  can  be  controlled. 
Since  proportionality  inside  the  spontaneous  sector  depends  on 
its  coordination  with  the  planned  sector,  the  key  to  spontaneous 
equilibrium  lies  outside  the  exclusive  authority  of  spontaneous 
law  and  in  the  sphere  of  the  relation  between  the  basic  sectors 
of  the  national  economy. 
79  This  type  of  plan  'creates  economic 
50 equilibrium'  through  the  cognition  of  spontaneous  socio-economic 
necessity,  the  result  being  an  'interpenetration  of  plan  and 
spontaneity'.  80 
Two  basic  points  come  from  this.  Firstly,  that  the  most 
important  area  of  planning  is  the  sphere  of  the  relation  between 
sectors  of  the  economy.  Secondly,  that  the  actions  of  state 
enterprises  on  the  market  can  in  themselves  control  the  market 
to  some  extent,  and  thus  can  be  used  for  planning  purposes. 
However,  all  planning  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  achieving 
economic  equilibrium. 
Aikhenval'd  compares  the  basic  sectors  of  the  economy  of 
the  Soviet  Union  with  those  of  England  and  the  USA.  He  finds 
that  in  the  USSR  the  agricultural  sector  occupies  83%  of  the 
population  as  compared  with  26.3%  in  the  USA  and  7.8%  in 
England,  and  industry  in  the  USSR  employs  6.8%  of  the  population 
compared  with  34.4%  in  the  USA  and  51.5%  in  England.  81 
Aikhenval'd  implies  that  in  order  to  develop  the  USSR  must  move 
closer  towards  the  sort  of  proportions  between  industry  and 
agriculture  which  are  characteristic  of  advanced  nations. 
82  He 
thus  implies  that  this  type  of  macro-planning  is  of  great 
importance  to  creating  a  planned  economy  in  general. 
As  a  Bukharinite  Aikhenval'd  supports  the  idea  of  the  law 
of  labour  outlays  as  a  law  of  all  economic  development.  83  In  a 
natural-patriarchal  peasant  economy  distribution  of  the  labour- 
power  of  all  members  of  the  family  regulates  the  peasant  farm. 
In  a  commodity  economy  the  mechanism  through  which  the  law  of 
labour  outlays  functions  is  more  complex.  On  the  market 
independent  commodity  producers  meet,  and  as  a  result  of  market 
collisions  and  fluctuations  the  necessary  concordance  between 
branches  of  production  is  achieved. 
84  According  to  Aikhenval'd 
the  law  of  value  means  that  'prices  are  all  the  time  striving  to 
conform  to  the  quantity  of  social  labour  which  is  on  average 
necessary  for  the  production  of  the  commodity  in  question',  and 
this  tendency  of  commodity  prices  to  gravitate  towards  values 
accomplishes  labour  proportionality  in  an  exchange  economy. 
85  If 
prices  are  above  value,  then  the  law  of  value  functions  by 
forcing  these  prices  down  towards  the  level  of  value  through 
producing  excess  commodities.  The  result  of  all  this  is  to 
51 create  equilibrium.  In  an  exchange  economy  regulation  of  labour 
outlay  is  thus  a  spontaneous  process  which  acts  independently  of 
the  will  of  people,  and  socio-economic  necessity  exists  as  a 
force  which  governs  people  exogenously. 
86 
Aikhenval'd  has  a  sub-heading  in  his  textbook  entitled  'the 
law  of  labour  outlays  in  conditions  of  socialism'.  According  to 
Aikhenval'd  in  socialism  the  centre  will  link  the  various 
producers  into  a  'union  of  free  people'.  A  socially-planned 
distribution  of  work  time  regulates  the  appropriate  relation  of 
different  aspects  of  labour  with  different  requirements.  The 
establishment  of  the  necessary  proportionality  in  labour  outlays 
is  thus  the  task  of  planning,  and  the  plan  is  composed  by 
'statistical-economic  organs'.  87  In  the  transitional  economy 
where  plan  and  market  are  unified,  spontaneous  methods  of 
regulation  operate  in  the  mass  of  independent  private  farms,  but 
planned  regulation  operates  in  the  leading  complex  of  socialist 
enterprises.  As  regards  the  actual  results  of  the  operation  of 
the  law  of  labour  outlays  Aikhenval'd  notes: 
It  would  be  incorrect  to  think  that  these  different 
forms  of  the  law  of  labour  outlays  are  simply 
different  ways  of  achieving  the  same  results;  the 
difference  between  them  lies  not  only  in  form,  but 
also  in  content.  88 
Thus  it  is  clear  that  he  perceived  the  equilibrium  achieved  as  a 
result  of  the  law  of  labour  outlays  operating  in  capitalism  to 
be  quantitatively  and  qualitatively  different  to  the  equilibrium 
achieved  as  a  result  of  its  operation  in  socialism.  This  shows 
that  the  law  of  labour  outlays  cannot  be  in  any  sense  a 
quantitative  law,  ie  adherence  to  which  results  in  strict 
numerical  proportion  between  given  variables,  and  thus  that  the 
word  'law'  was  used  by  Bukharinists  in  a  very  general  sense  and 
without  any  strict  quantitative  meaning. 
It  is  evident  that  Aikhenval'd's  conception  of  the 
transitional  plan  elaborates  on  Bukharin's  idea  of  achieving 
socialism  through  market  relations.  As  I  noted  above  according 
to  Aikhenval'd  the  transitional  plan  must  include  spontaneous 
market  pressures  in  its  planned  proportions,  it  must  cognise  and 
take  into  account  actual  economic  necessity  and  the  non- 
52 organised  pressure  of  the  mass  of  private  owners.  These  are 
preconditions  for  the  calculation  of  a  spontaneous  plan,  and 
thus  the  distinctive  proportions  and  tempo  of  private  economic 
equilibrium  must  be  included  in  the  transitional  type  of  plan.  89 
Aikhenval'd  mentions  two  types  of  economic  calculation  - 
material  and  market  -  and  both  these  types  must  be  incorporated 
into  plan  calculations.  Moving  beyond  a  simple  inclusion  of 
market  pressure  into  economic  calculation,  Aikhenval'd  stresses 
that  planning  can  actually  shape  this  market  pressure: 
Utilising  the  'commanding  heights'  of  the  state 
apparatus  -  the  budget,  credit,  manoeuvres  on  various 
markets  -  the  plan  can  to  a  known  degree  organise 
spontaneous  pressure,  can  struggle  for  the 
strengthening  or  reduction  of  one  or  other  anarchic 
tendency... 
Thus  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  can  to  some  extent  regulate  the 
market  by  market  means.  The  examples  given  are  as  follows.  The 
agricultural  tax  has  a  huge  significance  for  directing  the  grain 
market,  and  thus  the  state  through  this  lever  can  increase  or 
decrease  the  supply  of  grain  from  small  private  owners.  The 
tariff  policy  can  also  regulate  production  by  imposing 
favourable  and  unfavourable  taxes  on  various  branches  of 
production: 
Agricultural  measures,  cooperative  policy,  credit  to 
private  enterprise  etc  -  all  this  can  be  utilised  for 
organising  market  pressure,  for  modifying  the 
'customary'9yath  of  development  of  private 
enterprise. 
Customs  tariffs  are  held  very  low  or  are  waived  for  such  imports 
as  machine  equipment,  raw  materials  for  industry,  and  chemicals 
for  agriculture,  since  these  are  of  great  importance  for 
economic  development.  Those  imports  which  are  less  essential 
have  high  tariffs  imposed.  92  Thus  the  economic  plan  works  in 
unison  with  market  levers  to  regulate  market  forces  in  such  a 
way  as  to  achieve  the  realisation  of  planned  economic 
proportions. 
However,  although  planning  is  a  major  feature  of  economic 
development  in  the  transitional  economy,  Aikhenval'd  is  clear 
53 that  transitional  or  spontaneous  planning  only  partially 
corrects  the  economic  irrationality  endemic  to  capitalist 
production: 
The  [transitional]  plan  constructs  such  an 
equilibrium  which  is  possible  within  the  current 
composition  of  economic  forces,  which  is  possible 
under  conditions  of  known  spontaneous  pressure,  but 
not  such  as  would  be  rational  without  such 
pressure.  93 
As  well  as  noting  the  difference  between  transitional  planning 
and  what  could  be  called  'full  planning'  in  terms  of 
rationality,  Aikhenval'd  notes  that  socialist  enterprises 
following  the  transitional  plan  have  a  large  degree  of  freedom 
to  manoeuvre  in  changable  market  conditions  while  following  the 
basic  line  of  the  plan.  This  can  only  mean  that  the  transitional 
plan  does  not  dictate  exactly  every  product  which  must  be 
produced,  but  rather  lays  down  general  guidlines  which  are 
flexible  in  the  face  of  changing  conjuntural  conditions.  Another 
important  difference  between  the  transitional  plan  and  'full 
planning'  is  the  scope  of  the  regulation  involved: 
...  regulation  of  production  does  not  occur  in  all 
branches  of  the  economy,  since  all  elements  of 
production  are  connected  one  with  another  in  a 
unified  chain. 
94 
This  implies  that  by  regulating  some  key  links  in  the  economic 
chain  the  entire  economy  can  be  effectively  controlled,  and  thus 
that  the  transitional  plan  would  not  steer  all  sections  of  the 
economy  directly. 
Aikhenval'd  discusses  the  role  of  the  law  of  value  in  the 
transitional  economy  as  follows.  He  notes  that  in  place  of  a 
spontaneous  logic  the  transitional  economy  has  a  new  type  of 
regulation  -a  planned-spontaneous  type.  95  This  mechanism  of 
regulation  is  a  'close  approximation  to  the  law  of  value', 
although  deviation  from  its  logic  also  occurs.  The  'pure', 
'classical'  law  of  value  and  the  spontaneous-value  form  of 
regulation  cannot  exist  in  the  transitional  economy,  rather  a 
new  planned-spontaneous  form  of  regulation  occurs  which 
Aikhenval'd  implies  is  a  distorted  form  of  the  law  of  value. 
54 This  is  in  harmony  with  Bukharin's  idea  that  the  law  of  value 
'helps'  the  Bolsheviks  to  control  the  economy. 
Crises  differ  in  the  transitional  economy  by  not  being 
cyclical  in  nature.  What  Aikhenval'd  calls  'resultant  crises' 
(ravnodeistvuyushchaya  krizisa)  are  inevitable  in  the 
transitional  economy  because  of  the  difficulty  of  calculating 
spontaneity  'in  all  its  capriciousness',  but  such  crises  are  not 
connected  with  the  development  of  the  economy  as  they  are  in 
capitalism,  and  Aikhenval'd  implies  that  they  will  wither  away 
as  socialism  approaches.  96  Thus  resultant  crises  occur  because 
of  the  difficulty  in  accurately  predicting  market  conjuncture. 
Perhaps  the  scissors  crisis  would  be  regarded  as  such  a  crisis. 
In  his  'Zametki  ekonomista'  Bukharin  seems  to  disagree  with 
Aikhenval'd  on  this  point  by  implying  that  goods  famines  are  an 
endemic  feature  of  the  transitional  economy.  However,  Bukharin 
also  claims  that  the  relative  nature  of  planning  in  the 
transitional  period  is  the  cause  of  such  crises  and  thus  the 
difference  may  be  a  subtle  one.  97 
Aikhenval'd  lists  three  types  of  plan  which  are  constructed 
for  the  transitional  economy:  a  general  plan  (fifteen  years),  a 
perspective  plan  (five  years),  and  control  figures  (yearly 
plans).  This  was  totally  orthodox  at  the  time.  Acording  to 
Aikhenval'd  the  general  plan  is  concerned  with  the  type  of 
development  of  the  productive  forces  which  is  required  to  build 
the  technical  base  for  socialism,  the  perspective  plan  gives  the 
main  links  of  equilibrium  necessary  in  order  to  develop  along 
the  lines  of  the  genplan,  and  the  control  figures  give  the 
yearly  features  of  economic  development  including  spontaneous 
pressure. 
98 
In  conclusion  it  is  thus  clear  that  Aikhenval'd  conceived 
of  transitional  planning  as  being  of  a  flexible  kind,  the  key 
feature  of  which  was  the  cognition  of  market  conjuncture  and  the 
adaption  of  this  conjuncture  to  harmonise  with  the  plan. 
Monetary  and  fiscal  policy  would  be  used  to  partially  regulate 
various  markets  so  that  they  would  be  conducive  to  fulfilling 
the  plan,  and  economic  equilibrium  would  be  achieved  on  the 
basis  of  the  law  of  labour  outlays  (with  some  help  from  the  law 
of  value)  through  the  calculations  of  central  planning  organs 
55 such  as  Gosplan  and  the  Council  of  Labour  and  Defence  (STO).  By 
implication  a  fully  socialist  economy  would  have  no  element  of 
market  regulation  and  would  be  fully  planned  by  such  organs. 
Even  though  the  Bukharin  group  were  the  theorists  who  took  the 
reconsideration  of  the  role  of  the  market  to  the  greatest 
extent,  they  did  not  become  exponents  of  market  socialism. 
However,  even  though  they  realised  how  they  had  previously  been 
mistaken  as  regards  the  role  of  the  market  in  an  economy,  they 
did  not  attempt  to  outline  possible  replacements  for  its  role  in 
a  fully  planned  economy.  Rather  they  repeated  the  rather  worn 
phrases  opposing  spontaneity  to  rationality. 
Other  members  of  the  Bukharin  'school'  such  as  V.  N.  Astrov, 
A.  I.  Stetskii,  A.  Slepkov,  and  E.  Gol'denberg  expounded  similar 
views  to  those  given  above.  In  a  Bolshevik  article  of  1927 
entitled  'Avstro-marksistskaya  "sotsializatsiya"'  V.  N.  Astrov 
criticises  the  position  of  Otto  Bauer  as  regards  the 
socialisation  of  industry.  This  is  interesting  because  it 
indicates  how  much  agreement  there  was  between  the  Bukharin 
'school'  and  the  majority  of  Bolsheviks  on  many  major  issues. 
According  to  Astrov  Bauer  demands  the  socialisation 
(obobshchestvleniya)  of  industry  rather  than  its  statisation 
(ogosudarstvleniya),  but  Astrov  does  not  agree. 
99  According  to 
Bauer  socialisation  of  large-scale  enterprises  should  occur  in 
accordance  with  their  character,  as  state,  local,  or  communal 
enterprises,  or  should  occur  under  the  leadership  of  autonomous 
institutions  or  cooperatives. 
100  Astrov  disagrees,  emphasising 
that  the  state  must  be  the  controller  of  socialist  industry. 
Astrov  mocks  Bauer's  idea  that  owners  of  expropriated  industries 
should  be  given  compensation  for  their  loss  because  it  is  unfair 
simply  to  confiscate  property,  and  generally  dismisses  Bauer's 
views  concerning  alternative  types  of  socialist  ownership  other 
than  state.  This  article  shows  that  although  Bukharinists  were 
prepared  to  revise  doctrine  in  some  specific  areas,  namely  the 
use  of  the  market  in  the  transition,  they  did  not  support  a 
revision  of  other  fundamental  tenets  of  Bolshevism  such  as  state 
ownership. 
In  a  Pravda  article  of  1925  entitled  'K  voprosu  o  roli 
nepa'  A.  Slepkov  shows  that  the  views  held  by  Bukharinists 
56 concerning  the  transition  did  not  apply  to  the  USSR  alone. 
Slepkov  writes: 
... 
in  conditions  of  the  victory  of  the  international 
proletarian  revolution  the  world  city  will  establish 
a  smychka  with  the  world  country  through  NEP.  In 
these  conditions  NEP  on  a  international  scale  in  a 
world  of  Soviet  Unions  would  successfully  construct 
socialism,  despite  the  fact  that  on  a  world  scale  the 
peasantry  would  be  the  overwhelming  part  of  the 
population.  101 
Bukharin  seems  to  have  been  the  first  to  point  out  that  although 
Marxism  demanded  an  international  proleterian  revolution,  on  a 
world  scale  the  peasantry  was  in  fact  by  far  the  most  numerous 
class.  Bukharin  thus  concluded  that  a  world  NEP  would  be 
required  in  order  to  bring  the  world  to  socialism.  This  implies 
that  in  the  transition  period  exchange  between  states  would  be 
conduced  through  (regulated)  market  relations,  and  that  the 
experience  of  NEP  in  the  USSR,  according  to  the  Bukharinites, 
had  world  significance. 
In  a  Bol'shevik  article  of  1924  entitled  'Osnovnye  voprosy 
vnutrennei  torgovli'  A.  I.  Stetskii  advances  another  method  by 
which  the  market  can  be  regulated  during  NEP.  He  writes: 
...  of  special  significance  for  supervising 
(nablyudeniya)  of  the  market  are  the  exchanges 
(birzhi),  of  which  there  are  around  one  hundred  in 
the  Union,  since  on  these  is  concentrated  almost  all 
the  wholesale  turnover  of  the  country.  102 
These  exchanges  are  not  only  barometers  of  market  conjuncture, 
they  also  allow  state  organs  to  cooperate  in  their  activities  on 
the  market.  State  organs  must  plan  their  activities  on  the 
market  in  line  with  the  general  aims  of  socialist  construction, 
and  this  will  lead  to  planned  regulation  of  market  relations. 
Thus  Stetskii  is  arguing  that  such  exchanges  are  necessary  in 
order  for  it  to  be  possible  to  regulate  markets  in  a  systematic 
manner. 
It  is  clear  from  the  above  that  Bukharin's  ideas  were 
expounded  and  amplified  by  a  group  of  writers  within  the 
Bolshevik  party.  It  is  also  clear  that  this  group  supported  the 
use  of  market  mechanisms  of  regulation  alongside  planned  methods 
57 in  the  transition  period.  However,  no  Bukharinite  ever  argued 
that  market  methods  would  remain  after  the  transition  was 
complete:  NEP  remained  for  them  a  transitional  stage  only. 
2.9  -  POPOV  AND  THE  BALANS 
The  split  between  right  and  left  permeated  a  great  deal  of 
political  and  economic  activity  in  the  USSR  in  the  1920s.  On  a 
political  level  it  was  clear  which  people  belonged  to  the 
Bukharin  'school'  and  that  they  formed  a  powerful  sub-group 
within  the  Bolshevik  party.  However,  Bukharinist-type  ideas 
where  not  limited  to  those  Bolsheviks  who  formed  the  'inner 
circle'  around  Bukharin.  Ideas  which  can  be  labelled  'right' 
where  held  by  many  Bolsheviks  outside  Bukharin's  circle  as  well 
as  by  non-Bolsheviks,  especially  'bourgeois  experts'  in 
economics  and  other  fields. 
A  good  example  of  someone  who  was  not  part  of  the  Bukharin 
'school'  but  who  used  the  Bukharin  line  to  formulate  his  own 
work  in  the  1920s  was  P.  I.  Popov.  Popov  had  carried  out  the 
first  all-Russian  agricultural  census  in  1916  and  was  part  of 
the  zemstvo  statistical  movement.  After  the  October  revolution 
Popov  became  head  of  the  Central  Statistical  Administration 
(TsSU),  although  he  was  not  a  member  of  the  Bolshevik  party  at 
this  time.  One  of  the  main  tasks  of  the  TsSU  was  to  compile  a 
yearly  'balance'  of  the  national  economy.  This  was  a 
comprehensive  attempt  to  reveal  in  value  terms  the  process  of 
production  and  consumption,  including  fixed  capital  stock, 
circulating  capital,  and  consumer  goods.  103 
On  July  21  1924  the  STO  ordered  the  TsSU  to  construct  a 
balance  of  the  national  economy  for  1923/4  and  for  1924/5. 
Preliminary  results  of  this  work  were  published  in  1925  and  the 
final  balance  in  June  1926,  with  the  title  Balans  narodnogo 
khozyaistvo  Soyuza  SSR  1923/4  goda.  Soon  after  publication 
Stalin  dismissed  Popov  from  the  TsSU,  which  was  to  become  part 
of  Gosplan.  In  his  introduction  to  this  balance  of  the  national 
economy  Popov  writes: 
58 The  balance.  .  .  as  a  statistical  operation  seeks  to 
show  how  and  in  what  form  the  equilibrium  of  the 
national  economy  is  achieved  or  disturbed  in  any 
given  year. 
104 
The  balance  was  to  show  how  the  annual  output  of  the  Soviet 
economy  (plus  imports  and  reserves)  is  actually  realised  and 
distributed  among  the  branches  of  the  economy.  Popov  notes  that 
the  methodological  basis  which  Marx  used  in  his  analysis  of 
capitalist  society  can  also  be  used  to  solve  problems  of 
reproduction  in  socialist  society  and  in  the  transitional  epoch. 
Popov  discusses  Quesnay's  tableau  economique  and  then  explains 
how  Bukharin  in  Imperializm  i  nakoplenie  kapitala  derives  an 
expanded  reproduction  equilibrium  condition,  examined  earlier  in 
this  chapter. 
105  He  then  states  that  a  balance  should  be  guided 
by  these  schemes  in  order  that  the  current  relationships  between 
variables  can  be  discovered.  Proportionality  between  means  of 
production  and  means  of  consumption  and  in  distribution  of  the 
national  product  between  various  branches  of  the  economy  and 
classes  of  the  population  should  be  analysed  'thereby 
elucidating  the  relationships  of  equilibrium  between  production 
and  consumption'. 
106  Each  form  of  social  economy  is  based  on  a 
definite  equilibrium  which  comes  about  as  the  result  of  exchange 
between  branches  -  by  market  methods  in  capitalism,  by  a 
distributional  plan  in  socialism,  and  by  both  in  a  transition  - 
and  thus  the  balance  must  uncover  this  specific  relation. 
The  quantitative  relationships  which  Popov  claims  to  have 
found  in  the  economy  are  as  follows.  The  sum  total  of  assets 
which  came  into  the  national  economy  in  1923/4  for  distribution 
was  21,410,100,000  rubles,  of  which  47.2%  was  consumer  goods  and 
52.8%  raw  materials,  fuel,  and  tools  of  production.  Thus  Popov 
concludes: 
If  100  units  of  output  (in  value  terms)  are  to  be 
consumed  as  means  of  subsistence,  another  90  value 
units  must  be  produced  for  investment  in  production 
as  producer  goods.  This  is  the  law  of  the  Soviet 
economy,  as  it  is  precisely  in  this  form  that 
equilibrium  is  expressed...  107 
In  algebraic  form  the  above  equilibrium  condition  would  be 
expressed  as  follows: 
59 0.9A  =B 
where  A=  the  department  making  means  of  production  and  B=  the 
department  making  means  of  consumption.  It  is  evident  that  this 
condition  differs  from  Bukharin's  equilibrium  condition.  Groman 
noted  in  a  response  to  the  balance  that  this  scheme  'has  very 
little  in  common  with  Quesnay  or  Marx',  since  organic  unity  and 
a  breakdown  into  social  forms  -  state  socialist,  state 
capitalist,  private,  natural  etc  -  was  lacking.  108  An  important 
difference  between  the  type  of  work  undertaken  in  Popov's  Balans 
and  by  Marx  and  Bukharin  in  their  reproduction  schemes  is  that 
the  former  discovered  equilibrium  ratios  empirically,  through 
analysis  of  statistical  data  which  had  been  gathered  from  the 
field,  whereas  the  latter  deduced  their  equations  theoretically 
from  principles  and  assumptions  which  were  given  a  priori. 
Popov's  Balans  is  interesting  for  what  it  reveals  about  his 
conception  of  the  market.  In  the  chapter  entitled  'The  Structure 
of  the  Soviet  National  Economy'  Popov  differentiates  between 
three  methods  and  forms  of  distribution  and  realisation  (supply) 
of  products  in  the  national  economy.  They  are: 
1)  non-regulated  market  methods; 
2)  regulated  market  methods; 
3)  methods  of  socialist  regulation  (planning).  109 
Thus  in  this  sense  the  market  is  conceived  as  a  distributional 
mechanism.  Popov  links  these  different  mechanisms  with  different 
types  of  economy  as  follows.  The  non-regulated  market  dominates 
in  the  sphere  of  private  capital,  the  regulated  market  is 
predominant  in  state  capitalism,  and  planned  regulation  is  the 
method  of  socialist  industry.  Unregulated  markets  connect  all 
types  of  economy  but  regulated  markets  connect  state  capitalist 
forms  with  socialist  but  not  patriarchal-natural  forms. 
Peasant  economy  is  two-thirds  connected  with  non-regulated 
markets,  one-third  with  regulated,  and  less  than  one-fortieth 
with  planned  realisation.  Cooperative  industry  realises  four- 
fifths  of  its  commodities  on  regulated  markets,  and  kolkhoz  and 
sovkhoz  realise  three-quarters  of  their  products  on  such 
markets.  Two-thirds  of  large-scale  state  industry  also 
distributes  its  products  through  regulated  markets-110  In  the 
60 national  economy  as  a  whole  non-regulated  markets  realise  38.9% 
of  all  products,  regulated  markets  40.2%  and  planned 
distribution  20.9%.  The  following  table  summarises  this  data  for 
the  supply-side  of  the  economy  in  percentage  form:  111 
BRANCH  THROUGH  THE  MARKET  THROUGH  PLANNING 
UNREGULATED  REGULATED 
1  Agriculture  67.6  29.8  2.6% 




3  Transport 






















The  following  table  contains  the  corresponding  data  for  the 
demand-side  of  the  economy  also  in  percentage  form:  112 
CONSUMERS  ACQUIRED  THROUGH  THE  MARKET  PLANNING  TOTAL 
UNREGULATED  REGULATED 
1  Agriculture  67.1  32.4  0.5  100 
2  City  76.6  20.7  2.7  100 
3  Industry:  28.6  52.2  19.2  100 
small  98.9  1.1  -  100 
large  -  73.0  27.0  100 
4  Transport  -  51.3  48.7  100 
5  World  market: 
acquisition  -  89.2  10.8  100 
receipt  -  -  100.0  100 
TOTAL  43.6  46.7  9.7  100 
Popov  does  not  go  into  detail  about  how  markets  are  regulated, 
but  it  is  clear  from  other  works  of  the  time  that  this  involved 
regulation  of  prices,  taxes,  tariffs,  and  other  such  monetary 
indicators.  These  tables  show  that  according  to  Popov  market 
61 methods  of  distribution  (both  unregulated  and  regulated)  played 
by  far  the  dominant  role  in  distributing  products  in  1923/4, 
with  planned  distribution  accounting  for  20.9%  on  the  supply- 
side  and  9.7%  on  the  demand-side.  Of  course  Popov  sees  the 
planned  distribution  sector  steadily  increasing  in  size  in  the 
future  as  socialism  is  approached,  but  for  the  NEP  economy  at 
least  in  its  early  stages  markets  are  the  dominant  mechanism  of 
distribution.  Other  conceptions  of  the  market,  most  notably  as  a 
mechanism  for  determining  production  priorities,  are  not 
mentioned  by  Popov,  and  the  question  of  the  place  of  the  law  of 
value,  the  law  of  labour  outlays,  and  the  law  of  price  of 
production  are  also  not  discussed  in  the  Balans.  Such  'laws' 
seem  to  have  had  little  relevance  for  an  empirical  investigation 
of  the  structure  of  the  Soviet  national  economy  in  the  early 
years  of  NEP. 
The  authors  of  the  balance  further  attempt  to  examine 
various  types  of  economic  interdependencies,  ie  interindustry 
interdependence,  product  class  relations,  rural/urban  relations, 
and  regional  relations.  As  regards  relations  between  industry 
and  agriculture,  agriculture  consumed  10,146  million  gold  rubles 
and  produced  10,651  million,  ie  an  approximate  balance.  113  As  a 
supplier  of  raw  materials  and  fuel  agriculture  was  linked  mainly 
to  the  food  industry,  textiles,  solid  organic  products,  and 
wood-processing.  However,  as  a  consumer  agriculture  was  linked 
with  an  enormous  number  of  industrial  branches,  branches  which 
found  their  consumers  in  agriculture  both  in  its  productive 
operations  and  in  its  population. 
114  Another  important 
relationship  is  that  industry  received  35.6%  of  its  means  of 
production  from  agriculture  and  64.4%  from  its  own  branches, 
while  of  the  sum  total  of  means  of  production  turned  out  by 
industry  it  delivered  13.2%  to  agriculture  and  consumed  86.8% 
internally.  Generalising  from  this  data  Popov  comes  the  to 
conclusion  that  to  the  extent  that  individual  branches  of 
agriculture  are  suppliers  of  raw  materials  and  fuel  for 
industry,  industry  has  enormous  monopsonist  power  to  influence 
the  way  the  respective  agricultural  branches  organise-115  But 
since  agriculture  in  contrast  to  industry  is  fragmented  and 
lacks  a  coherent  economic  policy,  it  cannot  use  its  monopolistic 
62 power  to  anything 
relative  position 
view  of  their  mar; 
An  important 
is:  what  relation 
general  socialist 
like  the  same  degree.  Here  Popov  analyses  the 
of  industry  and  agriculture  from  the  point  of 
ket  making  ability. 
question  to  ask  in  relation  to  this  balance 
did  Popov  see  this  type  of  balance  having  to  a 
plan?  Popov  writes: 
On  the  basis  of  a  balance  of  the  national  economy  for 
a  number  of  years,  the  calculation  of  general 
relations  and  the  calculation  of  class  relations 
reflected  in  economic  policy,  it  is  possible  to 
compose  a  plan  for  the  whole  economy  for  the 
following  year  and  also,  in  general  outline,  the 
correct  movement  of  large  branches  of  the  national 
economy  as  a  whole  ... 
11b 
However,  Popov  notes  that  plans  longer  than  a  year  can  only  give 
the  general  lines  of  development,  not  detailed  and  specific 
directions.  The  type  of  plan  outlined  above  Popov  refers  to  as 
'a  plan  for  the  national  economy  in  the  transitional  epoch',  and 
he  stresses  the  idea  that  accurate  balances  were  required  for  a 
number  of  years  before  the  planning  process  can  begin.  The 
similarity  between  Popov's  conception  of  transitional  planning 
and  the  Bukharinist  view  is  readily  apparent. 
One  of  the  co-authors  of  the  balance,  L.  N.  Litoshenko, 
discusses  the  concept  of  'profitability'  as  a  criterion  for  the 
national  economy  in  a  section  entitled  'Methods  of  Constructing 
a  National  Economic  Balance'.  Litoshenko  notes  that  the  accounts 
of  a  private  enterprise  must  show  how  profitable  its  various 
branches  are  and  how  profitable  it  is  as  a  whole.  However, 
according  to  Litoshenko  this  is  not  a  suitable  approach  for  the 
national  economy  as  a  whole,  since  the  balance  of  overall  credit 
and  debt  would  be  an  'imaginary,  unreal  value'. 
117  The  point  of 
a  balance  should  be  to  provide  a  'conscientious  picture,  as 
complete  as  possible,  of  the  process  of  production  and 
distribution  of  physical  commodities'.  This  shows  clearly  that 
the  balance  was  not  designed  to  present  information  which 
enabled  decisions  concerning  production  priorities  to  be  taken, 
ie  it  was  not  designed  as  a  replacement  for  the  price  system  as 
the  carrier  of  information  regarding  optimal  production 
decisions.  The  idea  of  developing  planning  as  a  replacement  for 
63 the  market  was  not  the  aim  of  the  Popov  balance.  It  was  purely 
to  cognise  existing  reality  and  thus  to  understand  how  the 
Soviet  economy  functioned. 
I  hope  to  have  shown  in  this  section  on  the  Popov  Balans 
how  Bukharinist  ideas  had  wide  resonance  during  NEP  and  were  not 
confined  to  a  small  group  of  political  theoreticians.  I  also 
hope  to  have  demonstrated  that  this  type  of  balance  was  not 
conceived  of  as  a  replacement  for  the  market,  but  as  a  way  of 
cognising  its  activity.  According  to  Bukharinist  theory  the  full 
and  accurate  cognition  of  market  processes  was  a  necessary 
precondition  for  the  attempt  to  replace  such  processes  with 
planning.  Popov's  balance  was  one  step  in  this  direction. 
2.10  -  CONCLUSION 
In  this  chapter  I  have  shown  that  Bukharin's  theoretical 
critique  of  Bohm-Bawerk's  version  of  market  economics  was  both 
internal  and  external  in  nature,  but  that  the  actual  market 
mechanics  which  Bohm-Bawerk  outlined  were  of  less  interest  to 
Bukharin  than  the  subjective  value  theory  on  which  they  were 
based.  Bukharin's  attitude  towards  the  market  was 
overwhelmingly  negative  prior  to  the  October  revolution,  as 
shown  by  his  critique  of  Bohm-Bawerk.  In  relation  to  policy  I 
have  shown  that  while  after  1921  Bukharin  and  the  Bukharinites 
actively  supported  the  use  of  market  relations  in  the 
transitional  economy,  they  still  believed  that  the  market  would 
be  replaced  in  a  full  communist  economy  by  planning.  In  terms  of 
Wiles's  framework  outlined  in  chapter  one  the  Bukharinist 
transitional  economy  could  be  placed  somewhere  between  CWE  and 
RM,  ignoring  the  ownership  question. 
Bukharin's  acceptance  of  the  market  during  NEP  led  him  to 
reconsider  the  function  that  it  performs,  and  to  stress  some  of 
its  positive  features.  Even  so  this  acceptance  was  only  partial, 
as  Bukharin  supported  the  regulation  of  some  types  of  prices  and 
the  continuation  of  the  monopoly  of  foreign  trade.  Popov's 
conception  of  markets  as  distributional  instruments  linked  to 
certain  economic  spheres  reflects  the  'place'  meaning  of  the 
64 market  rather  than  the  optimality  conception,  and  was  related  to 
ideas  of  preparing  a  national  economic  balance.  Bukharin's 
stress  on  market  capacity  as  a  factor  influencing 
industrialisation  policy  also  reflected  this  'place'  conception. 
In  general  it  can  be  said  that  the  Bukharinite  view  of  the 
market  was  more  empirical  than  theoretical  in  nature,  and  that 
Bukharin's  support  of  the  market  in  NEP  was  linked  more  to 
policy  concerns  such  as  allowing  the  peasantry  freedom  to  trade 
rather  than  purely  theoretical  ideas  about  what  constitutes  an 
optimal  economic  system. 
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69 CHAPTER  THREE  -  PREOBRAZHENSKII 
3.1  -  INTRODUCTION 
Evgeny  Aleksandrovich  Preobrazhenskii  (1886-1937)  joined 
the  Russian  Social  Democratic  Party  when  he  was  seventeen.  In 
1920  he  was  elected  to  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Bolshevik 
Party,  and  from  the  early  1920s  he  was  the  leading  economic 
theorist  of  the  various  left  oppositions  within  the  party  often 
allied  with  Trotskii.  After  1929  he  was  readmitted  to  the  party 
on  a  number  of  occasions,  only  to  be  arrested  in  1935  and  shot 
two  years  later.  His  work  Novaya  ekonomika  of  1926  is  often 
referred  to  as  the  most  original  work  of  economics  to  emerge 
from  the  NEP  period. 
3.2  -  MARX  AND  HILFERDING 
Already  in  Marx's  time  it  was  clear  that  capitalism  was 
beginning  to  change  in  nature,  it  is  often  argued.  Pure  laissez- 
faire  was  being  replaced,  if  in  fact  it  ever  existed,  with  a 
more  interventionist  practise.  Marx  also  held  this  view  and 
interpreted  it  as  another  sign  that  the  capitalist  mode  of 
production  was  ripe  for  the  transition  to  socialism.  Thus  the 
instruments  which  had  developed  making  possible  intervention 
could  be  interpreted  as  being  in  some  sense  socialistic.  Marx 
wrote: 
The  banking  system  possesses  indeed  the  form  of 
universal  book-keeping  and  distribution  of  means  of 
production  on  a  social  scale,  but  solely  the 
form...  It  places  all  the  available  and  even  potential 
capital  of  society..  .  at  the  disposal  of  the 
industrial  and  commercial  capitalists  so  that  neither 
the  lenders  nor  users  of  this  capital  are  its  real 
owners  or  producers.  It  thus  does  away  with  the 
private  character  of  capital  and  thus  contains  in 




The  development  of  credit,  a  central  part  of  the  banking  system, 
enabled  an  enormous  expansion  of  the  scale  of  production 
impossible  for  individual  capitalists  alone,  and  transformed  the 
70 functioning  capitalist  into  a  mere  manager.  The  result  of  this 
ultimate  development  of  capitalist  production,  according  to 
Marx,  was  to  bring  about  'a  necessary  transitional  phase  towards 
the  reconversion  of  capital..  .  as  the  property  of  the  associated 
producers,  as  outright  social  property'.  2  Marx  linked  the  need 
for  state  intervention  with  the  development  of  monopoly  in 
certain  spheres  of  production.  If  monopoly  was  the  logical 
development  of  competition,  then  intervention  followed  pari 
passu. 
By  the  turn  of  the  century  things  had  progressed  even 
further.  In  Finance  Capital  of  1910  Rudolf  Hilferding  claimed  to 
analyse  a  'new  phase'  in  capitalist  development.  The  most 
characteristic  feature  of  'modern'  capitalism,  according  to 
Hilferding,  was  the  process  of  concentration,  which  eliminates 
free  competition  through  the  formation  of  cartels  and  trusts, 
and  brings  bank  and  industrial  capital  into  a  closer 
relationship.  3  Credit  was  a  central  mechanism  by  which  this 
'new'  phase  of  capitalism  operated.  According  to  Hilferding 
credit  was  a  private  relation  between  contracting  parties  based 
upon  a  mutual  confidence  in  ability  to  pay.  4  Repeating  ideas 
which  Marx  had  expressed,  Hilferding  noted  that  credit  extends 
the  scale  of  production  beyond  that  which  is  possible  with  money 
capital  alone,  and  a  new  'credit  superstructure'  is  built  upon 
this  expansion. 
As  in  Marx,  Hilferding  saw  these  new  developments  as 
heralding  the  appearance  of  socialism.  He  also  believed  that 
monopoly  showed  the  way  for  future  socialist  forms  of 
production.  He  writes  that  the  monopolistic  association  is  an 
organisation  for  economic  domination  and  there  is  therefore  a 
close  analogy  with  the  organisation  of  state  domination.  5  As  to 
the  limits  to  cartelisation  -  there  were  none.  The  ultimate 
outcome  could  be  a  general  cartel,  in  which  the  whole  of 
capitalist  production  is  consciously  regulated  by  a  single  body 
which  would  determine  the  volume  of  production  in  all  branches. 
Price  determination  becomes  purely  nominal,  involving  only  the 
distribution  of  the  aggregate  social  product  between  the  cartel 
on  the  one  side  and  the  rest  of  society  on  the  other. 
6  Price  is 
here  purely  an  accounting  device: 
71 The  tendency  of  finance  capital  is  to  establish 
social  control  of  production,  but  it  is  an 
antagonistic  form  of  socialisation,  since  the  control 
of  social  production  remains  vested  in  an  oligarchy. 
The  struggle  to  disposses  this  oligarchy  constitutes 
the  ultimate  phase  of  the  class  struggle  between 
proletarian  and  bourgeoisie.? 
3.3  -  PREOBRAZHENSKII  AND  MONOPOLY 
As  a  Marxist  Preobrazhenskii  held  to  the  orthodox  opinions 
on  these  matter  as  expressed  above.  In  Novaya  ekonomika  of  1926 
he  writes: 
Marx  on  the  one  hand  pointed  to  the  important  role 
which  the  credit  system  of  bourgeois  society  can  play 
in  the  transition  to  a  new  mode  of  production,  and  on 
the  other  hand  he  warned  against  over-estimating  the 
importance  for  socialist  production  of  the  system  of 
accounting  and  control... 
Thus  when  the  Bolsheviks  came  to  power  they  believed  that  pure 
competition  had  long  since  disappeared  from  the  capitalist 
system,  and  that  monopoly  in  one  form  or  another  was  the 
characteristic  feature  of  contemporary  capitalism.  This  meant 
further  that  free  markets  no  longer  had  any  place  in  the 
economic  system,  and  thus  the  state  monopoly  system  which  the 
Bolsheviks  created  after  1917  was  not  seen  as  much  removed  from 
the  monopoly  phase  of  capitalism  which  it  had  just  replaced. 
Preobrazhenskii's  conception  of  the  market  must  be  seen  in  this 
context. 
Included  in  the  system  of  'accounting  and  control' 
mentioned  by  Preobrazhenskii  in  the  above  quote  was  questions  of 
price  policy.  In  Novaya  ekonomika  Preobrazhenskii  argued  that 
behind  a  'shield  of  socialist  protectionalism'  different 
branches  of  production  could  be  preserved,  developed,  and 
created  'guided  by  our  ideas  of  what  is  economically  expedient 
for  the  entire  state  economy'. 
9  The  customs  policy  of  the  USSR 
would  be  a  powerful  barrier  protecting  the  country's  internal 
commodity  circulation  from  the  impact  of  the  world  law  of 
value. 
10  There  was  also  to  be  a  price  policy  of  consciously 
alienating  a  certain  part  of  the  surplus  product  of  private 
72 economy.  This  was  possible  because  of  the  features  which  had 
been  developed  by  monopoly  capitalism.  The  concentration  of  all 
large-scale  industry  into  the  hands  of  the  workers'  state 
increased  enormously  the  possible  extent  of  monopoly  control  of 
price  policy.  11 
For  Preobrazhenskii  prices  were  a  key  tool  by  which  the 
state  could  control  the  economy.  Prices  were  to  be  manipulated 
against  the  law  of  value  to  achieve  favourable  conditions  for 
the  development  of  types  of  industrial  organisation  which  were 
deemed  socialist.  He  also  supported  the  idea  of  using  the  USSR's 
natural  monopoly  of  certain  resources  such  as  platinum  and  flax 
on  the  world  market  to  obtain  a  surplus  profit  in  this  larger 
realm. 
12  It  is  necessary  to  differentiate  between  the  specific 
purpose  for  which  Preobrazhenskii  advocated  price  manipulation 
in  Novaya  ekononika  -  primitive  socialist  accumulation  -  and 
the  more  general  and  lasting  notion  of  state  regulation  itself. 
He  writes: 
... 
the  regulating  principles  in  our  economy  are  the 
organisational  shoots  of  the  new  economics  -  the 
economics  of  state-organised  economy.  But  at  the 
present  stage  these  shoots  are...  fulfilling  first  and 
foremost  the  fuf  tions  of  primitive  socialist 
accumulation... 
The  idea  of  state  regulation  of  production  is  very  strongly 
supported  by  Preobrazhenskii.  However,  it  is  clear  that  at  least 
for  the  transition  to  socialism,  and  perhaps  in  the  first  stages 
of  socialism  itself,  this  regulation  would  be  achieved  at  least 
partially  through  the  mechanisms  of  control  evolved  by 
capitalism  in  its  monopoly  phase.  Thus  this  would  be  regulation 
of  the  market  in  a  traditional  non-socialist  sense,  using 
indirect  controls  such  as  prices  and  interest  rates.  It  would 
not  mean  the  abolition  of  the  market  system  itself. 
In  a  later  work,  Zakat  kapitalizma  of  1931,  Preobrazhenskii 
again  discusses  the  relationship  between  the  final  monopolistic 
phase  of  capitalism  and  the  regulation  required  in  a  socialist 
economy.  He  writes: 
...  the  monopolistic  structure  of  capitalism  so 
curtails  -  or  distorts  -  the  action  of  the  law  of 
73 value,  that  today  this  law  can  no  longer  regulate  the 
process  of  reproduction  as  it  once  did  in  the  epoch 
of  free  competition. 
14 
This  seems  to  be  contradicted  by  a  passage  later  in  the  same 
work,  where  he  writes  that  in  monopolistic  capitalism  'the  law 
of  value  remains  the  spontaneous  regulator  of  economic  life'.  15 
The  two  passages  can  be  reconciled  if  the  first  is  taken  to  mean 
that  the  law  of  value  no  longer  regulates  reproduction  in  the 
same  manner  as  before,  but  rather  regulates  it  in  a  different 
manner,  ie  after  being  mediated  through  the  distortions  in  price 
produced  by  monopoly. 
In  relation  to  monopoly  capital  categories  in  the 
transition  Preobrazhenskii  notes  that  the  category  of  interest 
is  found  in  the  buying  and  selling  of  money  capital  on  the  legal 
and  illegal  private  money  markets  of  the  Soviet  Union.  16  This 
means  that  private  credit  institutions  such  as  societies  for 
mutual  credit,  and  the  illegal  loan  capital  market,  exist  and 
command  high  rates  of  interest.  Private  capital  in  the  USSR  is 
not  predominantly  industrial  capital,  but  is  trading  and  loan 
capital,  and  the  proportion  of  loan  capital  is  increasing  as  the 
sphere  of  application  of  private  capital  in  trade  narrows. 
Private  capital  steers  clear  of  industry  for  a  number  of 
reasons:  tax  policy,  laws  protecting  labour,  restrictions  on 
inheritance,  slower  rate  of  turnover,  risk  in  giving  up  some 
degree  of  liquidity,  and  of  course  the  degree  of  socialisation 
of  large-  and  medium-scale  industry. 
Preobrazhenskii  makes  it  clear  that  although  interest  as 
understood  in  a  capitalist  economy  does  exist  in  the  Soviet 
economy,  it  is  on  a  small  scale.  On  a  much  larger  scale  the 
state  uses  the  'methods  and  forms'  of  interest  and  capitalist 
credit  organisation  while  filling  them  with  an  entirely  new 
content:  17 
The  planning,  accounting  and  control  which  result 
organically  from  the  socialisation  of  the  instruments 
of  production  in  the  most  important  sections  of  the 
Soviet  economy  are  essentially  a  higher  type  of 
planning  and  accounting  than  those  to  which  the  most 
advanced  and  centralised  capitalist  system  could 
attain-18 
74 Preobrazhenskii  illustrates  this  difference  as  follows.  Assume 
that  the  state  has  a  certain  quantity  of  resources  which  it  can 
use  to  increase  the  fixed  and  circulating  capital  of  its  trusts. 
Assume  further  that  a  trust  obtains  a  corresponding  credit  from 
Gosbank.  It  pays  'interest'  on  this  loan,  but  from  what  source? 
From  its  own  surplus  product.  Who  owns  this  surplus?  The 
socialist  state.  Where  does  all  the  money  go  which  is  received 
as  interest  payments  on  loan  capital?  To  the  same  state.  Thus 
this  process  is  essentially  a  variety  of  planned  distribution  of 
the  resources  of  the  state  economy  which  imitates  the  form  of 
capitalist  relations  without  the  exploitative  content.  19 
This  section  shows  that  when  the  Bolsheviks  came  to  power 
they  did  not  think  that  they  would  be  involved  with  free 
markets,  as  capitalism  itself  had  overcome  them.  Preobrazhenskii 
followed  the  general  position  that  state  regulation  in  Soviet 
conditions  would  use  many  of  the  same  instruments  which  had  been 
developed  by  monopoly  capitalism,  and  his  work  Novaya  ekonomika 
can  be  regarded  as  a  continuation  of  these  existing  ideas 
relating  specifically  to  the  USSR. 
3.4  -  THE  MARKET 
In  Zakat  kapitalizma  Preobrazhenskii  asks  the  question: 
what  is  a  market  from  the  viewpoint  of  theoretical  economics? 
The  answer  he  gives  is  as  follows: 
The  market  represents  the  total  of  society's 
effective  demand  both  for  means  of  production  and  for 
articles  of  consumption;  that  is,  on  the  one  hand, 
the  total  demand  of  the  economy's  production 
apparatus  as  a  whole,  on  the  oth  r  hand  the  total 
demand  of  individual  producers. 
20 
Perhaps  the  key  point  of  this  passage  is  that  it  is  society's 
effective  demand,  ie  demand  backed  by  money,  not  necessarily 
demand  in  the  sense  of  need.  Here  the  market  is  presented  in 
terms  of  its  capacity  to  fulfil  desires  which  can  be  supported 
monetarily.  In  relation  to  this  paragraph  Preobrazhenskii 
discusses  the  example  of  the  coal  industry  in  England. 
75 According  to  Preobrazhenskii  the  oldest  and  most  important 
branch  of  heavy  industry  in  England  is  the  coal  industry.  But  it 
is  technologically  very  backward  and  in  need  of  colossal  capital 
investment  in  order  to  lower  the  costs  of  production  and  raise 
the  output  of  coal.  However  new  English  capital  persistently 
moves  in  exactly  the  opposite  direction,  since  such  capital 
investment  is  unattractive  from  the  viewpoint  of  acquiring 
profit  today.  For  Preobrazhenskii  this  indicates  that  the  system 
of  distributing  new  issues  by  way  of  the  market  is  'absolutely 
outmoded',  and  prevents  the  full  and  most  benefitial  use  of 
productive  forces  even  from  the  viewpoint  of  developing  the 
capitalist  economy  itself.  21 
Preobrazhenskii  also  asks  the  question:  how  is  it  that 
monopoly,  which  at  first  glance  appears  to  signify  the 
organisation  of  the  market,  in  reality  actually  reinforces  the 
disorganisation  of  capitalist  production?  The  answer  he  gives  is 
that  even  though  the  position  of  outsiders  are  weakened  in  their 
competitive  struggle  with  monopolistic  associations,  the 
competition  between  trusts  themselves  is  accenuated,  taking  the 
form  not  only  of  a  struggle  for  markets  on  which  to  sell  but 
also  of  a  struggle  in  money  and  credit  markets.  Monopoly  cannot 
eliminate  competition  because  it  does  not  eliminate  'what  is 
most  fundamental'  -  private  property  in  the  means  of  production, 
the  market,  and  the  struggle  for  a  maximum  share  of  profits.  22 
Preobrazhenskii  also  argues  that  monopolistic  capitalism  is 
inferior  to  'classical  capitalism'  in  that  the  former  undermines 
both  the  stimulus  for  rapidly  expanding  reproduction  and  the 
possibility  of  spontaneous  self-regulation  which  was  dominant  in 
the  latter.  Monopoly  represents  more  accurate  knowledge  of  the 
market  and  thus  a  better  adjustment  to  demand  in  any  given 
period,  which  leads  to  a  tendency  to  curtail  production  of  that 
anticipatory  expansion  for  an  unknown  demand  which  was 
characteristic  of  the  epoch  of  free  competition.  Limiting  the 
volume  of  production  creates  a  'thrombosis'  in  economic 
development,  and  intensifies  the  contradiction  between  the 
theoretical  capacity  of  the  available  production  forces  and 
their  degree  of  utilisation.  23  For  this  reason  monopoly  is 
inferior  to  'classical  capitalism',  and  although  the  market  is 
76 bucked  to  a  far  greater  extent  in  the  former  this  does  not  mean 
that  capitalism  has  changed  in  nature  and  will  produce  for  need. 
The  search  for  maximum  profit  through  the  market  has  been 
replaced  by  the  search  for  maximum  profit  through  regulation  of 
the  market. 
Thus  it  is  apparently  not  the  market  per  se  which 
Preobrazhenskii  seems  to  be  criticising,  but  rather  the  goal  of 
maximising  profit.  From  this  point  and  from  the  previous  point 
about  private  property  being  'most  fundamental'  to  capitalism, 
it  follows  that  Preobrazhenskii  viewed  the  market  as  a  secondary 
category  through  which  more  fundamental  categories  like  profit 
functioned.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  praising  classical 
capitalism  above  monopoly  Preobrazhenskii  seems  to  be 
contradicting  the  idea  examined  earlier  that  monopoly  levers 
developed  in  the  final  phase  of  capitalism  could  be  used  for 
socialist  purposes  in  the  transition,  since  here  monopoly  is 
equated  with  stagnation. 
3.5  -  PRICE  IN  THE  TRANSITION 
As  mentioned  above  in  Novaya  ekonomika  Preobrazhenskii 
outlines  a  framework  for  price  policy  in  the  transition  period. 
In  the  chapter  on  the  law  of  value  in  Soviet  economy  he  writes: 
While  on  the  capitalist  market  under  free  competition 
price  is  a  function  of  value,  the  state-monopolist's 
price  on  the  private  market  is  a  function  of 
primitive  ocialist  accumulation,  limited  by  the  law 
of  value. 
2' 
According  to  Preobrazhenskii  there  were  two  regulating  laws  in 
the  Soviet  economy  of  the  transition  period  -  the  law  of  value 
and  the  law  of  primitive  socialist  accumulation  -  and  these  two 
laws  were  engaged  in  a  struggle  for  dominance.  Thus  price,  as 
both  a  regulator  of  production  and  a  means  for  state 
accumulation,  was  one  of  the  arenas  of  struggle  between  the  two 
laws.  Preobrazhenskii's  notion  of  primitive  socialist 
accumulation  was  a  means  by  which  the  state  could  accumulate 
funds  for  socialist  construction  by  'pumping  over'  resources 
77 from  one  sector  to  another.  Prices  of  state-industry  produced 
goods  should  be  regulated  in  order  to  achieve  this  pumping  over. 
However,  as  the  quote  above  indicates,  Preobrazhenskii  believed 
that  this  operation  was  limited  by  the  law  of  value,  which  still 
at  least  partially  functioned  in  the  Soviet  economy  at  this 
time. 
Examples  of  price  manipulation  are  given  by  Preobrazhenskii 
as  follows.  In  areas  where  the  state  is  a  monopsonist,  such  as 
industrial  crops  and  raw  materials,  it  would  use  its  monopsonist 
position  to  regulate  the  prices  it  pays  for  these  commodities. 
However,  there  existed  two  'frontier-barriers'  establised  by  the 
law  of  value  -a  maximum  barrier  and  a  minimum  barrier.  The 
maximum  barrier  was  the  average  world  price,  the  minimum  barrier 
being  the  expenditure  on  labour  and  profitability  for  the 
producer  as  compared  with  other  crops,  resulting  in  a  field  of 
manoeuvre  of  30-40%  below  the  world  price.  The  difference 
between  the  level  of  procurement  price  which  would  be  formed  on 
the  basis  of  free  competition  by  bourgeois  purchasers  and  the 
level  actually  paid  by  the  Soviet  state  'should  be  fully 
attributed  to  the  operation  of  the  law  of  primitive  socialist 
accumulation'.  25  Preobrazhenskii  seems  proud  of  the  following 
fact,  which  is  given  as  an  example  of  how  planning  is  replacing 
the  market: 
When  the  state...  keeps  prices  at  a  certain  level  and 
even  reduces  them  in  spite  of  a  growth  in  demand 
which  outruns  supply,  as  happened  in  1925  with  flax 
and  cotton...  we  have  before  us  a  vivid  example  of  the 
restriction  of  the  law  of  value  by  the  planning 
principle,  in  this  case  taking  the  form  of  the  law  of 
primitive  socialist  accumulation.  26 
In  the  transition  period,  according  to  Preobrazhenskii,  not  only 
would  prices  be  used  in  order  to  facilitate  socialist 
accumulation,  but  also  to  determine  production  priorities  in  the 
peasant  sector.  He  writes: 
... 
the  price  policy  of  the  state,  as  the  predominant 
purchaser,  can  have  a  profound  influence  on  the 
distribution  of  the  production  forces  in  the  peasant 
economy,  encouraging  certain  crops  at  the  expense  of 
others  and  introducing  an  element  of  planning  into 
78 the  territorial  distribution  of  crops  in  peasant 
economy.  2 
Here  price  is  transformed  from  a  category  of  commodity  economy 
into  something  transitional  towards  socialist  calculation. 
Preobrazhenskii  differentiates  between  methods  of  price 
formation  in  a  number  of  different  sectors.  In  the  production  of 
means  of  production,  where  the  state  has  both  a  monopoly  and  is 
a  monopsonist,  the  law  of  value  'merely  influences  accumulation 
and  depreciation  through  the  fluctuation  in  prices,  without 
introducing  changes  into  the  distribution  of  labour  power'.  28 
However,  when  the  state  has  a  monopoly  but  is  not  a  monopsonist 
the  law  of  value  affects  'not  only  the  amount  of  accumulation  in 
the  state  sector  but  also  the  distribution  of  productive  forces 
in  it'.  29  The  case  where  the  overwhelming  majority  of  products 
were  produced  in  the  private  (peasant)  sector  was  discussed 
earlier,  with  the  result  that  the  state  can  use  its  monopsonist 
position  to  assist  accumulation. 
In  the  field  of  consumer  goods  the  influence  of  the  law  of 
value  is  'considerably  greater'  than  in  the  field  of  production 
of  means  of  production.  This  is  because  of  four  features: 
1)  the  greater  role  played  by  the  competition  of  private 
producers; 
2)  the  greater  influnce  of  the  law  of  value  as  regards  the 
fluctuation  of  raw  material  prices; 
3)  the  greater  dependence  on  the  effective  demand  of  private 
economy; 
4)  the  greater  influence  on  retail  prices  of  supply  and 
demand.  30 
State  production  of  consumer  goods  is  further  influenced  by  the 
law  of  value  in  so  far  as  the  raw  materials  are  purchased  from 
the  private  sector  or  from  overseas.  Preobrazhenskii  notes  that 
in  order  to  weaken  this  influence  of  the  law  of  value  it  is 
necessary  to  develop  internal  raw  material  production. 
3.6  -  THE  LAW  OF  VALUE 
In  Vestnik  kommunisticheskoi  akademii  of  1926  there  appears 
a  'Stenogrammy  dokladov  chitaemikh  v  kommunisticheskoi  akademii' 
79 concerning  a  debate  on  Preobrazhenskii's  paper  'Zakon  tsennosti 
v  sovetskom  khozyaistve'  (a  chapter  of  Novaya  ekonomika)  which 
had  appeared  in  the  Vestnik  on  a  previous  occasion.  A  number  of 
people  give  their  comments,  including  A.  A.  Bogdanov  and  L.  N. 
Kritsman.  Stetskii  puts  an  interesting  criticism.  He  argues  that 
Preobrazhenskii  discusses  the  question  of  value  exclusively  from 
the  point  of  view  of  modifications  in  price.  When 
Preobrazhenskii  says  that  the  categories  of  value  have  become 
obsolete,  what  does  this  signify?  It  means  that  the  law  of  value 
(zakon  tsennosti)  ceases  to  be  the  regulator  of  the  economy: 
This  also  means  that  the  redistribution  of  social 
labour  ceases  to  go  along  the  path  of  exchange  and 
trade  relations.  Consequently...  we  must  create  a  new 
means  for  the  redistribution  of  social  labour  besides 
exchange.  This  is  an  important  feature  to  which 
Preobrazhenskii  does  not  give  his  attention.  31 
Since  Preobrazhenskii  does  not  indicate  such  an  alternative 
means  of  dividing  social  labour  between  branches,  then, 
according  to  Stetskii,  it  is  impossible  to  give  a  full 
explanation  of  the  role  of  the  law  of  value  in  Soviet  economy. 
Bogdanov  puts  a  separate  criticism.  He  claims  that  whenever 
Preobrazhenskii  speaks  of  the  law  of  value  in  conditions  of 
socialist  economy,  it  is  possible  to  replace  it  with  the  'law  of 
the  free  play  of  supply  and  demand'.  Instead  of  the  'law  of  free 
play  of  supply  and  demand'  Preobrazhenskii  writes  'the  law  of 
value': 
Perhaps  these  are  one  and  the  same  thing?  The  law  of 
value  is  not  simply  the  law  of  the  free  play  of 
supply  and  demand.  This  is  only  the  spontaneous  form 
of  its  manifestation.  Strictly  speaking  the  law 
consists  by  no  means  of  oscillations,  but  rather  in 
the  ten91ncy  of  these  fluctuations  to  a  definite 
norm... 
Preobrazhenskii  gives  a  summary  of  what  he  means  by  'the  law  of 
value'  in  Novaya  ekonomika.  It  is  the  spontaneous  equilibriator 
of  commodity-capitalist  society  through  which  everything  which 
is  needed  for  the  comparatively  normal  functioning  of  the  whole 
productive  system  is  achieved.  This  includes:  1)  the 
distribution  of  productive  forces  (means  of  production  and 
80 people)  among  the  different  branches  of  the  economy;  2)  the 
distribution  of  the  aggregate  product  between  workers  and 
capitalists;  3)  the  distribution  of  the  surplus  product  among 
different  countries,  branches,  and  exploiters;  4)  technical 
progress  -  the  victory  of  advanced  economic  forms  over  backward 
ones.  33  From  this  it  follows  that  the  law  of  value  must  somehow 
include  the  'law  of  free  play  of  supply  and  demand',  but  it 
could  not  be  reduced  to  it. 
Bogdanov  then  asks:  what  is  the  law  of  value  in  Marx,  and 
what  is  it  in  Preobrazhenskii?  For  Marx,  according  to  Bogdanov, 
the  law  of  value  is  a  law  of  labour  values: 
...  the  law  of  labour  value  under  capitalism  is  a  law 
according  to  which  the  distribution  of  productive 
elements  are  regulated  by  labour  outlays  (trudovie 
zatrati)...  34 
However  Preobrazhenskii  does  not  mention  the  idea  of  labour 
value,  and  thus  Bogdanov  criticises  him.  Bogdanov  argues  that 
Preobrazhenskii  makes  this  mistake  because  he  is  looking  for 
another  science  to  use  in  socialism  instead  of  political  economy 
-a  science  of  social  technology. 
In  Marxist  literature  the  law  of  value  is  usually 
contrasted  either  with  the  law  of  primitive  socialist 
accumulation  or  with  a  law  of  planning.  Thus  it  is  implied  that 
these  things  are  totally  different  in  nature.  However,  Bogdanov 
speaks  of  the  law  of  value  'in  its  spontaneous  form'  and  'in  its 
planned  form'.  He  implies  that  there  is  some  general 
zakonomernost'  which  underlies  the  law  of  value,  and  which  may 
outlive  capitalism.  In  fact  Preobrazhenskii  had  done  exactly  the 
same  in  his  Novaya  ekonomika.  In  a  footnote  he  writes: 
...  I  speak  of  the  law  of  value  as  the  spontaneous 
regulator  under  the  commodity  and  the  commodity- 
capitalist  system  of  production,  that  is,  of  the 
historically-transient  form  assumed  in  exchange 
society  by  the  regulation  of  the  economy  by  labour- 
expenditure.  I  do  not  speak  of  this  regulation  in 
35  itself. 
According  to  Preobrazhenskii  regulation  by  labour-expenditure 
will  exist  in  planned  economy  too,  but  will  be  effected  in 
81 another  way,  ie  on  the  basis  of  direct  calculation  of  labour 
time.  Bukharin  had  in  fact  criticised  Preobrazhenskii  precisely 
for  not  conceeding  this  point,  as  shown  in  the  previous  chapter. 
These  distinctions  can  be  presented  in  diagramatic  form  as 
follows:  36 
LAW  OF  LABOUR-EXPENDITURE 
CAPITALISM  COMMUNISM 
A 
LAW  OF  VALUE  LAW  OF  PLANNING 
It  is  clear  from  these  debates  that  the  'law  of  value'  did  not 
have  a  clear  and  universally  accepted  meaning  for  economic 
theorists  in  the  USSR  in  the  1920s.  For  some  it  was  equivalent 
to  the  market  as  an  equilibriator  of  supply  and  demand,  for 
others  it  was  a  historically  specific  form  of  the  law  of  labour 
expenditure.  In  my  opinion  this  diversity  of  opinion  reflects 
the  ambiguity  present  in  Capital. 
3.7  -  FROM  NEP  TO  SOCIALISM? 
It  is  interesting  to  compare  Preobrazhenskii's  thoughts  on 
questions  of  state  regulation  and  markets  in  Novaya  ekonomika  to 
those  in  Ot  nepa  k  sotsializmu.  The  latter  was  written  much 
earlier  than  the  former,  almost  immediately  after  the  adoption 
of  NEP  in  1921,  and  contains  Preobrazhenskii's  speculations 
about  how  he  thinks/hopes  NEP  will  evolve. 
As  has  already  been  noted  one  of  the  basic  problems  of 
capitalism  according  to  Marxist  theory  is  realisation,  ie 
actually  selling  the  product  produced  at  a  price  which  yields 
the  expected  profit.  This  results  in  a  constant  search  for  new 
markets  on  which  to  sell.  However,  according  to  Preobrazhenskii, 
for  a  country  like  Russia  'external  markets  were  not  needed  for 
the  expansion  of  industry  because  every  increase  in  production 
made  more  available  for  socialist  distribution'.  37 
Overproduction  crises  were  thus  impossible  in  Russia:  although 
82 industry  still  worked  for  the  internal  peasant  market,  there  was 
no  need  for  external  markets. 
In  opposition  to  Lenin,  Preobrazhenskii  relates  in  Ot  nepa 
k  sotsializmu  that  he  believes  that  the  name  'state  capitalism' 
is  inappropriate  to  describe  the  Russian  economy  at  this  time. 
Rather  he  prefers  the  label  'commodity-socialist'  system  of 
economy  (tovarno-sotsialisticheskoi)  because  this  highlights  the 
two  key  constituents  -  petty  (peasant)  commodity  production  and 
large-scale  socialist  (state)  industry.  Preobrazhenskii's 
breakdown  of  the  NEP  economy  is  as  follows:  socialism  is 
represented  by  large-scale  state  industry,  which  occupies  the 
second  largest  section  of  the  entire  economy;  cooperatives, 
mixed  companies,  and  private  trade  occupy  significant  parts  of 
the  economy  but  each  are  smaller  in  total  than  state  industry; 
petty  production  in  town  and  country  represents  the  largest 
single  element  in  the  economy,  with  patriarchal  relations  also 
having  a  place  among  petty  producers. 
38  All  these  layers  of  the 
economy  are  linked  mainly  through  trade  and  thus  market 
relations,  and  this  is  evidently  a  picture  of  a  mixed  economy. 
The  following  passage  from  Ot  nepa  k  sotsializmu  is  very 
interesting  the  from  the  point  of  view  of  asking  the  question: 
how  much  market-determined  production  priority  was  allowed 
during  NEP?: 
Unless  an  enterprise  was  supported  by  the  state  as 
being  very  necessary  regardless  of  whether  it  was 
deficient  or  not,  the  question  of  its  necessity  was 
settled  by  reference  to  the  market. 
39 
This  suggests  that  only  the  most  important  types  of  production 
should  be,  according  to  Preobrazhenskii  in  1921,  supported  by 
the  state  regardless  of  its  economic  viability,  while  the 
majority  of  firms  should  be  allowed  to  find  their  own  way  on  the 
market.  Preobrazhenskii  notes  that  on  the  market  some 
enterprises  made  big  profits  while  others  hardly  made  ends  meet, 
and  this  led  to  a  situation  where  the  former  were  able  to  pay 
their  workers  a  great  deal  more  than  the  latter.  In  turn  this 
led  to  great  inequalities,  but  this  was  'absolutely  necessary' 
at  this  stage. 
40  Output  increases  were  stimulated  by  the  purely 
bourgeois  method  of  relying  on  the  personal  interest  of  each 
83 worker,  the  aim  being  to  expand  production  at  all  costs  with  the 
least  possible  expense. 
The  following  outline  by  Preobrazhenskii  of  a  practice 
supposidly  adopted  by  Gosbank  shows  firstly  that  his 
understanding  of  the  mechanics  of  markets  was  every  similar  to 
the  conception  which  was  dominant  in  'bourgeois'  economics  at 
this  time,  and  secondly  that  the  proletarian  state  would  act  on 
these  markets  in  an  identical  manner  to  those  wishing  to 
speculate  for  personal  gain,  except  of  course  that  the  spoils  of 
these  operations  would  be  used  for  the  construction  of 
socialism. 
Since  Russia  was  predominantly  an  agricultural  country,  it 
suffered  from  great  fluctuations  in  the  demand  for  money  in  the 
period  when  the  harvest  was  being  realised.  Gosbank  'brilliantly 
utilized'  these  seasonal  fluctuations  in  the  market  and  the 
corresponding  currency  conjectures  for  the  purpose  of 
accumulating  capital.  In  the  autumn,  when  all  commodity 
producers  in  the  countryside  were  obtaining  money  and  trying  to 
rid  themselves  of  goods,  Gosbank  utilised  its  right  of  issue  and 
bought  up  agricultural  products  with  hundreds  of  millions  of  new 
rubles.  In  the  spring  and  summer,  when  the  currency  'hangover' 
had  set  in  and  goods  were  scarce,  Gosbank  sold  off  at  favourable 
prices  its  stock  purchased  in  the  autumn  and  reaped  enormous 
profits. 
41  Thus  Gosbank  became  a  giant  speculator.  However, 
there  is  no  trace  of  this  idea  in  latter  works  such  as  Novaya 
ekonomika,  and  it  seems  unlikely  that  the  state  actually 
attempted  this  policy. 
Preobrazhenskii  gives  the  following  account  of  how  he 
thought  the  market  would  evolve  in  this  period: 
The  market,  with  its  capriciousness  and  its  elemental 
waves  of  rising  and  falling  prices,  ceased  to  be  a 
source  of  surprises  for  planned  economy,  partly 
through  study  of  the  demands  of  petty  production  and 
partly  through  the  power  over  it  which  the  state 
wielded  owing  to  its  dual  monopoly  in  the  production 
of  large-scale  industry  and  the  trade  in  its 
products.  I  was  gradually  'domesticated'  to 
socialism. 
4 
84 This  'domestication'  of  the  market  through  restricting  its  power 
proceeded  along  two  paths.  Firstly,  that  of  mastering  it  on  the 
basis  of  its  own  laws,  and  secondly,  that  of  distributing  part 
of  the  values  produced  in  ways  which  bypassed  it.  This  second 
path  included  collective  payment  of  bonuses  to  enterprises, 
advancing  long-term  loans  outside  of  the  market  mechanism, 
distribution  of  credit  in  kind  without  middlemen,  and  planned 
construction  outside  of  the  influence  of  market  criteria  by  the 
use  of  the  state's  free  capital.  As  a  result  of  this  sort  of 
combination  of  planned  guidance  with  capitalist  market 
calculation,  the  new  commodity-socialist  system  of  economy 
'exhibited  a  far  greater  equilibrium  of  its  different  parts  than 
had  ever  been  within  the  capacity  of  pure  capitalism'.  43 
Preobrazhenskii  writes  that  in  the  first  decade  of  NEP  the 
mixed  form  of  commodity-socialist  economy  opened  up  sufficient 
scope  for  the  development  of  the  producive  forces  so  that  the 
capitalist  forms  did  not  restrict  the  socialist  content. 
However,  after  a  time  restrictions  became  evident  and  a  new 
phase  of  casting  off  of  capitalist  husks  began.  44  In  this 
period: 
Market  prices,  formerly  the  spontaneous  regulator  of 
the  economy,  were  now  transformed  in  the  hands  of  the 
mighty  stgte,  into  an  auxiliary  tool  of  planned 
economy. 
The  movement  of  prices  on  the  market  was  now  a  means  of 
socialist  regulation  of  the  non-socialist  sectors  of  the 
economy.  Preobrazhenskii  seems  to  have  been  so  impressed  by  the 
regulatory  powers  of  the  market  that  instead  of  claiming  it 
could  be  used  in  the  transition  period  only,  in  the  following 
quote  he  shows  that  he  believed  it  would  exist  well  into 
socialism  itself,  and  not  fade  until  socialism  finally 
transforms  into  communism: 
...  socialism  does  not  completely  exclude  the  market 
for  those  branches  of  the  economy  -  for  example  for 
petty  production  -  which  are  not  yet  socialised. 
True,  these  branches,  and  the  market  with  them, 
gradually  wither  away  under  socialism.  But  they 
wither  away  gradually,  as  socialism  turns  into 
communism... 
85 During  the  existence  of  the  mixed  system  of  commodity-socialist 
production  'the  state  did  not  hasten  to  drive  money  out  of 
circulation  or  artificially  restrict  the  sphere  of  calculations 
of  money',  since  under  the  mixed  system  'money  had  a  great 
advantage,  and  could  not  be  replaced  by  "labour-units"  or  other 
artificially  conceived  methods  of  calculation'.  47  It  is  clear 
that  in  general  Ot  nepa  k  sotsializmu  was  more  optimistic  in 
tone  that  Preobrazhenskii's  later  works,  and  was  also  somewhat 
more  positive  towards  the  use  of  the  market  in  NEP. 
3.8  -  THE  GOODS  FAMINE 
Preobrazhenskii's  analysis  of  the  goods  famine  is 
interesting  for  what  it  reveals  about  his  views  of  the  market. 
However,  before  examining  this  it  is  useful  to  begin  with  some 
preliminary  remarks  about  War  Communism. 
In  'Ekonomicheskaya  politika  proletariata  v  krest'yanskoi 
strane'  published  in  Kommunisticheskii  internatsional  in  1922 
Preobrazhenskii  had  compared  NEP  to  War  Communism.  He 
characterised  War  Communism  as  an  attempt  to  impose  planned 
distribution  of  products  when  a  petty  individual  mode  of 
production  was  dominant.  In  these  terms  NEP  came  about  because 
'the  peasantry  forced  the  state  to  return  to  the  old  system  of 
market  distribution'.  48  This  implies  that  War  Communism  did  not 
prevent  market  production,  only  market  distribution.  In 
'Khozyaistvennoe  ravnovesie  pri  konkretnom  kapitalizme  iv 
sisteme  SSSR'  published  in  VKA  in  1926  Preobrazhenskii  notes 
that  in  War  Communism,  as  opposed  to  NEP,  there  was  no  market 
link  between  the  state  sector  and  the  petty  production  sector. 
However,  although  no  legal  market  exchange  occurred,  illegal  and 
'semi-legal'  markets  did  exist. 
49  This  shows  two  things. 
Firstly,  that  War  Communism  did  not  eliminate  the  market  in  the 
field  of  production.  Secondly,  that  although  there  was  no  legal 
market  link  between  the  state  and  petty  production  sectors  in 
the  field  of  distribution,  there  was  an  illegal  market  link. 
Thus  it  is  possible  to  conclude  that,  contrary  to  popular 
86 belief,  the  market  was  indeed  quite  active  in  the  War  Communism 
period. 
Now  to  the  goods  famine.  In  'Ekonomicheskie  zametki  I-0 
tavarnom  golode'  published  in  Pravda  in  1925  Preobrazhenskii 
states  that  the  goods  famine  is  the  result  of  an  excess  of 
effective  demand  over  supply-50  Roughly  the  same  proportions  of 
agriculture  and  industry  existed  in  Tsarist  Russia  as  now  exists 
in  the  USSR  -  why  did  they  not  experience  a  goods  famine  also? 
The  reason  is,  according  to  Preobrazhenskii,  that  the  peasantry 
paid  higher  taxes  and  dues  in  Tsarist  Russia.  51  The  goods  famine 
is  a  result  of  the  altered  system  of  distribution  of  national 
income  (ie  of  effective  demand),  therefore  by  implication  the 
way  to  prevent  a  further  goods  famine  is  to  reduce  the  effective 
demand  of  the  peasantry. 
In  'Ekonomicheskaya  zametki  II'  published  in  Bol'shevik  in 
1926  Preobrazhenskii  comes  at  the  problem  from  a  different 
angle.  He  asks  how  would  the  law  of  value  restore  equilibrium  if 
it  functioned  without  hindrance  in  the  USSR?: 
A  long-term  rise  in  the  prices  of  industrial 
commodities  would  have  to  lead,  on  the  one  hand,  to 
increased  imports  of  the  commodities  in  short  supply 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  a  redistribution  of 
productive  forces  between  town  and  country  through 
the  influx  of  fresh  capital  into  branches  with 
underproduction  of  commodities.  52 
Thus  production  would  adjust  to  the  country's  expanding 
effective  demand  by  both  increasing  imports  and  increasing 
production  in  those  branches  which  produce  the  goods  in 
question.  However,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  two  processes  of 
importation  and  increased  internal  production  are  a  zero-sum 
game.  The  more  of  one  which  occurs,  the  less  of  the  other.  The 
world  law  of  value  (or  comparative  advantage  in  'bourgeois' 
terminology)  will  decide  what  mix  of  the  two  actually  occurs.  It 
may  be  that  no  new  production  within  the  USSR  is  called  on-line, 
since  it  would  be  more  efficient  for  the  world  economy  for  other 
countries  to  produce  the  required  goods  and  export  them  to  the 
USSR.  In  other  passages  Preobrazhenskii  realises  this,  for 
example  also  in  'Ekonomicheskie  zametki  II'  the  following 
passage  can  be  found: 
87 If  economic  relations  in  our  country  were  now  to 
develop  on  the  basis  of  the  free  operation  of  the  law 
of  value  of  the  world  economy  ...  two-thirds  of  our 
large-scale  industry  would  be  eliminated  because  of 
its  unprofitability...  from  the  standpoint  of  th 
world  division  of  labour  on  a  capitalist  basis.  -J3 
If  the  law  of  value  would  lead  to  elimination  of  much  large- 
scale  industry,  then  an  argument  which  says  that  investment  in 
industry  should  be  increased  because  this  is  what  would  happen 
if  the  law  of  value  operated  without  hindrance,  is  plainly 
contradictory.  However,  from  Preobrazhenskii's  analysis  of  the 
goods  famine  it  is  apparent  that  he  perceived  the  mechanics  of 
world  'law  of  value'  operation  in  the  same  manner  as  many  non- 
Marxist  economists. 
3.9  -  REPRODUCTION  SCHEMES 
The  equilibrium  condition  which  Preobrazhenskii  claims  Marx 
discovered  in  simple  reproduction  was  the  following: 
Iv  +  Is  =  IIc 
However  in  concrete  capitalism  this  condition  was  violated,  and 
in  fact  there  was  a  different  equilibrium  condition. 
Preobrazhenskii's  work  in  this  area  was  thus  an  attempt  to 
discover  the  equilibrium  condition  which  corresponded  to  the 
current  transition  period  of  the  Soviet  economy. 
The  analysis  of  equilibrium  in  present  day  Soviet  economy, 
according  to  Preobrazhenskii  in  'Khozyaistvennoe  ravnovesie  pri 
konkretnom  kapitalizme  iv  sisteme  SSSR',  necessitates  three 
sectoral  divisions  as  follows:  1)  the  state  sector;  2)  The 
private  capitalist  sector;  3)  simple  commodity  production. 
54 
The  latter  two  sectors  make  up  what  is  called  'private  economy' 
as  a  whole.  The  form  of  the  schemes  corresponding  to  this  are 
thus: 
1)  state  sector: 
Ic  +  Iv  +  surplus  product 
IIc  +  IIv  +  surplus  product 
88 2)  capitalist  sector: 
Ic  +  Iv  +  Is 
IIc  +  IIv  +  Its 
3)  petty  bourgeois  sector: 
Ic  +  consumption  fund  +  surplus  product 
IIc  +  consumption  fund  +  surplus  product 
Further  on  in  the  same  work  Preobrazhenskii  gives  the 
equilibrium  conditions  for  the  entire  Soviet  economy.  They  are: 
1)  Given  a  discrepancy  between  world  and  domestic  industrial 
prices,  economic  equilibrium  with  expanded  reproduction  can 
only  be  brought  about  on  the  basis  of  nonequivalent  exchange 
with  the  private  sector; 
2)  The  volume  of  accumulation  in  the  state  sector  is  not 
arbitrary,  but  subject  to  'iron  laws  of  proportionality'. 
This  second  condition  has  to  do  with  the  proportions  of 
accumulation  needed  to  maintain  equilibrium  after  the  first 
condition  has  been  satisfied.  Preobrazhenskii  warns  that  if 
the  required  proportions  are  not  achieved  in  planned  fashion 
the  law  of  value  will  'burst  through  with  elemental  force';  55 
3)  This  condition  has  to  do  with  the  extent  of  Soviet 
participation  in  the  world  division  of  labour  and  the 
specific  conditions  under  which  this  participation  takes 
place.  Preobrazhenskii  outlines  the  following  scheme 
corresponding  to  the  state  sector  of  the  Soviet  economy: 
I  2100c  +  1400v  +  1400surplus  product  (700  to  the  accumulation 
fund;  700  to  the  nonproductive  consumption  fund) 
II  3550c  +  1775v  +  1775  surplus  product  (887.5  to  the 
accumulation  fund;  887.5  to  the  nonproductive  consumption  fund) 
These  numbers  are  based  very  roughly  on  the  actual  proportions 
of  state  economy  in  the  USSR  for  1925/6.  In  this  scheme 
Preobrazhenskii  assumes  that  half  of  IIc,  1775c,  is  reproduced 
though  exchange  with  petty  bourgeois  economy.  How  can  the  other 
half  be  reproduced?  The  answer  is,  according  to  Preobrazhenskii, 
through  foreign  trade.  If  the  state  sector  has  a  shortage  of  400 
million  rubles  then  it  must  export  consumer  goods  from  the 
peasant  economy  valued  at  200  million  rubles  ($100  million), 
since  to  produce  this  foreign  equipment  internally  would  cost 
400  million  rubles  and  would  thus  be  clearly  irrational.  56 
89 4)  Proportionality  in  distribution  of  labour  and  exchange 
between  state  and  private  economy.  Consumer  goods  are 
exported,  equipment  imported,  and  the  sellers  of  the  consumer 
goods  purchase  the  goods  produced  by  the  imported 
equipment.  However,  Preobrazhenskii  notes  that  'whether  or 
not  recourse  to  the  foreign  market  is  practically  possible 
under  present  conditions  is  another  question'.  57 
5)  Systematic  growth  of  wages; 
6)  Systematic  reduction  of  prices  of  output  of  state  economy  in 
order  to  return  to  normal  world  market  prices; 
7)  Gradual  absorption  of  the  country's  excess  population  by  the 
developing  state  and  agricultural  economies. 
All  seven  of  these  equilibrium  conditions  show  how  closely 
the  development  of  socialism  is  connected  with  the  necessity  'to 
make  a  breach  in  our  socialist  isolation  and  to  rely  in  the 
future  on  the  material  resources  of  other  socialist 
countries'. 
58  However,  the  idea  of  receiving  (free?  )  resources 
from  other  socialist  countries  and  the  notion  of  engaging  in 
trade  on  the  world  market  are  two  quite  different  possibilities. 
Throughout  'Khozyaistvennoe  ravnovesie  v  sisteme  SSSR' 
Preobrazhenskii  stresses  the  need  for  foreign  economic 
relations,  but  this  is  clearly  trade  with  capitalist  countries, 
with  the  USSR  offering  a  fair  exchange  of  goods  which  it  has 
produced.  Right  at  the  end  of  this  work,  however,  he  mentions 
the  material  resources  of  other  socialist  countries. 
This  section  reveals  that  Preobrazhenskii  was  concerned 
very  much  with  the  question  of  achieving  equilibrium  in  the 
Soviet  economy.  It  also  shows  that  he  took  seriously  the 
question  of  the  relation  between  the  private  and  state  sectors 
in  achieving  an  equilibrium,  and  that  he  was  against 
isolationism.  As  to  whether  the  socialist  revolution  would  have 
necessarily  to  spread  before  the  building  of  socialism  could  be 
begun,  I  believe  he  remained  ambiguous.  In  relation  to  markets 
this  shows  that  Preobrazhenskii  took  seriously  the  idea  of 
balanced  exchange  between  markets,  domestic  and  overseas,  and 
used  Marx's  reproduction  schemes  to  attempt  to  calculate  Soviet 
trade  requirements. 
90 3.10  -  THE  QUANTITY  THEORY  OF  MONEY 
The  quantity  theory  of  money  has  a  long  history  going  back 
at  least  to  Hume  and  Ricardo.  Throughout  its  history  it  has  been 
subject  to  many  reformulations,  although  it  has  remained  a 
theory  concerned  with  four  interconnected  variables:  the 
quantity  of  money  in  circulation,  its  velocity  of  turnover,  the 
general  price  level,  and  the  the  number  of  transactions  which 
occur/the  aggregate  level  of  production.  This  can  be  expressed 
as  follows: 
MV  =  PT 
This  equation  only  becomes  a  theory  when  a  causal  sequence  is 
proposed.  Traditionally  it  was  held  that  an  increase  in  M  would 
lead  to  an  increase  in  P,  since  V  and  T  would  remain  constant. 
However,  this  is  only  an  assumption.  An  increase  in  M  could  lead 
to  the  equilibrium  state  being  re-establised  either  through  a 
decrease  of  V  (Steuart),  an  increase  in  T  (Keynes),  an  increase 
in  P  (Friedman),  or  certain  combinations  of  these  changes.  Which 
particular  variable(s)  change  cannot  be  answered  endogenously. 
Marx  discusses  the  quantity  theory  of  money  at  some  length 
in  chapter  two  of  A  Contribution  to  a  Critique  of  Political 
Economy  of  1859.  He  uses  the  writings  of  Hume,  Ricardo,  J.  S. 
Mill,  James  Steuart,  and  Thomas  Tooke  as  material  through  which 
to  present  his  own  ideas  on  this  topic,  although  his  ideas  are 
not  particularly  original  and,  as  he  admits,  are  based  on  the 
works  of  Steuart,  Tooke,  and  to  some  extent  Ricardo.  The  basic 
view  which  Marx  wishes  to  refute  is  that  the  prices  of 
commodities  are  in  some  sense  determined  by  the  volume  of  money 
in  circulation,  ie  that  the  causal  sequence  runs  from  M  to  P. 
Hume  is  taken  by  Marx  as  the  most  important  exponent  of  this 
view.  59  Marx  posits  two  basic  criticisms  of  this  view,  which  can 
be  summarised  as  follows: 
1)  the  fact  that  gold  is  both  a  commodity  and  a  means  of 
circulation; 
2)  that  V  does  not  remain  constant. 
The  first  criticism  used  by  Marx  states  that  there  is  a 
fundamental  difference  between  using  precious  metals  as  money 
and  using  paper  notes  as  money.  If,  for  example,  gold  is  used  as 
91 the  universal  equivalent,  then  its  value  cannot  be  determined  in 
a  purely  arbitrary  manner.  Marx  quotes  Ricardo  to  the  effect 
that  the  value  of  gold  is  determined  by  the  labour-time  taken  to 
produce  it.  According  to  Marx  Hume's  theory  relies  on  the  notion 
that  the  value  of  gold  is  determined  by  the  proportion  of  its 
volume  compared  to  the  volume  of  commodities,  ie  the  balancing 
of  the  two  against  each  other. 
60  If  Hume's  view  is  accepted, 
then  it  follows  that  an  increase  in  the  quantity  of  gold  will 
ceteris  paribus  result  in  a  fall  in  its  value.  However,  Marx's 
criticism  relies  on  the  dual  nature  of  gold  and  the  fact  that 
its  value  is  determined  by  the  labour-time  taken  to  produce  it. 
Instead  of  the  prices  of  commodities  depending  on  the  volume  of 
money  in  circulation,  the  volume  of  money  in  circulation  is 
dependent  on  the  prices  of  commodities,  since  gold  is  also  a 
commodity  and  its  production  will  thus  vary  according  to  its 
price.  According  to  Marx's  theory  of  price,  its  price  will  be 
determined  by  its  value  mediated  through  the  distribution  of 
profit  on  the  basis  of  the  organic  composition  of  capital  and 
further  mediated  by  the  fluctuations  of  supply  and  demand.  Since 
gold  is  a  commodity  with  real  value  its  production  cannot  be 
increased  arbitrarily,  and  thus  the  amount  of  gold  in 
circulation  is  dependent  at  least  partially  on  how  much  gold  is 
produced  as  a  commodity.  Thus  Marx  writes: 
The  quantity  of  means  of  circulation  employed  in  a 
country  is  thus  determined  by  the  value  of  the 
standard  of  money  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  the 
aggregate  of  the  exchange  values  of  commodities  on 
the  other. 
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If  the  value  of  the  standard  of  money  is  exogenously  determined, 
then  the  causal  sequence  runs  from  P  to  M. 
Marx's  second  criticism  holds  that  the  velocity  of 
circulation  of  money  does  not  necessarily  remain  constant  when 
the  amount  of  currency  in  circulation  is  increased.  Drawing  on 
James  Steuart,  Marx  claims  that  if  more  gold  is  in  circulation 
than  is  required,  then  it  will  be  hoarded  or  turned  into  luxury 
items,  ie  it  will  not  circulate  as  money. 
62  This  can  be  recast 
to  say  that  an  increase  in  the  amount  of  money  in  circulation 
will  result  in  a  decrease  in  its  circulation  until  the  original 
92 equilibrium  state  is  achieved.  Again  this  relies  on  the  fact 
that  gold  is  also  a  commodity,  ie  has  intrinsic  value,  and  can 
thus  be  withdrawn  from  circulation  without  the  withdrawer 
forfeiting  any  value.  Marx  sums  up  his  position  as  follows, 
using  Tooke's  History  of  Prices  of  1823  as  supporting  evidence. 
The  direct  correlation  between  prices  and  the  quantity  of  money 
presupposed  by  Hume's  theory,  with  the  chain  of  causation 
running  from  M  to  P,  is  purely  imaginary.  Continued 
investigation  into  the  history  of  prices  compelled  Tooke,  even 
though  he  was  originally  an  adherent  of  Hume's  theory,  to 
recognise  that: 
... 
increases  or  decreases  in  the  amount  of  currency 
when  the  value  of  precious  metals  remains  constant 
are  always  the  consequence,  never  the  cause,  of  price 
variations,  that  altogether  the  circulation  of  money 
is  merely  a  secondary  movement  and  that,  in  addition 
to  serving  as  a  medium  of  circulation,  money  performs 
various  othe  functions  in  the  real  process  of 
production.  6 
3.11  -  THE  THEORY  OF  DEPRECIATING  CURRENCY 
Preobrazhenskii  is  well  known  for  his  idea  of  using 
inflation  to  tax  the  rich  and  his  advocacy  of  'the  end  of  money' 
during  War  Communism.  In  Finansy  v  epokhu  diktatury  proletariata 
of  1921  he  had  written  that  the  issue  of  paper  money  by  a 
proleterian  government  was  necessary: 
... 
for  both  countries  with  a  highly  developed 
capitalism  and  for  predominantly  agrarian  economies 
with  only  one  difference,  that  in  the  first  group  of 
countries  the  liquidation  of  paper-money  circulation 
can  occur  quicker  than  in  the  second.  64 
In  this  work  Preobrazhenskii  also  spoke  of  the  need  to  'close 
all  apparatuses  of  paper  emission  and  to  allow  the  monetary 
system  to  die  a  natural  death'.  65  However,  soon  after 
Preobrazhenskii  had  written  these  words  the  Bolsheviks  were 
desperately  trying  to  resuscitate  the  'terminally  ill'  monetary 
system  after  the  declaration  of  NEP.  In  Voprosy  finansovoi 
politiki  of  1921  this  change  is  shown  clearly.  Preobrazhenskii 
93 writes  that  the  first  general  task  of  financial  policy  is  'to 
achieve  a  stable  currency',  and  this  is  to  be  achieved  by 
reducing  emission.  66  Previously  issue  of  paper  money  was  used  to 
cover  the  budget  deficit,  and  this  destabilised  the  currency. 
Now  planned  emission  is  required  in  order  to  'drill  discipline' 
into  both  producers  and  consumers.  67 
The  topic  of  depreciating  currency  was  the  subject  of  quite 
a  long  work  by  Preobrazhenskii  entitled  Teoriya  padayushchei 
valyuty,  which  was  published  in  1930.68  It  is  noticable  that  at 
this  time  Preobrazhenskii  seemed  reluctant  to  engage  in  directly 
topical  work,  and  this  particular  book  examines  the  theory  of 
currency  depreciation  in  relation  to  countries  which  experienced 
this  phenomenon  after  WW1.  This  work  is  particularly  useful  in 
that  it  shows  how  Preobrazhenskii  viewed  money  in  an  economic 
system  at  some  length.  According  to  Preobrazhenskii  money,  for 
Marx,  fulfils  four  basic  functions.  They  are: 
1)  a  measure  of  value  and  a  scale  of  price; 
2)  a  means  of  circulation; 
3)  a  store  of  value; 
4)  a  means  of  payment.  69 
However,  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  Preobrazhenskii, 
following  Marx,  differentiated  between  gold  as  the  universal 
equivalent  and  paper  money,  whose  function  was  merely  to 
represent  gold  and  other  precious  metals  such  as  silver.  At  this 
time  the  gold  standard  was  still  important.  Preobrazhenskii 
writes: 
Marx  showed  that  the  ideal  for  a  commodity  economy  is 
metallic  money,  because  physically  it  is  the  most 
suitable  for  fulfilling  the  functions  of  monetary 
trade  in  an  economy  where  the  spontaneous  regulator 
is  the  law  of  value.  70 
According  to  Preobrazhenskii  paper  money  is  a  suitable  form  of 
money  for  the  internal  circulation  of  a  country,  but  could  not 
be  used  for  circulation  between  countries.  For  this  purpose  gold 
was  required.  This  is  in  concord  with  Marx,  who  wrote  that 
'paper  notes  are  money  of  the  society,  whereas  gold  and  silver 
are  money  of  the  world'.  71  From  the  point  of  view  of 
investigating  conceptions  of  the  market  the  theoretical 
94 framework  from  which  Preobrazhenskii  explains  why  a  currency 
depreciates  is  most  revealing.  In  this  section  I  try  to 
construct  from  the  positions  Preobrazhenskii  sets  out  in  this 
work  his  conception  of  the  relation  between  the  quantity  of 
money  in  circulation  and  the  rate  of  depreciation  of  the 
currency  in  order  to  yield  a  version  of  the  quantity  theory. 
Preobrazhenskii  claims  that  the  two  basic  factors  which 
determine  whether  a  currency  will  depreciate  or  not  are  the  rate 
of  emission  and  the  scale  of  commodity-exchange.  72  Elsewhere  in 
this  work  he  writes  that  'a  third  factor  which  influences  the 
necessary  quantity  of  money  in  circulation  is  the  velocity  of 
money  turnover  (bistrota  oborota  deneg)'.  73  Given  that  currency 
depreciation  is  manifested  in  price  increases,  Preobrazhenskii 
presents  four  related  variables  in  his  theory  of  currency 
depreciation.  They  could  be  represented  thus: 
MV  =  PT 
where  M=  the  quantity  of  money  (related  to  the  rate  of 
emission),  V=  the  velocity  of  money  turnover,  P=  the  price 
level,  and  T=  the  scale  of  commodity-exchange.  This  is  similar 
to,  although  not  identical  with,  the  quantity  theory  equation 
given  earlier. 
This  type  of  equation  is  clearly  what  Preobrazhenskii  has 
in  mind,  because  he  lists  four  examples  or  basic  scenarios  which 
could  occur  with  regards  to  stabilising  a  depreciating  currency 
which  illustrate  this.  In  the  first  scenario,  if  the  amount  of 
commodity-exchange  in  a  country  is  held  constant  and  if  paper- 
money  emission  is  suspended,  price  stabilisation  will  be 
achieved  'completely  spontaneously'.  In  terms  of  the  equation, 
if  T  and  M  are  held  constant,  then  P  will  be  constant. 
74  In  the 
second  scenario  there  is  not  only  a  cessation  of  monetary 
emission,  but  also  a  widening  of  commodity-exchange,  and  in 
these  conditions  stabilisation  will  be  achieved  still  faster 
than  in  scenario  one.  In  the  third  scenario  the  expansion  of 
commodity  exchange  exceeds  the  emission  of  paper  money,  and  thus 
stabilisation  can  be  achieved  even  without  a  reduction  of  paper- 
money  emission.  According  to  Preobrazhenskii  scenario  three 
corresponds  to  Russia  after  the  adoption  of  NEP.  In  the  fourth 
95 scenario  paper-money  emission  proceeds  in  conditions  where 
commodity-exchange  is  in  protracted  decline.  If  this  decline 
continues  even  after  the  suspension  of  emission,  then 
stabilisation  is  impossible  to  achieve  as  a  result  of  suspending 
emission  and  inflation  will  be  the  inevitable  result.  75 
Using  this  framework  Preobrazhenskii  explains  the  recovery 
in  Russia  after  the  adoption  of  NEP  as  follows.  In  the  summer  of 
1921  there  was  still  a  fast  growth  in  the  rate  of  emission  of 
paper  money,  but  after  several  months  the  ruble  was  stabilised: 
The  main  reason  was  the  sharp  expansion  of  monetary 
commodity-exchange,  connected  with  the  restoration  of 
free  trade  and  with  the  increased  capacity  for 
76  commodity-exchange. 
In  another  part  of  this  work  Preobrazhenskii  adds  another  factor 
to  the  four  already  given  in  the  classical  quantity  theory  -  the 
amount  of  non-monetary  accounting.  77  This  factor  is  obviously 
connected  to  the  specific  conditions  of  the  USSR  in  the  1920s, 
where  pre-capitalist  forms  were  common  and  monetary  relations 
were  less  than  totally  stable.  However,  he  does  not  use  this 
factor  in  the  four  scenarios  he  outlines,  which  perhaps 
indicates  that  he  thought  it  of  less  importance. 
This  explanation  by  Preobrazhenskii  is  very  close  to  the 
classical  quantity  theory  outlined  above.  In  fact  it  would  be 
fair  to  say  that  Preobrazhenskii  is  using  the  quantity  theory  to 
explain  events  in  Russia  during  NEP.  This  it  is  clear  that 
Preobrazhenskii's  conception  of  how  'the  market'  functioned  in 
relation  to  the  circulation  of  money  was  very  similar  to 
orthodox  'bourgeois'  conceptions. 
78 
Preobrazhenskii  also  discusses  the  question  of  how  the 
quantity  of  money  which  is  required  for  circulation,  taking  the 
word  'circulation'  (obrashchenie)  in  its  wide  meaning,  is 
actually  determined.  Six  factors  play  a  role:  1)  the  aggregate 
trading  mass;  2)  gold  commodity  prices;  3)  the  speed  of  monetary 
turnover;  4)  requirement  for  money  as  a  means  of  payment;  5)  the 
quantity  of  non-monetary  accounting;  6)  the  level  of 
accumulation. 
79 
Preobrazhenskii's  example,  which  he  gives  further  on  in  the 
work,  is  as  follows.  All  circulation  in  a  country  is  demanded  in 
96 conditions  where  commodity-turnover  equals  X,  the  function  of 
money  as  a  means  of  circulation  demands  quantity  Y,  where 
monetary  accumulation  equals  Z,  with  non-monetary  accounting 
equaling  T,  and  with  speed  of  turnover  equal  to  U.  80  Assume  that 
a  country  has  ten  milliard  rubles  for  a  period  of  time.  With  a 
stable  currency  if  the  speed  of  circulation  is  increased  ten 
times,  if  accumulation  demands  three  hundred  million,  if  non- 
monetary  accounting  equals  one  hundred  and  fifty  million,  and 
money  as  a  means  of  payment  requires  two  hundred  and  fifty 
million,  then  the  calculation  will  be  as  follows:  81 
10  milliard/10  +  300  million  +  250  million  -  150  million  =  1400 
million 
or  in  algebraic  terms: 
Y/U  +Z+X-T=r 
If  there  is  twice  the  amount  of  paper  money  in  circulation 
'necessary  for  representing  gold  (predstavitel  'stva  zolota)', 
then  its  value  will  depreciate  to  half  the  original  value, 
because  only  with  such  a  depreciation  will  it  correctly 
represent  the  real  quantity  of  gold  which  is  necessary  for 
circulation.  82 
It  is  clear  from  my  exposition  that  Preobrazhenskii  does 
not  really  question  the  basic  assumptions  and  framework  of  the 
classical  quantity  theory  of  money  in  this  work.  He  is  concerned 
with  paper  money,  and  thus  Marx's  criticisms  of  the  quantity 
theory  based  on  the  dual  nature  of  gold  could  not  stand  in  this 
case.  However,  Marx  seems  to  agree  with  Steuart's  version  of  a 
Law  of  Reflux,  something  which  Preobrazhenskii  does  not  mention 
in  this  work. 
83  In  my  opinion  Preobrazhenskii  seems  to  agree 
with  the  classical  quantity  theory  to  a  greater  extent  than 
Marx.  This  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  Preobrazhenskii  was  not 
in  a  situation  which  allowed  the  'luxury'  of  theoretical 
speculation  to  the  degree  afforded  to  Marx,  but  was  rather 
attempting  to  implement  policy,  or  it  may  be  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  situation  in  Russia  in  the  1920s  actually  proved  the 
97 classical  quantity  theory  proposition  that  the  causal  sequence 
runs  from  M  to  p.  84 
Preobrazhenskii's  explanation  of  currency  depreciation  in 
France  after  WW1,  which  reinforces  my  argument  above,  is  as 
follows.  Huge  reserves  were  issued  by  the  French  state  bank,  an 
act  connected  to  the  economics  of  the  war  period,  and  for  a 
while  this  did  not  weaken  the  franc.  However,  France  increased 
its  emission  for  circulation  from  27.6  milliard  to  34.7 
milliard,  ie  by  more  than  25%:  'As  a  result,  despite  the 
increase  in  commodity-turnover..  .  at  the  end  of  1919  depreciation 
had  already  reached  118%1.85  In  a  period  of  war  it  is  necessary 
to  increase  the  state  income,  and  this  increase  can  be  obtained 
from  three  sources:  increasing  taxation,  borrowing  from  future 
income,  and  increasing  emission.  When  the  first  two  methods  are 
not  longer  sufficient,  the  third  is  invariably  used. 
Preobrazhenskii  labels  inflation  an  'irrational  and  anarchic 
method'  of  reducing  social  consumption  and  central  government 
spending,  and  he  notes  that  it  achieves  its  aim  by  creating  an 
illusion  of  increasing  wages. 
86  However,  he  does  not  outline  a 
rational  and  planned  method  of  achieving  this  result. 
Preobrazhenskii's  attitude  to  inflation  and  the 
decpreciation  process  had  changed  markedly  from  his  pre-NEP 
views.  From  welcoming  inflation  as  a  sign  of  the  coming  end  of 
capitalism,  he  writes  in  1930: 
All  the  working  population  and  all  small  proprietors, 
ie  the  majority  of  the  population,  are  suffering  from 
the  side  effects  of  a  depreciating  currency  and 
consequently  are  against  the  policy  of  inflation.  87 
For  capitalist  society  inflation  has  a  large  advantage  and  is 
increasingly  indispensable,  since  it  achieves  the  desired  result 
'in  confusion,  imperceptibly,  and  in  a  spontaneous  manner'. 
Preobrazhenskii  notes  that  'the  budget  and  the  regulation  of 
monetary  circulation  is  the  area  where  bourgeois  society  has  its 
plan  and  economic  foresight',  thus  implying  that  in  socialism  a 
qualititively  different  type  of  plan  was  required. 
88 
Preobrazhenskii's  writings  after  approximately  1928/9  seem 
to  become  more  technical,  and  less  concerned  with  overtly 
political  questions  or  questions  of  the  overall  nature  and 
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difficult  to  postulate  a  reason  for  this.  A  good  example  of  this 
later  type  of  writing  is  'Vtopaya  pyatletka  legkoi 
promishlennosti'  published  in  1932  in  Planovoe  khozyaistvo.  This 
deals  with  technical  problems  of  producing  and  co-ordinating  raw 
materials  for  light  industry,  and  with  finding  the  most  rational 
uses  of  resources  and  maximal  levels  of  production.  The  closest 
Preobrazhenskii  comes  to  proposing  any  kind  of  theoretical 
principle  is  when  he  discusses  the  geographical  distribution  of 
light  industry.  He  writes  that  Soviet  power  had  received  as  its 
inheritance  a  geographical  distribution  of  light  industry  which 
was  in  'glaring  contradiction'  with  the  basic  line  of  the 
economic  policy  of  the  USSR  and  the  'spirit  of  socialist 
distribution  of  productive  forces': 
All  cotton  industry  was  sited  at  a  distance  of  four 
thousand  kilometres  from  the  basic  regions  of  raw 
materials.  The  basic  mass  of  the  flax  industry  was 
situated  in  the  territory  of  Ivanovchoi  oblast',  at  a 
time  when  the  main  mass  of  flax  fibre  production  was 
in  the  Western  regions...  which  do  not  have  flax 
enterprises.  89 
Instead  of  this  Preobrazhenskii  urges  that  productive 
enterprises  should  be  sited  as  close  to  their  raw  material  bases 
as  possible.  Whether  this  is  a  particularly  'socialist' 
principle  or  not  is  open  to  debate,  but  it  shows  that  by  this 
time  Preobrazhenskii  had  stopped  openly  discussing  the  major 
questions  of  socialist  economic  policy  which  had  so  fascinated 
him  during  NEP. 
3.12  -  CONCLUSION 
In  the  first  section  of  this  chapter  I  compared 
Preobrazhenskii's  work  with  Marx's  original  statements  on  the 
subject  of  monopoly  instruments  in  the  transition.  It  seems  to 
me  that  Marx's  ideas  are  very  general  with  respect  to  credit, 
and  thus  in  this  general  sense  it  can  be  said  that 
Preobrazhenskii  followed  Marx.  As  regards  Preobrazhenskii's 
conception  of  the  market  this  shows  that  he  believed  that  market 
99 relations  would  already  be  partially  negated  when  the 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  first  came  to  power.  As  regards 
the  quantity  theory  of  money,  I  argued  that  Preobrazhenskii  was 
more  sympathetic  to  the  classical  version  of  it  than  Marx, 
although  since  Preobrazhenskii  was  dealing  with  paper  money  not 
backed  by  gold  it  is  difficult  to  make  a  definitive  comparison 
using  this  material.  This  element  of  market  economics  was  thus 
used  uncritically  by  Preobrazhenskii. 
Preobrazhenskii's  use  of  the  quantity  theory  show  that  his 
criticisms  of  the  market  are  fundamentally  external.  This  means 
that,  as  regards  microeconomics,  Preobrazhensky's  ideas  of  how 
the  market  actually  functions  are  not  really  any  different  from 
that  of  an  orthodox  'bourgeois'  economist.  In  his  analyses  of 
concrete  phenomena,  for  example  the  goods  famine,  he  called  upon 
the  traditional  notion  of  supply  and  demand  being  harmonised  by 
the  market  mechanism,  and  argued  that  the  state  must  restore  the 
equilibrium  which  would  have  been  restored  in  a  market  economy 
by  the  law  of  value.  In  relation  to  the  debates  over  the  law  of 
value  I  argued  that  there  was  a  great  deal  of  confusion  over 
what  this  law  actually  was,  with  some  theorists  using  it  as  a 
synonym  for  the  market  mechanism  of  price  equilibriation. 
Preobrazhenskii's  statement  that  the  market  represents  society's 
effective  demand  shows  that  he  viewed  the  market  in  the 
traditional  Marxist  sense  of  capacity,  rather  than  in  the  sense 
of  being  a  mechanism  for  achieving  optimal  production.  However, 
his  work  using  Marx's  reproduction  schemes  demonstrates  that  he 
still  took  seriously  the  categories  Marx  had  developed  for 
explaining  the  movement  of  capitalist  production. 
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104 CHAPTER  FOUR  -  STRUMILIN,  BAZAROV,  AND  GROMAN 
4.1.1  -  INTRODUCTION 
This  chapter  will  examine  conceptions  of  the  market  which 
existed  within  the  state  planning  organ  Gosplan  in  the  1920s  by 
examining  three  leading  figures  from  this  institution:  S.  G. 
Strumilin  on  the  one  hand,  and  V.  G.  Groman  and  V.  A.  Bazarov  on 
the  other.  They  are  chosen  because  they  represent  different 
currents  within  Gosplan,  one  of  which  was  politically  triumphant 
at  the  end  of  the  decade. 
Stanislav  Gustavovich  Strumilin  (1877-1974)  was  originally 
a  Menshevik,  but  joined  the  Bolsheviks  in  1923.  As  a  student  he 
studied  at  the  St  Petersburg  Polytechnical  Institute  under 
Struve  and  Tugan-Baranovskii.  Lenin  appointed  him  to  the  staff 
of  the  State  Planning  Committee  in  1921,  and  he  became  a  leading 
figure  (if  not  the  leading  figure)  in  the  economics  of  planning 
in  the  USSR.  He  was  involved  in  the  first  GOELRO  plan  and  in  the 
development  of  the  first  five-year  plan  at  the  end  of  the  1920s. 
He  went  on  to  win  a  Stalin  prize  in  1942  for  studies  of  regional 
economic  development  in  the  Urals,  and  became  one  of  the  most 
famous  of  all  Soviet  economists. 
Vladimir  Aleksandrovich  Bazarov  (1874-1939)  studied 
chemistry  at  Moscow  University  as  a  student.  Politically  he  was 
close  to  Menshevism  and  was  criticised  by  Lenin  for  'Machism'. 
He  edited  a  Menshevik  paper  in  Khar'kov  in  1919,  and  in  the 
1920s  he  worked  closely  with  his  associate  Groman.  Together  with 
I.  I.  Stepanov  Bazarov  translated  Capital  into  Russian.  He  was 
arrested  in  1930  but  was  not  put  on  open  trial. 
Vladimir  Gustavovich  Groman  (1874-1937?  )  was  a  member  of 
the  RSDLP  from  1900  and  a  Menshevik  by  1905.  He  worked  as  a 
statistician  in  Tver'  and  Penza,  and  from  1921  became  a  leading 
figure  in  Gosplan.  He  became  a  member  of  the  Presidium  of 
Gosplan  as  well  as  a  member  of  the  council  of  the  TsSU.  Arrest 
followed  in  1930,  and  he  was  sentenced  to  ten  years  imprisonment 
in  the  'Menshevik'  trial  of  March  1931.  Along  with  Bazarov  and 
Strumilin,  Groman  produced  the  Kontrol'nye  tsifry  na  1925/6 
published  in  July  1925,  which  was  revised  due  to  harvest 
problems  and  reissued  in  October. 
105 4.1.2  -  STRUMILIN  AND  NON-MONETARY  ACCOUNTING 
In  Denezhnaya  pol  i  tika  sovetskoi  vl  as  ti  of  1928  Yurovskii 
reports  on  an  interesting  debate  which  took  place  on  the  eve  of 
NEP  about  the  question  of  non-monetary  accounting.  Strumilin  was 
one  of  the  participants  in  this  debate,  along  with  Vainshtein, 
Varga,  and  Chayanov.  According  to  Yurovskii  Strumilin  argued  for 
the  replacement  of  the  ruble  with  labour  values  (trudovoi 
tsennosti),  which  were  to  be  the  new  socialist  unit  of  account.  ' 
As  a  standard  measure  Strumilin  proposed  to  adopt  'the  value  of 
the  labour  product  of  one  normal  worker  in  the  primary  tariff 
category  fulfilling  his  work  norms  by  100%'.  2  Yurovskii  mocks 
such  attempts  as  naive. 
Yurovskii  relates  that  for  Strumilin  the  problem  of  the 
plan  is  the  problem  of  achieving  the  maximum  satisfaction  of 
human  needs  with  minimum  labour  outlays.  To  tackle  the  problem 
of  satisfying  human  needs  some  measure  of  utility  (poleznost') 
is  required,  since  the  satisfaction  of  a  need  is  a  utility. 
According  to  Strumilin  the  utility  of  a  unit  of  any  good  is  a 
definite  function  of  its  quantity,  and  he  suggests  as  a  first 
approximation  to  this  function  the  following  proposition:  while 
the  means  of  satisfaction  grows  in  geometric  progression,  the 
degree  of  satisfaction  will  grow  only  in  arithmetic  progression. 
Consequently,  every  new  unit  of  labour  expended  gives  less 
additional  utility,  and  this  means  there  must  be  a  moment  where 
the  additional  increase  of  labour  gives  results  which  do  not 
repay  this  expense  in  terms  of  utility.  This  gives  a  natural 
economic  limit  to  widening  production  under  a  given  level  of 
productivity. 
3 
Yurovskii  notes  the  resemblance  of  Strumilin's  position  to 
that  of  Jevons,  Marshall,  and  other  neo-classical  economists, 
who  claim  that  labour  will  be  carried  on  until  the  increment  of 
utility  from  any  of  its  employments  just  balances  the  increment 
of  pain.  Thus  the  implication  is  that  Yurovskii  has  caught 
Strumilin  utilising  the  marginal  utility  doctrine.  In  relation 
to  markets,  Yurovskii  notes  that  in  conditions  of  commodity- 
money  economy  the  process  of  adaption  of  outlays  to  requirements 
occurs  on  the  market.  Strumilin  proposes  that  in  a  socialist 
economy  the  same  task  can  be  accomplished  by  'coordinating 
106 material  coefficients  of  comparative  significance  of  different 
needs',  and  by  studying  the  question  of  how  changes  in  utility 
dependent  on  changes  in  the  quantities  of  goods  serve  to  satisfy 
related  needs.  4  Yurovskii  notes  that  attempts  to  construct 
curves  or  'equations  or  demand'  based  on  empirical  material  have 
a  long  history  in  economic  literature,  and  thus  again  implies 
that  Strumilin  is  using  a  neo-classical  approach.  In  such  a 
system  changing  evaluations  under  the  influence  of  changes  in 
demand  would  need  to  be  quickly  registered  to  the  appropriate 
body,  and  the  'social  shops'  which  Strumilin  proposes  would 
fulfil  in  such  a  scheme  the  customary  functions  of  the  retail 
market,  with  the  difference  that  evaluations  in  these  'markets' 
are  established  exclusively  on  the  basis  of  labour  outlays.  5 
This  scheme  resembles  somewhat  the  market  socialism  of 
Lange,  since  planners  would  be  required  to  construct 
supply/demand  tables  and  to  empirically  collect  data  on  consumer 
needs.  In  this  sense  such  a  scheme  simply  mimics  the  functions 
of  the  market  in  a  planned  manner,  and  it  also  utilises  a 
version  of  the  law  of  diminishing  returns.  Thus  in  the  pre-NEP 
period  Strumilin's  version  of  socialist  planning  (as  presented 
by  Yurovskii)  was  quite  different  to  the  one  which  triumphed 
after  NEP. 
4.1.3  -  PRICE  FORMATION 
One  of  the  most  interesting  articles  which  Strumilin  wrote 
during  the  NEP  period  from  the  point  of  view  of  investigating 
his  conception  of  the  market  was  entitled  'Protsessy 
tsenoobrazovaniya  v  SSSR'  and  appeared  in  Planovoe  khozyaistvo 
in  three  consecutive  issues  in  1928.  Strumilin  begins  by 
repeating  the  doctrine  that  in  capitalist  society  the  average 
level  of  prices  viewed  as  a  whole  is  determined  by  the  value 
(stoimost')  of  the  goods  involved,  ie  by  the  sum  of  socially 
necessary  labour  outlays  materialised  in  the  commodity  mass, 
although  individual  prices  may  differ  from  individual  values. 
Distribution  in  capitalist  society  is  realised  through 
spontaneous  competition  between  buyers  and  sellers  on  markets, 
107 and  in  this  struggle  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  the 
following  class  groups. 
Capitalists  struggle  among  themselves  for  buyers  on 
commodity  markets,  whereas  the  proletariat  appear  on  these 
markets  only  as  consumers. 
6  If  there  is  a  disproportion  between 
the  supply  and  demand  for  basic  goods  required  by  the 
proletariat,  ie  if  there  is  insufficient  supply,  then  the  law  of 
supply  and  demand  will  force  the  price  payed  for  such  goods 
higher  than  their  value.  In  turn,  if  the  supply  of  luxury  goods 
consumed  by  classes  other  than  the  proletariat  is  plentiful, 
then  competition  between  sellers  will  result  in  prices  falling 
below  values,  and  in  this  way  a  redistribution  of  national 
income  between  classes  can  occur.  Another  way  which  prices  can 
deviate  from  values  is  through  the  tax  policy  of  the  state. 
Excise  duties  may  raise  prices  above  values,  and  thus  result  in 
a  redistribution  of  the  national  income.  Monopoly  can  also  lead 
to  prices  deviating  from  values.  Strumilin  writes: 
Any  capitalist  trust,  monopolising  supply  markets  for 
certain  goods,  establishes  prices  for  these  goods 
according  to  arbitrary  rule,  since  it  does  not 
encounter  sufficiently  strong  competition.? 
However,  this  'arbitrary  rule'  is  not  infinite.  Monopolists 
cannot  set  each  price  as  they  please,  because  the  laws  of  the 
market  limit  this  arbitrary  rule  through  the  relation  that,  the 
higher  the  price  that  is  set,  the  less  product  the  monopolist 
sells.  Strumilin  notes  that  experience  has  shown  that 
monopolists  can  fix  prices  even  in  conditions  of  severe 
contraction  of  production. 
Strumilin  traces  the  basic  deviation  of  price  from  value 
inherent  in  capitalist  society  to  the  law  of  average  profit 
norms  (zakon  srednei  normy  pribyli).  Other  deviations  like  the 
ones  discussed  above  may  occur,  but  are  not  necessary  for 
capitalism  to  function.  However,  since  the  organic  composition 
of  capital  in  different  branches  of  production  differs,  prices 
must  deviate  from  values  to  counterbalance  this,  and  this  occurs 
through  the  law  of  average  profit. 
8  However,  this  law  in  Soviet 
conditions  is  'already  a  vestige  of  the  past'.  Strumilin  notes 
that  the  question  whether  prices  would  equal  values  in  communism 
108 is  redundant,  since  price  as  a  category  would  cease  to  exist. 
However,  in  the  transition  period  this  question  is  still 
relevant.  The  Soviet  state  can  and  will  fix  a  sharp  deviation  of 
price  from  value,  for  example  in  the  case  of  agricultural 
machinery  a  price  is  set  below  the  value  with  the  aim  of 
encouraging  agricultural  production.  In  the  interests  of 
industrialisation  fuel  prices  are  reduced,  and  in  class 
interests  prices  of  luxury  goods  are  increased.  9  Thus  this 
policy  may  increase  the  deviation  of  values  from  prices  in  the 
transition  period,  and  this  is  perfectly  legitimate. 
According  to  Strumilin  full  coordination  of  prices  with 
values,  and  thus  to  the  law  of  value,  would  not  create  any 
special  stimuli  for  changes  in  established  production 
proportions: 
...  a  course  of  uniting  planned 
values  would  hardly  coordinate 
tasks  of  the  transition  period 
cases  it  would  signify  a  refus; 
of  large  production  changes  in 
sector... 
prices  with  labour 
the  reconstruction 
to  socialism.  In  all 
al  of  an  active  policy 
the  private 
Strumilin  continues  by  saying  that  in  order  consciously  to  plan 
price  manoeuvres  of  this  type,  distinct  knowledge  of  prices  and 
labour  values  are  required.  If  it  is  necessary  to  widen  flax 
sowing  by  means  of  a  price  policy,  then  the  value  of  flax  at  a 
given  time  must  be  known.  However,  Strumilin  does  not  outline 
how  to  obtain  the  labour  value  of  a  given  amount  of  flax,  but 
does  claim  that  all  the  elements  necessary  for  such  an 
understanding  have  already  been  accumulated  in  sufficient 
quantity.  11 
Strumilin  presents  a  very  interesting  table  which  is 
entitled  'basic  elements  of  wholesale  prices  for  73  trusts  in 
1925/6',  and  this  table  gives  a  breakdown  in  terms  of  constant 
capital  (c),  variable  capital  (v),  and  surplus  value  (s)  in 
percentage  form.  The  reasoning  summarised  in  the  table  implies 
that  only  knowledge  of  market  price  is  required  to  influence 
production  priorities,  since  no  data  about  values  is  given.  This 
table  is  shown  overleaf:  -2 
109 BRANCH  METALS  COAL  ELEC.  TEXTILE  CHEM.  OIL  SUGAR  FOOD  TOTAL 
ELEMENTS 
Constant  54.6  43.1  47.6  50.5  58.4  52.0  41.2  19.3  45.8 
capital 
Variable  38.3  46.0  32.2  27.1  20.7  20.8  7.6  4.0  24.5 
capital 
Surplus  7.1  10.9  20.2  22.4  20.9  27.2  51.2  76.7  29.7 
product 
created  value 
v+s  45.4  56.9  52.4  49.5  41.6  48.0  58.8  80.7  54.2 
accumulation  no  rms 
(s:  v)  %  18.5  23.7  62.7  82.7  101.1  130.8  673.7  1917  121.2 
Strumilin  notes  that  this  table  reveals  a  strikingly  diverse  c+ 
v+s  composition  of  the  various  branches,  with  accumulation 
norms  ranging  from  18.5%  to  1917.5%.  Strumilin  obtains  these 
figures  by  aggregating  materials,  fuel,  transport,  and 
amortization  into  category  c,  wages  into  v,  and  profit, 
interest,  rent,  taxes,  and  excise  duties  into  s.  However,  the 
absolute  quantities  of  these  elements  are  taken  from  market 
prices  (in  chervonets  rubles)  and  thus  this  breakdown  gives  no 
information  as  to  values.  This  is  apparent  from  Strumilin's 
statement  that  the  average  newly  created  'value'  is  54.2%  of  the 
market  price  of  the  product.  13  Strumilin  notes  that  the  widely 
diverse  accumulation  norms  reveal  that  the  Soviet  state  does  not 
follow  the  law  of  average  profit  norms. 
4.1.4  -  THE  MARKET 
An  insight  into  Strumilin's  understanding  of  the  market  in 
relation  to  planning  can  be  obtained  from  Doklad  v  s"ezdu 
planovikh  rabotnikov  given  on  8  March  1929  entitled  'Sotsial'nie 
problemy  pyatiletki'.  In  a  section  called  'market  problems' 
Strumilin  writes: 
Problems  of  market  equilibrium  in  conditions  of 
planned  economy  in  current  calculation  is  reduced  to 
projecting  such  prices  for  the  realisation  of  the 
mass  of  commodities  produced  under  which  the  demand 
of  wide  markets  fully  covers  possible  supply. 
14 
110 But  market  demand  is  in  turn  determined  by  the  projected  growth 
of  income  of  the  population,  ie  the  projected  tempo  of  growth  of 
wages,  the  increasing  productivity  of  agriculture,  and  a  whole 
series  of  other  plans  which  are  conditioned  by  the  growth  of 
welfare  and  the  sum  removed  from  individual  incomes  by  taxation. 
All  these  elements,  which  determine  in  contemporary  accounting 
the  relation  of  supply  to  demand,  are  regulated  by  the  plan. 
Therefore  if  at  a  given  moment  a  goods  famine  is  experienced 
this  should  be  viewed  not  as  an  objective  necessity  but  as  the 
result  of  insufficient  skill  in  planning. 
Strumilin  states  that  the  basic  method  of  verifying  all 
plans  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  demands  of  market 
equilibrium  is  the  construction  of  a  provisional  balance  of 
supply  and  demand.  This  task  is  'somewhat  complex  and 
theoretically  little  elaborated',  and  different  departments 
utilise  different  methods  and  thus  arrive  at  different 
conclusions. 
15  An  example  of  such  a  balance  is  given  by 
Strumilin  entitled  'balance  of  supply  and  demand  of  industrial 
goods'  and  is  given  in  millions  of  chervonets  rubles:  16 
ARTICLES  OF  BALANCE  PROVISIONAL  BALANCE  '32/3  in  % 
FIRST  VARIANT  '32/  3  '27/8 
'27/8'28/9'29/30'30/1'31/2  1st  optimal  1st  op 
A.  SUPPLY 
1.  Stocks  of  goods  at  the  beginning  of  the  year: 
a)  from  producers  1250  1350  1450  1600  1750  1950  2100  156  168 
b)  in  goods  conduc- 
ting  channels  1630  1982  2342  2743  3174  3825  4302  235  264 
TOTAL  2880  3332  3792  4343  4924  5775  6402  201  222 
2.  Commodity  production: 
a)  large  11292  12955  14720  16404  18265  20139  22546  178  200 
industry 
b)  small  2360  2631  2819  3038  3246  3520  3477  149  147 
industry 
TOTAL  13652  15586  17539  19442  21511  23659  26023  173  191 
3.  Other  supplies  477  429  580  780  940  1200  1255  252  263 
4.  Trade-transport 
extras  3446  3640  4053  4498  4959  5515  5937  160  172 
TOTAL  1-4  20455  22987  25964  29063  32334  36149  39617  177  194 
111 B.  DEMAND 
1.  Organised  markets; 
a)  for  means  of 
production  6905  8296  9314  10314  11170  12114  13234  175  192 
b)  for  goods  of 
consumption  1010  1100  1200  1290  1410  1520  1617  150  160 
TOTAL  7915  9396  10514  11604  12580  13634  14851  172  188 
2.  Wide  markets: 
a)  for  means  of 
production  2230  2493  2806  3135  3520  4055  4400  182  197 
b)  for  goods  of 
consumption  6380  6631  7404  8087  8796  9551  10307  150  162 
3.  Other  demand  406  544  678  787 
4.  Stock  of  goods  to  end  of  year: 
a)  from  1350  1450  1600  1750 
producers 
b)  in  goods 
conducting  2309  2683  3137  3625 
channels 
884  1004  1172  247  289 
1950  2150  2300  159  170 
4376  5200  5940  225  257 
TOTAL  1-4  20590  23197  26139  28988  32106  35594  38970  173  189 
BALANCE  -135  -210  -175  +75  +228  +555  +647 
DIFFERENCE 
Strumilin  draws  from  this  the  conclusion  that  consumer  markets 
for  industrial  goods  in  general  are  fully  guarantied  supply. 
However,  he  notes  that  overall  there  are  several  balance 
differences  which  do  not  exceed  1-2%  of  the  balance  total.  Since 
this  sort  of  figure  is  within  the  margin  of  error  of  the  figures 
obtained,  Strumilin  does  not  express  any  major  concern  with  this 
result.  17 
Another  table  given  by  Strumilin  shows  the  supply  of 
various  industrial  goods  on  the  market  over  a  five  year 
period. 
18  This  table  also  has  two  variants  shown  -a  first  and 
an  optimal  variant.  In  the  first  variant  (for  example)  tea 
supply  grows  by  272%  over  the  five  years,  in  the  optimal  variant 
by  359%;  agricultural  machines  grow  by  372%  in  the  first  variant 
and  432%  in  the  optimal  variant. 
Two  things  are  clear  from  the  manner  in  which  Strumilin 
presents  this  data.  Firstly,  that  the  question  of  deciding  what 
growth  rates  to  assume  and  why  was  not  really  discussed  in  such 
articles.  These  sort  of  questions  were  debated  'behind  closed 
112 doors',  and  consequently  the  reasoning  proposed  to  support  the 
various  growth  rates  remains  obscure.  Secondly,  plans  were 
constructed  in  a  completely  un-democratic  manner.  Consultation 
was  limited  to  a  narrow  group  of  'specialists'  within  and  around 
the  Bolshevik  party,  and  no  attempt  was  made  to  involve  the 
wider  population  in  the  planning  process.  In  relation  to 
Strumilin's  conception  of  the  market  this  section  reveals  that 
he  viewed  the  market  in  terms  of  capacity  of  demand,  and 
believed  that  planning  could  replace  this  type  of  market  with 
calculation  techniques. 
4.1.5  -  AGAINST  BAZAROV  AND  GROMAN 
In  an  article  entitled  'Pervie  opyta  perspektivnogo 
planirovaniya'  of  1930  Strumilin  attacks  the  position  of  his 
Gosplan  colleagues  Bazarov  and  Groman,  as  well  as  other 
economists  like  Kondrat'ev.  Strumilin  quotes  Bazarov  arguing 
that  'the  state  must  give  freedom  to  markets  in  order  that  the 
process  of  commercial  competition  can  determine  the  economic 
conjuncture',  and  that  a  stable  currency  and  definite 
legislative  acts  are  required  if  capital  is  to  function.  19 
Moreover  Strumilin  quotes  the  following  Bazarov  passage: 
...  markets  and  khozraschet  are  essential 
preconditions  for  all  possible  planning...  Historical 
experience  shows  that  a  healthy  economy  is  possible 
only  when  every  worker  has  a  healthy  interest  in  the 
results  of  his  labour,  but  this  is  not  enough:  only 
the  market  allows  in  contemporary  conditions  the 
creation  of  automatic  controls  over  the  correctness 
of  all  actions,  automatic  calculations  showing  the 
results  of  the  activity  of  egery  economic  branch, 
every  enterprise  separately. 
Strumilin  responds  by  stating  that  socialism  principally 
excludes  free  market  elements.  Calling  the  market  a  necessary 
precondition  for  all  possible  planning  means  that  a  price  of 
renouncing  socialism  would  have  to  be  paid  for  such  planning.  By 
implication  Bazarov  is  an  enemy  of  socialism. 
Strumilin  emphasises  that  for  Bazarov  planning  is  mainly 
the  study  of  market  conjuncture.  The  balance  method  of  planning 
is  concerned  above  all  with  market  equilibrium,  and  conceives  of 
113 NEP  as  a  system  where  the  market  regulates  the  plan.  21 
Kondrat'ev's  plan  for  agriculture  is  hostage  to  spontaneous 
tendencies  within  the  economy,  and  is  principally  genetic  in 
nature.  Strumilin  presents  figures  which  show  that  Kondrat'ev's 
plan  was  overfulfilled  by  2.5  times  between  1924  and  1928,  thus 
implying  that  such  planning  methods  are  unreliable  and  tend  to 
give  conservative  results. 
22  The  figures  Strumilin  presents  are 
shown  below  in  a  table  containing  the  general  sum  of  outlay  for 
financing  agriculture  of  the  RSFSR  in  millions  of  chervonets 
rubles: 
YEAR  PLAN  FULFILMENT 
1924/5  58  104 
1925/6  72  157 
1926/7  89  239 
1927/8  106  286 
1928/9  125  384 
TOTAL  450  1170 
In  this  way  Strumilin  attempts  to  show  that  economists  like 
Bazarov  and  Kondrat'ev  are  hostile  to  socialism  and  that  the 
planning  methods  they  utilize  are  'bourgeois'  in  spirit. 
In  an  article  in  Ekonomicheskaya  zhizn'  published  on  2 
April  1927  entitled  'Otvet  kritikam  gosplana'  Strumilin  also 
criticises  his  critics.  He  complains  that  even  though  the  USSR 
Gosplan  adopted  a  resolution  on  simultaneous  work  on  general  and 
perspective  plans,  many  other  organs  involved  in  the  planning 
process  have  ignored  it.  For  instance  the  RSFSR  Gosplan  decided 
that  it  must  first  construct  a  genplan,  whereas  Zemplan  resolved 
that  it  could  not  construct  a  genplan,  since  to  predict  10-15 
years  ahead  was  impossible  and  thus  a  limit  of  five  years  was 
adopted.  Strumilin  complains  that  to  construct  a  fully 
satisfactory  and  coordinated  plan  under  such  circumstances  of 
independence  of  planning  organs  is  impossible.  23  Thus  implicitly 
he  calls  for  the  centralisation  of  the  planning  process. 
Criticising  Kondrat'ev,  Strumilin  emphasises  that  plans 
must  not  be  a  summary  of  predictions,  but  rather  a  system  of 
economic  policy  and  economic  tasks  expressed  in  figures: 
114 If  we  were  in  our  plans  to  give  only  forecasts  of 
objective  inevitability  independent  of  the  will  of 
economic  subjects...  then  we  would  arrive  at  a 
scientific  prognosis  of  the  future.  But  we  would  not  be  speaking  of  plans. 
24 
No  thought  is  given  to  constructing  a  plan  of  a  solar  eclipse, 
and  likewise  with  capitalist  crises,  because  they  are  by  nature 
unplanned  events.  Planning  can  only  occur  in  relation  to  events 
created  by  the  will  of  planners.  Thus  Strumilin  contrasts 
Kondrat'ev's  conception  of  planning,  which  is  based  on 
forecasting,  with  his  own  more  strident  conception  which 
emphasises  the  creation  of  tasks  to  be  fulfilled  in  line  with 
the  will  of  planners.  25  In  this  article  Strumilin  also 
criticises  the  detailed  calculations  of  Kondrat'ev,  Bazarov,  and 
Groman.  For  example  Groman's  figures  show  that  rural  welfare, 
according  to  data  from  the  five  year  plan,  has  grown  by  20%,  not 
30%.  Strumilin  disagrees.  In  general  he  is  again  concerned  to 
show  the  conservative  nature  of  the  planning  carried  out  by 
these  people.  This  section  demonstrates  that  Strumilin's 
conception  of  planning  excluded  the  market  completely. 
4.1.6  -  NEP 
While  Strumilin's  attitude  to  planning  in  the  later  part  of 
the  1920s  seems  clear,  what  about  his  attitude  to  the 
introduction  of  NEP  and  the  reforms  which  accompanied  this 
process  at  the  beginning  of  the  decade?  Strumilin  discusses  the 
financial  reforms  of  1922  in  an  article  called  '0  bazise 
reformy'  in  Ekonomicheskaya  zhizn'  published  on  1  June  1922.  He 
begins  by  stating  that  the  necessity  and  urgency  of  a  series  of 
financial  reforms  concomitant  with  the  New  Economic  Policy  is 
sufficiently  clear.  The  main  plank  of  these  reforms  concerns 
monetary  circulation  and  the  stabilisation  of  the  ruble. 
Narkomfin  plans  to  back  the  ruble  with  gold.  Strumilin  does  not 
question  the  ability  of  gold  to  stabilise  a  currency,  instead  he 
is  doubtful  over  whether  the  amount  of  gold  which  the  Bolsheviks 
control  will  be  adequate.  26 
Strumilin  directs  attention  to  the  pre-war  Austrian 
experience  of  regulating  a  paper  currency,  which  he  claims  shows 
115 that  satisfactory  results  can  be  achieved  without  accumulation 
of  large  gold  reserves  in  the  state  bank.  This  was  done  through 
actively  participating  in  market  play  with  paper  currency.  When 
the  currency  declined  in  price  below  parity  the  bank  played  on 
this  and  bought  up  the  cheaper  goods,  and  when  the  price 
increased  the  goods  were  sold  at  a  profit.  The  emission  of  paper 
currency  was  also  regulated  in  relation  to  the  requirements  of 
money  markets.  27  Thus  at  this  time  Strumilin  recommended 
regulation  of  markets  in  a  manner  common  to  non-socialist 
countries,  a  type  of  planning  which  he  would  later  criticise. 
An  article  written  even  earlier,  entitled  'Dvizhenie  tsen  i 
tarifnaya  politika'  published  on  18  December  1919  in 
Ekonomicheskaya  zhizn',  shows  that  at  the  same  time  as  debates 
were  occurring  about  the  replacement  of  money  with  labour  units, 
Strumilin  was  still  writing  about  the  movement  of  prices  on 
Moscow  and  Petrograd  markets,  specifically  in  relation  to  tariff 
policy.  In  this  article  Strumilin  argues  against  the  view  that 
the  prices  of  products  exactly  reflect  fluctuations  in  the 
tariff  rate.  He  presents  a  table  which  shows  movements  in  market 
prices  of  food  rations  between  1913  and  1919,  parts  of  which  are 
shown  below:  28 
YEAR  MOVEMENT  OF  RATION  PRICE 
in  Moscow  in  Petersburg 
1913  1.0  1.0 
1916  1.7  1.5 
May  1917  3.9  3.5 
May  1918  65.2  110.0 
May  1919  407.0  845.0 
He  also  presents  a  table  which  relates  market  prices  with 
changes  in  the  tariff  rate  over  this  period,  and  concludes  from 
this  data  that  changes  in  the  tariff  rate  do  not  automatically 
produce  changes  in  the  market  price.  This  table  is  shown 
below:  29 
YEAR  GROWTH  OF  TARIFF  GROWTH  OF  MARKET  PRICE 
Moscow  Petersburg  Moscow  Petersburg 
June  1918  -  +38  +20  +11 
September  1918  +17  +39  -16  +6 
February  1919  +43  +44  +19  -5 
September  1919  +100  +150  +13  - 
116 The  concern  which  Strumilin  shows  for  the  relation  of  tariff 
rates  to  prices  shows  that  even  at  the  height  of  war  Communism 
he  payed  serious  attention  to  markets  and  their  regulation.  If 
in  theory  he  was  discussing  the  abolition  of  money,  this  was 
certainly  not  the  case  in  practise. 
The  question  of  tariffs  was  still  occupying  Strumilin  at 
the  end  of  the  decade.  S.  A.  Bessonov  had  in  1928  written  an 
article  entitled  'Problema  prostranstva  v  perspectivnom  plane' 
in  Planovoe  khozyaistvo  in  which  he  objected  to  certain  features 
of  differential  tariff  policy.  Bessonov  stressed  that  the 
Fifteenth  Party  Congress  had  resolved  that  it  was  inadmissible 
for  the  party  to  solve  problems  of  equilibrium  by  altering 
market  prices  alone.  The  Congress  established  that  the  correct 
path  was  by  way  of  'reducing  the  prime  costs  (sebestoimosti)  of 
industrial  products  on  the  basis  of  energetically  conducting 
rationalisation  of  industry',  and  on  this  basis  to  reduce 
industrial  prices.  30  He  also  discussed  the  question  of  relating 
prices  to  values  in  the  transition  period: 
...  on  the  borders  of  communism,  ie  on  the  border  of 
liberation  from  value  categories,  we  must  propose 
full  agreement  of  prices  with  values  not  only  on  the 
scale  of  the  entire  society  or  in  individual  economic 
branches,  but  on  the  scale  of  every  tiny  composite 
section  of  the  social  economy.  31 
Thus  the  main  plank  of  Soviet  price  policy  should  be  the  maximal 
possible  coordination  of  prices  with  labour  outlays.  And  since 
costs  of  production  (izderzhki  proizvodstva)  reflect  labour 
outlays  more  accurately  than  pure  market  prices,  the  calculation 
of  tariffs  should  be  based  upon  costs  of  production  rather  than 
on  supply  and  demand  factors.  In  this  way  Bessonov  criticised 
the  current  tariff  policy  and  the  methods  used  to  calculate  the 
tariff  rate. 
Strumilin  responded  to  these  criticisms  in  an  article 
entitled  'Tarifnaya  problema  v  SSSR'  also  published  in  Planovoe 
khozyaistvo  in  1928.  Focusing  on  differential  tariffs  he  notes 
that  two  criteria  for  calculating  the  rates  of  railway  tariffs 
are  used:  the  value  of  the  transport  freight  and  the  distance  to 
be  transported.  According  to  Strumilin  Bessonov  criticised  this 
117 because  of  its  incorrect  theoretical  foundation  which  reflects 
the  theory  of  'cargo  solvency'  (platezhnesposobnosti  gruzov), 
which  in  turn  is  based  on  the  notorious  'law'  of  supply  and 
demand.  32  According  to  Strumilin  Bessonov  claims  that  current 
tariff  policy  can  be  explained  by  the  influence  of  the  Austrian 
school  on  the  minds  of  tariff  makers.  However,  Strumilin 
responds  by  noting  that  even  Bohm-Bawerk  did  not  exclude  a  cost 
of  production  or  prime  cost  element  from  price  formation, 
although  he  primarily  stressed  subjective  factors.  Marx  also 
allowed  a  cost  element  as  well  as  a  supply  and  demand  element  in 
price  formation,  although  his  theory  was  not  limited  to  these 
factors  since  he  brought  in  the  law  of  value.  33 
Strumilin  further  criticises  Bessonov's  idea  that  prices  in 
the  transitional  epoch  must  coincide  with  values.  This  already 
assumes  a  harmonious  distribution  of  productive  resources  under 
which  all  requirements  are  met,  a  situation  which  does  not 
correspond  to  current  Soviet  reality.  Only  when  communism  has 
been  built  can  'prices'  equal  'values',  but  in  an  epoch  of 
complete  economic  restructuring  price  policy  must  be  aimed  at 
development,  and  this  requires  that  some  prices  must  deviate 
from  values.  The  example  which  Strumilin  gives  is  again  of 
agricultural  machinery  and  fertilizers,  prices  of  which  are 
reduced  below  value  in  order  to  boost  production. 
34 
What  can  be  drawn  from  this  debate?  Firstly,  although  the 
question  of  finding  an  alternative  accounting  unit  to  money  had 
been  dropped  during  the  transition  to  NEP,  many  debates 
throughout  the  1920s  were  still  framed  in  terms  of  value. 
However,  it  is  clear  that  Strumilin  did  not  give  or  attempt  to 
give  any  way  of  calculating  such  values  in  his  writings.  Thus 
talk  of  having  a  price  policy  in  which  a  good  was  priced  above 
its  value  was  really  meaningless  in  the  absence  of  a  method  for 
calculating  this  value.  What  Strumilin  meant  of  course  was  that 
a  price  would  be  increased  above  its  current  level,  and  that 
state  regulation  of  prices  was  a  useful  instrument  of  economic 
policy.  But  since  a  theory  of  value  was  central  to  Marx's 
project,  suitable  respect  had  to  be  payed  to  this  idea. 
Secondly,  the  NEP  era  was  in  terms  of  economic  theory  an  era  of 
dual  track  development.  At  the  same  time  as  Strumilin  debated 
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emission  rates  etc,  he  was  debating  questions  relevant  to  a  non- 
monetary  economy,  ie  physical  balancing  of  supply  and  demand, 
planned  growth  rates  etc.  Thus  the  transitional  nature  of  NEP  is 
clearly  revealed  in  Strumilin's  work.  In  relation  to  the  market 
this  section  shows  that  debates  on  price  policy  were  still 
framed  in  terms  of  value  vs  price,  ie  that  the  law  of  value 
governed  the  operation  of  market  forces  in  some  unspecified 
manner. 
4.1.7  -  MARGINAL  UTILITY 
As  I  noted  earlier,  Yurovskii  pointed  out  that  Strumilin 
seemed  quite  close  to  marginal  utility  theory  in  some  of  his 
pronouncements.  In  an  article  entitled  'The  Economic 
Significance  of  National  Education'  published  in  1925  in 
Ekonomika  truda  Strumilin  came  even  closer  to  this  doctrine  than 
he  had  previously.  This  article  was  an  attempt  to  assess  the 
economic  benefits  of  education  to  the  economy  as  a  whole  by 
investigating  what  relation  the  length  of  education  undertaken 
had  to  benefits  in  terms  of  increased  skill  obtained.  Strumilin 
writes  that  any  amount  of  education  may  be  desirable  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  individual  who  receives  it,  but  the  state 
wants  to  know  whether  all  amounts  of  education  are  equally 
useful  in  raising  the  country's  productivity.  If  all  amounts  are 
not  equally  useful,  what  is  the  most  profitable  length  of 
education  for  each  worker? 
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In  order  to  make  a  rational  estimate  for  the  optimum  length 
of  education  it  is  necessary  to  determine  what  each  year  in 
education  gives  the  worker  and  the  state  and  what  it  costs 
overall.  Strumilin  does  this  by  measuring  the  increase  in  skill 
(measured  through  market  rates  of  wages),  and  by  comparing  this 
to  the  costs  borne  by  the  state.  This  is  a  rather  complex 
operation,  but  the  results  which  Strumilin  obtains  are  shown 
over  leaf  :  36 
119 AGE  OF  YEARS  SPENT  IN:  LIFE'S  WAGES  EFFECT  OF  COST  OF  BALANCE 
STARTING  EDUCATION  WORK  IN  RUBLES  EDUCATION  EDUCATION  TOTAL  MARGINAL 
WORK 
16  0  37  12278  -  -  -  -  16  1  37  14868  2590  18  2572  2572 
16  2  37  17404  5124  46  5078  2506 
16  3  37  19950  7672  85  7587  2509 
16  4  37  22330  10052  126  9926  2339 
16  5  37  24654  12376  170  12206  2280 
16  6  37  26838  14560  212  14348  2142 
16  7  37  28854  16576  272  16304  1956 
16  8  37  30772  18494  361  18133  1829 
17  9  36  31752  19474  491  18983  850 
18  10  35  32480  20202  615  19587  604 
19  11  34  32844  20566  761  19805  218 
20  12  33  33040  20762  983  19779  -26  21  13  32  33068  20790  1325  19465  -314  22  14  31  32984  20706  1853  18853  -612 
According  to  Strumilin  these  figures  reveal  the  'law'  of 
diminishing  productivity  of  education,  and  his  presentation  of 
this  data  clearly  reveals  that  he  is  using  the  marginal  concept 
to  determine  profitability  -  education  should  be  taken  to  the 
point  where  marginal  cost  equals  marginal  revenue,  in  this  case 
somewhere  between  eleven  and  twelve  years  of  education  with  work 
beginning  between  nineteen  and  twenty.  Strumilin  does  note  that 
political  and  other  evaluations  also  should  be  taken  into 
account  as  well  as  this  narrow  economic  approach,  but  his 
overall  method  is  clear.  37 
Why  was  it  that  Strumilin  could  use  the  MC  =  MR  principle, 
yet  reject  subjective  value  theory  and  price  determination  built 
upon  it?  One  reason  could  be  that  theoretically  MC  =  MR  was  not 
directly  linked  to  subjective  value  theory  in  the  writings  of 
people  such  as  Bohm-Bawerk,  and  its  development  was  somewhat 
divorced  from  the  subjective  price  determination  approach. 
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Such  an  optimisation  principle  seems  a  little  removed  from 
questions  of  value,  and  could  thus  be  utilised  in  the  1920s  with 
less  ideological  dissonance,  although  Yurovskii  did  note  the 
contradiction. 
Similarity  with  non-Marxist  economics  can  be  noted  in  other 
areas  also.  Strumilin  wrote  an  article  on  inflation  called  'K 
voprosu  o  denezhnoi  inflatsii  i  deflatsii'  in  Planovoe 
khozyaistvo  in  1926,  in  which  he  was  concerned  to  explore 
differing  definitions  of  inflation.  According  to  one  idea 
inflation  is  any  new  issue  of  monetary  symbols  into  circulation, 
according  to  another  inflation  is  the  condition  where  the 
120 purchasing  power  of  money  declines,  and  visa  versa  for 
deflation.  39  Still  another  states  that  inflation  is  a  process 
which  occurs  when  there  is  an  abundance  of  money  in  relation  to 
the  normal  level  of  requirements  for  it.  40 
Purportedly  using  the  ideas  of  Marx,  Strumilin  constructs 
an  equation  which  can  be  used  to  explain  the  inflationary 
process.  This  equation  is  given  below: 
k  (T  -  t)  IP-p 
x=+ 
n  nl 
where  x=  the  monetary  mass,  T=  all  the  commodity  mass  realised 
in  a  given  period,  t=  portion  of  goods  realised  non-monetarily, 
k=  coefficient  of  circulation,  I=  average  relation  of  price  in 
gold  for  a  unit  of  good  or  commodity  index  price,  P=  general 
sum  of  money  payments,  p=  portion  of  P  payed  non-monetarily, 
and  n  and  n1  are  the  number  of  turnovers  of  money  units  in  a 
given  period. 
41  According  to  Strumilin  all  these  elements  are 
subject  to  statistical  calculation. 
Strumilin  asks  the  question:  what  must  follow  from  the 
introduction  of  excess  monetary  units  in  comparison  with  the 
requirements  of  turnover?  The  above  formula  contains  all  the 
elements  necessary  for  an  answer.  If  the  total  circulation  of 
commodity  values  remains  constant,  but  the  sum  of  money  units 
changes,  then  assuming  that  the  purchasing  power  of  these  units 
remains  constant  there  is  only  one  change  possible  which  will 
keep  the  original  equilibrium  given  by  the  equation  -a  decrease 
in  the  average  rate  (skorost')  of  monetary  turnover.  42  Thus  a 
measure  of  inflation  can  be  a  decrease  in  the  rate  of  monetary 
turnover,  and  of  deflation  an  increase  in  this  rate.  Of  course, 
Strumilin  notes  that  this  holds  true  only  if  the  precondition  of 
stable  prices  holds  true.  43 
Such  an  understanding  of  inflation  exhibited  by  Strumilin 
is  close  to  the  quantity  theory  of  money  held  by  non-Marxist 
economists.  As  I  showed  in  chapter  three,  this  framework  was 
common  to  other  Bolsheviks  in  the  1920s,  and  thus  is  should  not 
be  surprising  to  find  that  Strumilin  adopted  a  similar  approach. 
121 This  section  shows  that  while  Strumilin  criticised 
'bourgeois'  economics  in  general  as  erroneous,  he  was  using 
ideas  common  to  non-Marxist  economics  in  his  detailed 
investigations  without  noting  any  problem,  specifically  MC  =  MR 
and  MV  =  PT.  Only  Yurovskii  seems  to  have  recognised  the  irony 
of  this  fact  at  the  time. 
4.2.1  -  BAZAROV 
One  of  Bazarov's  longest  and  most  detailed  economic  works 
from  the  NEP  period  was  entitled  "'Krivye  razvitiya" 
kapitalisticheskogo  i  sovetskogo  khozyaistva',  which  was  carried 
in  three  consecutive  issues  of  Planovoe  khozyaistvo  in  1926.  In 
this  work  Bazarov  gave  a  comparative  analysis  of  the 
developmental  curves  of  both  capitalist  and  Soviet  economic 
growth.  Bazarov  asks  the  question: 
...  what  is  the  mechanism  with  the  help  of  which  the 
development  of  the  productive  forces  occurs,  ie  which 
increases  their  level?  Is  there  a  universal  'tendency 
of  development',  as  an  immanent  process  of  social 
production  dynamics...  which  occurs  automatically?  44 
Bazarov  notes  that  Marx  had  answered  in  the  negative  to  this 
question.  The  first  period  of  human  economic  life  was 
characterised,  according  to  Bazarov,  by  conservatism  and 
spontaneous  inertia.  A  very  different  mechanism  is 
characteristic  of  capitalism:  'anarchy'  of  production  and 
competition  between  independent  enterprises  creates  a  stimulus 
to  relatively  fast  growth.  However,  the  essence  of  capitalism  is 
not  progress,  but  profit.  45 
In  this  work  Bazarov  analysed  the  qualitative  and 
quantitative  structures  of  the  trade-industrial  cycles  peculiar 
to  capitalist  and  Soviet  conditions.  To  do  this  he  distinguished 
between  mechanical  and  active  equilibrium,  and  used  analogous 
thinking.  Utilising  the  Newtonian  framework  of  inertia  and  the 
second  law  of  motion,  he  tried  to  construct  models  of  cyclical 
fluctuations.  46  Mechanical  equilibrium  in  its  pure  form  can  be 
122 modelled  by  the  law  of  simple  harmonic  oscillation,  expressed  as 
follows: 
x=A  sin  (2pi/T)  t  (1) 
where  x=  the  quantity  of  deflection  in  a  given  moment,  A=  the 
amplitude  of  oscillation,  T=  the  duration  of  one  cycle  or 
period,  and  t=  the  time  from  the  moment  when  the  system  reaches 
the  point  of  equilibrium  to  the  moment  of  observation.  47  But 
because,  according  to  Bazarov,  in  reality  trends  are  not  simply 
harmonic,  but  rather  fading  oscillation  dominates  in  which  the 
amplitude  subsides  little  by  little,  the  following  formula  can 
be  used: 
x=  Ae-kt  sin  (2pi/T)  t  (2) 
where  e=  natural  log  base,  and  k=a  constant  dependent  on  the 
quantity  of  internal  and  external  friction.  48 
In  the  fields  of  physics,  chemistry,  and  biology  the 
precondition  of  active  equilibrium  is  the  principle  of 
conservation  of  energy  and  materials.  A  system  of  economic 
equilibrium  can  be  interpreted  in  the  form  of  such  a  balance, 
but  in  terms  of  social,  not  physical  energy. 
49  The  quantity  of 
living  human  labour  socially  necessary  for  satisfying  a  given 
sum  of  consumption  determines  the  level  of  economic  equilibrium. 
In  capitalist  society  requirements  are  expressed  in  the  form  of 
'solvent  demand'  (platezhesposobnogo  sprosa). 
Bazarov  goes  on  to  relate  all  this  to  the  law  of  market 
saturation  (zakon  nasyshcheniya  rynka)  which  he  presents  as 
follows.  Suppose  that  on  the  market  there  is  a  definite  and 
fully  stable  demand  for  several  goods  which  at  a  given  moment 
are  absolutely  unavailable.  Suppose  then  that  the  commodities 
which  are  lacking  appear  on  the  market  in  quantities  sufficient 
for  saturating  the  solvent  demand,  for  example  from  foreign 
suppliers.  Clearly,  the  realisation  of  goods  will  occur 
especially  fast  in  the  first  period,  gradually  slowing  down 
according  to  the  measure  of  satisfaction  of  demand  which  is 
achieved. 
50  What  is  the  law  of  this  decline?  In  order  to  answer 
this  question  four  preconditions  are  necessary:  1)  that  these 
123 goods  are  irreplaceable  by  other  similar  goods;  2)  that  selling 
prices  do  not  change;  3)  that  every  consumer  acquires  one  good; 
4)  that  the  consumer  value  of  the  good  is  stable. 
Given  these  assumptions,  Bazarov  states  that  the  process  of 
market  saturation  is  identical  with  the  flowing  'exchange 
decomposition'  reaction,  under  the  condition  that  one  of  the 
products  of  the  reaction  is  removed  from  the  sphere  of  the 
reacting  liquid.  An  example  is  to  dissolve  sodium  carbonate  in 
hydrochloric  acid: 
Na2CO3(s)  +  2HC1(aq)  --->  2NaCl(aq)  +  H20(1)  +  C02(g) 
Because  carbon  dioxide  and  water  are  formed  from  this  reaction 
(commodities,  having  entered  into  the  sphere  of  consumption, 
disappear  on  the  market),  the  process  goes  to  completion  when 
all  molecules  of  sodium  carbonate  are  transformed  into  sodium 
chloride  (until  full  saturation  of  solvent  demand  for  all 
consumers  occurs). 
51  The  molecules  of  sodium  carbonate  can 
diffuse  in  solution  in  all  possible  directions  at  various  rates. 
However,  according  to  Maxwell  it  is  possible  to  use  Gauss's 
analysis  of  the  law  of  normal  distribution,  and  therefore  every 
molecule  of  sodium  carbonate  has  the  same  chance  of  meeting  a 
molecule  of  hydrochloric  acid  in  a  given  time.  52 
Using  analogous  reasoning  consumers  of  goods,  as  opposed  to 
molecules,  are  endowed  with  consciousness  and  will,  but  their 
actions  are  no  more  diverse  than  the  spontaneous  movement  of 
molecules.  Therefore  with  anarchical-market  processes  there  is 
no  basis  to  question  the  statistical  regularity  required  for  the 
kinetic  theory  of  gases  or  the  theory  of  solubility.  Thus  for 
analysis  of  market  saturation  it  is  possible  to  use  the  category 
of  average  probability  of  collision  of  a  potential  purchaser 
with  goods  on  the  market,  which  is  a  constant.  Giving  this  the 
letter  p,  if  A  equals  the  number  of  goods  required  by 
purchasers,  and  x=  the  number  of  successful  purchases  of  goods 
during  the  period  of  observation,  then  the  mathematical 
expectation  of  the  number  of  purchases  in  a  unit  of  time  is 
expressed  by  the  formula  p  (A  -  x);  the  actual  number  of 
purchases  in  a  unit  of  time  is  the  rate  (dx/dy).  53  Because  in  a 
124 mass  process  the  actual  number  will  not  significantly  differ 
from  the  mathematical  expectation,  it  is  possible  to  write: 
(dx/dy)  =p  (A  -  x)  (3) 
or  after  integration: 
A-x=  (A  -  x0)  e-Pt  (4) 
According  to  Bazarov  this  expresses  the  law  of  market  saturation 
in  its  simplist  form.  The  graph  of  equation  one  is  a  curve  which 
at  first  quickly  decreases  in  rate  but  only  asymptotically 
approaches  the  x  axis. 
Bazarov  continues  by  pointing  out  that  the  above  analysis 
rests  on  many  simplifying  assumptions,  for  instance  that  all  the 
goods  necessary  for  satisfying  the  solvent  demand  are  thrown  on 
the  market  at  once.  It  would  be  more  realistic  to  assume  that 
such  goods  appear  first  in  small  quantities  and  must  win  back 
demand  from  their  competitors. 
54  The  process  of  recovery  of 
active  equilibrium  may  be  'autocatalytic'  in  nature,  and  thus  be 
closer  to  a  chemical  reaction  in  which  every  molecule  produced 
by  the  reaction  itself  stimulates  the  formation  of  new 
molecules.  Here  the  rate  is  proportional  to  the  number  of  newly 
created  molecules: 
(dx/dy)  =  kx  (A  -  x) 
or 
lgC  (x/A  -  x)  =  Akt  (5) 
where  C  and  k  are  constant  coefficients,  x=  degree  of 
production,  and  A  is  the  new  level  achieved  by  increasing  labour 
productivity.  According  to  Bazarov  in  classical  capitalism 
formula  four  is  the  basic  regularity  of  the  dynamic  level  of 
productive  forces  (labour  productivity),  but  not  of  physical 
exchange. 
55 
This  analysis  shows  a  number  of  things.  Firstly,  that 
Bazarov  was  concerned  to  seriously  investigate  the  oscillations 
experienced  by  capitalism  and  to  try  to  find  mathematical 
expressions  of  them.  This  involved  using  assumptions  about  how 
the  market  operated.  Secondly,  that  Bazarov,  perhaps  because  of 
125 his  youthful  affinity  with  Bogdanov  and  his  days  studying 
chemistry,  relied  quite  heavily  on  analogy  with  ideas  taken  from 
the  natural  sciences.  Thirdly,  although  Bazarov  was  clearly 
anti-capitalist  in  his  general  outlook,  he  was  prepared  to 
engage  in  academic  research  concerning  capitalist  processes  and 
was  not  content  to  'rest  on  Marx'.  This  approach  was  at  odds 
with  the  Stalinist  ideological  system  which  was  established  soon 
after. 
In  the  third  instalment  of  this  series  of  articles  on 
economic  cycles  Bazarov  turned  his  attention  to  the  Soviet 
economy,  and  the  general  structure  of  the  restoration  process 
(vosstanovitel'nogo  protsessa)  occurring  in  it.  He  asks  in  what 
measure  is  the  Soviet  economy  engaged  in  a  simple  restoration 
process,  ie  in  reaching  pre-war  levels,  and  to  what  extent  are 
new  developments  occurring?  Pure  restoration  of  pre-war  levels 
is  unlikely,  so  some  new  developments  must  be  occurring. 
56 
Extending  his  chemical  analogy,  Bazarov  attempts  to  show  that 
the  equilibrium  of  social  economy  in  its  formal  structure  is 
analogous  to  a  chemical  process  in  which  products  of  the 
reaction  are  persistently  removed  from  the  sphere  of  the 
reacting  bodies,  and  the  original  reactants  are  continually 
poured  into  the  vessel  in  which  the  reaction  is  occurring  in  a 
coordinated  manner.  To  do  this  at  some  point  it  may  be  necessary 
to  suspend  the  new  influx  of  substances.  After  this  to  gradually 
increase  this  influx  creates  a  restoration  process  which 
achieves  the  previous  level  of  equilibrium  when  the  reactants 
flow  in  at  the  previous  rate. 
57 
Bazarov  believed  that  in  the  transitional  epoch  there 
existed  a  contradiction  between  the  solvent  demand  of  the 
working  masses  and  the  ability  of  the  growth  of  the  productive 
forces  to  fulfil  this  demand.  Usually  the  origins  of  a  goods 
famine  was  a  mistake  in  economic  policy,  but  according  to 
Bazarov  even  if  there  was  no  mistake  and  the  Soviet  management 
organs  possessed  ideal  perception,  the  goods  famine  would  only 
be  somewhat  mitigated,  but  not  removed  at  root.  While  the  USSR 
remained  a  backward  country  as  regards  productive  forces,  to 
create  a  steady  relative  equilibrium  between  production  and 
126 solvent  demand  was  possible  only  capitalistically  and  by 
limiting  demand: 
While  our  economic  and  political  order  excludes  or 
limits  these  methods,  the  tendency  to  relative 
underproduction  must  be  acknowledged  as 
characteristic  of  our  social  structure,  as  the 
tendency  for  overproduction  is  to  capitalism.  58 
Thus  Bazarov  implied  that  the  only  way  to  prevent  a  goods  famine 
in  Soviet  conditions  was  to  limit  demand,  ie  to  reduce  wage 
levels.  This  may  appear  to  contradict  the  socialist  policy  of 
increasing  the  living  standards  of  workers,  at  least  in  the 
short  term,  and  this  idea  is  somewhat  similar  to  Bukharin's  view 
of  the  nature  of  Soviet  crises  examined  in  chapter  two. 
Bazarov  continues  by  discussing  Groman's  theory  of  the 
dynamic  restoration  process.  According  to  Bazarov  Groman's 
theory  is  based  on  two  ideas  which  are  presented  in  the 
introduction  to  the  1925/6  Gosplan  control  figures.  These  are  as 
follows: 
1)  In  the  period  of  economic  chaos,  the  forms  of  economic 
activity  which  were  hardest  hit  were  those  with  the  most 
complex  organisation  and  the  highest  technological  level 
(metallurgy  and  metal  working),  while  the  organisationally 
and  technologically  primitive  branches  (agriculture  and 
handicrafts)  were  disrupted  the  least.  The  least  disorganised 
were  the  branches  serving  primary  needs  (food,  fuel, 
clothing),  while  there  was  almost  total  paralysis  of 
production  of  means  of  production; 
2)  In  accordance  with  this  the  more  urgent  is  the  need 
gratified  by  a  given  branch,  the  sooner  that  branch  will  be 
embraced  by  the  restoration  process  and,  ceteris  paribus,  the 
restoration  process  will  proceed  faster  the  greater  was  the 
disorganisation  in  the  period  of  economic  chaos. 
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Given  these  basic  postulates  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume, 
according  to  Bazarov,  that  the  speed  of  the  restoration  process 
must  be  maximal  in  the  first  months  of  the  economic  restoration, 
and  for  there  to  be  a  persistent  and  steady  reduction  in  the 
speed  as  time  progresses  and  as  more  and  more  means  of 
127 production  are  brought  back  on-line.  This  would  give  movement 
according  to  equation  three  above. 
Bazarov  notes  that  this  formula  was  the  subconscious  basis 
of  Soviet  planning  perspectives  one  and  a  half  to  two  years  ago. 
Approximate  calculations  show  that  gross  production  in  state 
census  industry  grew  in  1921/2  by  more  than  40%  as  compared  with 
the  preceding  year,  in  1922/3  gross  production  in  pre-war  prices 
grew  by  31%,  and  thus  the  formula  of  slower  growth  seems  to  be 
verified.  However,  in  1923/4  there  was  instead  of  a  further 
reduction  a  30%  increase.  But  this  may  be  explained  by  the 
'sales  hitch'  (zaminka  sbyta)  at  the  end  of  1923,  and  may  not 
necessary  be  a  refutation  of  this  thesis.  Even  if  this  is  so,  in 
the  fourth  year  of  the  restoration  process  there  was  the  most 
unequivocal  overturn  of  this  theory,  with  census  industry 
growing  by  60%.  Noting  that  the  owl  of  Minerva  flies  only  after 
dark,  Bazarov  places  the  root  of  this  underestimation  of  the 
capacity  of  Soviet  economy  to  expand  in  the  underevaluation  of 
the  profound  turning  point  brought  in  by  the  war-revolutionary 
epoch  in  the  organisation  and  social-economic  position  of  labour 
power. 
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According  to  Bazarov  it  is  possible  to  see  that  the  Soviet 
restoration  process  is  analogous  with  the  dynamics  of  capitalist 
industry  in  the  period  of  its  transition  from  a  depression  to 
resuscitation  by  means  of  technical  reconstruction  and  increased 
productivity  of  labour.  There  is  one  major  difference:  because 
the  Soviet  system  of  credit  differs  fundamentally  from  the 
capitalist,  in  the  second  part  of  the  restoration  cycle  there 
cannot  be  a  phase  of  'stock-jobbing',  and  consequently  the 
Soviet  restoration  must  be  more  or  less  smooth,  without  a  crisis 
waiting  inevitably  at  the  end.  61 
Another  difference  between  capitalist  cycles  and  the  Soviet 
restoration  process  is  the  mechanism  through  which 
reconstruction  occurs.  In  a  capitalist  depression  price 
reduction  stimulates  technical  reconstruction  of  production,  and 
creates  the  preconditions  for  a  movement  out  of  depression. 
However,  the  analogy  with  the  Soviet  economy  cannot  be  made. 
Prices  of  industrial  goods  in  the  famine  year  were  so  low,  and 
organisational-technical  possibilities  for  industry  so  limited, 
128 that  industry  worked  at  a  loss,  and  basic  and  turnover  capital 
was  wasted.  62  If  instead  of  state  industry  there  were  private 
capitalists,  undoubtedly  such  'animation'  would  not  arise,  and 
in  1921/2  there  would  be  a  strengthening  in  the  depression  as 
compared  with  the  previous  year.  In  1922/3  prices  of  industrial 
goods  increased,  and  state  industry  received  a  large  profit.  A 
highly  generous  credit  policy  led  to  'credit  inflation',  as  the 
illusion  of  infinite  demand  was  evoked. 
63  As  a  result  of  this 
the  'goods  hitch'  occurred,  which  was  essentially  different  from 
capitalist  crises  since  state  enterprises  were  not  sold  under 
the  hammer,  but  received  financial  support. 
it  is  apparent  from  this  analysis  that  Bazarov  questioned 
the  Soviet  policy  of  funding  state  enterprises  even  when  they 
were  hugely  unprofitable,  as  this  may  lead  to  inflationary 
pressures.  He  thus  implied  that  a  more  orthodox  approach  would 
be  more  successful,  and  based  his  conclusions  on  arguments  which 
were  and  are  common  in  Western  economic  literature.  Thus 
Strumilin's  complaints  against  the  'bourgeois'  influences 
present  in  Bazarov's  work  seem  somewhat  vindicated. 
In  another  article  on  the  restoration  process  published  in 
Ekonomicheskoe  obozrenie  in  1925  entitled  '0  "vostanovitel'nykh 
protsessakh"  voobshche  i  ob  "emissionnykh  vozmozhnostiakh"  v 
chastnosti'  Bazarov  states  that: 
Subject  to  the  same  law  of  'fading  oscillation'  are 
the  movements  of  a  sounding  string,  the  discharge  of 
an  electric  battery,  waves  spread  out  as  the  effect 
of  a  stone  thrown  into  water,  'conjunctural' 
fluctuations  of  market  supply  and  demand,  and  even 
the  succession  of  political  forms  in  transitional 
periods... 
64 
This  law  of  fading  oscillation  could  be  stated  as  follows:  the 
closer  a  system  which  has  been  disturbed  from  equilibrium  comes 
to  returning  to  the  initial  point  of  equilibrium,  the  slower 
will  the  traverse  to  equilibrium  move.  Or,  put  another  way,  the 
speed  of  the  traverse  is  directly  proportional  to  the  distance 
from  equilibrium.  According  to  Bazarov  this  is  applicable  to  the 
Soviet  restoration  process,  as  well  as  the  oscillations  of 
supply  and  demand  in  a  market. 
129 In  this  article  Bazarov  represents  these  ideas 
mathematically  as  follows.  Model  functions  which  have  the  form 
X=  ca-kt  or  x=  c/akt  meet  the  requirements  set,  where  a,  c, 
and  k  are  constants,  and  X  and  t  are  variables  (distance  and 
time).  65  Another  way  to  write  this  would  be:  X=  XOe-kt,  where 
X0  is  the  distance  from  equilibrium  at  the  start,  e=  natural 
log  base,  k=a  coefficient  describing  the  intensity  of  the 
process,  X=  the  distance  from  equilibrium  at  the  point  of 
measurement,  t=  time  elapsed  from  X0  to  X.  However,  Bazarov 
stresses  that  such  a  mathematical  model  is  a  simplification 
based  on  the  pure  form  of  the  restoration  process  only.  In  terms 
of  the  economy  it  assumes  that  productive  capacity  and  effective 
demand  are  limitless,  which  in  the  Soviet  context  is  clearly 
misleading. 
66  He  notes  that  on  present  information  only  a  very 
rough  guess  of,  for  example,  technical  capacity  could  be  made. 
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Bazarov  published  the  three  'Krivye  razvitiya'  articles 
from  Planovoe  khozyaistvo  together  with  some  new  material  on  the 
dynamic  regularity  of  social  economy  in  a  book  entitled 
Kapitatisticheskie  tsikly  i  vosstanovitel  'nyi  protsess 
khozyaistva  SSSR  of  1927.  The  new  material  included  a  chapter  on 
energetics  and  economics,  and  a  chapter  on  the  internal 
connections  between  basic  elements  in  the  restoration  process. 
In  the  latter  chapter  Bazarov  attempted  to  show  that  the 
productivity  of  labour  represents  the  integral  result  of  the 
action  of  two  composite  elements:  the  effort  of  labour 
(napryazhennosti  truda)  or  the  changing  quantity  of  labour 
energy,  and  the  productive  power  of  labour  which  depends  on  the 
level  of  technique  and  the  current  organisation  of  the  labour 
process.  68  Direct  measure  of  this  latter  element  is  impossible, 
but  the  level  of  wages  can  be  used  as  an  indirect  measure  of 
labour  effort. 
Bazarov  calculates  Pearson's  correlation  coefficients  for 
various  data  sets  in  relation  to  productivity  of  labour/wages, 
gross  output/wages,  and  gross  output/productivity  of  labour  in 
various  industrial  branches  such  as  metals,  chemicals,  paper, 
mining  etc.  For  example  the  following  table  shows  the  relation 
between  monthly  fluctuations  of  labour  productivity  and  wages  in 
various  branches  of  industry:  69 
130 INDUSTRIAL  BRANCH  COAL  METAL  CHEMICAL  TEXTILE  FOOD  PAPER 
1922/3  0.47  0.26  0.62  0.40  -0.11  0.13 
1923/4  0.28  0.04  0.03  0.43  0.35  -0.03 
1924/5  0.22  -0.12  -0.05  -0.06  0.27  0.41 
Bazarov  notes  that  a  weakening  of  the  connection  between  labour 
productivity  and  wages  is  observed  towards  the  end  of  the  three 
years  in  leading  branches  of  industry  such  as  coal,  metals, 
chemicals,  and  textiles.  This  analysis  shows  that  Bazarov  used 
statistical  measures  of  correlation  to  investigate  the  dynamics 
of  the  restoration  process  in  the  USSR,  and  thus  was  not 
satisfied  with  a  purely  qualitative  account. 
4.2.2  -  BAZAROV  AND  PLANNING 
Some  interesting  points  were  made  in  relation  to  planning 
by  Bazarov  in  an  article  entitled  '0  metodologii  postroeniya 
perspectivnykh  planov'  in  Planovoe  khozyaistvo  in  1926.  Bazarov 
states  that  perspective  plans  must  unite  genetic  and 
teleological  methods  of  planning,  and  that  the  agricultural 
sector  requires  predominantly  genetic  planning  whereas  the  state 
sector  requires  a  predominantly  teleological  approach. 
7°  He  asks 
the  question:  what  is  an  optimal  plan?  His  answer  contains  three 
basic  conditions.  Firstly,  that  the  progress  of  the  economy  from 
the  point  of  departure  to  the  end  point  indicated  by  the  plan 
must  be  smooth  and  without  interruptions,  which  in  turn  assumes 
the  existence  of  economic  reserves.  Secondly,  that  the  economy 
must  be  a  harmonious,  organic  whole  -a  maximally  stable  system 
of  mobile  equilibrium  and  proportionality.  Thirdly,  that  the 
path  chosen  from  the  initial  point  to  the  final  goal  should  be 
7  the  shortest  possible  one. 
l 
In  this  article  Bazarov  notes  some  stress  points  within 
current  Soviet  economic  policy.  Since  wages  should  grow  faster 
than  productivity  (this  presumably  being  a  socialist  goal),  the 
norms  of  capitalism  in  respect  to  expenses  on  reconstruction  and 
growth  will  be  higher  than  the  corresponding  norms  in  Soviet 
conditions.  Since  also  that  there  are  large  administrative 
expenses  on  the  planning  apparatus,  to  achieve  the  growth  rate 
observed  in  advanced  capitalist  countries  in  Soviet  conditions 
131 would  be  rather  difficult.  72  Bazarov  also  recognises  that  his 
three  criteria  for  optimal  planning  given  above  may  contradict 
each  other.  In  the  case  of  a  conflict  between  the  shortest  path 
and  proportionality,  the  latter  should  prevail.  Consequently 
growth  rates  may  have  to  be  sacrificed  to  stability.  73  Bazarov 
also  advocates  the  notion  that,  except  in  special  cases  such  as 
defence  needs,  the  international  division  of  labour  should  be 
respected  in  perspective  plans.  Despite  the  abundance  of  natural 
resources  in  the  USSR,  there  will  inevitably  be: 
... 
individual  areas  of  production  in  which,  owing  to 
natural  conditions,  we  shall  be  unable  in  the 
foreseeable  future  to  bring  the  cost  of  production 
down  sufficiently  for  the  domestic  product  to  cost  us 
no  more  than  the  foreign  output  of  the  same  quality. 
As  a  general  rule  output  of  this  type  should  be  left 
out  of  the  general  plan.  74 
This  shows  that  Bazarov  accepted  the  rationality  of  the 
international  division  of  labour,  and  this  clearly  contradicted 
the  isolationist  policy  favoured  by  Stalin  in  the  1930s.  As 
regards  the  end  of  the  restoration  period,  Bazarov  recommends 
that  as  growth  slows  investment  needs  to  grow  also,  but  even  if 
this  occurs  there  will  be  a  pause  in  growth  until  the  new 
investment  projects  come  into  working  order. 
75  This  is  part  of 
the  logic  of  the  current  position  of  the  Soviet  economy. 
It  is  clear  from  his  writings  that  Bazarov  supported  the 
notion  of  planning  in  the  wide  meaning  of  the  word.  But  how 
would  planning  replace  the  functions  performed  by  the  market? 
Bazarov  gave  an  indication  of  one  aspect  of  this  question  in  an 
article  called  'Ispol'zovanie  byudzhetnykh  dannykh  dlya 
postroeniya  struktury  gorodskogo  sprosa  v  perspektive 
general'nogo  plana'  in  Planovoe  khozyaistvo  in  1927.  In  this 
article  Bazarov  attempts  to  show  how  the  structure  of  urban 
demand  can  be  calculated  from  budget  data  in  relation  to  the 
genplan.  He  takes  the  TsSU  budgets  of  March  1923,1924,  and  1925 
as  base  material,  and  tries  to  construct  a  perspective  curve  of 
how  demand  will  develop  over  the  period  of  a  genplan.  Bazarov's 
calculations  reveal  that  the  average  earnings  of  all  workers  in 
March  1925  was  13%  higher  than  in  March  1924,  and  in  March  1926 
it  was  27%  higher  than  in  March  1925.76 
132 Bazarov  presents  the  following  figures  for  the  projected 
changes  in  distribution  of  earnings  between  1926  and  1940,  given 
in  percentage  form:  77 
EARNINGS  IN  RUBLES 
<20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-60  60-70  70-80  80-90  90-100  100-150 
YEAR 
1926  15.7  21.9  22.4  19.2  11.3  4.9  2.6  1.2  0.48  0.4 
1940  1.1  9.6  7.2  11.7  11.8  2.8  23.5  --  22.5  --  9.8 
In  terms  of  the  structure  of  this  demand,  ie  how  aggregate 
demand  is  divided  into  demand  for  individual  goods,  Bazarov 
gives  the  following  percentage  figures  which  represent  this  for 
1925:  78 
EARNINGS  OF  OUTLAY 
HEAD  OF  FAMILY  LODGINGS  FUEL/LIGHTING  FOOD  CLOTHES  OTHER 
16.9  4.5  11.8  53.5  19.0  11.2 
28.5  5.2  9.6  49.2  22.2  13.8 
39.5  4.7  8.8  48.2  24.1  14.2 
48.9  6.2  7.6  46.6  25.2  14.4 
58.8  5.4  6.7  46.0  25.8  16.1 
65.0  5.9  6.6  45.4  24.3  17.8 
76.5  5.7  6.2  44.2  24.8  19.1 
103.3  5.9  5.5  42.9  24.4  21.3 
The  correspond  ing  figures  for  1940  are  given  bel  ow: 
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AVERAGE  OUTLAY  OUTLAY 
OF  FAMILY  LODGINGS  FUEL/LIGHTING  FOOD  CLOTHES  OTHER 
37.2  12.0  11.8  51.0  17.0  8.2 
51.0  11.0  9.6  47.3  20.4  11.7 
62.4  10.0  8.8  46.4  22.3  12.5 
76.5  10.0  7.6  45.3  23.9  13.2 
85.9  10.0  6.7  44.4  24.3  14.6 
93.6  12.0  6.6  43.4  22.2  15.8 
102.5  12.0  6.2  42.1  22.7  17.0 
130.4  12.5  5.5  40.3  22.0  19.7 
221.0  14.0  4.0  34.0  25.0  23.0 
However,  it  is  clear  that  the  methods  used  to  calculate  these 
figures  in  no  sense  involved  the  families  whose  outlays  were 
being  predicted.  These  type  of  calculations  were  made  solely  by 
planners,  without  regard  for  the  desires  of  those  people  whose 
133 actions  were  being  forecast.  In  this  sense  Bazarov's  approach  to 
planning  was  identical  with  Strumilin's,  and  with  the  approach 
which  became  dominant  in  the  1930s.  The  idea  of  democratic 
planning  was  never  mentioned  in  such  articles,  rather  the  task 
of  planning  was  left  to  experts  alone.  Of  course,  it  may  be  the 
case  that  democratic  planning  is  simply  not  feasible,  but  there 
were  no  debates  on  this  question  in  the  1920s  and  thus  this 
conclusion,  if  it  was  made,  was  accepted  implicitly.  In  this 
article  it  is  also  clear  that  Bazarov  takes  the  genplan  data  as 
given.  He  notes  that  the  genplan  is  constructed  on  a  hypothesis 
of  proportional  growth,  and  that  the  growth  rate  of  national 
income  which  he  uses  is  given  by  the  genplan.  He  does  not  detail 
how  the  genplan  figures  were  constructed,  and  thus  it  is 
possible  to  conclude  that  he  agreed  with  the  methods  by  which 
the  genplan  was  constructed. 
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However,  the  difference  between  Bazarov's  approach  to 
planning  compared  with  Strumilin's  is  apparent  from  the  chapter 
on  energetics  and  economics  in  Kapitalisticheskie  tsikly  i 
vosstanovitel'nyi  protsess  khozyaistva  SSSR.  In  this  chapter 
Bazarov  cogitates  on  the  construction  of  planning  balances  based 
not  on  value  and  price  categories,  but  rather  on  physical  and 
energy  categories.  Using  A.  N.  Shchukarev's  article 
'Termodinamika  i  kinetika  obshchestvennykh  protsessov'  from  the 
journal  Nauka  i  tekhnika,  Bazarov  discusses  the  meaning  of  the 
categories  in  the  following  equation: 
dW  =  Wldwl  +  W2dw2  +...  Wndwn 
where  dW  is  the  outlay  of  social  labour  in  production  or  the 
growth  of  all  social  energy,  and  W1...  Wn  is  the  quantity  of 
specific  social  energy  (quantity  of  social  labour)  expended  on 
producing  a  unit  of  a  good. 
81  Bazarov  notes  the  difference 
between  socially-necessary  labour  as  a  norm  and  kinetic  energy 
as  a  definite  quantity,  and  relates  that  the  second  law  of 
thermodynamics  is  not  applicable  to  the  process  of  production. 
82 
In  conclusion  Bazarov  notes  that  the  task  of  constructing  a 
general  theory  of  the  social  force  field  requires  a  synthesising 
genius  on  a  par  with  Newton.  83 
134 4.2.3  -  NEP 
It  is  worth  noting  that  Bazarov  divided  the  first  half  of 
the  1920s  into  two  periods.  In  a  1926  article  entitled  'K 
pyatiletiyu  nep'a'  published  in  Ekonomicheskoe  obozrenie  Bazarov 
reviewed  the  first  five  years  of  development  in  the  NEP  period. 
He  stated  that  these  five  years  can  be  divided  into  two  basic 
sections.  In  the  first  period,  from  the  moment  of  the 
proclamation  of  NEP  until  the  'crisis'  at  the  end  of  1923,  the 
object  of  the  regulating  activity  of  the  state  in  the  industrial 
field  was  the  physical  volume  of  production.  Planning  and 
regulative  organs  composed  'production  programmes',  and  fields 
of  exchange  and  distribution  such  a  prices  and  profit  remained 
outside  the  direct  control  of  the  state.  In  these  areas  acted 
the  automatic  regulator  'conjuncture',  ie  the  spontaneous  play 
of  supply  and  demand  on  free  markets. 
84  However,  in  the  autumn 
of  1923  the  goods  crisis  occurred.  From  this  time  begins  the 
second  stage  of  NEP,  when  the  state  aspired  to  subordinate 
market  relations  to  its  directly  planned  goals. 
85  Thus  Bazarov 
implies  that  from  mid-1921  until  the  end  of  1923  markets 
developed  freely  and  without  a  great  deal  of  state  control.  It 
was  only  after  the  crises  in  1923  that  the  state  begun  to 
intervene  heavily.  This  is  interesting  because  many  commentators 
place  the  high  point  of  NEP  around  1925,  but  according  to 
Bazarov  the  state  was  regulating  at  this  time  more  than  it  was 
in  the  early  part  of  NEP.  It  may  follow  that  the  most  successful 
period  of  NEP  was  when  the  state  was  intervening  on  markets  to 
some  extent. 
An  outline  of  Bazarov's  general  conception  of  NEP  can  be 
found  in  a  1924  Ekonomicheskoe  obozrenie  article  called  'K 
voprosu  o  khozyaistvennom  plane'.  In  this  article  Bazarov  states 
that  it  is  correct  to  say  that  a  fully  developed  planned  economy 
contradicts  a  commodity  economy.  Direct  social  management  of  all 
aspects  of  production  and  distribution  is  not  compatible  with 
commodity  markets,  a  fact  known  by  every  student.  However,  the 
dialectical  movement  towards  socialism  is  exceedingly  complex 
and  contradictory,  in  particular  the  combination  of  commodity 
135 markets  with  planning  which  now  exists  under  NEP.  This 
combination: 
... 
is  not  simply  a  compromise  between  socialist  and 
capitalist  principles.  In  the  framework  of  the 
production  possibilities  of  the  given  epoch  and  the 
given  country,  NEP  is  the  basic  precondition  of 
successful  economic  planning  dictated  by  the  internal 
structure  of  state  industry,  and  it  would  be  a 
profound  mistake  to  see  in  current  economic  policy  a 
limiting  of  the  planning  principle  i6  the  interests 
of  petty-bourgeois  peasant  elements. 
Bazarov  continues  by  outlining  how  commodity  markets  were  the 
precondition  of  successful  planning  in  a  double  sense.  Firstly, 
they  made  easier  the  restoration  of  the  personal  interest  of 
each  worker  in  the  results  of  their  labour.  Secondly,  they 
simplified  the  functions  of  actual  control  of  work  in 
enterprises,  and  consequently  they  simplified  all  economic 
regulation.  Bazarov  says  that  if  Soviet  industry  was  already  at 
the  level  where  planned  management  was  possible,  then  there 
would  be  no  basic  difficulty  in  organising  product  exchange 
between  the  rural  economy  and  state  industry.  Free  markets  and 
the  smychka  would  be  unnecessary. 
87  Thus  it  is  clear  that  in 
this  article  he  shared  Strumilin's  aim  of  abolishing  markets  in 
planned  economy,  and  saw  the  use  of  markets  in  NEP  as  a 
temporary  measure.  However,  it  is  also  clear  from  the  above  that 
Bazarov  did  not  regard  NEP  as  simply  a  retreat.  It  was  progress 
in  the  Soviet  context,  and  thus  the  development  of  market 
exchange  in  NEP  constituted  a  step  forward,  not  a  step 
backwards.  From  this  it  follows  that  markets  were  important  for 
the  development  of  the  Soviet  economy. 
4.3.1  -  GROMAN 
One  of  Groman's  most  famous  ideas  was  put  forward  in  an 
article  entitled  '0  nekotorykh  zakonomernostiakh  empiricheski 
obnaruzhivaemykh  v  nashem  narodonom  khozyaistve',  published  in 
the  first  and  second  editions  of  Planovoe  khozyaistvo  in  1925. 
This  work  was  a  bold  attempt  to  establish  regularities 
empirically  observable  in  the  Soviet  economy,  relevant  at  least 
136 to  the  current  restoration  period.  Groman  gave  these  the  title 
'empirical  law',  by  which  he  meant: 
...  observable  regularities  of  the  existence  and 
sequence  of  phenomena,  for  instance  the  law  of 
declining  mortality  associated  with  the  growth  of 
welfare,  the  growth  or  decline  of  yields  associated 
with  changes  in  cultivation,  the  relation  between  the 
value  of  industrial  and  agricultural  output  coming  to 
the  market... 
88 
The  specific  regularities  which  Groman  wanted  to  investigate 
were:  a)  the  relative  growth  rates  of  industry  and  agriculture; 
b)  the  relation  between  the  value  of  industrial  and  agricultural 
products  entering  the  market  and  their  respective  price  levels; 
c)  the  distribution  of  industrial  products  between  city  and 
country;  d)  the  relation  between  volume  of  money  and  turnover  of 
goods;  e)  the  relationships  between  labour  productivity,  wages, 
and  labour  costs.  89 
However,  a  theoretical  ambiguity  lies  at  the  heart  of  this 
approach,  a  problem  which  was  quickly  picked  up  by  his 
opponents.  Groman,  claiming  that  even  though  economic  life  is 
complex  regularities  can  be  found,  writes: 
...  the  degree  of  their  stability  is  not  absolute; 
regularities  once  discovered  will  not  subsequently 
reappear  in  identical  form.  However,  subsequent 
events  will  closely  resemble  the  regularities  ... 
90 
Why  must  they  'closely  resemble'  the  regularities?  If  their 
stability  is  not  absolute,  then  there  is  no  reason  why  in  any 
given  case  they  will  be  followed.  This  ambiguity  about  how  and 
when  a  given  regularity  can  be  applied  was  taken  up  by  many  at 
the  time,  who  mocked  the  idea  that  a  ratio  found  from  a  small 
number  of  past  years  could  have  accurate  predictive  powers. 
Here  I  will  investigate  three  of  Groman's  regularities; 
that  between  prices  of  agricultural  and  industrial  goods,  that 
between  distribution  in  city  and  country,  and  that  between  the 
money  mass  and  the  commodity  mass.  In  the  first  case,  Groman 
calculated  the  percentage  distribution  of  total  sales  between 
agricultural  and  industrial  products  to  be  as  follows:  91 
137 YEAR  AGRICULTURE  INDUSTRY 
1913  37  63 
1921-2  52  48 
1922-3  41  59 
1923-4  38  62 
1924-5  (forecast)  37  63 
Thus  Groman  notes  that  the  pre-war  coefficient  (37:  63)  was 
restored  after  three  years  of  regeneration,  and  that  it  is  this 
ratio  which  is  being  approached  during  this  time.  Jasny  states 
that  Groman  restricted  this  regularity  to  the  restoration 
process,  but  this  would  be  rather  devious  since  by  definition 
the  restoration  process  is  a  process  of  reaching  pre-war 
norms. 
92  In  my  opinion  Groman  seems  to  imply  that  this  ratio  is 
relevant  to  more  than  just  the  restoration  process,  although 
does  not  explicitly  define  its  relevance.  Jasny  gives  the 
following  figures  from  the  1929/30  control  figures  for  this 
ratio  in  subsequent  years: 
93 
YEAR  AGRICULTURE  INDUSTRY 
1926/7  33.1  66.9 
1927/8  31.9  68.1 
1928/9  (estimate)  32.0  68.0 
Jasny  implies  that  these  figures  show  Groman's  approach  to  be 
correct,  since  1926/7  was  given  as  the  year  in  which  the 
restoration  process  came  to  an  end. 
In  relation  to  the  distribution  between  country  and  city 
Groman's  analysis  was  as  follows.  Agricultural  goods  were 
distributed  one  third  to  the  country,  and  two  thirds  to  the 
city;  industrial  goods  were  distributed  28.5%  to  the  country 
while  71.5%  remains  in  the  sphere  of  industry  or  goes  to  trade, 
transport  and  the  state  apparatus.  94  As  regards  the  relation 
between  the  commodity  and  monetary  masses,  Groman  concludes  that 
there  is  a  definite  empirical  law  by  which  the  growth  of  the 
money  mass  increases  faster  than  the  growth  of  the  commodity 
mass. 
95 
Such  an  analysis  would  have  been  of  obvious  importance  to 
Soviet  economic  policy  at  this  time,  but  its  claim  to  show 
coefficients  which  were  empirical  laws  may  seem  to  be  rather 
stretched.  Groman  gave  no  reasons  why  for  example  the  ratio  of 
138 industrial  to  agricultural  produce  sold  should  be  63:  37,  and  if 
this  ratio  was  limited  to  the  restoration  process  he  gave  no 
indication  what  it  would  be  after  this  process  had  ended. 
As  was  mentioned  above,  Groman  was  one  of  the  major 
economists  who  worked  on  the  1925/6  control  figures.  In  1926  he 
published  an  article  in  Planovoe  khozyaistvo  entitled  'Tezisy  k 
peresmotru  kontrol'nikh  tsifr  na  1925/6g'  in  which  he  set  out  a 
number  of  theses  concerning  these  control  figures,  some  of  which 
are  as  follows: 
1)  The  planning  principle  contradicts  not  only  elements  of 
private  economy,  but  also  elements  of  enterprises  run  on 
khozraschet  principles; 
2)  The  group  interests  of  workers  are  not  always  in  agreement 
with  the  aim  of  developing  the  economy  towards  socialism;  96 
3)  Under  Soviet  conditions  the  elaboration  of  a  general  plan  for 
state  enterprises  which  is  in  harmony  with  the  system  of 
regulating  private  economy  is  extremely  difficult;  97 
4)  In  the  first  quarter  of  the  new  economic  year  we  have  a 
completely  different  economic  environment  than  that  which  was 
supposed  by  the  control  figures.  Grain  exports  do  not 
coincide  with  the  figures  supposed,  and  because  of  this 
imports  had  to  be  reduced.  Problems  were  also  encountered 
with  the  relative  purchasing  power  of  gold  on  internal  and 
foreign  markets;  98 
5)  Since  the  control  figures  were  not  discussed  in  the  higher 
organs  until  their  finalisation,  the  economic  activity  of  our 
economic  organs  and  the  regulating  activity  of  our 
departments  was  not  definite  and  lacked  leadership; 
6)  The  Soviet  economy  is  a  complex  transitionary  form  which  is 
absolutely  original  and  in  which  monetary  circulation  can  and 
must  be  regulated  by  an  original  system  of  measures  unlike 
that  which  exists  in  Western  Europe.  99 
These  theses  reveal  a  number  of  things.  Firstly,  that  Groman  was 
ready  to  accept  that  the  control  figures  contained  errors. 
Secondly,  that  planning  may  contradict  the  market  is  some 
respects.  Thirdly,  that  the  financial  regulation  which  Groman 
proposed  was  not  simply  a  duplicate  of  the  type  which  already 
existed  in  capitalist  countries.  Unfortunately,  he  does  not 
139 provide  any  more  detail  on  this  topic.  They  also  show  that 
Groman  strongly  supported  the  idea  of  planning  as  such,  and 
seemed  to  have  no  doubts  over  the  correctness  of  the  direction 
of  movement  occurring  -  towards  a  totally  planned  economy. 
4.3.2  -  THE  CONTROL  FIGURES 
The  first  control  figures  were  prepared  by  Gosplan  in  the 
summer  of  1925  for  the  economic  year  1925/6,  and  were  published 
on  20  August  1925.  Carr  &  Davies  interpret  the  development  of 
the  control  figures  as  one  stage  in  the  battle  between  Gosplan 
and  VSNKh  on  the  one  hand,  and  Narkomfin  on  the  other,  and  state 
that  the  first  control  figures  were  a  'bold  attempt'  by  Gosplan 
to  take  the  lead  in  economic  policy-making  from  Narkomfin  and 
the  budget.  100  To  support  this  they  quote  the  following 
statement  by  Groman: 
The  volume  of  capital  expenditure  already  being 
undertaken  shows  that  the  control  figures  have 
already  won  a  certain  victory;  for  the  attack  from 
Narkomfin  and  Gosbank  and  Narkomzem  on  the  control 
figures  was  resisted  not  only  by  VSNKh,  but  alsolby 
Gosplan,  armed  with  the  revised  control  figures. 
This  shows  that  Groman  had  little  sympathy  for  the  critics  of 
planning  in  Narkomfin  such  as  Sokol'nikov,  and  was  perhaps  in 
this  respect  closer  to  Strumilin  than  would  have  been  at  first 
expected. 
The  control  figures  increased  in  importance  in  1926/7,  when 
the  plans  of  individual  commissariats  and  the  state  budget  were 
required  to  take  these  figures  into  account.  The  1925/6  figures, 
according  to  Carr  &  Davies,  contained  three  major  errors: 
harvest  difficulties  were  underestimated,  and  both  currency 
emission  and  exports  were  exaggerated. 
102  As  a  result  the 
figures  for  1926/7  were,  by  Strumilin's  admission,  extremely 
modest,  although  by  1927/8  upward  revisions  became  more  common. 
On  the  1928/9  control  figures  the  names  of  Groman  and  Bazarov 
did  not  appear  in  the  preface. 
The  1925/6  control  figures  contained  a  section  which 
discussed  the  methodology  used  for  drafting  the  figures. 
140 According  to  this  discussion  there  were  three  basic  methods 
used: 
1)  the  method  of  dynamic  coefficients,  obtained  from  analysis  of 
the  actual  evolution  of  the  economy  in  recent  times; 
2)  the  method  of  expert  estimates  of  advances  economically  and 
technically  feasible; 
3)  the  method  of  control  comparison  of  the  results  obtained  with 
other  data,  for  example  pre-war  data.  103 
It  is  apparent  that  the  first  of  these  methods  is  Groman's 
notion  of  finding  empirical  regularities  of  economic 
development,  and  the  ratio  37:  63  for  industrial  and  agricultural 
output  is  explicitly  mentioned.  The  second  involved  asking 
experts  to  examine  development  possibilities  from  the  point  of 
view  of  factors  such  as  market  capacity,  raw  material 
availability,  import  possibilities,  or  even  the  skill  level  of 
labour.  The  third  method  was  a  useful  guide  only,  since 
comparison  with  pre-war  norms  could  not  be  taken  as  the  absolute 
criteria  of  acceptance.  Such  norms  were  not  ideal  relations,  but 
historical  examples. 
Strumilin  was  also  one  of  the  major  originators  of  the 
control  figures,  and  by  the  time  of  the  1928/9  control  figures 
as  I  mentioned  above  the  names  of  Groman  and  Bazarov  were  not 
mentioned  in  the  preface,  whereas  Strumilin's  role  was 
acknowledged  as  chairman  of  the  special  commission  for 
statistical  material.  The  1928/9  control  figures  are  also 
interesting  because  they  give  an  insight  into  how  the  state  was 
to  regulate  commodity-turnover  at  this  time.  This  system  was  to 
be  based  on  three  elements.  Firstly,  on  socialisation  of 
commodity-turnover,  on  the  widening  of  cooperative  trade. 
Secondly,  planned  contracts  for  important  goods  were  to  be 
issued,  and  their  distribution  would  also  be  planned.  Thirdly, 
price  norms  were  to  operate,  directed  to  stimulate  market  supply 
of  important  agricultural  commodities. 
104  However,  these  control 
figures  also  warn  against  excessive  development  of 
administrative  norms,  which  could  lead  to  bureaucratisation  of 
trade.  Even  so,  the  control  figures  direct  a  preservation  and 
deepening  of  centralised  distribution  of  important  goods  such  as 
the  products  of  census  industry  and  grain,  and  thus  some  element 
141 of  contradiction  may  be  observed. 
105  The  following  passage 
indicates  that  there  was  still  some  element  of  market-orientated 
thinking  remaining  in  Gosplan  at  this  time: 
Through  the  market,  as  was  indicated,  it  is  possible 
in  significant  degree  to  facilitate  the  fulfilment  of 
the  November  party  directives  concerning  the 
stimulation  of  the  economic  inte  ests  of  the  wide 
bednyak-serednik  peasant  mass.  10° 
However,  it  is  clear  from  the  1928/9  control  figures  that  such 
market-orientated  thinking  was  under  siege  from  another  type  of 
thinking,  as  centralised  directives  were  given  a  prime  role  in 
the  system  of  state  regulation  of  the  economy. 
4.4  -  CONCLUSION 
In  comparative  perspective  it  can  be  seen  that  Strumilin, 
Bazarov,  and  Groman  all  supported  the  introduction  of  planning 
into  the  Soviet  economy  in  the  1920s  to  some  extent.  Strumilin 
conceived  of  planning  as  a  replacement  for  the  market  in  the 
sense  that  the  market  revealed  consumer  demand,  and  thus 
planners  would  have  to  calculate  such  demand  through  various 
techniques.  Strumilin's  explicit  evaluation  of  subjective  value 
theory  and  the  market  economics  built  on  it  was  negative,  but  I 
demonstrated  that  he  actually  utilised  elements  of  subjectivism 
in  his  work  on  education  and  inflation.  In  his  work  on  price 
formation  Strumilin  attempted  to  use  Marxist  categories  such  as 
value  to  guide  the  task  of  price  regulation,  but  this  attempt 
seems  to  have  been  rather  unsuccessful.  This  shows  that  although 
he  still  thought  of  the  market  in  terms  of  Marxist  theoretical 
categories,  he  found  it  difficult  to  apply  such  categories  to 
the  real  cases  of  price  control  which  he  and  the  Bolsheviks 
faced  in  the  1920s. 
Although  Bazarov  and  Groman  supported  the  idea  of  planning 
in  a  general  sense,  their  approach  to  market  economics  differed 
from  that  of  Strumilin.  Bazarov  pioneered  his  own  very  original 
approach  to  the  study  of  economic  phenomena  such  as  the  market, 
which  combined  techniques  taken  from  contemporary  Western 
economics  such  as  correlation  analysis  with  reasoning  analogous 
142 to  phenomena  studied  in  natural  science  such  as  wave  motion  and 
chemical  equilibrium.  As  in  the  of  case  Bukharin  it  is  not 
difficult  to  see  the  influence  of  Bogdanov  at  work  here, 
although  Bazarov's  knowledge  of  science  seems  far  greater  than 
Bukharin's.  Bazarov's  analysis  of  the  market  mechanics  which 
were  applicable  to  the  restoration  process  based  on  his  law  of 
market  saturation  was  an  impressive  attempt  to  analyse  current 
Soviet  reality,  and  showed  that  he  viewed  the  market  in  terms 
analogous  to  acid/base  chemical  reactions  and  the  kinetic  theory 
of  gases.  This  approach  was  highly  original. 
Groman's  analysis  based  on  empirical  regularities  shows 
that  he  viewed  market  economics  in  terms  of  the  observable 
relations  between  categories,  and  that  he  extrapolated  these 
regularities  into  his  approach  to  planning.  Strumilin  criticised 
both  Groman  and  Bazarov  for  this  type  of  planning,  as  he 
favoured  the  teleological  over  the  genetic  approach.  However, 
some  of  Strumilin's  early  work  on  planning  shows  that  his  view 
was  not  always  so  opposed  to  genetic  planning. 
In  the  1920s  Gosplan  was  an  institution  containing  people 
with  diverse  conceptions  of  the  market  and  of  planning.  In  the 
1930s  this  diversity  was  replaced  by  a  more  monolithic  approach 
as  Bazarov  and  Groman  were  both  placed  under  arrest. 
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147 CHAPTER  FIVE  -  KONDRAT'EV  AND  OPARIN 
5.1.1  -  INTRODUCTION 
This  chapter  focuses  on  two  members  of  the  Kon"yunkturnogo 
instituta  -  N.  D.  Kondrat'ev  and  D.  I.  Oparin.  Nikolay  Dmitrievich 
Kondrat'ev  (1892-1938)  was  a  pupil  of  Tugan-Baranovskii  at  St 
Petersburg  University,  and  politically  he  sympathised  with  the 
Social  Revolutionaries.  He  worked  as  deputy  Minister  for  Food  in 
the  Provisional  Government,  and  in  the  1920s  he  organised  the 
innovative  Kon"yunkturnogo  instituta  and  advised  both  Narkomfin 
and  Narkomzem.  Towards  the  end  of  this  decade  he  was  attacked  as 
a  'neo-narodnik'  and  was  arrested.  In  the  'Menshevik'  trial  of 
March  1931  he  was  accused  of  organising  a  counter-revolutionary 
'Working-Peasant  Party'. 
Dmitrii  Ivanovich  Oparin  (1891-1978)  graduated  from  the 
Petrograd  Polytechnical  institute  with  a  diploma  candidate  of 
economic  science  in  1915.  He  worked  at  the  Kon"yunkturnogo 
instituta  in  the  1920s,  was  a  member  of  the  conjuncture  Soviet 
of  Gosplan  USSR  (1923-1926),  the  conjuncture  department  of 
Narkomvnutorg  (1924-1925),  and  also  worked  in  the  world  economy 
department  of  Gosplan  USSR  (1925-1930).  He  taught  at  the  Moscow 
industrial-economic  institute  named  after  A.  I.  Rykov  and  at 
Moscow  State  University  (1924-1925).  In  1930  he  was  arrested, 
but  was  eventually  released.  After  his  arrest  he  worked  in  the 
baking  and  tea  industries,  and  in  1964  he  became  a  member  of  the 
scientific  council  of  the  Academy  of  Sciences  USSR.  1  Thus  he  was 
one  of  the  few  economists  to  survive  the  1920s  and  to  continue 
working  for  many  years  after.  In  the  1920s  perhaps  the  greatest 
influence  on  his  work  was  Kondrat'ev.  Much  of  Oparin's  work  is 
concerned  with  the  study  of  conjuncture,  or  market  fluctuation, 
and  it  was  Kondrat'ev's  Kon"yunkturnogo  instituta  which  provided 
the  lead  in  investigating  this  topic  at  this  time.  However, 
Oparin  did  not  follow  Kondrat'ev  blindly,  as  his  'Kriticheskii 
analiz  "Bol'shikh  tsiklov  kon"yunktury"  Prof.  Kondrat'ev' 
clearly  demonstrates.  2  In  fact  Oparin  pioneered  his  own  approach 
to  the  study  of  market  conjuncture,  an  approach  he  called 
'schematic  economy'  or  'schematic  equilibrium',  which  utilised 
statistical  analysis  alongside  qualitative  reasoning. 
148 5.1.2  -  KONDRAT'EV  AND  PLANNING 
Kondrat'ev  is  undoubtedly  famous  today  for  his  theory  of 
long  waves  in  the  economic  process.  However,  what  is  less  well- 
known  is  that  this  discovery  was  part  of  a  study  of  cyclical 
phenomena  in  general  which  Kondrat'ev  called  economic  dynamics. 
Kondrat'ev  headed  an  institute  devoted  to  such  study  called  the 
Kon"yunkturnogo  instituta  in  Moscow,  the  aim  of  which  was  to 
study  the  dynamics  of  economic  indicators  such  as  price. 
Kondrat'ev  was  also  involved  in  debates  on  planning  and  in  the 
planning  process  itself.  The  question  of  outlining  future 
development  was  clearly  linked  to  the  question  of  recent 
developments,  and  Kondrat'ev's  institute  was  a  body  created 
precisely  for  the  task  of  studying  current  trends.  Kondrat'ev 
was  also  involved  in  drafting  a  five-year  plan  for  agriculture 
which  was  never  adopted,  and  wrote  much  on  the  methodology  of 
the  planning  process.  This  is  perhaps  a  useful  place  to  begin. 
In  an  article  entitled  'Plan  i  predvidenie'  of  1927 
published  in  the  journal  Puti  sel'skogo  khozyaistvo  Kondrat'ev 
outlined  his  views  on  the  methodology  of  the  planning  process. 
This  article  was  subtitled  'on  the  methods  of  composing 
perspective  plans  for  the  development  of  the  national  economy 
and  agriculture  in  particular',  and  begins  by  noting  the 
enthusiasm  with  which  many  types  of  plans  are  currently  being 
composed  at  various  levels  such  as  local,  republican,  and  Union. 
However,  'it  is  clear  that  such  enthusiasm  for  constructing 
plans  is  not  a  guarantee  of  the  feasibility  of  these  plans  in 
actual  economic  life',  nor  that  they  are  of  sufficient  quality.  3 
Kondrat'ev  notes  that  local  and  republican  plans  are  composed 
for  incompatible  time  periods  and  with  different  methods,  and 
thus  sometimes  come  to  different  conclusions.  Since  planning  is 
concerned  to  surmount  the  spontaneous-economic  process  with  a 
rationally  based  process,  this  seems  mistaken  -  the  planning 
process  itself  demands  planned  regulation. 
The  main  theme  of  this  article,  indeed  of  much  of 
Kondrat'ev's  work,  is  outlined  by  him  as  follows: 
...  plans  for  future  development  have  a  close 
connection  with  forecasting  this  future.  But  if  this 
149 is  so  then  it  is  clear  that  methods  of  constructing 
plans  must  be  in  harmony  with  the  possibilities  of 
such  forecasts.  We  discuss  the  methodology  of  plan 
construction  primarily  as  it  is  connected  with 
problems  of  forecast  possibilities  and  the  limits  to 
these  possibilities. 
4 
According  to  Kondrat'ev  this  problem  is  the  basic  question  of 
plan  construction  on  which  the  correctness  of  all  planning  work 
depends.  Thus  the  connection  is  made  between  conjunctural  study 
and  the  planning  process. 
Kondrat'ev,  like  most  Bolsheviks,  contrasts  planned 
development  with  spontaneity.  However,  he  notes  that 
historically  there  has  never  been  a  national  economy  which  has 
developed  without  any  influence  or  support  from  organs  of 
economic  policy,  the  example  of  commodity-capitalist  economies 
being  given.  This  does  not  mean,  though,  that  Soviet  and 
capitalist  planning  are  identical.  They  differ  not  only 
quantitatively  but  also  qualitatively: 
The  influence  of  the  state  on  economic  life  under 
private-capitalist  order  is  limited  to  relatively 
narrow  spheres  of  the  economy  and,  as  a  rule,  has  an 
indirect  (kosvennii)  character.  The  state  influences 
the  economy  through  customs  and  tariff  policy, 
through  legislation  of  entrepreneurial  unions,  on  the 
duration  of  the  working  day  etc.  5 
The  state  aspires  to  limit  or  encourage  the  development  of  a 
particular  branch  or  form  of  organisation,  but  there  is  no 
direct  leadership  of  the  economy  as  a  whole.  Kondrat'ev 
contrasts  this  with  the  position  in  the  Soviet  economy.  The 
state  has  concentrated  into  its  hands  almost  all  industry  and 
transport,  almost  all  of  the  credit  system,  and  a  significant 
part  of  trade.  Under  such  conditions  the  role  of  the  state 
consist  of  direct  leadership.  In  relation  to  private  economy  the 
state  plays  an  indirect  regulating  and  influencing  role.  Thus 
Kondrat'ev  concludes  that  the  state  in  the  Soviet  economy  has  a 
principally  different  role  to  the  state  in  capitalist  economy, 
and  even  in  influencing  private  elements  the  Soviet  state  has  a 
greater  amount  of  power  than  a  capitalist  state.  6  This  reveals 
that  Kondrat'ev  made  a  sharp  distinction  between  a  capitalist 
and  a  transitional/socialist  economy.  Although  both  were 
150 regulated  by  the  state  to  some  extent,  the  quantity  of 
regulation  in  socialism  produced  a  qualitative  change  in  nature. 
According  to  Kondrat'ev,  if  capitalist  economy  is  a 
decentralised  system  regulated  by  the  spontaneous  laws  of  the 
market,  then  the  current  Soviet  system  is  'already  not 
characterised  by  these  features'.  On  the  one  hand  there  is 
decentralisation  and  competition,  on  the  other  there  is 
centralisation  and  the  principle  of  conscious  leadership  by 
state  organs.  Hence  there  is  a  'struggle  of  spirits'  occurring 
in  the  Soviet  economy:  spontaneity  verses  planning.  The 
spontaneous  principle  has  its  root  in  market  relations,  both 
internal  and  external,  and  the  planning  principle  is  based  on 
centralisation  in  the  hands  of  the  state.?  This  conception  is 
closer  to  Preobrazhenskii's  view  of  the  transition  rather  than 
Bukharin's.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Kondrat'ev  strongly 
connected  planning  with  centralisation  and  the  market  with 
decentralisation,  a  position  which  today  would  be  supported  by 
many  pro-market  economists. 
Kondrat'ev  writes  that  plans  are  composed  first  of  all  from 
perspectives,  ie  perspectives  on  growth  rates  of  particular 
industries,  on  the  productivity  of  labour  etc,  and  he  outlines 
two  possible  types  of  perspective.  In  the  first  type 
perspectives  are  constructed  solely  on  the  basis  of  more  or  less 
distant  socio-economic  aims.  Since  this  method  fails  to  produce 
feasible  plans,  Kondrat'ev  rejects  it.  8  Instead  he  recommends 
that  plan  criteria  should  be  obtained  from  analysis  of 
actuality,  from  analysis  of  the  current  position  of  the  economy 
and  the  possibilities  of  spontaneous  development,  and  of 
analysis  of  ways  of  influencing  this  spontaneous  development 
into  desirable  channels: 
... 
these  perspectives  in  principle  are  not  simply  an 
expression  of  the  spontaneous  course  of  events,  but 
are  also  not  simply  expressions  of  our  wishes 
(pozhelanii).  They  are  an  expression  of  desirable 
results  of  economic  construction  within  the  framework 
of  possibility.  9 
Thus  the  limits  of  the  framework  of  possibility  were  to  be  found 
through  analysis  of  current  economic  trends,  ie  through 
151 conjunctural  analysis,  and  the  question  to  ask  was:  how  are  the 
spontaneous  tendencies  revealed  going  to  be  influenced  in  the 
direction  desired? 
Kondrat'ev  objects  to  the  view  that  the  genetic  method,  ie 
the  dominance  of  simple  extrapolation  of  spontaneous  tendencies, 
should  be  used  for  agricultural  plans,  whereas  the  teleological 
method,  ie  setting  up  desired  targets  independent  of 
possibility,  should  be  used  for  industrial  plans.  Such  a 
categorical  form  of  opposition,  according  to  Kondrat'ev,  is 
mistaken.  Rather  both  methods  have  to  be  used  to  some  degree  in 
both  types  of  plan.  '°  Even  the  state  sector  is  affected  by  the 
anarchic  developments  of  the  private  sector,  and  thus  objective 
conditions  partially  outside  of  state  control  have  to  be  taken 
into  consideration  when  composing  plans  for  this  sector. 
Conversely,  agricultural  plans  must  reflect  to  some  extent  the 
consciously  desired  path  of  development,  otherwise  they  would  be 
totally  superfluous: 
Differences  between  the  first  and  second  types  of 
plan  [ie  industrial  and  agricultural  -  V.  B.  ]  are 
conditioned  not  by  the  fact  that  in  one  case  the 
genetic  method  and  another  the  teleological  method  is 
used.  Differences  lie  in  the  different  possible 
influence  of  the  state  on  industry  and  agriculture.  ll 
Since  in  industry  the  state  leads  directly,  whereas  in 
agriculture  it  only  influences,  the  power  of  the  state  over 
industry  is  significantly  higher  and  qualitatively  wider  than 
its  power  over  agriculture. 
Apart  from  the  construction  of  perspectives,  there  are  two 
other  plan  elements.  The  first  is  analysis  of  the  existing 
economic  conjuncture,  the  second  is  a  system  of  measures  and 
means  by  which  the  state  can  influence  this  economic  conjuncture 
in  the  direction  desired.  What  must  be  provided  by  such 
analyses,  according  to  Kondrat'ev,  are  'probable  tendencies  in 
the  future  economy  in  the  period  of  interest',  ie  forecasting  of 
future  spontaneous  developments  which  would  have  occurred 
without  any  attempt  at  influencing  them  by  the  state-12  Thus  for 
Kondrat'ev  a  perspective  plan  is  not  only  a  directive,  but 
simultaneously  a  forecast:  not  only  a  forecast,  but 
152 simultaneously  a  programme  of  action.  He  quotes  the  following 
formula:  know,  in  order  to  forecast;  forecast,  in  order  to 
manage.  13 
If  the  attempt  is  made  to  look  into  the  future,  then  this 
is  inevitably  based,  according  to  Kondrat'ev,  on  knowledge 
connected  with  zakonomernost'  (translated  as  'law-governed 
regularity'  or  'logic').  Regularity  is  discovered  in  the  course 
of  actuality  and  in  the  study  of  the  past,  and  extrapolation  of 
this  regularity  can  give  a  basis  for  forecasting  the  future. 
Kondrat'ev  calls  regularities  observed  over  time  dynamic 
regularities,  and  these  are  the  type  required  for  forecasting. 
He  differentiates  between  a  strict  causal  connection  and  an 
empirical  law.  The  former  occurs  without  fail  given  certain 
preconditions,  whereas  the  latter  is  not  as  strict  and  various 
exceptions  are  allowed: 
... 
it  is  clear  that  the  more  quantitative  connection 
and  causal  regularity  are  established,  the  more  exact 
knowledge  of  actuality  we  can  have  and  the  more  exact 
forms  of  forecasting  can  occur... 
The  largest  possibility  for  forecast  occurs  in  those  branches  of 
science  where  exact  quantitative  regularities  can  be 
established,  for  example  physics  and  astronomy.  However,  in 
fields  such  as  meteorology,  where  phenomena  are  of  a  highly 
complex  nature  and  exact  quantitative  formulae  are  difficult  to 
establish,  the  possibility  of  forecasting  is  drastically 
reduced.  Therefore  in  the  field  of  socio-economic  life  where 
phenomena  are  even  more  complex,  still  fewer  quantitatively 
established  regularities  will  be  found,  and  those  that  are 
discovered  will  have  a  lower  degree  of  certainty.  15  However, 
Kondrat'ev  notes  that  the  possibility  of  forecast  depends  not 
only  on  the  available  supply  of  knowledge,  but  also  on  how  this 
knowledge  is  utilised  and  on  the  peculiarities  of  the  specific 
phenomenon  of  which  a  forecast  is  desired. 
Kondrat'ev  outlines  three  possible  types  of  forecasting  of 
socio-economic  phenomena.  The  first  type  is  concerned  with 
forecasting  events  of  an  irregular  nature,  examples  of  which  are 
the  level  of  sales  or  industrial  production  on  a  definite  date, 
the  concrete  level  of  exports  or  of  prices  etc.  According  to 
153 Kondrat'ev  these  type  of  phenomena  cannot  be  included  in  law- 
like  formulas,  and  in  order  to  forecast  these  exactly  almost 
ideal  knowledge  of  the  economic  conjuncture  and  all  regularities 
would  be  required.  16  Since  such  perfect  knowledge  is 
unavailable,  then  such  forecasting  is  very  difficult  and  liable 
to  error.  In  order  to  prove  this  thesis  Kondrat'ev  cites  the 
Gosplan  control  figures  for  1925-6.  In  these  control  figures 
Gosplan  attempted  to  predict  the  price  level  in  each  month  and 
as  a  whole  for  the  year.  Prices  not  only  did  not  confirm  the 
Gosplan  predictions,  but  moved  in  exactly  the  opposite  direction 
to  that  forecast.  Thus  Gosplan  predicted  that  for  1925-6  as  a 
whole  the  average  level  of  wholesale  prices  would  fall  by  8.3%. 
Actually  they  increased  by  2.7%.  The  control  figures  assumed 
that  the  wholesale  price  index  for  agriculture  would  decline  by 
8%,  and  for  industry  by  9%.  In  fact  the  former  increased  by 
0.7%,  the  latter  by  4.7%.  Gosplan  also  attempted  to  predict 
investment  levels,  the  rate  of  monetary  circulation,  and 
exports.  Gosplan  predicted  a  114%  rise  in  investment  and  current 
account  holdings,  whereas  the  real  figure  was  40.5%.  The  average 
monetary  mass  was  to  increase  by  71%,  whereas  it  really 
increased  by  only  17.5%,  and  exports  would  grow  by  138%  whereas 
they  actually  grew  by  only  16%.  Thus  it  is  clear  that  Gosplan's 
predictions  for  this  first  type  of  phenomena  proved  inaccurate 
to  a  large  degree. 
The  second  type  of  forecasting  is  of  events  of  a  more  or 
less  regular  nature,  for  example  capitalist  economic  cycles  or 
seasonal  conjunctural  fluctuations.  According  to  Kondrat'ev 
predicting  such  events  is  also  highly  difficult,  but  since  such 
predictions  are  in  the  form  of  a  confirmation  of  the  probable 
occurrence  or  nonoccurrence  in  a  known  period  of  a  regular 
event,  rather  than  a  definite  quantitative  expression  of  an 
indicator,  such  a  type  of  prediction  is  more  accessible  than  the 
first  type.  17 
The  third  type  of  forecasting  is  a  general  expression  of 
the  development  of  one  or  other  socio-economic  tendency,  and  is 
not  localised  or  quantitative  in  nature.  It  would  be  used  in 
relation  to  predicting  whether  a  particular  branch  of  the 
economy  will  grow  or  not,  or  whether  there  will  be  a  general 
154 price  increase.  According  to  Kondrat'ev  this  type  of  forecasting 
'is  the  most  approachable  under  current  levels  of  socio-economic 
knowledge',  although  he  notes  that  the  first  and  most  difficult 
type  is  usually  chosen  by  Soviet  planners. 
Kondrat'ev  then  goes  on  to  explain  how  expressional  forms 
of  forecasting  can  be  of  two  types:  categorical  or  conditional. 
In  the  first  case  the  formula  of  forecasting  is  as  follows:  on 
the  basis  of  so  and  so  data  we  consider  event  X  probable.  In  the 
second  case:  on  the  basis  of  so  and  so  data  we  consider  that  if 
events  A,  B,  C  etc  occur,  then  event  X  will  occur.  Since  in  the 
conditional  form  no  statement  is  made  of  the  likelihood  of  A,  B, 
and  C  occurring,  then  this  solves  the  problem  'only  by  half'.  18 
Kondrat'ev  discusses  Strumilin's  attempt  at  a  plan  entitled 
'Perspective  Orientations  of  Gosplan',  published  in  Planovoe 
khozyaistvo  in  1926.19  This  is  a  five-year  plan  beginning 
1929/30,  and  Strumilin  uses  the  first  type  of  forecasting,  ie 
quantitative  expression  of  economic  indicators.  Kondrat'ev 
criticises  Strumilin  as  follows.  Strumilin  does  not  give  the 
dynamic  of  the  general  price  level,  of  the  relation  of 
industrial  and  agricultural  prices,  or  of  wholesale  and  retail 
prices.  However,  he  does  include  a  prognosis  for  future  profits 
in  industrial  enterprises.  But,  according  to  Kondrat'ev,  doesn't 
this  depend  on  the  price  dynamic  of  industrial  in  relation  to 
other  commodities?: 
...  under  one  relation  of  retail  and  wholesale  prices 
the  profit  of  industry,  state  trade,  and  cooperatives 
will  be  one  thing,  but  under  another  relation  it  will 
be  absolutely  different.  Because  Strumilin  does  not 
know  what  the  price  relation  will  be,  he  must  also 
not  know  the  profits  of  various  branches 
... 
20 
Kondrat'ev  finds  the  price  prognoses  which  are  included  to  be 
'exceedingly  problematic',  and  concludes  that  'it  is  absolutely 
clear  that  the  task  of  constructing  a  perspective  plan  was 
tackled  insufficiently  critically'.  21 
The  answer,  according  to  Kondrat'ev,  lies  with  the  balance 
method,  which  views  every  economic  phenomena  in  connection  with 
other  phenomena: 
155 The  balance  method  approximately  establishes  the 
factual  balance  for  the  national  economy  in  one  or 
other  moment  in  the  past.  Expressed  symbolically, 
this  gives  us  the  possibility  of  establishing  a 
quantitative  expression  of  the  connections  between 
elements  of  the  national  economy  A,  B,  C...  X  as  they 
existed  in  the  past.  22 
However,  in  order  to  use  this  information  about  past 
regularities  to  predict  future  developments,  it  is  necessary  to 
'know  the  laws  of  change  over  time  of  A,  B,  C  etc,  and  the  laws 
of  change  of  connections  between  elements'.  23  Kondrat'ev  does 
not  explain  how  to  discover  such  laws,  instead  he  notes  that  it 
would  be  incorrect  to  conclude  that  this  is  a  critique  of 
perspective  planning  in  general.  It  is  only  a  critique  of 
mistaken  perspective  plans,  of  bad  planning. 
In  his  conclusion  to  this  article  Kondrat'ev  stresses  the 
following.  Firstly,  that  the  given  level  of  knowledge  and 
understanding  is  a  limit  to  planning  possibilities.  Given 
absolute  knowledge  then  total  planning  would  be  possible. 
However,  Bolshevik  planners  are  far  from  the  possibility  of 
total  knowledge.  24  Secondly,  that  the  fetishisation  of  figures 
should  be  avoided.  It  is  necessary  to  refrain  from  expressing  in 
quantitative  form  those  indicators  which,  given  the  current 
stage  of  knowledge,  are  not  possible  to  predict. 
25  However, 
Kondrat'ev  emphasises  that  he  is  not  against  all  quantitative 
expression.  Thirdly,  given  the  limitations  of  the  current  level 
of  understanding,  quantitative  forecasts  should  be  given  in  the 
form  of  an  approximate  probability. 
26  Fourthly,  that  flexibility 
between  types  of  plan  should  be  maintained,  for  example  between 
five  year  and  fifteen  year  plans.  Kondrat'ev  suggests  that  two 
types  of  plan  should  differ  in  content.  Operational  plans  should 
be  concrete  and  contain  the  maximum  possible  quantitative 
expression  of  indicators;  perspective  plans,  on  the  contrary, 
should  be  maximally  liberated  from  concrete  and  detailed 
figures.  27  Finally,  that  the  business  of  conducting  perspective 
plans  should  be  concentrated  in  the  centre. 
28 
Kondrat'ev  discussed  various  drafts  for  the  first  five  year 
plan  published  in  Planovoe  khozyaistvo  in  an  article  entitled 
'Kriticheskie  zametki  o  plane  razvitiya  narodnogo  khozyaistva' 
which  appeared  in  Planovoe  khozyaistvo  in  1927.  Kondrat'ev 
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planning.  The  first  involves: 
...  a  certain  combination  of  elements  of  prediction  of 
what  is  objectively  inevitable  and  projection  of  what 
is  advisable  from  the  standpoint  of  our  subjective 
social  and  class  aspirations,  in  the  yearly  plans  it 
is  prediction  that  has  the  paramount  role,  while  in 
the  long-term  plans  it  is  prescription.  29 
This  approach  Kondrat'ev  seems  to  have  no  quarrels  with. 
However,  this  approach  is  soon  crowded  out  by  another  very 
different  conception.  Strumilin  draws  an  analogy  between 
economic  planning  and  the  ordinary  art  of  building.  According  to 
Strumilin  many  of  the  problems  in  the  art  of  building,  though 
insoluble  theoretically,  are  solved  practically  and 
approximately  enough  for  real  needs.  Further,  such  problems  can 
be  solved  in  several  ways,  since  new  engineers  appear  with  new 
designs.  In  drafting  plans,  or  'social  engineering',  we  have 
something  analogous.  Problems  may  appear  insurmountable 
theoretically,  but  are  solved  quite  satisfactorily  in 
practise.  30 
It  is  clear  why  Kondrat'ev  would  object  to  this  latter 
approach,  since  it  does  not  pay  enough  attention  to  the  limits 
of  knowledge  and  thus  the  limits  of  the  planning  process,  points 
which  Kondrat'ev  constantly  stresses  in  his  articles  on  planning 
and  forecasting.  He  notes  that  an  engineer  does  not  have  to 
solve  the  problem  of  whether  the  building  materials  and  the 
monetary  resources  will  be  available,  and  if  so  in  what  volume; 
these  are  taken  as  given.  However,  in  constructing  economic 
plans  these  questions  have  to  be  answered  definitively  in 
relation  both  to  the  present  and  the  future;  these  elements 
cannot  be  taken  as  given.  Kondrat'ev  thus  accuses  Strumilin  of 
oversimplifying  the  plan-making  problem,  and  writes  that  from 
this  'it  is  but  a  step,  and  a  small  one  at  that,  to  the  forming 
of  plans  that  are  completely  arbitrary'. 
31 
Kondrat'ev  also  criticises  Strumilin  and  his  co-workers  for 
not  clearly  elaborating  the  methods  they  used  in  constructing 
these  plans,  and  for  seemingly  arbitrary  setting  of  key 
variables  such  as  the  industrial  growth  rate.  He  questions  why 
157 the  centre  of  gravity  of  plan  construction  was  so  hastily 
directed  towards  numerical  calculation,  without  adequate 
formulation  of  the  basic  tasks  and  methods.  Greater  effort 
should  be  directed  towards  substantiating  the  figures  given  in 
the  plan.  32  Kondrat'ev  recommends  the  balance  method  to 
eliminate  vicious  circles  and  to  validate  the  plan,  although  he 
stresses  that  he  does  not  have  absolute  faith  even  in  this 
method.  The  balance  method  guarantees  only  one  thing  -  that  the 
rates  of  development  projected  for  each  branch  will  be 
consistent  with  one  another.  It  does  not  guarantee  that  these 
rates  will  be  either  feasible  or  optimal  -  separate  analysis  is 
required  to  fulfil  these  latter  two  requirements.  33  The  basic 
error  attributed  to  Strumilin  and  his  co-workers  by  Kondrat'ev 
is  that  they  sought  to  accomplish  a  series  of  tasks  -  the 
maximum  crisis-free  development  of  the  economy,  maximising 
satisfaction  of  current  needs  of  the  working  masses,  as  rapid  as 
possible  advancement  towards  communism  -  without  taking 
sufficient  account  that  these  partial  tasks  may  be  contradictory 
when  expressed  in  extreme  terms.  According  to  Kondrat'ev  it  is 
the  very  best  (ie  optimal)  combinations  which  are  required. 
34 
From  this  type  of  criticism  it  is  clear  that  Kondrat'ev  adopted 
a  much  more  cautious  approach  to  planning  than  Gosplan. 
Some  key  points  drawn  from  this  are  as  follows.  Kondrat'ev 
emphasised  the  limits  to  knowledge,  and  thus  it  is  easy  to  see 
why  he  might  have  been  unpopular  with  'no  unclimbed  mountain' 
Bolsheviks.  He  also  stressed  the  genetic  method  of  plan 
construction  over  the  teleological,  although  did  not  exclude  the 
latter.  His  conception  of  discovering  empirical  regularities  in 
past  economic  development  and  then  using  these  as  a  basis  for 
future  planning  was  shared  by  many  non-Bolshevik  planners  such 
as  Popov  and  Groman.  However,  his  emphasis  on  empirical  analysis 
of  dynamic  conjuncture  and  the  work  carried  out  in  this  field 
was  obviously  of  great  importance  to  the  planning  process  as  he 
conceived  it.  Without  this  element,  plans  would  simply  be  pipe 
dreams.  It  is  also  apparent  that  he  agreed  with  the  Bolshevik 
association  of  planning  with  centralisation. 
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It  is  apparent  that  in  many  ways  Kondrat'ev's  conception  of 
the  market  as  being  spontaneous  and  irrational  was  identical  to 
the  orthodox  Bolshevik  view.  However,  in  other  ways  it  differed. 
An  example  of  this  occurs  in  Kondrat'ev's  article  'K  voprosu  o 
differentsiatsii  derevni'  written  in  1927  in  Puti  sel'skogo 
khozyaistvo.  In  this  article  Kondrat'ev  discusses  conceptions 
and  causes  of  rural  stratification.  He  notes  that  there  are 
different  types  of  differentiation,  for  example  economic, 
domestic,  and  professional.  In  its  sociological  meaning  this 
process  will  not  only  be  a  process  of  stratification  of  society 
(rassloeniya  obshchestva)  into  social  classes,  but  also 
specialisation  and  the  formation  of  professions.  35 
Kondrat'ev  asks:  what  are  the  causes  of  differentiation  in 
conditions  of  commodity-capitalist  economy?  He  answers: 
The  basis  and  general  precondition  (predposilki)  of 
the  rural  differentiation  process  is  the  existence 
and  development  of  market  relations.  If  market 
relations  exist  then  we  can  say  that  there  is  a 
multitude  of  different  concrete  causes  which  ar 
favourable  to  the  rural  stratification  process. 
6 
Kondrat'ev  claims  that  if,  given  the  presence  of  markets,  all 
farms  had  absolutely  the  same  chances  of  success  in  the 
struggles  which  characterise  markets,  then  the  differentiation 
process  would  not  occur.  However,  this  equality  in  chances  of 
success  does  not  exist  in  conditions  of  the  development  of 
various  farms.  If  one  farm  has  less  land  and  another  more,  if 
one  farm  has  nearby  transport  links  and  another  not,  if  one  farm 
has  a  disaster  and  another  not,  then  their  initial  conditions 
are  not  equal  and  they  do  not  have  equal  chances  of  success  in 
the  struggle.  If  a  farm  has  an  advantage  in  the  struggle,  then 
the  existence  of  market  relations  allows  this  advantage  to  grow 
and  multiply,  and  conversely  for  a  disadvantaged  farm.  However, 
does  this  mean  that  differences  in  initial  conditions  are  the 
cause  of  differentiation?  Not  according  to  Kondrat'ev.  He  says 
that: 
159 Without  the  market  and  market  relations 
differentiation  would  not  occur.  Consequently,  the 
existence  of  the  market  and  its  associated 
spontaneity  is  the  basic  precondition  (predposilki) 
for  differentiation.  37 
However,  it  is  revealing  that  Kondrat'ev  uses  the  word 
'precondition'  (predposilki)  here  rather  than  'cause' 
(prichina).  At  the  beginning  of  the  article  he  had  asked  the 
question  what  causes  differentiation,  not  what  are  its 
preconditions.  Kondrat'ev  does  not  say  that  the  market  causes 
differentiation,  rather  that  its  existence  is  a  necessary 
condition  for  differentiation  to  occur.  This  is  part  of 
Kondrat'ev's  ambiguous  relation  to  capitalism  and  the  market. 
Kondrat'ev  goes  on  to  link  the  differentiation  process  in 
commodity-capitalist  conditions  to  the  growth  of  productivity, 
the  growth  of  accumulation  and  marketability  (tovarnost'),  and 
to  the  growth  of  productive  forces  in  general.  This  is  also 
linked  to  the  strengthening  of  the  rural/urban  division  of 
labour  and  to  the  growth  of  industry.  Kondrat'ev  notes  that  from 
a  social  point  of  view  this  was  linked  to  the  growth  of 
capitalist  exploitation,  but  'if  it  was  true  that  the  process  of 
differentiation  accelerated  the  growth  of  the  productive  forces, 
then  it  was  a  factor  increasing  the  welfare  of  the  population', 
although  increasing  the  welfare  of  different  groups  by  different 
amounts. 
38  Thus  for  Kondrat'ev  differentiation  was  inevitable 
and  progressive  in  capitalism. 
Kondrat'ev  then  moves  on  to  the  current  Soviet  situation. 
While  admitting  that  differentiation  is  taking  place,  he  claims 
that  it  is  in  a  less  sharp  form  than  that  which  occurred  under 
capitalism.  However,  the  cause  of  the  differentiation  is 
identical.  Struggle  for  success  on  the  market,  given  unequal 
initial  conditions,  leads  to  this  inequality  being  reproduced  on 
an  expanding  scale.  Although  the  agrarian  revolution  widened  the 
land  fund  of  the  peasantry  and  significantly  equalised  land  use, 
it  was  not  fully  equalised,  and  thus  there  still  is  a  basis  for 
differentiation.  39  Kondrat'ev  claims  that  productivity  of 
labour,  accumulation,  and  marketability  are  all  higher  on  farms 
of  the  more  powerful  groups,  as  in  the  pre-revolutionary  era, 
and  concludes  that  reducing  farm  size  too  far  would  be  a 
160 mistake.  Encouraging  cooperation  and  collectivisation  are  the 
general  tasks  of  the  economic  policy  of  Soviet  power.  40 
It  is  clear  from  this  article  that  Kondrat'ev  does  not 
absolutely  condemn  differentiation,  since  he  links  it  with 
increased  productivity  of  labour,  accumulation  etc.  In  relation 
to  his  assertion  that  the  market  is  the  key  condition  required 
for  differentiation  it  should  be  noted  that  this  was  simply 
asserted  without  argument.  Perhaps  this  was  because  the  market 
was  a  Bolshevik  bete  noir  and  thus  the  blame  for  anything  which 
was  seen  as  harmful  could  be  laid  at  its  door,  knowing  that 
counter-argument  was  unlikely  to  be  encountered.  Kondrat'ev's 
account  of  differentiation  was  ambiguous  in  that  he  cited  the 
market  as  a  precondition  rather  than  a  cause,  and  that 
differentiation  in  capitalism  was  seen  as  progressive. 
5.1.4  -  MARKET  CAPACITY 
An  interesting  exchange  took  place  between  Kondrat'ev  and 
I.  Zhirkovich  in  the  pages  of  Sotsialisticheskoe  khozyaistvo  in 
1924  on  the  subject  of  market  capacity  (emkost'  rynka). 
Zhirkovich  published  an  article  called  'Emkost'  rynka  i  tseny' 
which  aimed  to  analyse  theoretically  the  influence  of 
agricultural  prices  on  the  market  capacity  of  industrial  goods, 
and  Kondrat'ev  responded  with  'K  voprosu  o  vliyanii  urovnya  tsen 
s-kh.  tovarov  i  ego  izmeneniya  na  obshchuyu  emkost'  rynka 
tovarov  industrial'noi  promyshlennosti'.  Zhirkovich  tried  to 
question  the  'widely  circulated'  view  that  a  lowering  of 
agricultural  prices  would  hinder  the  development  of  industry 
since  it  would  reduce  the  market  capacity  for  industrial  goods. 
Instead  he  argued  that  when  labour  and  capital  are  distributed 
according  to  the  actual  income  of  civilians: 
...  the  general  market  capacity  for  industrial 
products  absolutely  does  not  depend  on  the  level  of 
agricultural  prices.  Moreover,  that  a  reduction  of 
agricultural  prices  to  zero.  .  .  will  not  reduce  the 
market  capacity  for  industrial  products  by  one  unit 
of  real  value.  ' 
161 The  state  could  distribute  the  necessary  means  of  production  to 
the  rural  population,  and  by  means  of  a  tax  in  kind  could 
receive  all  the  necessary  raw  materials  and  means  of  nourishment 
for  the  non-rural  classes.  Zhirkovich  sets  out  a  scheme  to  prove 
these  assertions  as  follows,  given  in  arbitrary  value  units: 
ELEMENTS  OF  PRODUCTION  COSTS  CONSUMPTION  MEANS  OF  PRODUCTION 
Raw  materials  70  - 
Means  of  production  135  165 
Wages  265  185 
General  sum  of  productive  value  470  350 
Suppose  that  workers  with  their  income  (265  +  185  =  450)  buy 
agricultural  products  to  a  sum  of  80  value  units.  Then  rural 
purchasing  power  will  be  (80  +  70  =)  150  units.  Suppose  further 
that  rural  income  buys  means  of  production  to  the  value  of  50 
units,  and  buys  means  of  consumption  from  industry  of  100  units. 
Under  these  conditions  the  market  capacity  for  industrial 
products  will  be  as  follows: 
a)  market  capacity  for  consumption  products  equals  100  (peasant 
consumption)  +  370  (consumption  of  workers)  =  470  units; 
b)  market  capacity  for  means  of  production  equals  50  (peasant 
purchase)  +  135  (purchase  of  first  group  of  industry)  +  65 
(purchase  of  second  group  of  industry)  =  350  units; 
c)  the  general  market  capacity  equals  350  +  470  =  820  units, 
which  also  equals  the  general  value  of  industrial  goods. 
42 
If,  given  the  above  scheme,  agricultural  prices  decline  by  for 
example  two  times,  the  scheme  will  be  altered  as  follows: 
COSTS  OF  PRODUCTION  CONSUMPTION  MEANS  OF  PRODUCTION 
Raw  materials  35  - 
Means  of  production  135  165 
Wages  265  185 
General  sum  of  productive  value  435  350 
Agricultural  purchasing  power  decreases  by  half,  since  rural 
workers  now  receive  only  40  units  instead  of  80,  and  sale  of  raw 
materials  yields  only  35  instead  of  70  units.  Suppose  further 
that  rural  workers  contract  at  a  lower  price,  but  not  a  lower 
162 consumption,  which  equals  50  units  as  before.  Then  market 
capacity  for  industrial  products  can  be  expressed  thus: 
a)  consumer  goods  equals  25  (peasant  consumption)  +  410 
(consumption  of  workers)  =  435  units; 
b)  means  of  production  equals  50  +  135  +  165  =  350; 
c)  general  market  capacity  equals  350  +  435  =  785  units.  43 
Thus  all  industrial  goods  under  decreased  agricultural  prices 
find  themselves  sold  in  equal  measure:  in  other  words, 
reductions  in  agricultural  prices  does  not  lead  to  a  reduction 
of  market  capacity  for  industrial  goods.  Zhirkovich  further 
claims  that: 
... 
increasing  or  decreasing  the  agricultural  price 
level  coordinates  changes  in  the  share  of  industrial 
product  obtained  by  rural  classes..  .  the  question  of 
prices  is  a  question  of  the  distribution  of  income, 
44  and  not  of  market  capacity  for  industrial  products. 
In  this  argument  Zhirkovich  admits  that  he  ignores  the  question 
of  the  quality  of  demand.  It  is  possible  that  the  non-rural 
population  would  demand  different  kinds  of  products  that  the 
rural  population,  and  thus  a  shift  in  purchasing  power  from  one 
to  the  other  would  alter  the  structure  of  demand. 
Kondrat'ev  responds  to  these  arguments  as  follows. 
Zhirkovich  adopts  a  basically  static  point  of  view,  and  asks  the 
question:  what  influence  on  the  general  market  capacity  for 
industrial  goods  does  a  given  (high,  low)  agricultural  price 
level  have?  But  the  correct  approach,  according  to  Kondrat'ev, 
is  dynamic,  and  asks:  what  influence  does  the  process  of  change 
(increasing  or  decreasing)  in  the  price  level  have  on  market 
capacity? 
45  Zhirkovich's  schemes  are  predicated  on  the  belief 
that  changing  price  levels  simply  redistributes  purchasing  power 
from  one  group  to  another,  but  does  not  alter  the  level  of 
aggregate  purchasing  power.  Kondrat'ev  attacks  this  by  arguing 
that  it  assumes  Say's  Law.  Assuming  that  all  sales  are 
simultaneous  and  synonymous  with  purchases,  then  the  market 
capacity  for  sales  equals  the  sum  of  the  values  of  production, 
and  consequently  supply.  Supply  would  always  equal  demand  and 
market  capacity,  because  a  sum  always  equals  its  components. 
However,  according  to  Kondrat'ev  it  is  clear  that  this  view  is 
163 erroneous,  since  by  determining  market  capacity  through  the  sum 
of  production,  the  problem  of  market  capacity  is  simply 
abolished.  46 
Therefore  Kondrat'ev  notes  that  what  he  understands  by 
market  capacity  is  not  the  sum  of  productive  values  in  general, 
but  the  sum  of  such  values  which  actually,  in  accordance  with 
demand,  can  be  purchased  on  markets.  This  he  symbolises  as 
follows: 
al  +  bl  +  cl...  nl  =  sl 
Between  s1  and  s  (aggregate  production  and  supply)  the  following 
relations  are  possible:  sl  =  s;  sl  >  s;  sl  <  s.  Only  in  the 
first  case  does  market  capacity  equal  the  aggregate  production 
level.  Kondrat'ev  stresses  also  that  it  is  impossible  to  ignore 
the  effects  of  qualitative  changes  in  demand,  since  these  will 
have  real  effects  on  the  general  market  capacity.  If  the  total 
quantity  of  demand  is  spread  differently  between  component 
parts,  and  these  component  parts  have  diverse  desires,  then  the 
resultant  aggregate  demand  will  be  different  according  to  how 
the  demand  is  spread.  Thus  transferring  demand  from  one  social 
group  to  another  does  affect  overall  market  capacity. 
47 
Moreover,  changes  in  price  levels  also  affects  the  overall 
market  capacity.  A  reduction  in  agricultural  prices  will  produce 
a  reduction  in  market  capacity. 
The  practical  aspect  of  market  capacity  was  also 
investigated  by  Kondrat'ev.  In  a  1923  article  entitled  'Mirovoi 
khlebnyi  rynok'  in  Ekonomicheskoe  obozrenie  he  gave  an 
interesting  analysis  of  the  world  grain  market  and  thus  the 
possibilities  for  Russian  export.  According  to  Kondrat'ev  the 
agriculture  of  the  United  States  is  now  in  a  condition  where 
grain  prices  are  lower  than  costs  of  production,  as  follows  (in 
gold  kopeks  per  pood): 
AREA  1917  1921 
Costs  Prices  Costs  Prices 
Western  states  64  132  62  37 
Eastern  states  78  161  78  52 
164 Under  such  conditions  agriculture  must  lose  profitability,  and 
thus  the  extent  of  production  must  decline.  In  fact  sown  area 
decreased  in  the  USA  between  1921  and  1923.48  Kondrat'ev 
compares  grain  prices  for  the  major  producers  as  follows  (in 
gold  kopeks  per  pood): 
COUNTRY  WHEAT  RYE  OATS 
1913  1923  1913  1923  1913  1923 
Germany  150  152  124  130  122  117 
England  121  168  -  -  112  155 
USA  105  158  70  108  82  114 
Canada  102  149  -  -  70  113 
Russia  (Moscow)  121  112  86  57  83  79 
Russia  (Rostov)  113  54  77  35  81  36 
Thus  Russian  prices  are  now  cheaper  than  the  world  market  price 
by  two  or  more  times.  However,  since  transport  facilities  are 
relatively  poor,  by  the  time  Russian  grain  reaches  its  overseas 
destination  any  price  advantage  has  been  lost.  49 
This  section  shows  that  market  capacity  was  an  important 
topic  in  the  USSR  in  the  1920s.  This  type  of  understanding  of 
the  market  was  widespread,  and  Kondrat'ev  argued  that  the 
structure  of  market  capacity  was  important  for  understanding  the 
potential  effects  of  changes  in  price  levels.  Other  economists 
disagreed  with  Kondrat'ev  on  this  point. 
5.1.5  -  PRICE  INDICES 
If  the  market  functioned  through  price  movements,  then  the 
study  of  these  movements  was  obviously  important  for  studying 
the  market.  The  price  index  was  a  main  focus  of  study  of  the 
Conjuncture  Institute.  Kondrat'ev  and  his  co-workers  discussed 
the  methodologies  and  techniques  used  to  construct  these  indices 
in  a  book  called  Krest'yanskie  indeksy:  sbornik  trudov 
Kon"yunkturnogo  Instituta,  published  by  Narkomfin  in  1927.  The 
book  begins  with  a  chapter  by  Kondrat'ev  outlining  the  main  aim 
of  these  indices.  He  writes: 
...  the  market  is  one  of  the  basic  forms  determining 
the  organisation  and  development  of  peasant  economy. 
The  spontaneous  market  influences  peasant  economy 
165 through  the  system  of  price..  .  Thus  it  is  clear  that 
great  significance  is  acquired  by  the  study  of 
prices,  their  changes  in  relation  to  explaining  the 
development  of  agriculture  and  the  influence  of 
state  measures  on  them...  56 
Kondrat'ev  distinguishes  between  a  city  price  index  and  a  price 
index  for  local  markets.  The  latter  is  harder  to  produce,  since 
the  information  which  is  required  is  more  difficult  to  obtain. 
Also,  because  the  organisation  of  peasant  economy  in  each  raion 
has  its  peculiarities,  the  price  index  can  only  be  constructed 
on  this  level.  Kondrat'ev  stresses  the  importance  these  indices 
have  for  constructing  plans.  They  allow  a  judgement  to  be  made  - 
whether  stimulating  market  development  of  peasant  economy  in 
each  region  leads  to  increased  intensity,  marketability, 
specialisation  etc  or  not,  and  thus  decisions  about  state 
measures  required  can  be  made  on  this  basis.  Kondrat'ev 
expresses  the  confidence  that,  having  worked  on  the  peasant 
index  for  many  years,  he  is  sure  that  it  is  a  'sufficiently 
exact  signal  of  the  probable  results  of  the  influence  of  the 
market  on  peasant  economy'. 
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One  of  Kondrat'ev  co-workers,  N.  Lyubimov,  has  a  chapter  on 
the  method  of  constructing  and  calculating  peasant  indices. 
Designating  the  price  of  each  commodity  at  various  points  in  the 
region  at  each  time  m  by: 
1pm,  2pm,  3pm 
... 
kpm 
The  prices  of  these  commodities  at  that  point  at  a  previous  time 
is  designated  by: 
lpm_1,2pm-1,3pm-1  ... 
kpm-1 
Relative  changes  in  prices  over  time  of  previous  registration  is 
thus  expressed: 
lpm  2pm  3pm  kpm 
lpm-1  2pm-1  3pm-1  kpm-1 
The  regional  average  for  these  changes  over  a  given  period  of 
time  m  through  jm  will  be  given  by: 
166 lpm  2pm  3pm  kpm 
jm  =k... 
lpm-1  2pm-1  3pm-1  kpm-i 
This  expression  is  the  formula  which  the  Conjuncture  Institute 
uses  to  calculate  in  each  period  the  regional  commodity  index.  52 
Lyubimov  notes  that  since  there  are  various  types  of  trade  - 
bazaar,  cooperative,  private  -  there  will  have  to  be  different 
types  of  index  to  measure  this  trade.  The  Conjuncture  Institute 
utilises  mainly  bazaar  prices,  as  these  are  the  main  places 
where  peasant  trade  is  conducted. 
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On  a  chapter  on  the  peasant  index  as  a  guide  to  changes  in 
the  purchasing  power  of  the  peasantry,  A.  L.  Vainshtein  sets 
purchasing  power  (S)  equal  to: 
A- 
where  M  equals  the  sum  received  from  sale  of  products,  m  equals 
the  sum  expended  to  buy  other  products,  A  equals  money  obtained 
by  work  off  the  land,  and  B  equals  the  obligatory  payments  of 
peasants,  eg  taxes.  If  the  quantity  of  realised  products  in  a 
given  period  is  denoted  by  q1,  q2,  q3  ...  qn,  and  the  prices  at 
which  these  products  are  sold  by  p1,  P2,  P3  "..  Pn,  then  the 
general  sum  of  receipts  is  given  by: 
p1g1  +  p2g2  +  p3g3  +  ...  pngn  =  [sum]  pigi 
For  a  subsequent  period  an  analogous  expression  can  be  composed: 
po  =  [sum]  p0ig0i 
pl  =  [sum]  pligli 
If  in  the  first  period  the  sum  of  receipts  from  realised 
products  is: 
p01g01;  P02g02  """  POngOn 
and  in  the  following  period: 
p11g11;  P12g12  """  Pingln 
167 then  the  increase  in  this  period  is: 
P11g11  P12g12  Pingln 
p01g01  P02g02  POngOn 
This  gives  the  change  in  income  of  the  peasantry,  and  thus 
changes  in  its  purchasing  power.  54  Vainshtein  notes  that  changes 
in  the  purchase  of  any  one  product  will  have  a  weighted  effect 
on  the  particular  region  which  produces  it. 
These  formulae  show  that  Kondrat'ev  and  his  co-workers  took 
seriously  the  problems  of  measuring  economic  indicators. 
However,  it  may  be  noted  that  these  indicators  measured 
categories  found  in  market  economies,  and  thus  that  theoretical 
problems  arose  since  the  USSR  in  the  1920s  was  supposed  to  be  in 
a  transitional  phase.  If  Kondrat'ev  proposed  using  these  type  of 
indicators  as  a  basis  for  plan  construction,  which  he  clearly 
did,  then  the  socialist  nature  of  these  plans  can  be 
legitimately  questioned.  If  as  I  noted  earlier  Kondrat'ev  made  a 
large  theoretical  distinction  between  capitalist  and  socialist 
planning,  then  this  distinction  is  less  readily  apparent  in  his 
practical  work.  Since  in  a  transitional  economy  market  elements 
would  be  present,  study  of  such  elements  is  clearly  legitimate. 
However,  it  is  the  relation  of  these  elements  to  the  socialist 
elements  which  is  unclear,  and  thus  using  them  as  a  basis  for 
plan  construction  would  require  further  theoretical 
clarification,  something  Kondrat'ev  does  not  supply. 
5.1.6  -  ECONOMIC  DYNAMICS 
In  an  article  entitled  'K  voprosu  o  ponyatiyakh 
ekonomicheskoi  statiki,  dinamiki,  i  kon'yunktury'  Kondrat'ev 
outlines  his  views  on  economic  dynamics  in  some  detail.  He 
claims  that  the  marginal  utility  school  are  static  in  character, 
as  is  clear  from  one  of  its  basic  assertions  -  that  means  of 
production  are  distributed  to  branches  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  equality  of  marginal  utility. 
55  Marx  was  interested 
in  dynamics,  as  his  work  on  the  law  of  concentration  of  capital 
and  on  crises  shows,  but  his  theory  was  not  systematic. 
168 Schumpeter  sees  dynamics  only  when  entrepreneurial  activity 
occurs,  and  statics  where  tradition  dominates.  56  Kondrat'ev 
notes  that  recent  work  on  crises  establishes  that  there  are 
close  connections  between  the  changes  manifested  in  various 
elements: 
When  an  increasing  tendency  is  observed  in  one 
element,  then  an  increasing  or  decreasing  tendency  is 
observed  in  another.  This  regular  connection  of 
changing  elements  occurs  because  of  the  market.  57 
Thus  here  Kondrat'ev  sees  the  market  as  a  transmitter  of  changes 
in  economic  variables,  and  thus  information  which  economic 
subjects  require  to  make  decisions,  throughout  the  economy.  A 
sharp  decline  in  such  indicators  denotes  a  crisis. 
Kondrat'ev  gives  a  definition  of  conjuncture  as  'the 
direction  and  degree  of  aggregate  change  in  the  elements  of 
national  economic  life  in  comparison  with  the  preceding 
period'.  58  A  series  of  such  relations  would  produce  a  curve  of 
conjunctural  motion.  Kondrat'ev  outlines  two  types  of 
conjuncture:  simple  and  differential.  Simple  conjuncture  is  as 
outlined  in  the  definition  above,  but  differential  conjuncture 
is  a  measure  of  the  conjuncture  of  one  branch  of  the  economy  in 
relation  to  another.  The  following  example  is  given: 
ELEMENTS  SIMPLE  CONJUNCTURE  DIFFERENTIAL  CONJUNCTURE 
COAL  INDUSTRY  COAL  INDUSTRY 
(relation  of  moment  (relation  of  simple  coal 
one  with  moment  two)  conjuncture  to  simple 
metal  conjuncture) 
Price  of  coal  120  95 
Production  110  90 
Trade  turnover  115  98 
Percentage  unemployed  116  97 
From  this  it  is  clear  that  although  coal  indicators  are 
increasing,  they  are  increasing  at  a  slower  rate  than  those  of 
the  metals  industry.  Kondrat'ev  notes  that  the  scientific 
significance  of  this  understanding  is  huge. 
Although  Kondrat'ev  does  not  specifically  mention  planning 
at  this  point,  it  is  clear  from  the  general  principles  which 
flow  from  other  parts  of  his  work  that  such  a  technique  as 
169 differential  conjuncture  would  be  invaluable  in  the  planning 
process.  Empirical  regularities  based  on  the  analysis  of  past 
developments  in  terms  of  differential  conjuncture  could  yield 
growth  coefficients  which  could  be  used  to  plan  the  rates  of 
growth  of  various  industrial  branches.  In  this  way  Kondrat'ev's 
concern  for  realistic  planning  could  be  fulfilled. 
In  relation  to  the  question  of  the  ways  and  means  of 
industrialisation  in  the  1920s  the  question  of  protectionism  was 
of  great  importance.  Kondrat'ev  gave  his  views  on  this  question 
in  a  1925  article  entitled  'Problema  germanskogo  agrarnogo 
protektsionizma'  which  appeared  in  the  journal  Ekonomicheskoe 
obozrenie.  Kondrat'ev  claims  that  the  policy  of  protectionism  is 
linked  to  crises.  The  world  agricultural  crisis  of  the  1870s 
gave  an  impetus  to  the  transition  of  the  main  European  countries 
to  agrarian  protectionism,  and  the  current  crisis  promises  to  do 
likewise  today,  as  this  policy  is  considered  as  a  means  of 
salvation  from  crisis.  However,  Kondrat'ev  differentiates 
between  isolated  import  duties  and  protectionism  erected  as  a 
system,  and  it  is  this  latter  form  that  he  is  most  interested 
in.  59 
Agrarian  protectionism  influences  the  national  economy  as 
import  duties  change  the  relative  price  levels  prevalent.  Many 
consider  that  since  increasing  prices  is  a  stimulus  to  widening 
economic  activity,  protectionism  in  general  is  a  policy 
favourable  to  the  economic  system.  However,  Kondrat'ev  calls 
this  approach  primitive  and  mistaken.  Protectionist  policies  not 
only  increase  the  price  of  a  particular  good,  but  also  change 
the  relation  of  prices  of  goods  in  all  branches  of  the  economy: 
Simultaneously  it  influences  the  redistribution  of 
social  income,  and  consequently  affects  the  interests 
of  various  social  classes  and  groups.  .  . 
it  is 
necessary  to  investigate  this  influence.  60 
Using  the  German  economy  around  the  time  of  WW1  as  an  example, 
Kondrat'ev  reasons  as  follows.  If  it  is  said  that  one  of  the 
characteristics  of  cereal  production  is  the  large  scale  on  which 
it  is  produced,  and  that  animal  husbandry  and  the  production  of 
technical  raw  materials  are  concentrated  in  small  peasant 
economy,  then  it  becomes  clear  that  the  pre-WW1  system  of  German 
170 agricultural  protectionism  had  a  'definite  class  spirit  in 
accordance  with  the  interests  of  the  industrial  and  large-scale 
landed  classes'.  61  This  is  clearly  seen  in  the  fact  that,  for 
example,  in  1913  rye  and  oats  were  both  subject  to  a  more  than 
30%  duty  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  price,  whereas  the 
corresponding  figure  for  raw  materials  was  10.6%,  for  swine 
6.2%,  and  for  hide  0%.  Thus  protectionism  can  be  directed 
towards  satisfying  the  interests  of  particular  class  groupings, 
in  this  case  that  of  the  large  landowners  growing  cereal. 
Kondrat'ev  argues  that  for  Germany  to  recover  after  the  war 
a  policy  of  protectionism  would  not  work.  He  reasons  as  follows. 
The  industrial  development  of  Germany  requires  reducing  costs  of 
production  as  a  method  of  capturing  new  markets: 
But  the  task  of  reducing  costs  of  production 
presupposes  a  higher  productivity  of  labour  and 
relatively  low  wages.  This  possibility  exists  only  on 
the  basis  of  low  price  grain...  Protectionism  in 
relation  to  grain  does  not  coordinate  with  the  idea 
of  cheap  grain. 
Thus  protectionist  policies  would  not  assist  the  development  of 
the  German  economy.  Kondrat'ev  concludes  by  noting  that  he  has 
been  concerned  to  criticise  protectionism  as  a  system,  and  that 
this  does  not  mean  that  it  would  be  in  Germany's  interest  to 
promote  absolute  free  trade  in  all  agricultural  products. 
From  this  article  it  would  be  difficult  to  derive 
Kondrat'ev's  views  on  the  question  of  protectionism  in  the  USSR. 
Although  he  would  be  against  protectionism  as  a  system,  he  would 
not  be  against  all  protectionist  policies  and  for  total  free 
trade.  Thus  he  may  have  agreed  with  (for  example) 
Preobrazhenskii's  notion  of  using  protectionism  as  a  means  for 
industrial  development.  If  protectionism  can  be  used  in  the 
interests  of  one  class  in  capitalism  -  the  landowners  -  then 
perhaps  it  could  be  used  in  the  interests  of  another  in  the 
transition  to  socialism  -  the  proletariat. 
Kondrat'ev  outlined  a  model  of  economic  dynamics  for 
capitalist  economy  in  a  1934  letter  which  is  interesting  as  an 
insight  into  his  conception  of  planning.  He  asserts  that  in 
order  to  determine  the  dynamic  laws  of  the  national  economy  it 
171 is  necessary  to  formulate  the  task  mathematically  and  to 
introduce  a  new  division  of  the  social  economy.  Kondrat'ev 
proposes  that  the  basic  elements  of  the  economy  can  be  expressed 
quantitatively  as  follows:  1)  national  capital  -  K;  2)  quantity 
of  population  -  A;  3)  production  of  the  means  of  production  - 
P1;  4)  production  of  the  means  of  consumption  -  P2;  5)  the 
general  rate  of  production  -  P;  6)  national  income  -  E;  7)  wages 
-  1;  8)  the  interest  rate  -  i;  9)  the  sum  of  land  rents  -  R;  10) 
the  rate  of  capital  accumulation  -  S.  63 
In  order  to  determine  the  laws  of  change  of  the  economy  it 
is  necessary  to  construct  a  coordinated  system  of  equations  from 
these  ten  elements  and  then  to  solve  them  empirically.  The 
equations  Kondrat'ev  constructs  are  as  follows.  Connecting 
national  capital  (K),  population  (A)  and  national  income  (E) 
gives  the  following  expression: 
E=  (dE/dK)  K+  (dE/dA)  A 
Integrating  this  produces  E=  m/AK,  where  m  is  the  level  of 
technique.  Other  equations  are  given  by  Kondrat'ev  as  follows: 
S=  dK/dt  -  an  expression  determining  the  course  of 
accumulation;  i=  dE/dK  -  an  expression  determining  the  course 
of  the  interest  rate;  1=  dE/dA  -  an  expression  determining  the 
course  of  wages;  P1  =C+S-  an  expression  determining  the 
course  of  production  of  means  of  production;  P2  =E-S-  an 
expression  determining  the  course  of  production  of  means  of 
consumption;  P=  P1  +  P2  -  determining  the  course  of  the  general 
rate  of  production;  R=  iV  -  determining  the  sum  of  rents,  where 
V=  the  value  of  land.  64 
The  purpose  of  constructing  such  a  scheme  is  to  then  be 
able  to  substitute  empirically  observed  quantities  into  these 
equations  for  a  given  period  of  time  and  by  this  means  to 
discover  the  general  laws  of  change  of  all  the  basic  elements  of 
economic  life  for  this  period.  After  determining  the  relations 
of  parameters  on  the  basis  of  concrete  facts  for  various 
countries,  it  is  then  possible  to  determine  the  law  of  trends 
for  these  countries.  Phases  of  development  such  as  ascent, 
decline,  and  stabilisation  can  be  found,  and  this  will  allow  a 
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country. 
Thus  it  is  clear  that  Kondrat'ev  saw  such  a  construction  as 
a  means  to  help  forecast  development,  ie  to  help  with  the 
construction  of  national  economic  plans.  All  his  conjunctural 
work  was  devoted  to  this  aim.  However,  what  is  somewhat 
problematic  is  the  relevance  of  a  scheme  built  upon  capitalist 
categories  to  a  socialist  economy.  It  would  be  possible  to  argue 
that,  since  in  the  transition  period  elements  of  capitalism 
still  exist,  calculations  based  on  capitalist  categories  have 
some  relevance.  This  may  be  correct,  but  it  does  not  show 
exactly  how  these  calculations  will  be  relevant  or  can  be 
adapted  to  transitional  circumstances.  Elements  of  socialist 
categories  should  also  be  somehow  included.  Kondrat'ev  does  not 
provide  answers  to  these  problems. 
In  a  1925  article  entitled  'Sovremennoe  sostoyanie 
narodnokhozyaistvennoi  kon'yunkturi  v  svete  vziamootnoshenii 
industrii  i  sel'skogo  khozyaistva'  published  in 
Sotsialisticheskoe  khozyaistvo  in  1925,  Kondrat'ev  analyses  the 
allegation  that  the  cause  of  the  current  violation  of 
equilibrium  of  the  national  economy  is  disproportion  between 
industry  and  agriculture.  He  disagrees  with  this  diagnosis.  It 
is  absolutely  clear,  according  to  Kondrat'ev,  that  this 
disproportion  cannot  be  absolute,  since  the  total  amount  of 
agriculture  outweighs  the  total  amount  of  industry  considerably. 
Thus  this  alleged  disproportion  must  be  of  a  relative  kind,  but 
relative  to  what? 
65  A  base  period  must  be  taken  for  comparison, 
and  if  the  year  1924/5  is  compared  with  1923/4  the  data  shows 
that  industry  grew  63.4%  whilst  agriculture  grew  by  only  7.9%. 
Gosplan  control  figures  show  that  in  relation  to  pre-war 
production  industry  has  achieved  a  higher  level  (76%)  than 
agriculture  (65%),  expressed  in  contemporary  prices. 
66  Thus 
relative  to  these  figures  industry  does  not  'lag  behind' 
agriculture. 
If  Kondrat'ev  rejects  the  disproportionality  explanation  of 
the  goods  famine,  what  is  his  alternative  cause?  He  writes  that 
the  cause  must  have  a  dynamic  character  and  must  appear  sharply 
in  1924/5,  and  cites  the  credit  expansion  of  this  period  as  an 
173 explanation.  The  year  1924/5  saw  an  increase  in  available  credit 
of  over  two  times  the  preceding  year,  and  Kondrat'ev  gives  the 
decisive  month  as  being  February  1925,  when  credit  expanded 
around  seven  times  from  10.6  million  to  71.3  million  rubles.  67 
This  credit  expansion  had  a  huge  significance  for  industry, 
since  it  gave  industry  the  possibility  not  only  to  expand 
production  but  also  to  withdraw  from  turnover.  This  increased 
industrial  production  took  place  to  a  greater  degree  in  the 
department  producing  means  of  production,  and  the  general  growth 
of  industry  led  to  increased  demand  for  industrial  consumer 
goods.  However,  since  increased  production  took  place  to  a 
greater  extent  in  those  branches  producing  means  of  production, 
and  since  the  state  stuck  to  its  policy  of  holding  down  prices, 
there  were  insufficient  industrial  consumer  goods  available  and 
thus  the  goods  famine  developed.  68  Hence  the  disproportion  is 
not  between  industry  and  agriculture,  but  between  urban 
purchasing  power  (effective  demand)  and  the  supply  of  ready-made 
industrial  goods.  69 
Kondrat'ev  argues  that  it  was  this  disproportion  between 
supply  and  demand  which  was  the  basic  cause  of  the  goods  famine: 
What  was  violated  was  above  all  the  precondition  that 
on  markets  there  is  a  place  for  only  that  demand 
which  really  flows  from  the  internal  mechanism  of 
production  and  exchange. 
7° 
An  increase  in  demand  created  exogenously  would  inevitably  lead 
to  a  disproportion,  and  the  credit  expansion  of  1924/5  was  such 
an  increase.  Kondrat'ev  notes  that  for  example  Groman  uses  the 
argument  that  laws  of  the  restoration  process  can  be  empirically 
discovered,  and  credit  expansion  in  line  with  these  laws  is 
safe.  However,  Kondrat'ev  replies  that  a  law  cannot  be  based 
upon  a  single  observation  only,  ie  the  USSR  in  the  1920s,  and 
thus  there  is  a  risk  that  a  generalisation  could  be  obtained 
which  is  not  warranted  by  empirical  law.  71 
Groman  uses  the  argument  that  pre-war  proportions  between 
industry  and  agriculture  must  be  re-established.  Kondrat'ev 
questions  this.  Since  radical  changes  have  occurred  in  the 
ownership  structure  of  the  economy,  why  should  pre-war 
proportions  be  taken  as  'correct'?  In  fact  even  without  such 
174 fundamental  economic  changes,  why  should  the  pre-war  period  be 
taken  as  a  benchmark?  Why  not  some  other  period?.  72  Kondrat'ev 
warns  against  attempts  to  increase  production  through  credit 
expansion,  rather  production  should  be  increased  on  the  basis  of 
real  accumulation  and  thus  at  a  pace  in  line  with  the  rate  of 
this  accumulation.  It  is  clear  from  this  article  that  Kondrat'ev 
held  orthodox  'sound  money'  views  on  the  question  of  credit,  and 
perceived  the  balancing  of  supply  with  demand  as  an  essential 
function  of  the  market.  73 
Kondrat'ev  presented  some  results  of  his  work  on  a  plan  for 
agriculture  and  forestry  at  a  plenum  meeting  of  the  Presidium  of 
Gosplan  on  the  4th  of  July  1925,  and  a  stenographic  record  of 
his  presentation  plus  some  debate  was  published  in  Planovoe 
khozyaistvo  under  the  title  'Osnovi  perspektivnogo  plana 
razvitiya  sel'skogo  i  lesnogo  khozyaistva'  that  year.  In  his 
presentation  Kondrat'ev  stresses  the  difference  between 
teleological  and  genetic  methods  of  planning,  and  states  that 
the  method  which  he  and  his  co-workers  used  for  this  plan  was 
'basically  genetic,  but  it  included  teleological  elements'. 
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The  scheme  of  plan  construction  used  contained  the  following 
stages: 
1)  investigation  of  economic  tendencies  during  the  war  and  the 
revolution; 
2)  their  evaluation  from  the  point  of  view  of  definite  economic 
criteria,  ie  their  progressive  or  regressive  character; 
3)  the  task  of  improving  and  reconstructing  agriculture; 
4)  preconditions  for  realising  general  economic  tasks; 
5)  the  system  of  measures  by  Narkomzem  required  to  realise  the 
given  tasks. 
This  scheme  was  used  both  in  agriculture  and  in  forestry. 
The  basic  task  related  by  Kondrat'ev  is  the  development  of 
agricultural  productive  forces,  which  in  concrete  terms  means 
increasing  the  level  of  production,  increasing  marketability  and 
the  industrialisation  of  agriculture,  and  accelerating 
accumulation.  In  terms  of  measures  which  Kondrat'ev  recommends, 
the  first  is  in  the  field  of  regulating  markets.  Prices  of 
agricultural  products  should  be  held  at  a  level  which  guarantees 
the  expanded  reproduction  of  agricultural  commodities. 
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175 Secondly,  in  the  field  of  foreign  trade  Kondrat'ev  supports  the 
maximal  widening  of  agricultural  exports  in  line  with  directives 
from  the  Congress  of  Soviets.  Tariffs  should  not  fall  heavier  on 
agricultural  goods  than  on  other  goods,  and  must  not  prevent 
agricultural  exports.  Thirdly,  the  trade  apparatus  must  be 
improved.  Fourthly,  protectionism  in  industry  must  not  prevent 
the  import  of  tools  and  means  of  production  for  agriculture.  In 
terms  of  land  utilisation,  the  most  progressive  form  is  of 
course  collective  utilisation,  but  the  speed  of  the  transition 
to  this  form  should  depend  on  the  particular  conditions  in  the 
different  regions. 
This  section  on  Kondrat'ev's  economic  dynamics  shows  that 
he  viewed  such  dynamics  partly  in  terms  of  shifts  in  supply  and 
demand  on  the  market,  and  partly  in  terms  of  real  economy 
concepts  such  as  national  capital,  population,  and  national 
income.  For  Kondrat'ev  study  of  the  relations  between  economic 
categories  would  assist  economic  forecasting,  which  was  the  main 
focus  of  the  Kon"yunkturnogo  instituta. 
5.2.1  -  OPARIN 
Oparin's  longest  and  most  detailed  work  was  entitled 
Kon"yunktura  1  rynki  of  1928,  and  was  subtitled  Opyt  postroeniya 
skhematicheskoi  ekonomii  obmena.  In  this  book  Oparin  explains 
what  he  understands  by  'market',  and  constructs  a  method  for 
analysing  market  fluctuations.  According  to  Oparin  a  market  is 
where  economic  elements  are  exchanged.  By  'markets'  is  meant  the 
totality  of  economic  relations  arising  from  the  exchange  of 
these  economic  elements.  The  market  can  be  viewed  from  four 
basic  angles:  1)  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  place  where  the 
exchange  occurs;  2)  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  time  at  which 
the  exchange  is  accomplished;  3)  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
object  exchanged;  4)  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  form  or 
character  of  exchange. 
76  In  the  first  case  there  can  be  the 
world  market,  the  national  market,  regional  markets,  city 
markets,  local  bazaars  etc,  ie  particular  geographical  areas.  In 
the  second  case  there  can  be  daily,  weekly,  monthly,  yearly  etc 
time-periods  from  which  to  analyse  price  movements.  In  the  third 
case  there  can  be  money  markets,  commodity  markets,  labour 
176 markets  etc.  In  the  fourth  case  there  can  be  large-wholesale, 
small-wholesale,  wholesale-retail,  retail  etc  markets.  These 
categories  can  be  further  sub-divided,  for  example  the  money 
market  can  be  divided  into  a  loan  market,  a  stock  market,  a 
currency  market  etc,  and  the  labour  market  can  be  classified 
according  to  profession,  qualifications,  experience  etc. 
Oparin  then  proceeds  by  relating  how  the  nature  of  the 
commodity  in  question  can  influence  the  market  for  this  good.  If 
the  good  in  question  is  fresh  fish,  then  the  fact  that  this  has 
to  be  recently  caught  influences  the  relation  between  supply  and 
demand.  A  different  logic  applies  on  the  wheat  market,  where 
supply  is  not  determined  by  production  at  a  given  moment,  but  by 
the  harvest  and  the  import/export  balance.  The  existence  of 
goods  which  can  be  substituted  (eg  fodder  grains)  leads  to  the 
prices  of  such  substitutables  being  interrelated.  There  are  also 
'connected'  goods,  where  the  demand  for  one  good  stands  in 
direct  relation  to  the  supply  of  another,  for  example  hops  and 
barley  in  beer  production.  Thus  Oparin  stresses  that  for  each 
commodity  type  it  is  necessary  to  have  in  mind  the  relevant 
particularity  when  analysing  the  market  for  that  good.  77  In 
relation  to  time  Oparin  relates  that  he  uses  Marshall's  division 
into  four  periods.  First  there  is  a  very  short  period  where 
equilibrium  on  markets  is  established  purely  by  supply  and 
demand.  A  longer  period  equilibrium  occurs  when  supply  is 
determined  in  relation  to  the  possibilities  of  production  with 
existing  tools  of  production.  Then  there  is  equilibrium  on  the 
basis  of  allowing  new  tools  of  production  to  be  created,  and 
finally  there  is  equilibrium  on  the  basis  of  the  methods  of  a 
definite  epoch. 
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Oparin  then  turns  to  an  analysis  of  the  general  price 
level.  If  there  is  a  definite  quantity  of  goods  and  a  definite 
quantity  of  money,  the  money  mass  divided  by  the  goods  mass 
gives  the  price  of  a  single  good: 
PQ  =M 
where  P=  price  of  a  single  good,  M=  sum  of  money,  Q=  the 
quantity  of  goods.  This  is  the  quantity  theory  of  money,  and 
Oparin  notes  that  it  has  a  number  of  formulations.  For  example: 
177 p1g1  +  p2g2  +  ...  pngn  =  MV 
where  V=  the  velocity  of  circulation.  Real  money  in  circulation 
is  often  replaced  by  one  or  other  monetary  surrogate: 
PT  =  MV  +  M1V1 
where  M1  is  the  quantity  of  such  a  surrogate.  In  relation  to 
this  Oparin  discusses  Fisher's  Purchasing  Power  of  Money,  a 
Russian  translation  of  which  appeared  in  1926  published  by  NKF, 
and  Keynes's  Tract  on  Monetary  Reform,  a  Russian  translation  of 
which  appeared  in  1925.  Oparin  relates  that  Fisher  adopts  the 
formula  PT  =  MV  +  M1V1.  M  and  M1  can  be  represented  by  the  means 
of  payment  index,  V  and  V1  by  the  rate  of  circulation,  P  by  the 
general  price  level  index,  and  T  by  the  index  of  the  real  value 
of  all  goods  turnover.  A  deficiency  of  Fisher's  formula, 
according  to  Oparin,  is  viewing  the  total  commodity  mass  as  a 
single  whole  and  contrasting  it  with  the  total  quantity  of  money 
and  monetary  surrogates.  This  is  because  in  the  sphere  of 
circulation  money  capital  and  the  consumer  fund  are  different.  79 
A  different  formulation  of  the  quantity  theory  is  proposed 
by  others,  for  example  Marshall  and  Keynes.  According  to  Keynes 
the  population  usually  wants  to  have  a  definite  sum  of  money 
sufficient  for  buying  a  definite  quantity  of  goods,  which  can  be 
expressed  in  several  units  of  consumption  k.  Suppose  that  in 
circulation  there  are  n  banknotes  and  that  p  is  the  price  of 
consumer  units  (value  of  life  index):  then  n=  pk.  Keynes 
complicates  this  formula  as  follows.  So  far  it  has  been  supposed 
that  on  the  one  hand  all  the  purchasing  power  needs  of  the 
population  are  covered  by  ready  cash,  and  on  the  other  that 
these  needs  are  the  single  source  of  demand  for  ready  cash. 
However,  Keynes  continues  by  supposing  that  the  population  finds 
it  convenient  to  hold  k  units  in  the  form  of  ready  cash,  and  a 
further  k1  units  in  banks  as  depositors.  Then  the  following 
formula  is  obtained: 
n=  p(k  +  rkl) 
178 where  r=  the  portion  of  the  bank's  current  obligation  in 
relation  to  public  provision  of  ready  cash.  Thus  if  in  Fisher's 
formula  the  quantity  of  money  circulating  at  a  definite  velocity 
is  opposed  to  the  quantity  of  goods,  then  in  Keynes's  formula 
the  requirement  for  money  is  opposed  to  the  actual  quantity  of 
money  in  circulation.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  quantity  k+ 
rkl  changes  in  connection  with  the  changing  quantity  of 
circulating  goods  and  the  rate  of  monetary  circulation,  and 
consequently  it  is  possible  to  transfer  between  the  two 
formulae.  The  only  difference  according  to  Oparin  is  that  Fisher 
begins  with  trade  turnover  which  results  in  the  movement  of 
money  in  a  definite  period,  whereas  Keynes  starts  from  the 
requirements  of  the  population  for  money  and  the  quantity  of 
ready  cash  available  at  any  given  moment.  8°  Oparin  concludes 
that  Keynes  makes  the  same  error  as  Fisher,  which  is  viewing  all 
monetary  turnover  as  a  whole.  The  problem  with  this  approach  is 
brought  into  sharp  relief  when  p  is  considered,  which  is 
represented  by  the  budget  index.  This  view  comes  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  business  world  calculates  its  monetary 
requirement  on  the  basis  of  movements  in  the  budget  index,  which 
in  no  way  coordinates  with  reality. 
Oparin  continues  by  analysing  the  equation  of  exchange  as 
presented  by  Schumpeter: 
E=  MU  =  plml  +  p2m2  +  ...  Pmmn 
where  E=  the  sum  of  pure  monetary  income  of  all  economic 
subjects,  M=  the  circulating  money  mass,  U=  the  rate  of 
monetary  turnover,  m=  the  quantity  of  a  good,  p=  the  price  of 
a  good.  This  equation  states  that  monetary  income  equals  the 
circulating  money  mass  multiplied  by  its  rate  of  circulation, 
which  also  equals  the  sum  of  all  consumer  goods  multiplied  by 
their  price. 
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The  quantity  theory  of  money  is  used  by  authors  mainly  for 
establishing  a  causal  dependence  between  the  various  elements, 
in  which  some  elements  play  an  active  role  and  some  a  passive 
role.  Oparin  stresses  that  a  sweeping  solution  to  this  question 
is  not  possible,  since  changes  can  influence  one  or  other 
element  in  the  equation.  Thus  in  a  period  of  inflation  the 
179 changing  quantity  of  money  in  circulation  is  the  determining 
factor  in  relation  to  other  elements,  but  in  a  period  of 
cyclical  fluctuation  the  increased  commodity-turnover  provokes  a 
rise  in  money  capital  with  the  predicted  consequences.  Thus  in 
dependence  on  the  psychological  motives  of  economic  subjects  and 
the  particular  conditions  prevailing  the  determining  element 
will  be  different.  In  relation  to  the  geographical  area  examined 
it  is  necessary  to  keep  in  mind  that  changes  in  the  price  level 
of  one  nation  can  have  a  decisive  influence  on  the  world  price 
level,  and  thus  when  analysing  causal  relations  it  is  necessary 
to  keep  geographical  location  in  view. 
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5.2.2  -  MARKET  MECHANICS 
Having  presented  a  scheme  for  understanding  markets  and  an 
analysis  of  the  various  forms  of  the  quantity  theory,  Oparin 
turns  to  a  detailed  analysis  of  conjunctural-market  fluctuations 
using  the  tools  he  has  outlined  above.  First  he  takes  the  long- 
term  movement  (45  to  60  years)  of  the  general  level  of  commodity 
prices.  From  the  point  of  view  of  time  the  empirical  curve  must 
be  smoothed  out  in  order  to  remove  smaller  prominences  and  to 
establish  the  long-term  trend.  From  the  point  of  view  of  place 
the  most  important  countries  playing  the  leading  role  in  the 
world  economy  must  be  used,  and  from  the  point  of  view  of 
object,  form,  and  character  of  exchange  the  question  concerning 
the  relation  between  the  commodity  mass  and  the  fund  of  consumer 
money  should  be  raised.  The  quantity  of  gold  in  circulation  can 
serve  as  a  correct  measure  of  the  consumer  money  fund.  83  The 
point  of  this  investigation  is  to  establish  an  underlying 
theoretical  hypothesis  (scheme  of  equilibrium)  in  relation  to 
the  long-term  price  level,  and  then  to  test  this  hypothesis 
against  empirical  data. 
Oparin  argues  that  in  the  long-term  it  is  the  quantity  of 
gold  in  circulation  which  regulates  the  price  level.  He  writes 
that  'if  the  changing  quantity  of  gold  in  circulation 
coordinates  with  the  changing  requirement  for  gold  in 
circulation,  then  prices  will  remain  stationary'. 
84  To 
illustrate  this  position  Oparin  gives  the  following  example.  If 
180 the  quantity  of  extracted  gold  increased  at  a  lesser  rate  than 
the  increase  in  commodity-turnover,  then  the  purchasing  power  of 
gold  must  increase  and  the  general  price  level  would  fall. 
However,  the  increased  purchasing  power  of  gold  would  encourage 
further  extraction  of  gold  in  hitherto  unprofitable  gold-fields, 
which  would  tend  to  lower  the  purchasing  power  of  gold  and  bring 
the  price  level  back  up  to  its  previous  level.  Having  outlined 
this  theoretical  scheme,  Oparin  then  turns  to  concrete 
statistical  material,  material  which  he  takes  from  Cassel. 
Oparin  presents  a  graph  which  shows  the  actual  quantity  of  gold 
in  circulation,  the  normal  quantity  of  gold  (that  quantity  which 
would  give  a  stationary  price  level),  the  relative  quantity  of 
gold,  and  the  price  level  for  the  period  1800  to  1910  in 
England.  This  graph  shows  that  the  actual  quantity  of  gold  in 
circulation  followed  the  normal  quantity  quite  closely,  and  that 
the  general  price  level  followed  the  relative  quantity  of  gold 
closely  also. 
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Adapting  the  quantity  theory  of  money  in  its  simplest  form 
(MV  =  PT)  and  ignoring  V,  P=  M/T.  P  is  the  price  index  and  T  is 
the  index  of  the  real  of  value  of  goods  turnover,  in  other  words 
that  quantity  of  gold  which  is  required  for  turnover  and  to 
maintain  price  equilibrium.  Consequently  M/T  is  the  deviation  of 
the  actual  from  the  normal  quantity  of  gold  required  in 
turnover.  Oparin  then  gives  the  following  formal  statement  of 
the  secular  equilibrium  scheme  for  this  case: 
... 
in  the  long-term  price  fluctuations  around  the 
level  adopted  for  composing  equilibrium  are 
determined  by  the  deviation  in  the  gold  quantity 
actually  in  circulation  from  the  quantity  required 
for  turnover,  so  as  to  maintain  prices  at  a 
stationary  level.  86 
Oparin  then  compares  this  theoretical  scheme  with  the  empirical 
data  which  he  gives  presented  above.  To  do  this  it  is  necessary 
to  compare  the  actual  quantity  of  gold  in  circulation  with  the 
normal  quantity,  this  latter  relation  being  called  the  relative 
quantity  of  gold  by  Cassel.  When  this  is  done  it  is  clear  that 
the  relative  quantity  of  gold  with  sufficient  exactitude 
reflects  the  fluctuations  in  the  general  price  level  over  the 
181 long-term.  From  1800  to  1850  they  both  decline  fast.  From  1850 
to  1880  they  rise  a  little  over  the  1850  level,  and  from  1880  to 
1910  they  fall  a  little  below  the  1850  level.  Thus  Oparin 
concludes  that  his  scheme  is  accurate  in  this  case. 
He  then  moves  on  to  analyse  cyclical  fluctuations  in  the 
general  price  level  over  shorter  time  periods  such  as  the 
capitalist  cycle  (3  to  11  years).  In  this  case  Oparin  uses 
Cassel's  analysis.  Cassel  considers  that  general  price  movements 
in  the  capitalist  cycle  are  determined  by  the  quantity  of 
monetary  means  in  circulation.  This  position  begins  from  the 
quantity  theory  and  can  be  formulated  thus:  the  relation  of  the 
quantity  of  bank  means  in  circulation  to  the  actual  quantity  of 
gold  in  circulation  determines  the  relation  of  price  movements 
in  the  capitalist  cycle  to  their  long-term  movement,  ie  to  the 
relative  quantity  of  gold  in  circulation. 
87  Oparin  presents  a 
diagram  which  shows  for  the  period  1870  to  1910  the  turnover  of 
London  clearing  houses  (raschetnykh  palat)  divided  by  the  actual 
quantity  of  gold,  and  the  Zauerbeka  index  divided  by  the 
relative  quantity  of  gold,  ie  the  deviation  of  price  movements 
in  the  period  of  cyclical  fluctuation  from  their  long-term 
movement.  These  two  lines  move  together,  indicating  their 
dependence. 
However,  Oparin  is  critical  of  Cassel's  analysis  in  this 
case.  According  to  Oparin  it  is  impossible  to  consider  that  the 
increase  in  circulation  of  monetary  surrogates  is  the 
determining  factor,  since  this  is  a  consequence  of  expansion  of 
commodity-turnover,  not  its  determinant.  Thus  for  Oparin  the 
independent  variable  in  cyclical  fluctuations  is  the  industrial 
upturn  and  the  expansion  of  commodity-turnover,  which  provokes 
demand  for  money  capital  and  causes  a  credit  expansion. 
88  He 
admits  that  to  establish  underlying  schemes  for  cyclical 
fluctuations  would  require  an  analysis  of  all  the  components  of 
the  trade  cycle,  something  which  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
present  work.  While  Oparin  did  not  go  further  in  this  work,  he 
did  provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  trade  cycle  in  another 
work  which  will  be  examined  later. 
Oparin  moves  on  to  analyse  price  movements  of  various 
commodities.  The  deviation  of  demand  for  a  good  from  normal 
182 requirements  will  be  coordinated  by  the  deviation  of  the  good's 
price  index  to  the  general  price  index:  M=  1/10  M0,  ie  the 
quantity  expended  on  the  good  in  money  (M)  is  equal  to  one  tenth 
of  the  general  trade-industrial  capital  (MO).  The  normal 
consumption  of  the  good  is  one  tenth  of  the  general  commodity- 
turnover  (1/10  Q0).  If  M  is  replaced  by  PQ,  ie  price  times 
quantity,  and  MO  =  POQO,  then  PQ  =  1/10  POQO.  This  means  that 
the  relation  of  a  good's  supply  to  requirements  must  coordinate 
with  the  relation  of  the  general  price  level  to  the  good's  price 
(PO/P).  89  Oparin  then  turns  to  potato  prices  in  St  Paul  and 
Minneapolis  in  the  USA  as  analysed  by  the  University  of 
Minnesota  Agricultural  Experiment  Station  in  1922.  The 
investigators  constructed  schemes  of  dependence  for  potato  price 
fluctuations  on  the  following  factors:  1)  on  potato  production 
throughout  the  USA;  2)  on  damage  to  the  potato  crop;  3)  on  the 
movement  of  the  general  price  level;  4)  on  yearly  growth  of 
demand  for  potatoes.  In  addition  to  showing  these  dependencies, 
the  investigators  showed  that  the  potato  price  is  not  influenced 
by  the  following:  1)  the  production  of  potatoes  in  states 
adjoining  the  investigated  market;  2)  export  and  import;  3) 
general  cyclical  fluctuations.  90  From  this  Oparin  concludes  that 
the  two  elements  which  can  be  adopted  as  basic  to  the 
equilibrium  schemes  in  this  case  are  the  general  price  level  and 
the  level  of  demand.  91 
Proceeding  to  other  agricultural  produce,  Oparin  presents  a 
diagram  showing  the  relation  of  the  harvest  level  to  the  price 
of  hops  in  England  from  1885  to  1907.  This  shows  a  simple 
inverse  dependence  between  the  harvest  level  and  the  price,  ie 
as  the  harvest  falls  the  price  increases.  The  same  logic  applies 
to  hog  prices,  and  for  such  goods  Oparin  formulates  a  law  of 
contrary  fluctuation  of  price  and  supply  (pravil  'nosti 
protivopolozhnykh  kolebanii).  92  However,  this  law  does  not  apply 
to  all  agricultural  produce.  For  example  the  schemes  of 
dependence  for  the  world  wheat  price  are  not  as  simple  as  those 
presented  above.  This  is  due  mainly  to  the  fact  that  a 
relatively  small  proportion  of  the  total  wheat  harvest  flows 
onto  the  world  market,  and  consequently  the  world  wheat  price  is 
determined  by  changes  in  this  small  part  of  world  supply.  Thus 
183 in  order  to  establish  equilibrium  schemes  for  this  crop  it  is 
necessary  to  establish  connecting  laws  of  grain  harvests  in 
various  countries  with  changes  in  the  level  of  supply  and  demand 
for  wheat  export.  In  a  number  of  articles  for  Ekonomicheskoe 
obozrenie  Oparin  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  harvest  level 
in  the  main  exporting  countries  was  the  primary  determining 
factor  of  the  world  wheat  price,  and  that  the  harvest  level  in 
importing  countries  was  only  a  secondary  determinant.  93 
Oparin  then  turns  his  attention  to  industrial  goods,  and 
picks  cast-iron  as  an  example.  He  presents  a  graph  showing  the 
movement  of  cast-iron  output  and  price  for  the  period  1898  to 
1914,  composed  from  Harvard  University  data.  This  data  has  been 
manipulated  to  exclude  the  long-term  trend  by  the  method  of 
least  squares,  and  seasonal  fluctuations  through  Pearson's 
method.  The  two  curves  for  output  and  price  show  an  almost 
simultaneous  rise  and  fall,  ie  an  increase  in  smelting  of  cast- 
iron  is  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  price.  Thus  industrial 
goods  exhibit  a  totally  different  connecting  scheme  between 
price  and  production  level  than  agricultural  produce.  Oparin 
explains  this  as  follows.  On  agricultural  markets  supply  changes 
in  relation  to  climatic  conditions,  but  demand  remains  more  or 
less  constant.  Hence  there  are  strong  changes  in  price  in 
relation  to  supply  fluctuations.  However  on  cast-iron  markets 
the  primary  force  is  changing  demand  for  these  goods,  and  as  a 
consequence  of  rising  demand  prices  rise,  which  in  turn  provokes 
increased  production.  Hence  prices  and  output  move  in  the  same 
direction.  Having  achieved  demand  saturation  prices  begin  to 
fall,  which  signals  for  a  decline  in  production  levels.  Thus  as 
the  price  falls  the  level  of  production  declines  also. 
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Oparin  then  moves  on  to  analyse  movements  in  the  interest 
rate.  He  sees  the  interest  rate  as  the  price  of  exchanging 
current  money  capital  for  future  money  capital,  and  he  presents 
the  economic  basis  for  periodic  fluctuations  in  the  interest 
rate  as  follows.  At  the  beginning  of  an  upturn  there  are 
insufficient  finished  goods  on  the  market  to  satisfy  the  rising 
demand,  and  consequently  prices  rise.  This  price  increase 
provokes  an  increase  in  demand  for  nominal  money  capital.  Also 
at  this  point  in  the  cycle  there  is  a  rise  in  economic  activity, 
184 since  price  rises  bring  greater  profits.  This  increase  in 
production  also  increases  demand  for  money  capital,  as 
enterprises  borrow  to  fund  new  production.  Increased  demand  for 
money  capital  affects  its  price,  and  thus  the  interest  rate 
begins  to  rise.  For  some  time  it  is  still  profitable  to  borrow 
at  higher  rates,  but  there  comes  a  time  when  demand  for  money 
capital  begins  to  decline  as  commodity  market  saturation  is 
achieved.  Consequently  as  demand  for  goods  declines  profits  and 
prices  fall,  and  this  provokes  a  contraction  of  production. 
Since  demand  for  money  capital  falls  along  with  production 
levels,  the  interest  rate  will  begin  to  fall  also.  95  Oparin 
gives  graphs  which  show  the  movement  of  the  interest  rate 
together  with  the  movement  in  the  turnover  of  clearing  houses 
and  the  quantity  of  money  in  banks.  The  interest  rate  moves  in 
parallel  with  the  former  but  contrary  to  the  latter,  which  shows 
that  the  interest  rate  rises  in  response  to  increased  demand  for 
money  and  falls  in  response  to  an  increased  supply  of  money. 
Oparin  formulates  the  equilibrium  scheme  for  the  interest  rate 
as  follows: 
... 
if  the  demand  for  money  capital  is  coordinated 
by  the  relation  between  fictitious  money  capital 
and  cash  reserves,  then  the  interest  rate  will  be 
stationary.  If  demand  for  money  capital  deviates 
from  its  normal  level  then  the  interest  rate  must 
follow.  96 
Oparin  then  considers  the  movements  of  share  prices.  Shares 
give  the  right  to  own  a  certain  portion  of  an  enterprise  and  to 
receive  a  percentage  of  the  profits  in  the  form  of  a  dividend. 
Oparin  considers  that  analysis  of  the  psychological  motivation 
for  holding  shares  should  concentrate  on  the  income  stream  they 
generate.  Hence  it  follows  that  the  share  price  must  be 
determined  by  the  income  of  the  enterprise  in  question. 
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Further,  to  borrow  money  in  order  to  buy  shares  is  logical  only 
if  the  interest  rate  is  lower  than  the  rate  of  return  which  the 
shares  will  provide.  Oparin  presents  a  graph  which  shows  the 
movement  of  industrial  shares  against  the  seasonally  adjusted 
interest  rate  for  the  period  1897  to  1913,  and  concludes  that 
the  turning  point  for  changes  in  the  share  price  is 
185 approximately  the  moment  when  the  interest  rate  falls  or  rises 
by  1.25%  against  its  preceding  highest  point.  The  lower  the 
interest  rate  the  more  advantageous  it  is  to  hold  shares,  and 
thus  the  higher  the  share  price.  Credit  is  gradually  exhausted 
as  a  consequence  of  loans,  and  the  interest  rate  begins  to  rise. 
When  it  reaches  1.25%  higher  than  its  previous  highest  point, 
the  share  price  begins  to  decline.  98 
Moving  on  to  the  exchange  rate,  Oparin  relates  that  at  the 
root  of  demand  for  foreign  currency  lies  international  trading 
turnover.  Consequently  the  level  of  the  exchange  rate  is 
determined  mainly  by  the  export/import  trade  balance.  If  a 
country  imports  a  greater  quantity  of  goods  from  overseas  than 
it  exports,  ie  it  has  a  passive  trade  balance,  then  it  is 
compelled  to  pay  for  these  extra  imports  with  gold  or  money. 
With  an  active  trade  balance  a  country  has  a  surplus  of  foreign 
currency.  Hence  the  exchange  rate  will  rise  in  the  first  case  - 
the  currency  of  the  country  with  a  passive  trade  balance  will 
fall  in  relation  to  other  currencies  -  and  fall  in  the  second  - 
the  country  with  the  active  balance  will  pay  less  for  foreign 
currency.  Oparin  notes  that  the  trade  balance  does  not  fully 
take  into  account  the  totality  of  accounts  between  two 
countries,  although  it  is  probably  the  single  largest  factor  in 
the  total  accounting  balance,  and  thus  has  the  greatest  effect 
on  the  exchange  rate. 
Under  conditions  of  normal  gold  circulation  fluctuations  in 
the  exchange  rate  occur  around  gold  parity  and  within  the  limits 
of  the  gold  point.  If  a  country's  currency  declines  beyond  a 
certain  point  it  becomes  more  rational  to  directly  send  gold  as 
payment  for  imported  goods,  since  it  would  cost  more  to  purchase 
foreign  currency.  In  consequence  of  this  the  exchange  rate  of 
gold-backed  currencies  cannot  fall  lower  than  the  gold  point,  ie 
gold  parity  plus  the  cost  of  gold  transfer.  Oparin  notes  that 
the  price  relation  between  two  countries  under  gold  is  brought 
into  constant  equilibrium  as  follows.  If  the  price  of  any  good 
in  a  country  fell  drastically,  then  other  states  would  buy  this 
good  from  overseas,  and  the  price  would  be  pushed  upwards  in  the 
exporting  country  and  downwards  in  the  importing  countries,  thus 
restoring  equilibrium.  99 
186 Turning  his  attention  to  the  case  of  paper  currencies, 
Oparin  relates  the  purchasing  power  parity  theory  of  Cassel. 
Willingness  to  pay  a  certain  price  for  foreign  currency  rests  in 
essence  on  the  purchasing  power  this  foreign  currency  has  in 
relation  to  foreign  goods.  Hence  the  exchange  rate  between  two 
countries  is  determined  by  the  relation  of  their  internal  prices 
or  their  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP).  However,  Oparin  notes 
that  there  can  be  another  influence  on  the  exchange  rate,  namely 
capital  flight  from  one  country  to  another.  In  this  case  there 
is  greater  demand  for  foreign  bills  of  exchange,  and  the 
exchange  rate  falls  outside  the  influence  of  PPP.  Oparin  gives 
the  following  statement  for  the  equilibrium  scheme  of  the 
exchange  rate: 
The  deviation  in  the  relation  of  price  levels  of 
two  countries  from  the  relation  set  by  the  gold 
standard  coordinates  the  deviation  of  the  exchange 
rate  from  gold  parity.  100 
To  illustrate  this  position  Oparin  provides  a  graph  which  shows 
the  relation  of  USA,  UK,  and  French  exchange  rates  for  the 
period  1913  to  1924.  The  curve  showing  the  deviation  of  the 
exchange  rate  of  France  from  gold  parity  is  very  close  to  the 
curve  showing  PPP.  In  the  war  period  the  fit  is  less  exact,  but 
from  1919  not  only  the  yearly  but  also  the  monthly  fluctuations 
coincide.  The  exchange  rate  often  fluctuates  stronger  than  PPP, 
but  according  to  Oparin  this  is  due  to  speculation  on  the  future 
decline  of  the  internal  purchasing  power  of  the  currency. 
Turning  then  to  the  labour  market,  Oparin  starts  from  the 
position  that  capitalists  and  workers  have  opposing  interests: 
capitalists  want  to  pay  workers  the  least  possible  wage,  whereas 
workers  want  to  improve  their  material  conditions.  This  has  the 
following  consequences.  In  an  upturn  increased  production  allows 
an  increase  in  employment  of  labour  power,  and  in  such 
conditions  workers  aspire  to  increase  wages  by  threatening 
strikes.  Calls  for  higher  wages  are  also  stimulated  by  the 
rising  general  price  level  which  usually  accompanies  an  upturn, 
and  which  reduces  the  real  wages  of  workers.  At  this  point  in 
the  cycle  the  struggle  is  usually  resolved  in  favour  of  the 
workers,  as  capitalists  cannot  afford  a  halt  to  production.  The 
187 reverse  is  the  case  during  a  downturn.  Demand  for  labour  falls, 
prices  fall,  capital  is  scarce,  and  thus  capitalists  reduce  the 
nominal  wages  of  workers-101  Oparin  presents  two  graphs  which 
show  the  relation  between  industrial  production  and  employment 
of  labour  power,  and  demand  for  labour  power  against  hourly 
wages  between  1899  and  1913.  Both  sets  of  curves  move  together, 
although  hourly  wages  lags  behind  demand.  Oparin  notes  that  if 
the  movement  of  wages  is  compared  with  the  movement  of  the 
general  price  level,  then  the  lag  of  wages  behind  prices  is 
clear.  He  also  points  out  that  while  on  commodity  markets 
changes  in  price  are  determined  usually  by  the  views  of  owners 
of  businesses  in  relation  to  conjuncture,  on  the  labour  market 
there  is  a  struggle  of  antagonistic  forces,  and  thus  every 
change  in  wages  is  resisted  by  one  of  the  antagonists.  Hence  the 
less  intensive  movement  of  wages  as  compared  to  commodities.  102 
This  gives  the  substance  of  Oparin's  analysis:  now  to  the 
conclusion.  Oparin  stresses  the  relevance  of  schematic  analysis 
for  socialist  regulation.  He  has  shown  how  comparisons  between 
the  movements  of  various  economic  elements  can  be  made,  and  from 
such  comparisons  laws  of  connection  can  be  elucidated: 
If  socialism  is  science  conducted  in  all  spheres  of 
human  activity,  then  the  socialist  state  must  in 
every  way  support  schematic  analysis.  The  socialist 
state  manages  the  economy  on  the  basis  of  planned 
measures  based  on  the  laws  of  combining  economic 
elements,  and  for  this  it  is  necessary  to  know  the 
basic  lines  of  schematic  equilibrium... 
103 
This  approach  is  somewhat  Bukharinist  in  spirit,  since  it 
implies  planning  within  the  bounds  of  economic  feasibility,  ie 
with  regards  for  market  equilibrium.  Oparin  continues  by  noting 
that  the  economic  process  in  the  bourgeois  order  is  represented 
by  an  undulating  line  around  equilibrium.  These  waves  disturb 
economic  organisation,  and  in  crises  there  is  panic, 
unemployment,  bankruptcy  etc.  In  socialism,  according  to  Oparin, 
all  this  can  be  avoided: 
We  are  convinced  that  the  socialist  state  on  the 
basis  of  recognised  laws  of  connection  between 
economic  processes  can  through  regulation  avoid 
periods  of  crisis,  and  even  other  less  catastrophic 
188 conjunctural  fluctuations.  Dynamic  processes  in  the 
socialist  state  will  develop,  as  indicated  above, 
according  to  the  fluent  lines  of  schematic 
equilibrium,  without  retarding  trends  and  with 
greater  speed.  As  an  engine  cannot  move  against  the 
track  on  which  it  stands,  the  economy  can  only 
develop  quickly  when  the  frictio  f  conjunctural 
movements  have  been  eliminated.  1840 
Oparin  further  argues  that  the  socialist  state  has  an  advantage 
over  its  capitalist  equivalent  in  the  task  of  schematic 
equilibrium,  in  that  while  statistical  data  is  collected  under 
capitalism  for  one  or  other  practical  requirement,  it  is  not 
collected  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  the  underlying 
characteristics  of  movement  of  economic  elements.  In  socialism, 
however,  the  aspiration  to  introduce  regulation  is  strong,  and 
thus  such  characteristics  can  be  elucidated  on  the  basis  of 
schematic  analysis. 
The  supreme  leader  in  bourgeois  economy  is  the  market,  and 
thus  in  Western  European  and  American  economic  thought  the  prime 
directive  is  taken  to  be  the  accurate  forecasting  of  future 
market  fluctuations  in  order  to  reap  greater  profit.  The 
socialist  state,  on  the  contrary,  aspires  to  the  scientific 
formulation  of  laws  of  dependence  between  economic  elements,  and 
regulation  of  the  economy  on  the  basis  of  these  laws.  Oparin 
calls  for  the  creation  of  Institutes  for  Schematic  Economics 
(Insti  tuta  skhematicheskoi  ekonomii)  to  carry  out  this  programme 
of  schematic  investigation.  While  there  are  currently  many 
institutes  for  the  study  of  natural  science,  there  are 
insufficient  number  for  the  study  of  economics,  as  even  the 
conjuncture  sections  of  Gosplan  and  Narkomfin  are  often  viewed 
as  extravagances.  Oparin  stresses  that  in  such  Institutes  for 
Schematic  Economics  foreign  methodology  will  not  present  a 
danger.  American  and  Western  European  economics  is  a  convenient 
ground  for  borrowing  statistical-economic  methods  which  will  be 
useful  for  elaborating  laws  of  connection,  since  foreign 
economists  have  available  to  them  a  wealth  of  statistical 
material: 
The  laws  of  movement  of  economic  elements  can  be 
applied  to  the  Soviet  economy  in  those  areas  when 
the  general  movement  in  our  economy  is  determined 
189 by  the  world  economy,  and  in  so  far  as  the  social 
structure  of  the  USSR  does  not  change  the  content 
of  these  laws...  l 
Foreign  methodology  in  Soviet  hands  can  be  exceedingly  fruitful 
for  scientific  work,  since  the  history  of  scientific  thought 
shows  many  examples  of  incorrect  theory  leading  to  the 
uncovering  of  useful  scientific  connections  between  phenomena. 
Thus  Oparin  supports  the  use  of  'bourgeois'  economics  in  the 
USSR  in  certain  areas  and  with  certain  reservations. 
5.2.3  -  THE  HARVARD  BAROMETER 
As  mentioned  above  Oparin  gave  a  more  detailed  analysis  of 
the  business  cycle  in  an  article  entitled  'Ekonomicheskyi  analiz 
Garvardskogo  barometra'  published  in  Planovoe  khozyaistvo  in 
1926.  Here  he  discussed  the  economic  barometer  created  at 
Harvard  university  to  quantitatively  analyse  the  business  cycle 
by  measuring  prices  on  stock,  money,  and  commodity  markets. 
Oparin  states  that  this  barometer  is  fairly  well-known  among 
Russian  economists  analysing  conjuncture,  and  he  presents  a 
diagram  showing  the  movement  of  stock,  money,  and  commodity 
markets  for  the  period  1903  to  1914.  This  diagram  shows  that 
after  the  1907  crisis  the  first  to  achieve  its  minimum  at  the 
end  of  1907  is  the  stock  market,  after  which  it  begins  to  rise. 
Commodity  markets  achieve  their  minimum  in  mid-1908,  after  which 
they  also  begin  to  rise.  Finally  the  money  market  reaches  the 
trough  only  at  the  end  of  1908.  This  same  sequence  is  found 
during  the  transition  from  upturn  to  downturn.  The  first  to 
begin  to  fall  is  the  stock  market  at  the  end  of  1909,  the 
commodity  markets  fall  at  the  beginning  of  1910,  and  the  money 
markets  begin  the  downturn  in  mid-1910.106 
Oparin  presents  another  diagram  showing  the  same  three 
markets  for  the  post-war  period.  Here  the  stock  market  peaks  at 
the  end  of  1919,  the  commodity  markets  in  mid-1920,  and  the 
money  markets  at  the  end  of  1920.  This  is  shown  as  follows: 
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Oparin  concludes  from  these  charts  that  the  Harvard  barometer 
makes  it  possible  to  forecast  future  developments  in  the  sense 
that  the  movement  of  one  indicator  (eg  the  stock  market)  can  be 
taken  as  indicative  of  the  future  movements  of  other  indicators 
(commodity  and  money  markets).  He  stresses  that  although  some 
Russian  economists  have  expressed  the  opinion  that  this  sequence 
is  based  only  on  observed  empirical  regularity,  in  fact  this 
regularity  is  based  on  economic  laws  which  are  fully  apparent. 
For  example,  it  is  clear  from  the  data  presented  that  the 
movement  of  the  stock  market  is  directly  contrary  to  the 
movement  of  the  money  markets.  Although  the  minima  and  maxima  do 
not  exactly  coincide,  the  contradictory  movement  is  clear  in 
both  the  pre-  and  post-war  years.  Oparin  argues  that  speculation 
on  stock  and  money  markets  must  be  inversely  related,  since 
yield  falls  on  paper  will  make  stocks  seem  more  profitable. 
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Oparin  continues  by  analysing  the  work  of  Pearsons  & 
Frickey  on  the  relation  between  money  rates  and  security 
prices. 
108  They  attempted  to  find  how  far  a  decline  or  increase 
in  the  discount  rate  in  comparison  with  its  previous  minima  or 
maxima  would  have  to  go  before  triggering  a  turning  point.  The 
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1919  to  1928 turning  point  in  the  movement  of  share  prices  was  not  connected 
with  a  time  lag  of  a  definite  amount  in  relation  to  movements  of 
the  discount  rate,  but  with  a  level  of  change  of  the  discount 
rate  compared  with  its  previous  turning  point.  On  the  basis  of 
statistical  analysis  Pearsons  &  Frickey  conclude  that  the 
turning  point  in  relation  to  shares  occurs  when  the  discount 
rate  falls  or  rises  by  1.25%  against  its  preceding  turning 
point.  109 
Oparin  then  turns  to  a  detailed  explanation  of  the 
movements  of  all  economic  elements  in  the  business  cycle  as 
follows,  with  the  aid  of  a  three-part  diagram  which  shows 
production  of  consumer  goods  and  means  of  production  with  the 
amount  of  money  in  banks,  the  supply  of  consumer  goods,  and 
commodity  prices  against  the  discount  rate.  In  a  period  of 
crisis  supplies  of  goods  are  above  the  normal  level,  the  normal 
level  being  the  long-term  trend.  At  this  point  banks  have  little 
free  money  to  lend,  so  the  discount  rate  is  high.  Prices  begin 
to  fall,  which  causes  a  fall  in  the  production  of  means  of 
production,  and  as  a  consequence  there  is  a  gradual  reduction  in 
production  of  consumer  goods.  Even  so  the  supply  of  goods 
increases  because  production  is  still  above  the  normal  level, 
and  the  discount  rate  continues  to  rise.  The  decline  in 
production  continues  until  the  supply  of  finished  goods  peaks 
and  then  begins  to  fall,  and  prices  continue  to  fall.  In 
connection  with  the  decline  in  productive  turnover  the  quantity 
of  money  in  banks  begins  to  rise,  pushing  the  discount  rate 
lower.  At  the  point  where  the  supply  of  goods  reaches  the  normal 
level,  prices  reach  their  lowest  point  and  begin  to  rise.  After 
this  the  production  of  means  of  production  begins  to  rise, 
followed  by  the  production  of  consumer  goods.  It  is  now  possible 
to  obtain  credit  for  expanding  production,  as  the  banks  have 
spare  money  available  and  the  discount  rate  has  fallen 
substantially. 
Production  of  means  of  production  and  finished  goods  rises 
strongly  from  this  point,  and  reserves  of  consumer  goods  fall 
while  production  is  below  the  normal  level.  Sometime  later  the 
amount  of  available  money  in  the  banks  begins  to  fall  as  credit 
is  given,  and  the  discount  rate  reaches  its  lowest  point.  The 
192 latter  then  begins  to  rise,  although  for  some  time  it  is  still 
below  normal  allowing  credit  to  be  obtained.  Oparin  notes  that 
when  the  production  of  means  of  production  reaches  its  normal 
level,  production  should  stop  rising,  but  the  indicators  which 
entrepreneurs  follow  fail  to  give  this  information,  and  thus 
production  continues  to  rise.  When  the  production  of  finished 
goods  reaches  its  normal  level,  reserves  of  consumer  goods  begin 
to  rise  and  prices  stop  falling.  Sometime  later  production  of 
means  of  production  reaches  a  peak  and  begins  to  fall,  credit 
becomes  harder  to  obtain,  and  the  discount  rate  begins  to 
increase.  A  crisis  then  develops  where  reserves  of  goods 
increase,  production  of  means  of  production  falls  drastically, 
the  discount  rate  rises  sharply,  and  prices  fall.  The  starting 
point  of  the  analysis  has  been  reached.  110 
According  to  Oparin  this  Harvard  barometer  analysis  is 
fully  correct  with  certain  preconditions.  The  first  is  based  in 
the  techniques  of  industrial  production,  that  there  is  a  lag 
between  the  requirement  for  finished  goods  and  its  fulfilment, 
since  this  depends  on  an  increase  in  production  of  tools  of 
production.  The  second  is  related  to  the  psychology  of  economic 
subjects  in  capitalist  society,  that  entrepreneurs  are  led  by 
market  indicators  which  may  themselves  lag  behind  reality,  and 
which  may  indicate  profit  even  when  production  should  fall  to 
avoid  crisis.  Oparin  states  that  the  elimination  of  cyclical 
fluctuations  is  thus  possible  only  when  enterprise  leaders  do 
not  follow  the  market,  but  calculate  current  and  future  need  on 
the  basis  of  norms  'declared  by  leaders  of  social 
organisations',  ie  when  planning  occurs. 
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Oparin  is  clearly  arguing  in  this  article  as  follows: 
capitalism  leads  to  recurrent  crises  which  are  wasteful  and 
damaging,  thus  the  market  should  be  replaced  by  planning,  which 
can  avoid  such  crises  and  guarantee  a  smooth  equilibrium  growth 
based  on  calculation  of  human  requirements.  Hence  although 
Oparin  was  sympathetic  to  Western  economics  he  still  believed 
that  a  socialist  economy  could  be  superior  to  a  capitalist  one. 
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Although  Kondrat'ev  and  Oparin  worked  together  it  is 
apparent  that  they  had  different  priorities  with  regards  to 
economic  analysis.  While  Kondrat'ev  was  very  concerned  to  link 
his  study  of  economic  dynamics  with  the  methodology  of  planning, 
Oparin  was  less  concerned  to  directly  relate  his  study  of 
schematic  equilibrium  to  planning,  although  he  did  agree  with 
the  general  principle  that  planning  requires  prognosis.  However, 
as  Strumilin  argued  Kondrat'ev's  conception  of  planning  was 
predominantly  the  study  of  market  conjuncture  and  possibility, 
and  this  type  of  planning  does  not  differ  greatly  from  what  is 
now  a  routine  element  of  contemporary  mixed  economies. 
Kondrat'ev's  normative  appraisal  of  the  market  was 
ambiguous,  as  his  analysis  of  rural  stratification  illustrates. 
Whether  he  felt  it  difficult  not  to  criticise  the  market  in  some 
regard  because  of  the  circumstances  it  is  impossible  to  know. 
Again  the  notion  of  market  capacity  was  used  by  Kondrat'ev,  and 
again  this  is  a  'demand'  conception  of  the  market.  The  price 
indices  used  by  members  of  the  Kon"yunkturnogo  instituta  show 
that  the  study  of  price  movement  was  taken  seriously  by  them. 
It  is  clear  that  Oparin's  understanding  of  what  the  market 
actually  was  and  how  it  functioned  was  very  similar  to 
conceptions  held  by  Western  economists  in  the  1920s,  as  shown  by 
the  typology  of  markets  given  in  Kon"yunktura  i  rynki  and  the 
analysis  of  the  Harvard  barometer  in  Planovoe  khozyaistvo. 
However,  he  believed  that  regulating  production  through  the 
market  alone  was  irrational,  since  it  led  to  under/ 
overproduction,  unemployment,  and  crisis.  Planning  would 
overcome  these  problems  by  better  cognising  the  laws  governing 
economic  processes,  and  regulating  production  in  harmony  with 
these  laws.  The  purpose  of  schematic  analysis  was  to  discover 
these  laws  and  the  circumstances  in  which  they  acted.  However, 
it  is  apparent  that  the  laws  discovered  by  schematic  analysis  as 
presented  above  were  very  similar  to  the  laws  of  market 
mechanics. 
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198 CHAPTER  SIX  -  SOKOL'NIKOV  AND  YUROVSKII 
6.1.1  -  INTRODUCTION 
This  chapter  will  examine  conceptions  of  the  market  within 
the  People's  Commissariat  of  Finance  in  the  1920s  by 
investigating  two  leading  members  of  this  institution:  G.  Ya. 
Sokol'nikov  and  L.  N.  Yurovskii.  Sokol'nikov  was  actually  the 
People's  Commissar  for  Finance  until  1926,  when  he  was  replaced. 
Yurovskii  was  a  leading  member  of  the  Commissariat  working 
particularly  on  monetary  questions. 
Grigoriy  Yakovlevich  Sokol'nikov  (1888-1939)  became  a 
Bolshevik  in  1905,  and  after  the  October  revolution  he  was  part 
of  the  Soviet  delegation  at  Brest-Litovsk.  During  the  civil  war 
he  served  in  the  military  command,  and  in  1922  he  was  appointed 
Commissar  of  Finance.  From  1924  to  1926  he  was  a  candidate  member 
of  the  Politburo,  and  in  1926  he  was  replaced  as  head  of 
Narkomfin.  In  1929  he  became  Soviet  ambassador  to  Britain  and 
deputy  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs.  In  1936  he  was  arrested  and 
a  year  later  sentenced  to  ten  years  imprisonment. 
L.  N.  Yurovskii  (1884-1938)  enrolled  at  the  St  Petersburg 
political  institute  in  1902,  and  after  this  he  studied  overseas 
at  Munich  university  and  at  Berlin  university.  Returning  to 
Russia  he  became  a  correspondent  in  Siberia  and  China,  and  in 
1913  he  submitted  as  his  dissertation  at  Kharkov  university  a 
monograph  entitled  Russian  Grain  Exports.  He  was  appointed  the 
first  rector  at  the  Saratov  Institute  of  National  Economy  in 
1918,  where  he  published  Ocherki  po  teorii  tseny  discussed  below, 
and  in  1921  he  returned  to  Moscow.  On  20  September  1922  he  was 
made  deputy  president  of  currency  management  in  Narkomfin,  and  in 
July  1923  he  was  appointed  to  head  the  currency  section.  He  was 
also  the  chairman  of  the  Moscow  Commodity  Exchange  in  the  mid- 
1920s.  He  was  later  accused  together  with  Chayanov  and  Kondrat'ev 
of  plotting  to  restore  capitalism,  and  was  arrested.  In  1934  he 
was  released,  only  to  be  rearrested  again  in  1937.  He  was 
executed  on  17  September  of  the  following  year. 
199 6.1.2  -  SOKOL'NIKOV  AND  MONETARY  REFORM 
The  monetary  reform  of  1924  was  a  major  element  of  the  New 
Economic  Policy.  In  a  book  entitled  Denezhnaya  reforma  of  1925 
Sokol'nikov  outlined  the  contents  of  the  various  stages  of  the 
monetary  reform.  He  states  that  the  first  group  of  measures  - 
action  on  monetary  circulation  -  included  the  following  features: 
maximal  limiting  of  the  budget  deficit  and  reduction  of  treasury 
emission;  reduction  in  purchase  of  foreign  currency  by  Gosbank 
and  reduction  of  credit  on  grain  for  export;  energetic  currency 
and  precious  metal  intervention  on  free  markets;  the 
establishment  of  a  stable  currency  (the  chervonets);  a 
categorical  prohibition  on  the  issue  of  monetary  surrogates.  ' 
The  second  group  of  measures  -  action  on  commodity-turnover  - 
included  the  following  elements:  grain  exports;  state  support  of 
grain  sales  in  consumer  regions;  the  organisation  of  ration 
intervention  on  goods  required  by  workers  for  nourishment,  eg 
meat,  sugar  etc;  increasing  imports  of  industrial  raw  materials; 
the  liquidation  of  the  commodity  ruble;  an  obligatory  reduction 
of  retail  prices  and  the  introduction  of  the  publication  of 
retail  prices. 
Sokol'nikov  continues  by  relating  how  a  reduction  of  grain 
prices  combined  with  a  reduction  in  the  price  of  foreign  currency 
allowed  a  renewal  of  exports.  The  reduction  in  the  price  of 
foreign  currency  led  also  to  imports  being  more  profitable,  and 
according  to  Sokol'nikov  this  chain  of  price  realignments  led  to 
the  stabilisation  of  Soviet  currency  in  relation  to  gold  and 
silver.  2  The  first  task  in  currency  policy  was  to  achieve  gold 
parity  -  equality  between  the  chervonets  and  the  dollar. 
In  this  work  Sokol'nikov  also  discussed  the  speed  of 
development  of  Soviet  industry.  In  so  far  as  light  industry  was 
concerned: 
The  degree  of  market  demand  directly  determines  the 
maximal  amount  of  production  of  light  industry,  and  if 
production  of  this  begins  to  lag  behind  market  demand, 
then  the  amount  of  lag  stands  in  dependence  on  the 
degree  of  guarantied  raw  materials  ... 
3 
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determined  by  the  scale  of  orders  (ie  demand)  from  light  industry 
and  peasant  farms,  from  transport,  and  from  the  state.  The  less 
is  the  growth  of  peasant  farms,  the  less  grows  not  only  light 
industry  but  also  heavy  industry,  and  thus  the  'chain'  nature  of 
Soviet  development  is  clearly  shown.  The  fast  tempo  of 
development  of  Russian  industry  until  the  war  was  only  possible 
because  of  the  success  of  foreign  loans.  If  this  policy  was 
attempted  now  it  would  tie  the  Soviet  republic  to  the  dictates  of 
Wall  Street.  Clearly  Sokol'nikov  is  not  advocating  this  path  in 
this  work. 
6.1.3  -  EXCHANGES 
In  a  slightly  later  work  entitled  Finansovaya  politika 
revolyutsii  of  1926  Sokol'nikov  discusses  the  question  of 
exchanges  in  the  Soviet  context.  Quite  often  the  question  of  the 
necessity  of  stock  exchanges  in  current  conditions  is  raised. 
Can't  there  be  turnover  without  exchanges,  through  the 
operational  hall  of  Gosbank?  Sokol'nikov  answers  in  the  negative. 
The  unified  location  for  the  currency  operations  of  Gosbank  and 
other  banks  could  only  be  a  stock  exchange. 
4  In  this  work 
Sokol'nikov  also  speaks  of  the  opening  of  new  stock  and  commodity 
exchanges  in  Moscow,  and  he  states  that  these  events  represent  a 
new  step  forward  on  the  path  to  creating  a  monetary  economy  with 
all  its  complexity  and  regulatory  elements. 
5  Several  years  ago 
the  first  commodity  exchanges  opened.  But  the  circulation  of 
goods  signifies  the  simultaneous  turnover  of  money,  and  thus  the 
opening  of  commodity  exchanges  pre-determined  the  opening  of 
stock  exchanges.  However,  according  to  Sokol'nikov  it  is  natural 
that  the  process  of  development  of  markets  took  this  order  of 
priority,  since  money  markets  required  more  stable  relations  than 
those  which  existed  in  1921. 
Sokol'nikov  states  that  the  organisation  of  stock  exchanges 
is  most  significant  as  a  form  of  organisation  of  currency 
markets.  Currency  markets  aid  the  development  of  foreign  trade, 
and  help  exports  to  be  realised  for  foreign  currency.  On  the 
other  hand  stock  exchanges  are  required  to  allow  the  use  of 
201 Soviet  currency  on  foreign  markets,  which  is  necessary  in  order 
to  import  goods  into  Russia.  Sokol'nikov  stresses  that  'stock 
exchanges  will  establish  relations  between  world  currencies  and 
the  Soviet  currency,  ie  are  regulators  of  the  internal  money 
market.  '6  The  American  dollar  and  the  pound  sterling  will  be  the 
major  currencies  which  will  figure  as  gold  money,  and  thus  the 
relation  between  Soviet  currency  and  these  currencies  will  be  the 
key  relationship  for  the  gold  value  of  Soviet  money. 
Another  function  of  exchanges  will  result  from  their  role  as 
markets  for  state  stock  and  loans.  Currently  bonds  in  gold  units 
exist,  and  in  the  near  future  state  grain  loans  will  be  issued.? 
The  process  of  issuing  shares  (aktsionirovaniya)  for  state 
industry  and  trading  enterprises  will  give  stock  exchanges  a 
further  role.  The  issue  of  such  bonds  and  shares  will  serve  for 
state  industry  and  trade  as  a  means  to  mobilise  and  attract 
money,  and  this  is  possible  only  with  the  existence  of  stock 
exchanges.  Sokol'nikov  relates  how  such  exchanges  differ  in 
capitalist  and  in  Soviet  conditions  as  follows.  In  the  capitalist 
system  exchanges  play  the  role  of  economic  regulators,  reflecting 
the  social  nature  of  production  and  distribution.  However,  since 
property  is  privately  owned,  the  social  element  is  subdued.  In 
the  Soviet  system,  however,  stock  exchanges  will  more  fully  serve 
a  function  as  a  social  organisation  institute,  and  state 
industry,  trade,  and  credit  will  come  to  dominate  this  mechanism 
by  economic,  not  administrative  influence.  To  master  the  stock 
exchanges  in  NEP  conditions  signifies  the  introduction  of  the 
planning  principle  into  the  economy. 
8 
In  the  third  volume  of  Finansovaya  politika  revolyutsii 
published  in  1928  Sokol'nikov  examines  prices  and  price  indices. 
He  notes  that  comparing  wholesale  prices  in  the  USSR  to  such 
prices  in  various  other  countries  reveals  that  the  relation  of 
these  prices  to  one  another  is  not  simple  and  of  a  continuous 
nature.  For  one  group  of  goods  wholesale  prices  in  the  USSR  are 
lower  than  other  countries,  and  for  other  goods  they  are  higher. 
For  example  prices  for  grain,  potatoes,  and  some  raw  materials  in 
England,  Germany,  and  France  were  significantly  higher  as 
compared  with  Soviet  prices  in  September  1926.  On  the  other  hand 
prices  for  metal  and  coal  were  lower  in  these  countries. 
9  The 
202 Conjuncture  Institute  of  Narkomfin  has  determined  the  average 
level  of  wholesale  prices  on  all  groups  of  goods  in  September 
1926  to  be  100  for  USSR,  79  for  England,  and  66  for  Germany  and 
France.  Thus  these  prices  are  on  average  higher  in  the  USSR.  10 
The  following  chart  shows  the  relation  between  prices  on 
cooperative  and  private  markets  in  the  USSR  in  1926,  and  was 
compiled  by  the  Conjuncture  Institute  of  Narkomfin: 
PRICES  ON  COOP  AND  PRIVATE  MARKETS 




Sokol'nikov  notes  that  this  shows  that  prices  on  private  markets 
were  consistently  higher  than  prices  on  cooperative  markets  at 
this  time,  in  general  by  around  thirty  percent. 
11  However,  he 
does  not  criticise  private  markets  because  of  this,  rather  he 
just  mentions  the  data  in  a  matter  of  fact  manner.  At  this  time 
(1926)  private  markets  were  still  openly  tolerated  by  the  Soviet 
government. 
6.1.4  -  PUBLIC  FINANCE 
Right  at  the  end  of  the  NEP  period  Sokol'nikov  wrote  a 
series  of  works  entitled  Finansovaya  nauka  published  in  1930, 
which  are  in  effect  a  course  on  finance  in  the  Soviet  context  for 
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®  coop  vat's  pri students  to  read  and  use.  They  even  have  mock  questions  at  the 
end  of  each  chapter  and  suggested  outline  answers.  These  works 
are  interesting  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  they  should  reveal  how 
Sokol'nikov  viewed  the  foundations  of  financial  science,  and 
secondly  as  they  are  written  at  a  time  of  great  change,  change 
which  Sokol'nikov  might  not  have  totally  welcomed,  they  might 
reveal  something  about  the  attitude  of  a  'pro-market'  economist 
to  Stalin's  left  turn. 
Issue  one  number  two  of  Finansovaya  nauka  begins  with  a 
discussion  of  the  role  of  finance  in  a  socialist  economy. 
Sokol'nikov  states  that  there  exists  a  widespread  opinion  that 
the  development  of  a  socialist  economy  signifies  the  gradual 
abolition  of  finance,  a  view  expressed  (for  example)  by  Professor 
M.  N.  Sobolev.  Sobolev  states  that: 
Financial  economy...  exists  in  series  with  numerous 
elements  of  private  economy,  and  can  exist  with  these 
elements  only..  .  the  establishment  of  a  socialist 
12  order...  removes  the  need  for  financial  economy... 
Sokol'nikov  questions  this  opinion.  He  notes  that  Sobolev 
conflates  a  socialist  with  a  communist  society,  and  further  does 
not  explain  why  the  destruction  of  financial  science  must 
accompany  socialism.  According  to  Sokol'nikov  experience  of 
socialist  construction  in  the  Soviet  context  shows  that  the 
problem  of  the  interconnection  of  a  monetary  with  a  socialist 
economy  is  resolved  less  primitively  than  was  first  thought  by 
several  War  Communist  economists.  In  fact,  financial  economy  in  a 
socialist  state  is  immeasurably  wider  and  more  complex  than  the 
financial  economy  of  the  bourgeois  state.  The  proletarian  state 
has  great  responsibility  for  the  correct  organisation  of  tax  and 
credit,  as  well  as  of  profit  from  the  point  of  view  of 
rationality.  13 
Sokol'nikov  stresses  the  importance  of  distinguishing 
between  three  different  types  of  problems  of  managing  a  unified 
socialised  economy:  technical,  economic,  and  financial.  According 
to  Sokol'nikov  it  is  particularly  incorrect  to  drown  financial 
problems  in  economic  ones.  He  defines  financial  science,  as 
opposed  to  economic,  as  a  science: 
204 ...  concerned  with  the  general  basis  of  the  most 
profitable,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  proletariat, 
construction  and  development  of  the  economy  and  of 
management  in  a  socialist  state.  The  most  profitable 
is  such  which  introduces  socialist  management  with  the 
minimum  cost  at  the  faster  rate  obtainin  the  maximal 
resources  for  socialist  construction.. 
In  terms  of  its  political  context,  Sokol'nikov  argues  that  the 
form  of  financial  organisation  is  never  detached  from  the  state 
organisation  and  from  the  economic  relations  which  coordinate  the 
state.  For  example  the  economics  of  medieval  society  determined 
the  political  way  of  life  (the  feudal  state)  and  the  financial 
structure  then  prevalent.  The  development  of  bourgeois  relations 
liquidated  the  feudal  monarch  and  promoted  a  planned  tax  system 
as  the  basic  source  of  income  for  the  capitalist  state.  15 
Sokol'nikov  continues  by  asking  the  question:  what  is  the 
difference  between  the  Soviet  state  budget  and  the  state  budget 
of  other  countries?  Sokol'nikov  defines  a  budget  as  a  financial 
plan  for  a  definite  period  which  gives  the  sources  and  amounts  of 
income  which  can  be  distributed  by  the  state  in  accordance  with 
outlays  which  are  feasible  in  this  period.  A  major  task  of  the 
budget  is  to  maintain  budget  equilibrium  -  the  general  sum  of 
income  must  be  coordinated  with  the  general  sum  of  outlay.  16  In 
the  Soviet  system  the  budget  is  the  financial  plan  for 
strengthening  the  socialist  state  and  for  redistributing  national 
income.  Sokol'nikov  then  relates  how  the  union  budget  is  analysed 
by  various  governmental  departments.  The  budget  is  reviewed  by 
the  Soviet  of  People's  Commissars  through  Gosplan,  where  it  is 
analysed  from  the  point  of  view  of  coordination  with  economic 
plans,  and  is  approved  by  this  organ.  The  budget  is  further 
reviewed  by  the  Budget  Commission  of  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  (TsIK).  17  The  budget  is  executed  through  Narkomfin  and 
other  organs,  and  it  is  Narkomfin  which  collects  incomes  and 
taxes.  In  reality  the  budget  fund  of  Narkomfin  merges  with  the 
funds  of  the  state  bank,  and  a  great  portion  of  budget  work  falls 
on  Gosbank.  However,  responsibility  for  fulfilment  of  the  budget 
falls  on  Narkomfin  in  that  it  has  control  over  the  direction  of 
funds  flowing  from  budgetary  sources. 
'8 
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notes  that  there  are  two  methods.  In  France  unbalanced  aspects  of 
the  budget  are  presented  to  parliament.  The  Minister  of  Finance 
presents  the  material,  and  the  chamber  of  deputies  produces  a 
balanced  budget  either  by  reducing  outlay  or  by  establishing 
additional  sources  of  income.  However,  Sokol'nikov  notes  that  the 
budget  can  also  be  balanced  if  income  is  obtained  from  credit. 
But  in  effect  this  means  that  the  deficit  has  simply  to  be  found 
at  some  future  date,  and  thus  this  is  not  really  a  method  of 
balancing  the  budget.  It  is  established  practice  in  the  USSR  that 
the  Commissar  of  Finance  cannot  present  to  Sovnarkom  an 
unbalanced  budget.  Thus  Narkomfin  has  the  right  to  reduce  local 
financial  estimates  as  required.  However,  Sokol'nikov  stresses 
that  there  is  protracted  struggle  over  the  precise  content  of  the 
budget  both  in  Sovnarkom  and  in  TsIK.  For  example  in  1927/8  a 
budget  which  was  established  in  Sovnarkom  was  in  the  final 
account  increased  by  400  million  rubles.  19 
Sokol'nikov  goes  on  to  discuss  how  budgets  are  constructed 
for  a  future  time  period.  How  are  degrees  of  increase  or  decrease 
decided?  There  are  various  systems.  In  one  system  the  income  of 
the  coming  year  is  set  at  the  level  achieved  for  the  previous 
year.  In  another  system  statistical  investigations  establish  the 
amount  of  increase/decrease  in  the  course  of  a  series  of  previous 
years  and  projects  a  value  for  the  coming  year.  In  a  third  system 
economic  and  financial  prognoses  are  used.  In  Soviet  conditions 
it  is  necessary  to  analyse  perspectives  for  economic  growth  in 
the  current  period,  and  use  this  as  a  basis.  20 
Sokol'nikov  notes  that  while  after  the  transition  to  NEP 
budgetary  affairs  underwent  a  fundamental  restructuring,  still 
after  three  years  of  NEP  the  budget  retained  a  mixed  character: 
it  was  still  partially  a  monetary  budget  and  partially  a  natural 
one,  although  the  monetary  side  was  growing  at  the  expense  of  the 
natural.  It  was  not  until  1924  that  the  natural  tax  system  was 
fully  liquidated,  coincident  with  the  monetary  reforms.  For 
example  in  the  1922/3  budget  all  dealings  in  state  resources  were 
conducted  in  money,  but  in  order  to  do  this  receipts  from  the 
natural  tax  were  converted  to  a  monetary  equivalent.  In 
Narkomprod  grain  and  other  products  were  still  distributed  in 
206 natura  at  this  time,  and  these  dealings  had  to  be  converted  to 
money  through  a  system  of  account.  Another  complication  in  the 
budget  of  the  first  years  of  NEP  was  that  although  it  was 
expressed  in  gold  rubles,  the  actual  monetary  income  received  by 
the  state  was  mainly  in  depreciating  paper  currency.  Thus  a 
complicated  system  of  relating  gold  rubles  to  paper  had  to  be 
created  which  was  constantly  changing  in  order  to  keep  up  with 
the  depreciation  of  paper  currency.  21  Sokol'nikov  describes  this 
system  as  a  'set  of  crutches  on  which  the  state  budget  hobbled'. 
The  following  data  given  by  Sokol'nikov  shows  the  growth  of 
the  state  budget  during  the  NEP  period.  According  to  Sokol'nikov 
by  1929/30  the  budget  had  no  natural  element,  and  no  income  came 
from  paper  money  emission: 
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Sokol'nikov  continues  by  discussing  the  republican  structure 
of  the  state  budget.  Local  budgets  are  not  included  in  the  state 
budget,  but  the  single  state  budget  is  divided  into  the  union 
budget  and  the  republican  budgets.  In  the  USSR  at  the  present 
time  there  are  six  republics:  the  RSFSR,  Byelorussia,  the 
Ukraine,  the  Caucasus,  Uzbekistan,  and  Turkmenistan.  In  December 
1929  Tadzhikistan  was  made  an  autonomous  SSR  within  Uzbekistan. 
207 Sokol'nikov  states  that  although  republics  do  not  have  the  right 
to  set  the  total  level  of  their  budget,  rather  this  is  set  by  the 
union  TsIK,  they  do  have  the  right  to  allocate  the  given  total  in 
the  manner  which  they  see  fit,  ie  to  which  republican 
departments,  sections,  and  divisions  they  desire.  23  Sokol'nikov 
further  distinguishes  between  the  right  to  collect  taxes  and  the 
right  to  receive  them.  Although  the  union  republics  receive  99% 
of  all  agricultural  and  income  taxes,  and  the  union  the  remaining 
1%,  these  taxes  still  remain  union  taxes.  This  means  that  the 
right  to  modify  or  abolish  these  taxes  lies  with  the  union  and 
not  the  republics. 
24 
In  a  later  number  of  Finansovaya  nauka  (no.  3)  Sokol'nikov 
begins  by  discussing  the  general  theory  of  taxation.  He  says  that 
the  study  of  taxes  in  the  Soviet  context  must  begin  with  the 
programme  of  the  RKP(B)  adopted  at  the  Eighth  Congress  in  1919, 
which  states  that  tax  policy  must  be  directed  towards  the 
exploitation  of  the  remnants  of  capitalist  ownership. 
25  The  tax 
system  in  the  USSR  plays  an  important  role  as  a  tool  for 
redistribution  of  national  income,  as  a  regulator  of  the 
accumulation  of  various  classes,  and  assists  in  transferring 
resources  from  the  non-socialist  to  the  socialist  sector  of  the 
economy.  As  it  assists  in  the  development  of  a  socialist  society 
the  tax  system  dialectically  prepares  its  own  abolition,  but  at 
the  present  time  the  abolition  of  tax  would  only  benefit  classes 
hostile  to  the  proletariat. 
Sokol'nikov  then  turns  his  attention  to  the  question  of  the 
basic  theoretical  conception  of  taxation,  and  acknowledges  that 
there  exists  several  understandings  of  it.  Characteristic  of  the 
petty-bourgeois  conception  is  the  idea  taken  from  Rousseau  that 
taxes  involve  a  'social  contract'  (sotsial'nyi  dogovor).  This 
theory  states  that  society  is  the  result  of  a  contract  relation 
between  its  members  and  the  state,  and  in  the  Russian  context 
Sokol'nikov  notes  that  this  notion  was  developed  by  'one  of  the 
few  Russian  financial  theoreticians'  Nikolai  Turgenev  at  the 
beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Turgenev  speaks  of  taxation 
growing  out  of  the  need  for  private  contributions  to  tasks  best 
accomplished  collectively,  and  Sokol'nikov  criticises  this 
approach  because  study  of  the  actual  historical  development  of 
208 taxation  is  neglected. 
26  The  most  characteristic  feature  of  this 
approach  is  the  idea  of  voluntary  contributions,  which  in  the 
interests  of  all  are  used  to  develop  community  facilities. 
Another  theory  of  taxes  from  the  nineteenth  century  views 
them  as  follows.  Civilians,  giving  the  state  a  definite  sum, 
receive  for  this  payment  equivalent  services  from  the  state. 
Sokol'nikov  claims  that  this  conception  reflects  the  relations 
which  exist  on  commodity  markets  and  is  thus  a  reflection  of 
bourgeois  society.  Another  theory  which  flowered  at  the  end  of 
the  nineteenth  century  views  taxes  as  an  investment  of  capital  in 
a  profitable  enterprise.  27  However,  Sokol'nikov  dismisses  all 
these  theories  as  inadequate.  The  correct  approach  to  taxation  in 
the  Soviet  Union  is  to  view  taxes  as  a  means  of  redistributing 
national  income  in  accordance  with  the  class  tasks  of  the 
proletarian  state.  Sokol'nikov  stresses  that  by  this  he  does  not 
mean  redistribution  between  individuals,  but  between  sectors  of 
the  national  economy  and  branches  of  the  state  economy. 
He  then  goes  on  to  discuss  the  classification  of  taxes. 
First  of  all  he  distinguishes  between  direct  and  indirect  taxes. 
Indirect  taxes  are  paid  mainly  on  the  act  of  consumption,  are 
paid  as  part  of  the  price  of  a  good.  Direct  taxes  are  demanded 
straight  from  the  financial  apparatus  and  in  the  case  of  workers 
are  paid  from  wages.  Several  authors  divide  taxes  along  the 
following  lines:  tax  on  production,  circulation,  and 
consumption. 
28  However,  Sokol'nikov  argues  that  it  is  difficult 
in  practice  to  distinguish  between  taxes  which  fall  on  production 
and  those  which  do  not.  He  prefers  to  distinguish  between  taxes 
which  fall  on  accumulated  values  or  on  current  income  -  speaking 
in  capitalist  categories  either  on  capital,  on  surplus-value,  or 
on  wages.  Another  division  often  used  in  public  finance  is  to 
divide  taxes  into  real  and  personal.  A  personal  tax  is  levied  on 
the  general  total  income  of  a  person  irrespective  of  what  the 
source  of  this  income  was.  A  real  tax  falls  on  various  income 
sources,  and  is  not  connected  with  an  individual  person.  Personal 
taxes  can  take  into  account  circumstance,  which  is  ignored  by 
real  taxes,  and  thus  there  is  a  welfare  minimum  below  which  such 
taxes  are  waived. 
29  In  the  USSR  this  minimum  is  set  at  1200 
rubles  per  year  for  a  worker's  income  (1000  rubles  in  the 
209 localities).  Taxes  can  be  further  divided  into  routine  and 
exceptional.  Exceptional  taxes  are  levied  in  times  of  war  and 
famine,  and  in  the  USSR  a  famine  tax  was  levied  in  1922. 
Sokol'nikov  then  continues  by  discussing  the  difference 
between  the  payer  and  the  bearer  of  a  tax.  The  payer  is  the 
person  who  directly  pays  the  tax,  the  bearer  is  the  person  who  in 
the  final  account  the  tax  falls  on.  For  example,  suppose  that  the 
promtax  is  increased.  Traders  are  compelled  to  pay  higher  taxes 
and  thus  their  profit  margins  are  squeezed.  In  order  to 
counteract  this  the  trader  increases  the  prices  of  his  goods,  ie 
passes  the  tax  on  to  the  consumer.  If  this  consumer  is  a  worker 
then  the  response  might  be  increased  wages.  Since  wages  are  an 
element  in  the  cost  of  production  of  a  good,  this  increase  in 
wages  might  further  increase  the  price  of  the  good  or  prevent  it 
from  being  produced.  If  the  former  then  traders  have  to  ask  even 
more  for  the  good,  and  the  spiral  continues.  Thus  the  payer  of 
the  tax  does  not  necessarily  coincide  with  the  bearer.  30 
Sokol'nikov  notes  that  this  spiral  is  in  fact  a  class 
struggle  to  determine  who  in  the  end  will  pay  for  the  increased 
tax.  Thus  the  question  of  taxation  is  closely  linked  with  the 
question  of  the  redistribution  of  national  income  between  social 
groups.  Another  example  of  how  taxation  can  influence  price  is  as 
follows.  Suppose  the  current  price  of  a  piece  of  land  is  100,000 
rubles  and  the  income  received  from  this  plot  of  land  is  15,000 
rubles.  If  a  land  tax  is  introduced  at  5,000  rubles  then  the 
income  will  fall  to  10,000.  If  the  owner  attempts  to  sell  this 
plot  of  land  after  the  land  tax  has  been  introduced,  a 
prospective  purchaser  will  not  pay  100,000  rubles  for  the  land 
and  receive  10%  income  if  this  100,000  rubles  invested  in  another 
economic  branch  can  earn  15%.  Thus  the  price  will  fall  to  65,000 
rubles,  and  the  introduction  of  a  land  tax  has  resulted  in  a 
general  fall  in  land  prices.  Sokol'nikov  notes  that  historically 
bourgeois  classes  were  constantly  struggling  with  landowning 
classes  over  the  distribution  of  the  tax  burden.  31 
Sokol'nikov  claims  that  the  tax  system  of  pre-war  Russia 
gave  huge  privileges  to  the  upper  classes.  The  prevailing  type  of 
tax  was  indirect  in  nature  and  was  levied  on  sugar,  spirits, 
beer,  tobacco,  and  oil  products.  Pure  income  from  vodka  sales  was 
210 575  million  rubles  in  1909.  There  were  also  taxes  on  land  and  on 
real  estate,  an  industrial  tax,  and  a  tax  on  income  from  capital. 
The  data  which  Sokol'nikov  gives  on  the  relation  between  direct 
and  indirect  taxes  can  be  presented  as  follows:  32 
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This  reveals  that  although  the  coming  of  the  Soviet  regime 
brought  significant  changes  to  the  relation  between  direct  and 
indirect  taxes,  as  time  passed  the  Soviet  government  was  slowly 
moving  back  towards  pre-war  norms.  Sokol'nikov  states  that  in 
future  years  tax  policy  will  be  directed  towards  increasing  the 
role  of  direct  taxation.  In  the  budget  for  1929/30  direct  taxes 
accounted  for  45%  and  indirect  taxes  51%  of  the  total. 
In  the  current  USSR  budget  the  single  agricultural  tax,  the 
promtax,  income  tax,  tax  on  superprofits,  inheritance  tax,  and 
the  basic  tax  on  cotton  are  forms  of  direct  taxation.  The  basis 
of  the  single  agricultural  tax  is  a  direct  tax  on  income  received 
from  land.  Sokol'nikov  notes  that  the  development  of  this  tax 
eloquently  shows  the  gradual  transition  from  natural  taxation  to 
monetary,  and  he  stresses  that  to  confuse  this  tax  with  the  pre- 
war  land  tax  would  be  mistaken.  33  He  also  stresses  the  difference 
as  compared  to  prodrazverstka;  the  system  which  replaced  forced 
211 
f  dlraot  f  indirsot  f  atom. requisitioning  specified  a  definite  tax  obligation  on  the  peasant 
farm,  and  after  this  obligation  was  met  the  peasant  was  free  to 
dispose  of  his  produce  as  he  saw  fit.  According  to  TsSU  the  value 
of  goods  confiscated  from  peasant  farms  in  1920/1  was  632  million 
rubles,  whereas  in  1921/2  the  amount  taxed  was  386  million 
rubles,  ie  a  reduction  to  65%  of  the  1920/1  figure.  The  single 
agricultural  tax  was  actually  introduced  on  10  May  1923,  and  it 
divided  the  country  into  two  basic  regions:  a  consumer  region  and 
a  producer  region.  In  the  producer  region,  where  a  surplus  of 
grain  was  produced,  the  peasantry  were  given  the  option  to  pay 
either  in  money  or  in  kind.  Criteria  for  determining  the  amount 
of  tax  to  be  paid  were:  quantity  of  arable  land,  number  of  mouths 
to  feed,  quantity  of  working  livestock,  and  crop  capacity.  A 
table  was  produced  in  which  farms  with  differing  amounts  of 
arable  land  were  divided  into  nine  groups,  farms  with  varying 
livestock  four  groups,  and  farms  with  different  crop  capacity 
eleven  groups:  in  total  there  were  396  categories.  However,  it 
was  not  until  30  April  1924  that  natural  taxation  was  fully 
liquidated.  Under  the  new  monetary  system  livestock  was 
transformed  into  arable  land  by  means  of  a  conversion  system  for 
the  purposes  of  determining  the  level  of  taxation.  34 
Sokol'nikov  relates  that  a  fundamental  restructuring  of 
agricultural  taxation  occurred  in  1926/7,  when  for  the  first  time 
non-land  workers  and  the  production  income  of  peasant  farms  were 
included  in  tax  criteria.  Activities  such  as  vineyard 
cultivation,  bee-keeping,  income  from  small  stock-breeding,  and 
anything  of  industrial  character  were  made  subject  to  tax. 
However,  Sokol'nikov  notes  that  the  agricultural  tax  is  still  not 
a  tax  which  fully  conforms  to  the  norms  of  income  taxation. 
Income  tax  is  levied  on  the  amount  of  actually  received  income, 
not  an  estimation  of  this  income  calculated  from  indirect 
criteria  such  as  amount  of  arable  land  and  livestock.  But  in 
practice  to  calculate  the  actual  income  of  27  million  peasant 
dvors  is  not  possible,  therefore  the  present  system  remains. 
35 
Sokol'nikov  then  goes  on  to  discuss  income  tax  per  se.  In 
general  the  income  tax  is  an  urban  tax  which  is  levied  on  all 
income  except  income  for  agriculture,  and  it  is  a  personal  tax 
which  falls  not  on  gross  income  from  various  sources,  but  on  the 
212 total  pure  income  of  an  individual.  Income  tax  in  not  levied  on 
those  receiving  a  wage  below  a  certain  minimum,  is  progressive  in 
nature,  and  contains  family  advantages. 
36  Sokol'nikov  relates 
that  in  Western  Europe  classification  is  usually  made  into  three 
differing  systems  of  income  tax:  the  English  system,  the  German 
system  which  is  totally  different  from  the  English,  and  the 
French  system  which  is  a  compromise  between  the  two.  However, 
Sokol'nikov  prefers  to  use  only  two  categories:  the  German  type, 
which  is  the  most  developed  application  of  the  principle  of 
progressive  personal  income  taxation,  and  other  compromise  types 
(the  English  and  French  systems)  in  which  elements  of  real 
taxation  which  historically  were  prevalent  still  remain  and 
dilute  the  progressive  personal  element. 
In  the  English  case,  for  example,  a  vestige  of  the  system  of 
real  direct  taxation  remains  in  the  schedule  system.  Schedule  A 
relates  to  income  from  land  and  real  estate,  schedule  B  to 
agriculture,  schedule  C  to  capital,  schedule  D  to  trade  and 
industrial  activity,  and  schedule  E  to  wages.  As  the  English 
schedule  system  unites  five  different  taxes  it  is  thus  a 
compromise. 
37  The  basic  deficiency  of  the  schedule  system, 
according  to  Sokol'nikov,  is  that  it  prevents  the  full 
implementation  of  the  progressive  idea.  Sokol'nikov  continues  by 
describing  how  a  purer  type  of  income  tax  system  exists  in 
Germany.  In  Germany  if  an  individual  has  a  house,  some  land,  owns 
a  factory,  and  receives  income  from  state  bonds,  he  is  not  taxed 
under  various  schedules,  as  in  England,  rather  tax  is  levied  on 
the  total  sum  of  income  according  to  the  principle  of  progressive 
rating. 
38 
In  the  USSR  income  tax  was  restored  in  1922.  It  approximated 
to  the  German  type,  but  it  did  not  yield  large  amounts  in  tax 
because  of  a  lack  of  correct  and  reliable  forms  of  financial 
accounting  and  because  of  the  depreciating  currency.  In  1923  the 
law  on  income  tax  was  altered  and  this  tax  was  divided  into  two 
components,  a  basic  rate  element  with  four  categories  according 
to  zone  of  locality,  and  a  progressive  rate  element  levied  on 
income  from  300  to  500  rubles  per  year.  Thus  until  1926  income 
tax  in  the  USSR  was  composed  of  two  elements,  but  in  1926  the 
basic  rate  element  was  abolished  and  three  bands  of  progressive 
213 taxation  were  established,  according  to  Sokol'nikov,  'on  the 
basis  of  class  principles'. 
39  In  band  one  were  workers  whose  tax 
burden  progressed  from  0.7%  to  30%,  in  band  two  were  artisans, 
handicrafts,  and  persons  of  free  profession,  whose  burden 
progressed  from  2.5%  to  35%,  and  in  band  three  was  unearned 
income,  the  taxation  of  which  ranged  from  3%  to  45%.  The  minimum 
wage  below  which  taxation  was  waived  was  1200  rubles  per  year  for 
Moscow  workers,  and  this  amount  was  lower  for  other  classes.  40 
Sokol'nikov  continues  by  stating  that  the  significance  of 
income  tax  in  the  state  budget  has  declined  in  recent  years.  This 
reflects  the  decline  in  activity  of  private  capital  in  the  USSR 
in  this  period,  and  is  compensated  by  a  significant  increase  in 
revenue  from  enterprises  in  the  socialised  sector.  41  In  addition 
to  income  tax  on  private  capital  there  was  introduced  on  18  July 
1926  a  tax  on  super-profits.  Turning  to  business  taxation, 
Sokol'nikov  notes  that  the  roots  of  the  business  tax  lie  in  the 
guild  system,  where  employment  is  regulated  through  membership  of 
guilds.  Members  of  guild  organisations  paid  a  fee  in  order  to 
trade,  and  this  fee  was  the  first  form  of  business  tax.  42  With 
the  development  of  bourgeois  relations  this  fee  became  a 
licence/patent  paid  to  the  state.  The  business  tax  in  the  USSR 
however  is  a  tax  on  (gross)  turnover. 
Moving  on  to  the  credit  system,  Sokol'nikov  first  notes  that 
the  USSR  is  in  a  transitional  stage,  and  thus  the  Soviet  economy 
is  not  a  complete  socialist  economy.  Since  commodities  still 
circulate  on  markets,  money,  as  an  expression  of  commodities, 
will  also  circulate.  A  credit  system  can  exist  in  an  economy  only 
in  so  far  as  money  having  a  commodity  character  is  preserved. 
Therefore  the  existence  and  development  of  credit  relations  in 
the  USSR  is  closely  connected  with  the  character  of  the  money 
system.  Sokol'nikov  asks:  what  is  the  role  of  the  credit  system 
in  a  capitalist  society?  The  banks  concentrate  in  their  hands  the 
money  capital  of  bourgeois  society,  and  socialise  free  capital 
within  the  limits  of  the  bourgeois  class.  Thus  credit  in 
capitalist  society  spontaneously  breaks  the  framework  created  by 
private  ownership,  as  the  walls  which  divide  the  capital  of  one 
from  the  capital  of  another  are  broken.  43  The  development  of  the 
214 banking  system  in  bourgeois  society  means  that  great  power  is 
concentrated  into  the  hands  of  the  banks. 
In  a  socialist  system,  according  to  Sokol'nikov,  this 
process  of  socialisation  which  has  dialectically  developed  within 
capitalist  society  receives  its  full  expression.  The  role  of 
banks  as  accounting  centres  increases,  as  does  the  socialised 
nature  of  accounting  operations.  It  is  impossible  to  say  that  the 
current  Soviet  banking  system  fulfils  completely  the  function  of 
social  book-keeping,  since  elements  of  private  economy  remain. 
Suppose  that  a  Soviet  trust  places  500,000  rubles  in  wages  in  the 
state  bank.  If  the  USSR  had  a  fully  socialised  economy,  then  the 
trust  would  pay  this  money  to  workers  as  wages,  and  the  workers 
would  spend  their  wages  in  cooperative  shops.  These  shops  would 
in  turn  pay  their  suppliers  -  Soviet  trusts  -  for  the  products 
they  receive.  The  trusts  would  return  the  money  to  the  state 
bank,  and  the  process  would  continue. 
44  However,  in  fact  trusts 
pay  wages  to  workers,  who  spend  their  money  partly  at  cooperative 
shops  and  partly  on  the  free  market.  From  the  free  market  money 
can  accumulate  in  the  private  sector,  and  thus  non-socialised 
forms  of  credit  can  exist.  Sokol'nikov  notes  that: 
In  the  private  sector  money  circulates  not  as  a 
certificate  expended  on  socially-necessary  labour  or 
as  a  receipt  for  a  definite  portion  of  national 
income,  but  functions  as  the  universal  commodity  - 
money. 
Thus  the  current  Soviet  credit  system  has  a  dual  and  transitional 
nature. 
Sokol'nikov  states  that  in  capitalist  society  amortization 
means  are  given  by  banks  to  the  branches  of  the  economy  which  are 
most  profitable.  In  a  socialist  system,  however,  banks  give  funds 
for  amortization  to  those  enterprises  which  are  deemed  to  require 
re-equiping  by  the  economic  plan.  Although  the  capitalist  banking 
system  allows  some  degree  of  socialisation  of  credit,  profit  is 
still  the  driving  criteria  that  determines  which  enterprises 
receive  credit.  Thus  while  the  current  Soviet  banking  system  is 
externally  analogous  to  the  capitalist  system,  the  key  difference 
is  that  credit  is  given  not  for  profit,  but  to  fulfil  the 
economic  plan.  46  Because  of  this  fact  amortization  means  can  be 
215 directed  towards  new  capital  construction  instead  of  restoring 
equipment  in  old  factories. 
A  technical  difference  between  capitalist  and  Soviet  credit 
forms  is  the  following.  Enterprises  in  capitalist  economies  can 
receive  supplementary  funds  for  capital  outlay  by  direct  appeal 
to  the  money  and  stock  markets  through  the  issue  of  loans  or 
equities.  Enterprises  in  the  USSR  are  not  allowed  independent  and 
direct  appeal  to  money  markets,  rather  they  receive  such 
supplementary  means  indirectly  through  the  state.  The  state 
issues  bonds  to  the  general  population,  and  the  receipts  from 
such  bonds  can  be  directed  to  fund  capital  growth.  47 
Moving  on  to  a  more  detailed  view  of  the  credit  system, 
Sokol'nikov  outlines  that  the  state  bank  has  two  main  functions: 
an  emission  bank,  and  a  bank  of  banks,  ie  a  regulating  centre. 
But  it  also  serves  as  the  credit  centre  for  the  national  economy, 
being  the  largest  bank  to  offer  short-term  commercial  credit. 
Three  other  banks  specialise  in  long-term  credit:  the  Industrial 
Bank  for  Long-term  Credit,  the  Central  Agricultural  Bank,  and  the 
Central  Bank  for  Communal  Credit.  48  Active  bank  operations  in  the 
first  years  of  NEP  proceeded  according  to  the  form  adopted  from 
the  practice  of  the  pre-war  credit  institutions  of  Russia,  but 
the  growth  of  the  planning  principle  modified  this  method. 
The  budget  is  the  next  topic  discussed  by  Sokol'nikov.  The 
state  budget  is  in  fact  a  financial  plan  for  state  economy.  In  a 
capitalist  system  the  state  budget  is  concerned  only  with 
economic  enterprises  in  a  definite  branch,  and  is  not  concerned 
with  the  overall  relations  between  these  enterprises.  In  the 
Soviet  system,  however,  things  are  different.  Relations  between 
enterprises  -  in  industry,  agriculture,  transport,  banking  etc  - 
are  included  in  the  state  budget  according  to  the  principles  of 
planned  economy.  The  budget  in  the  USSR  is  thus  one  of  the 
elements  of  planned  economy,  one  plan  among  many. 
49  After  the 
budget  the  financial  plan  for  industry  is  an  important  element  of 
the  planning  system.  It  outlines  the  degree  of  production, 
realisation  prices,  movement  of  workers  and  wages,  changes  in 
costs  of  production,  profit  rates,  and  capital  construction 
etc. 
50  Thus  Sokol'nikov  outlines  the  basic  elements  of  financial 
science. 
216 From  the  above  presentation  it  is  possible  to  see  a  change 
in  Sokol'nikov's  attitude  between  his  works  from  the  mid-1920s  to 
the  ones  written  in  1930.  In  the  latter  category  Sokol'nikov 
stresses  the  class  nature  of  financial  policy  to  a  greater  degree 
and  is  more  aggressive  towards  elements  of  private  economy.  He 
also  seems  to  regard  the  budget  as  one  among  many  economic  plans. 
It  is  difficult  to  say  whether  this  change  was  really  a 
reflection  of  what  Sokol'nikov  felt,  or  whether  he  was  forced 
into  following  the  general  line  through  fear.  It  may  also  be 
possible  that  Sokol'nikov  thought  that  the  line  might  return  to 
what  it  was  in  the  mid-1920s,  and  thus  the  swing  away  from  a  pro- 
market  position  might  be  reversed.  In  this  case  he  could  have 
followed  the  general  line  only  to  remain  in  place  when  the  line 
again  changed. 
6.2.1  -  YUROVSKII  AND  PRICE  THEORY 
In  1919  Yurovskii  published  a  work  entitled  Ocherki  po 
teorii  tseny  in  which  he  analyses  in  some  detail  various 
classical  and  neo-classical  economic  doctrines  in  relation  to 
questions  such  as  price  determination  and  interest  rates.  Some  of 
the  economists  which  he  uses  are:  Tugan-Baranovskii,  Dmitriev, 
Pareto,  Jevons,  Walras,  Marshall,  Fisher,  Gossen,  Schumpeter, 
Bohm-Bawerk,  Clark,  Ricardo,  Cournot,  Smith,  Struve,  Cassel,  and 
Thunen.  However,  it  is  striking  that,  apart  from  one  mention  in  a 
footnote  of  little  significance,  Marx  is  nowhere  to  be  found. 
Even  more  significant  is  the  overall  tone  of  the  writing.  There 
are  none  of  the  usual  Marxist  criticisms  of  neo-classical 
doctrine  that  can  be  found  in  Bukharin's  Politicheskaya  ekonomiya 
rant'e  of  1914,  and  contrast  with  this  work  is  very  illuminating. 
Overall  it  is  clear  that  Yurovskii  took  recent  developments  in 
economic  theory  very  seriously,  and  was  not  particularly 
concerned  to  defend  Marxist  economics  against  such  developments. 
It  seems  unlikely  that  he  would  have  regarded  himself  as  a 
Marxist  at  this  time. 
In  this  work  there  is  quite  a  detailed  discussion  of 
marginal  utility  doctrine.  Yurovskii  notes  that  marginal  utility 
is  actually  based  on  psychological  postulates,  according  to 
217 Dmitriev  four  postulates,  the  first  two  of  which  are:  1)  with  an 
increasing  supply  of  a  good  at  the  disposal  of  a  subject,  the 
marginal  utility  of  each  subsequent  example  of  the  good  available 
decreases;  2)  it  is  always  possible  to  increase  the  quantity  of  a 
product  available  to  such  an  extent  that  its  marginal  utility 
becomes  zero.  51  Yurovskii  notes  that  for  Pareto  it  is  not 
necessary  to  have  an  exact  measure  of  satisfaction,  it  is 
sufficient  only  to  have  an  index  of  satisfaction.  52  Yurovskii  is 
somewhat  sceptical  of  this  approach,  as  he  states  that  these 
propositions  seem  like  platitudes  which  are  known  by  everyone. 
Conclusions  are  required  which  go  beyond  simple  statements  of  the 
obvious. 
Yurovskii  gives  an  interesting  presentation  of  the  equations 
developed  by  Wal  ras  in  his  Elements  of  Pure  Economics  of  1874  to 
model  supply  and  demand  equilibrium.  They  are  based  on  the  idea 
that  prices  are  functionally  related  to  the  quantity  of  goods 
available.  According  to  Yurovskii  when  current  economic  theory 
says  that  demand  or  supply  is  a  function  of  price,  or  that  price 
is  a  function  of  demand  or  supply,  this  can  be  expressed  as 
follows: 
Da  =  Fa(P)  or  Oa  =  Fla(P) 
Equilibrium  exists  between  supply  and  demand  when  Da  =  Oa,  and 
then  the  following  equality  is  obtained: 
(P)  Fa(P)  =  Fla 
Geometrically  this  can  be  represented  as  two  curves,  the  point  of 
intersection  being  the  equilibrium  price.  Walras  shows  that 
supply  and  demand  in  connection  with  the  prices  of  all  economic 
goods  can  be  expressed  as  a  system  of  equations,  the  number  of 
which  equals  the  number  of  unknowns,  thus  allowing  solutions  to 
be  found.  In  such  a  system  the  demand  for  each  good  is  a  function 
not  only  of  its  price,  but  the  price  of  all  goods.  For  the  goods 
A,  B,  C,...  with  prices  pay  Pb,  Pc,  --- 
the  following  equations 
are  formed:  53 
Da  =  Fd,  a  (Pa.  Pb,  PC,...  ) 
Db  =  Fd,  b  (Pb,  Pa,  Pc....  ) 
Dc  =  Fd,  c  (Pc,  Pa.  Pb,...  ) 
218 Oa  =  FO,  a  (Pa.  Pb,  PC,...  ) 
Ob  =  Fo,  b  (Pb.  Pa,  Pc,...  ) 
Oc  =  FO,  c  (PC,  Pa.  Pb....  ) 
Under  conditions  of  equilibrium  between  supply  and  demand: 
Fd,  a  (Pa.  Pb,  Pc,...  )  =  F0,  a  (Pa,  Pb,  Pc,...  ) 
Fd,  b  (Pb,  Pa,  PC,...  )  =  FO,  b  (Pb,  Pa,  Pc,...  ) 
Fd,  c  (Pc,  Pa,  Pb,...  )  =  Fo,  c  (Pc,  Pa,  Pb,...  ) 
Yurovskii  notes  that  in  this  form  the  contemporary  theory  of 
price  expresses  the  relational  dependence  between  prices  and 
other  economic  quantities,  and  does  not  attempt  to  find  a  single 
source  which  determines  price  but  is  independent  from  it.  54 
Yurovskii  outlines  some  problems  with  the  Walrasian  approach 
as  follows.  It  is  essential  to  the  above  set  of  equations  that 
the  price  of  any  one  good  is  dependent  on  the  prices  of  other 
goods,  and  this  means  that  if  the  price  of  any  good  changes  the 
whole  system  of  prices  must  also  change  to  maintain  equilibrium. 
However,  in  reality  all  prices  are  not  set  simultaneously,  rather 
some  prices  will  be  given  (eg  Pb  and  pc),  while  others  will  not 
(eg  pa).  This  leads  to  the  position  that  all  current  evaluations 
are  in  fact  determined  by  previous  evaluations,  and  consequently 
to  the  idea  that  theoretical  clarification  inevitably  leads  to 
historical  investigation  of  the  price  of  a  good.  The  above 
equations  can  be  rewritten  in  the  form: 
Pa  =  F  (Da,  Pb,  Pc,...  )  X11 
Pb  =  F  (Db,  Pa,  Pc,...  )  [2] 
pc  =  F  (Dc,  Pa.  Pb￿**)  [3] 
This  means  that  given  prices  coordinate  given  demand  under  a 
definite  price.  In  equation  one  pa  is  the  unknown  price,  but  Pb 
and  pc  exist  on  actual  markets  as  antecedent  prices.  But  as 
equation  two  shows  in  order  to  know  Pb  it  is  necessary  to  know 
pa,  and  thus  pa  must  here  be  an  antecedent  price  in  relation  to 
Pb.  This  means  that  the  pa  in  equation  two  cannot  be  the  pa  from 
equation  one.  In  fact  the  time  period  is  crucial.  Todays  price  of 
a  good  depends  on  yesterdays  prices  of  all  goods,  including  the 
price  of  milk.  But  yesterdays  price  of  milk  depends  also  on  the 
price  of  all  other  goods  the  day  before  yesterday,  ad 
219 infinitum.  55  Applying  this  to  the  system  of  equations,  if  pa  in 
the  second  equation  is  not  pa  in  the  first  equation,  and  Pb  in 
the  third  equation  is  not  Pb  in  the  second,  then  a  closed  system 
of  equations  in  which  the  number  of  equations  equals  the  number 
of  unknowns  is  not  obtained,  and  a  quantitative  solution  to 
general  equilibrium  remains  elusive.  In  order  to  surmount  this 
problem  Yurovskii  proposes  that  the  subjective  evaluation  of  a 
good  depends  not  on  the  past  prices  of  all  goods,  but  on 
currently  existing  prices. 
56 
Yurovskii  continues  this  work  by  outlining  Bohm-Bawerk's 
presentation  of  price  formation  through  the  law  of  marginal 
pairs.  His  presentation  is  similar  to  Bukharin's  exposition  from 
Politicheskaya  ekonomiya  rant  'e,  and  it  is  thus  clear  that  this 
conception  must  have  been  well-known  among  Soviet  economists  at 
this  time.  57  I  noted  in  chapter  two  that  it  was  likely  that 
Bukharin  had  Bohm-Bawerk's  formulation  in  mind  when  he  spoke  of 
the  'law  of  supply  and  demand'.  It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  one 
of  the  goals  of  Walras's  Elements  of  Pure  Economics  was  to  give  a 
rigourous  statement  of  the  law  of  supply  and  demand.  According  to 
Walras  this  fundamental  law  had  'hitherto  been  stated  either 
erroneously  or  in  a  form  devoid  of  meaning'. 
58  For  Walras  this 
law  had  two  elements:  the  law  of  establishment  of  equilibrium 
prices  and  the  law  of  variation  of  equilibrium  prices.  The  former 
meant  that  effective  demand  had  to  equal  effective  offer,  the 
latter  that  value  in  exchange  was  proportional  to  rarete,  and 
thus  that  if  the  ratio  of  raretes  of  goods  remained  the  same, 
prices  also  would  remain  unchanged. 
59  Thus  when  Soviet  economists 
from  the  1920s  speak  of  the  'laws  of  supply  and  demand'  it  is 
possible  that  they  have  in  mind  Bohm-Bawerk's  or  Walras's 
presentation,  as  both  were  generally  known  at  this  time. 
Yurovskii  also  discusses  Cournot  and  monopoly  in  this  work, 
and  asks  the  question:  how  will  it  affect  prices  if  instead  of 
one  seller  there  are  two?  If  a  monopolist  increases  the  proposed 
quantity  of  goods  beyond  that  which  gives  maximum  pure  profit, 
then  the  price  will  fall  and  the  monopolist  will  obtain  less 
profit  on  each  good.  Suppose  that  prices  of  the  good  decline 
faster  than  the  growth  of  quantity  of  goods  sold,  for  example 
that  the  quantity  of  goods  sold  increases  by  10%  but  the  price 
220 declines  by  15%.  Assume  that  there  are  two  sellers  which  sell  the 
good  in  equal  parts.  One  of  the  sellers  may  be  tempted  to 
increase  their  supply  in  order  to  gain  from  the  'beneficial 
moment'  when  his  sales  will  increase.  This  discussion  reveals 
that,  indirectly  at  least,  Yurovskii  knew  that  prices  are  not 
always  unit  elastic,  although  he  does  not  directly  bring  out  the 
consequences  of  this  fact.  60 
Yurovskii  devotes  a  large  section  of  this  work  to  analysing 
the  significance  of  and  the  techniques  used  to  calculate  prices 
quoted  on  exchanges  (birzhi)  such  as  commodity  and  stock 
exchanges.  For  Yurovskii  exchanges  are  the  most  organised  example 
of  markets  and  provide  extremely  useful  material  for  theoretical 
analysis,  although  he  notes  that  the  practices  of  different 
exchanges  are  highly  diverse.  Many  exchanges  aspire  to  register 
prices  of  all  the  transactions  concluded  in  a  day  at  the  end  of 
the  day.  On  the  New  York  stock  exchange  dealers  issue  reports 
concerning  every  deal  concluded  to  a  committee,  which  notes  the 
prices  and  disseminates  this  information  to  brokers,  banks,  and 
other  interested  persons.  Data  concerning  fluctuations  of  the 
price  and  the  quantity  sold  at  a  given  price  are  printed  in  an 
official  bulletin.  61  On  the  London  stock  exchange  the  broker 
questions  the  jobber  as  to  the  price  to  be  paid  for  stock,  and  in 
the  case  of  a  deal  being  concluded  the  broker  is  obliged  to 
officially  note  the  rate.  According  to  Yurovskii  as  a  rule  the 
broker  gives  little  significance  to  obtaining  the  rate  published 
in  the  bulletin,  and  prefers  not  to  waste  time  on  reporting 
deals.  Therefore  there  is  a  widespread  conviction  that  the  broker 
notes  the  rate  only  when  he  has  concluded  an  unfavourable  deal 
and  must  show  the  client  that  such  a  price  actually  existed  on 
the  market. 
Furthermore,  bulletins  published  by  exchanges  give  only  the 
price  which  characterises  a  series  of  fluctuations  over  a  time 
period,  for  example  a  day.  In  Berlin  dealers  act  to  establish  a 
'first  rate'  for  the  day  at  12  o'clock.  This  price  is  then 
adopted  as  the  officially  established  rate.  At  2  o'clock  a 
concluding  rate  is  established.  If,  for  example,  the  price  of  a 
given  stock  moved  as  follows  in  a  day  -  179.5,179.125,178.75, 
179,179.25,178.75,178.5  -  then  the  bulletin  may  note  only  the 
221 following  sequence  of  prices  -  179.5,178.75,179.25,178.5.  The 
rules  for  composing  bulletins  state  clearly  that  not  all  price 
movements  are  required  to  be  recorded,  rather  only  the  nature  of 
the  movements  need  to  be  noted. 
62  On  the  Hamburg  coffee  exchange 
prices  are  set  at  10  o'clock  and  at  2  o'clock,  decisive 
significance  being  given  to  the  latter  quotation.  In  the  bulletin 
of  the  Frankfurt  stock  exchange  the  average  price  for  the  day  is 
printed,  and  in  Vienna  the  bulletin  records  the  highest  and 
lowest  price  over  the  day.  Few  bulletins  give  only  a  single 
price.  Often  they  give:  1)  the  limits  of  daily  fluctuations;  2) 
starting  and  finishing  prices,  or  highest  and  lowest  prices;  3) 
only  the  concluding  price  together  with  the  final  declaration  of 
buyers  and  sellers,  or  the  supply  price  and  the  demand  price;  4) 
an  average  price  over  a  time  period. 
63 
Yurovskii  gives  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  methods  used 
in  the  Berlin  stock  exchange  as  follows.  In  this  system  the 
bulletin  price  mixes  with  the  actual  price  on  the  exchange.  From 
12  o'clock  until  1.30pm  dealers  take  commissions  from  buyers  and 
sellers  and  note  them  in  their  books.  Deals  begin  at  this  time 
but  are  not  yet  concluded,  since  the  price  is  still  unknown.  From 
1.30pm  to  2  o'clock  a  single  rate  is  established,  and  this  rate 
corresponds  to  what  the  majority  of  commissions  indicate.  Every 
dealer  sets  a  rate  which  corresponds  to  the  majority  of 
commissions  which  he  has  received,  and  from  these  individual 
dealer  rates  a  single  rate  on  the  exchange  is  formed  by 
consultation. 
64  Struve  notes  in  Khozyaistvo  i  tsena  that  this 
type  of  single  rate  is  something  intermediate  between  the  typical 
value  and  the  average  calculated  statistically  from  a  series. 
According  to  Yurovskii  the  unified  rate  of  the  Berlin  exchange  is 
the  price  which  establishes  equilibrium  between  supply  and 
demand.  Assume  the  following  data  is  obtained  from  buyers  and 
sellers: 
PRICE  BUY  SELL 
100%  40,000  10,000 
101%  25,000  20,000 
102%  30,000  25,000 
103%  15,000  30,000 
104%  10,000  50,000 
222 The  price  which  would  coordinate  equilibrium  between  supply  and 
demand  is  102%,  since  (10,000  +  15,000  +  30,000)  _  (10,000  + 
20,000  +  25,000).  At  103%  supply  (85,000)  exceeds  demand 
(25,000),  and  at  101%  demand  (80,000)  exceeds  supply  (30,000).  65 
Yurovskii  states  that  this  method  for  establishing  an  equilibrium 
price  given  supply  and  demand  schedules  is  identical  with  the 
method  used  on  the  Berlin  stock  exchange,  the  method  used  by 
Marshall  in  his  example  of  the  corn  market  from  the  Principles, 
and  the  method  used  by  Bohm-Bawerk  in  his  Osnovy  teorii  tsennosti 
khozyaistvennykh  blag.  Thus  in  essence  the  methods  used  by 
exchanges  aspire  to  establish  an  equilibrium  price  between  supply 
and  demand,  and  this  method  is  faithfully  documented  in  economic 
theory.  66 
Yurovskii  continues  by  discussing  the  notion  of  tatonnement 
as  conceived  by  Walras.  Yurovskii  notes  that  there  is  a  'period 
of  tatonnement'  in  which  prices  fluctuate  around  the  equilibrium 
value,  and  all  deviations  from  the  equilibrium  price  result  from 
imperfect  information  (netochnoe  znanie)  of  market  conditions. 
Since  actual  prices  fluctuate  around  the  equilibrium  price 
symmetrically,  the  equilibrium  price  can  be  viewed  statistically 
as  the  average  of  the  actual  series  of  prices. 
67  However, 
Yurovskii  emphasises  that  all  the  above  reasoning  has  taken  place 
within  a  static  framework,  and  that  when  the  idea  that 
equilibrium  between  supply  and  demand  forms  a  price  is  used  this 
picture  of  the  market  does  not  fully  coordinate  with  reality, 
since  a  fully  stable  equilibrium  never  occurs.  Yurovskii  quotes 
Jevons's  Theory  of  Political  Economy  of  1871  to  the  effect  that 
the  neo-classical  model  of  a  market  does  not  in  practice 
accurately  represent  any  real  market,  since  (for  example) 
accidents  and  speculation  is  ignored.  68  According  to  Yurovskii 
tatonnement  arises  from  the  fact  that  on  actual  markets  the 
degree  of  supply  and  demand  is  at  first  unknown,  so  a  process  of 
approximation  or  'groping'  towards  the  equilibrium  value  occurs. 
Yurovskii  discusses  Marshall's  example  of  a  corn  market  in  a 
country  town  were  all  corn  is  of  equal  quality  as  follows,  taken 
from  the  Principles  of  Economics.  Assume  the  following  data  set: 
223 PRICE  SELLERS  BUYERS 
'I  37s  1000  600 
II  36s  700  700 
III  35s  600  900 
The  equilibrium  price  is  36s.  However,  trade  can  begin  at  a 
higher  or  lower  price.  Suppose  that  at  the  start  of  the  day  200 
units  of  demand  were  satisfied  at  35s.  These  buyers  can  come  from 
different  groups  as  shown  above,  ie  from  those  who  would  buy  only 
at  35s  or  from  those  who  would  buy  at  36s.  When  the  latter 
possibility  is  the  case,  table  one  below  forms,  when  the  former 
occurs,  then  table  two  forms:  69 
12 
PRICE  SELLER  BUYER  SELLER  BUYER 
37s  800  400  800  600 
36s  500  500  500  700 
35s  400  700  400  700 
In  the  first  table  the  equilibrium  price  will  be  36s.  In  the 
second  table,  however,  the  equilibrium  price  will  not  be  36s, 
since  200  units  of  unsatisfied  demand  remains,  100  units  of  which 
would  be  satisfied  at  37s.  But  a  price  of  37s  is  not  actually 
reached,  since  then  supply  would  outweigh  demand.  The  equilibrium 
price  is  actually  established  between  36s  and  37s,  and  thus  in 
comparison  with  the  first  table  the  equilibrium  position  has 
changed.  Yurovskii  writes: 
It  is  a  general  rule  that  the  first  deal  is  not 
conducted  at  the  equilibrium  price...  If  this 
deviation  is  adopted  by  buyers  and  sellers.  .  .  then 
the  equilibrium  position  must  change.  Consequently 
the  equilibrium  which  we  have  is  not  stable. 
7° 
Yurovskii  notes  that  although  the  first  deal  could  be  conducted 
above  or  below  the  equilibrium  price,  this  could  be  compensated 
by  the  second  deal  being  concluded  below  or  above  the  equilibrium 
price.  He  also  states  that  the  influence  of  deals  conducted  at 
non-equilibrium  prices  should  be  insignificant  on  sufficiently 
large  markets.  Both  of  these  arguments  could  be  true  in  some 
cases,  but  the  possibility  of  upsetting  the  equilibrium  price  by 
concluding  deals  at  non-equilibrium  prices  remains. 
224 It  is  worth  comparing  Yurovskii's  presentation  with 
Marshall's  original.  In  fact  Yurovskii  follows  Marshall  in 
virtually  every  respect.  On  the  question  of  the  influence  the 
taking  of  non-equilibrium  prices  may  have  on  future  dealings, 
Marshall  writes  that  his  assumption  of  practically  no  effect  'is 
justified  with  regard  to  most  of  the  market  dealings  with  which 
we  are  practically  concerned'. 
71  Marshall  argues  that  since 
purchases  on  commodity  markets  are  usually  only  a  small  part  of  a 
persons  total  resources,  there  is  no  appreciable  change  in 
willingness  to  part  with  money  if  early  payments  had  been  at  a 
non-equilibrium  high  (or  low)  rate.  He  does  admit  that  on  the 
labour  market  such  effects  could  be  important.  Yurovskii  follows 
Marshall  and  offers  no  criticism  of  his  approach  in  this  respect. 
Returning  to  the  nature  of  prices,  according  to  Yurovskii 
price  formation  under  given  supply  and  demand  is  a  static 
problem,  and  in  such  conditions  the  prices  formed  can  be  called 
static  equilibrium  prices,  or  the  average  market  price.  Around 
static  equilibrium  prices  fluctuate  prices  actually  paid  in 
definite  places  and  times,  which  can  be  called  actual  prices.  An 
example  of  a  static  equilibrium  price  is  the  average  price  given 
in  an  exchange  bulletin.  72  From  this  definition  of  a  static  price 
it  follows  that  economic  statics  investigates  the  question  of 
equilibrium  in  relation  to  a  simultaneously  given  supply  and 
demand.  Yurovskii  goes  on  to  discuss  another  type  of  price 
related  to  economic  dynamics,  which  he  calls  the  natural  price  or 
the  dynamic  equilibrium  price.  Static  equilibrium  prices 
fluctuate  around  dynamic  equilibrium  prices,  and  the  latter  are 
viewed  as  being  fundamentally  determined  by  the  law  of  costs  of 
production,  costs  which  are  composed  from  two  basic  elements: 
wages  and  profit. 
73 
If  in  a  given  system  of  equations  with  prices  pay  Pb, 
pc,  """pn, 
these  prices  coordinate  with  costs  of  production  and  if 
there  are  no  changes  in  conditions  such  as  population  size,  then 
these  prices  are  dynamic  equilibrium  prices.  If  these  prices  fail 
to  coordinate  with  production  costs,  then  further  changes  in  the 
direction  of  establishing  a  set  of  dynamic  equilibrium  prices 
pia,  pub'  p'cl...  p'n  will  occur.  Yurovskii  stresses  that  all 
types  of  equilibrium  are  related  to  given  conditions.  In  the  case 
225 of  dynamic  equilibrium  prices,  the  preconditions  are:  1)  a 
constant  number  and  composition  of  population;  2)  constant  needs 
which  give  constant  demand  curves;  3)  unchanging  technique  and 
organisation  of  production;  4)  constant  availability  of  goods;  5) 
unchanging  distribution.  All  changes  in  the  above  conditions 
would  automatically  lead  to  a  change  in  equilibrium.  74  It  is 
worth  comparing  Yurovskii's  presentation  of  the  typology  of 
prices  with  that  present  in  the  work  of  classical  and  neo- 
classical  economists,  and  for  this  purpose  I  will  use  Smith, 
Ricardo,  Marshall,  and  Walras. 
In  An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of 
Nations  of  1776  Smith  has  a  chapter  entitled  'Of  the  natural  and 
market  price  of  commodities'  in  which  he  makes  the  distinction  as 
follows.  There  is  in  every  society  or  region  an  ordinary  or 
average  rate  of  wages,  profit,  and  rent,  regulated  by 
circumstance  and  the  nature  of  employment,  and  when  these  natural 
0  rates  are  just  covered  by  the  y  price  of  a  good  the  good  is  at  its 
natural  price  and  is  sold  for  what  it  is  worth. 
75  The  actual  or 
market  price  can  be  above  or  below  the  natural  price  due  to 
fluctuations  in  supply  and  demand.  When  supply  equals  demand, 
then  the  market  price  will  equal  the  natural  price,  and  the 
natural  price  is  the  central  price  to  which  all  prices 
gravitate. 
76  Ricardo  in  his  Principles  of  Political  Economy  and 
Taxation  of  1817  gives  a  slightly  different  presentation  in  a 
chapter  entitled  'Natural  and  market  price'.  A  good  is  at  its 
natural  price  for  Ricardo  when  the  comparative  quantities  of 
labour  necessary  to  produce  commodities  is  the  rule  which 
determines  exchange  ratios.  Actual  or  market  prices  can  deviate 
from  natural  prices  due  to  movements  in  supply  and  demand.  77  When 
all  goods  are  at  their  natural  price  the  rates  of  profit  are 
equal  in  all  branches,  allowing  for  differences  caused  by 
advantages  possessed  or  foregone  by  particular  employments.  It  is 
free  competition,  ie  the  desire  of  every  capitalist  to  transfer 
funds  from  less  to  more  profitable  areas,  which  prevents  the 
market  price  from  staying  above  the  natural  price  for  any  length 
of  time.  78  Ricardo  refers  to  Smith's  analysis  of  this  question  as 
being  very  useful. 
226 In  his  Principles  of  Economics  of  1890  Marshall  speaks  of 
this  distinction  as  follows.  The  contrasting  of  normal  and  market 
prices  refers  to  the  time  taken  for  moral  and  physical  influences 
to  have  effect.  In  the  short  term  supply  and  demand  has  a  greater 
role,  in  the  long  term  costs  of  production  have  a  larger 
influence.  79  Average  prices  are  taken  from  any  set  of  sales  over 
a  period,  but  the  normal  price  is  the  price  which  any  one  set  of 
conditions  tends  to  produce.  The  average  price  equals  the  normal 
price  only  in  a  stationary  state.  80  According  to  Blaug  in 
Economic  Theory  in  Retrospect  what  Smith  calls  the  market  and 
natural  price  is  identical  to  what  Marshall  calls  the  short 
period  and  long  period  price. 
81  In  his  Elements  of  Pure  Economics 
Wairas  does  not  mention  the  distinction  between  normal  and  market 
price  at  all.  He  is  concerned  to  analyse  the  formation  of 
equilibrium  prices,  and  this  means  analysing  the  action  of 
changes  in  supply  and  demand. 
What  can  be  seen  by  comparing  Yurovskii's  presentation  of  a 
typology  of  price  with  that  present  in  classical  and  neo- 
classical  theory?  Firstly,  Yurovskii  stresses  the  notion  of 
equilibrium  price,  something  taken  from  Walras  rather  than  Smith 
or  Ricardo.  However,  while  appropriating  the  terminology  of  neo- 
classical  economics,  Yurovskii  keeps  some  elements  of  the 
classical  typology  by  making  a  distinction  between  static 
equilibrium  prices  and  dynamic  equilibrium  prices.  Secondly, 
Yurovskii  adheres  to  the  idea  that  prices  are  determined  in  a 
fundamental  sense  by  costs  of  production,  and  thus  again  uses  an 
idea  from  classical  economics.  This  is  apparent  from  his  position 
that  dynamic  equilibrium  prices  are  determined  by  costs  of 
production.  Neo-classical  theory  did  not  totally  reject  the  costs 
of  production  approach,  as  shown  by  Marshall's  famous  scissor 
blades  of  utility  and  production  costs,  but  it  did  shift  emphasis 
onto  supply  and  demand.  82  In  Yurovskii's  conception  costs  of 
production  seem  primary  and  utility  only  secondary. 
Returning  to  Ocherki  po  teorii  tseny  Yurovskii  seems  to 
admit  further  on  in  the  work,  in  contrast  to  his  position 
outlined  previously,  that  prices  taken  at  non-equilibrium  levels 
will  forever  alter  the  equilibrium  position.  He  notes  that  the 
'accidental'  conclusion  of  a  deal  not  at  the  natural  price 
227 changes  the  distribution  of  income,  creates  new  demand,  and  can 
call  forth  changes  in  the  cost  of  production  of  some  goods.  Even 
though  dynamic  equilibrium  will  attempt  to  restore  itself 
spontaneously,  the  new  equilibrium  position  will  be  different 
from  what  would  have  been  the  equilibrium  position  if  the  deal  at 
a  non-equilibrium  price  had  not  been  completed.  Thus  a  system  of 
dynamic  equilibrium  is  inherently  unstable,  and  in  the  case  of  a 
disruption  of  equilibrium  the  system  will  act  so  as  to  restore  an 
equilibrium  position,  but  not  necessarily  the  one  which  existed 
before. 
Yurovskii  relates  how  dynamic  equilibrium  prices  are  of 
theoretical  and  practical  interest.  They  are  theoretically 
interesting  because  they  represent  prices  not  readily  apparent 
from  average  market  prices.  Practically  they  are  of  interest  in 
the  following  type  of  problem.  Owners  of  large  bakeries  wishing 
to  buy  flour  from  a  large  trading  exchange  where  prices  are 
unusually  high  in  relation  to  the  usual  level  can  wait  until  more 
normal  levels  are  restored  if  they  know  world  harvest  levels.  But 
this  sort  of  judgement  relies  on  comparing  an  average  market 
price  with  an  (estimated)  dynamic  equilibrium  price,  and  assuming 
that  the  former  will  soon  gravitate  back  towards  the  latter.  83 
Another  topic  which  Yurovskii  discusses  in  relation  to 
Walras  is  the  theory  of  marginal  productivity.  According  to 
Walras  this  theory  involves  two  propositions:  first  that  free 
competition  brings  costs  of  production  to  a  minimum,  and  second 
that  when  cost  of  production  equals  the  selling  price  (ie  at 
equilibrium),  the  price  of  services  are  proportional  to  their 
marginal  productivities. 
84  The  first  proposition  can  be  seen  to 
imply  the  normative  conclusion  that  a  system  of  free  competition 
is  the  most  efficient  and  hence  superior  system  which  should  be 
aspired  to,  although  Walras  makes  no  such  explicit  claim  at  this 
point.  Walras  presents  this  algebraically  as  follows.  Let  bt,  bp, 
bk,...  be  the  quantities  of  productive  services  T  (land),  P 
(labour),  K  (capital)  required  in  the  production  of  a  unit  of 
commodity  B.  Consequently  the  cost  of  production  per  unit  will 
be: 
Pb  =  btpt  +  bppp  +  bkpk  +  ... 
228 Walras  assumes  that  in  producing  a  good  it  is  possible  to  use 
more  or  less  of  some  productive  services,  provided  that  less  or 
more  of  another  is  used.  This  means  that  the  coefficients  of 
production  bt,  bp,  bk,...  are  related  in  the  following  production 
equation,  with  Q  being  the  quantity  of  B  manufactured: 
f(Qbt,  Qbp,  Qbk,...  )  =Q 
If  Qbt  =  T,  Qbp  =  P,  Qbk  =  K,  then: 
QPb  =  Tpt  +  Ppp  +  Kpk  +  ... 
Q=  f(T,  P,  K,...  ) 
Differentiating  Walras  obtains: 
df/dT  =  Pt/Pb 
df/dP  =  pp/pb 
df/dK  =  Pk/Pb 
This  is  how  the  minimum  cost  of  production  is  obtained  according 
to  Walras.  85  At  this  point  in  the  text  Walras  does  not  show 
explicitly  how  these  equations  relate  to  minimum  costs  being 
expended.  But  in  an  appendix  on  Wicksteed  and  rent  added  to  the 
third  edition  of  1896  he  is  more  explicit.  He  writes: 
..  the  entrepreneur,  proceeding,  as  is  his  wont,  by 
tatonnement,  adds  to  or  subtracts  from  the  quantity 
of  each  productive  service  according  as  the  value  of 
the  [marginal]  increment  of  this  service  is  less 
than  or  greater  than  the  value  of  the  [marginal] 
increment  of  the  product  which  this  increment  of 
services  produces,  until  the  following  equalities 
are  reached: 
86 
P=  (df/dA)A  +  (df/dB)B  +  (df/dC)C  +  ... 
This  equation  reveals  how  the  total  quantity  of  output  is 
distributed  among  productive  services,  and  it  is  Walras's 
implication  that  this  distribution  is  optimal.  In  lesson  twenty 
two  of  the  Elements  Walras  makes  it  explicit  that  he  is 
advocating  free  competition  as  leading  to  utility  maximisation. 
He  writes: 
229 ...  the  equations  we  have  developed  do  show  freedom 
of  production  to  be  the  superior  general  rule. 
Freedom  procures,  within  certain  limits,  the  maximum 
of  utility;  and,  since  the  factors  which  interfere 
with  freedom  are  obstacles  to  the  attainment  of  this 
maximum,  they  should,  without  exception,  be 
eliminated  as  completely  as  possible.  87 
A  clearer  normative  statement  about  the  superiority  of  laisser- 
faire  would  be  difficult  to  find.  Since  Yurovskii  mentions  the 
Elements  often  in  his  Ocherki  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  this 
argument  was  not  clearly  understood  by  him. 
Yurovskii  discusses  the  idea  of  marginal  productivity  in 
Ocherki  po  teorli  tseny  as  follows.  He  writes: 
...  theoretically  we  can  assert  that  only  in 
conditions  of  a  rational  organisation  of  the 
economy,  free  competition,  and  complete  mobility  of 
labour  and  capital,  neither  one  of  these  factors  of 
production  could  be  applied  in  a  quantity  below  its 
optimum...  but  this  would  be  a  petitio  principii.  88 
If  increasing  capital  expenditure  by  5%,  10%,  15%,  would  give  an 
increase  in  profits  of  10%,  25%,  40%  respectively,  this  means 
that  the  quantity  of  capital  is  not  in  correct  relation  with  the 
quantity  of  labour,  ie  capital  expenditure  is  not  at  its  optimum. 
But  where  should  the  extra  capital  come  from?  In  theory  from  less 
profitable  areas,  but  what  if  there  are  no  such  areas?  Yurovskii 
points  out  a  number  of  difficulties  in  relation  to  this  idea.  The 
army  of  unemployed  would  seem  to  indicate  that  in  many  cases  the 
quantity  of  capital  has  already  exceeded  its  optimum  in  relation 
to  the  quantity  of  labour.  Moreover,  it  is  feasible  that  large 
enterprises  could  be  reorganised  as  regards  the  relation  between 
quantities  of  capital  and  labour  if  this  was  profitable,  but 
peasant  farms  and  small  craft  capital  often  may  not  achieve  an 
optimum  position  due  to  their  inability  to  calculate  what  would 
be  optimal  and  difficulties  in  obtaining  credit  for  expansion. 
89 
Another  criticism  made  is  that  this  theory  assumes  that  if  the 
quantity  of  one  factor  of  production  is  less  than  its  optimum, 
there  must  be  simultaneously  another  factor  of  production 
available  in  surplus.  Yurovskii  implies  that  this  may  not  always 
be  so. 
230 However,  these  criticisms  of  Walras's  idea  of  marginal 
productivity  seem  to  be  that  this  ideal  position  is  not  achieved 
in  practice  because  of  factors  which  are  ignored  in  the  theory. 
They  do  not  attempt  to  show  that  the  theoretical  optimum  outlined 
by  Walras  is  in  fact  non-optimal.  This  is  supported  by 
Yurovskii's  statement  that  N.  N.  Shaposhnikov  is  'absolutely 
correct'  to  note  that  the  principle  of  marginal  productivity  must 
be  recognised  as  a  necessary  basis  for  the  distribution  of 
income.  90  It  is  clear  that  Walras  would  have  regarded  such 
criticisms  as  'falling  to  the  ground  of  their  own  weight',  since 
his  system  was  intended  as  a  theoretical  ideal  to  be  attained, 
not  a  concrete  description  of  reality.  91  Thus  the  question  of  the 
optimal  economic  system  was  touched  on  by  Yurovskii,  but  he  does 
not  examine  it  in  great  detail  and  did  not  follow  it  up  in  later 
works. 
92 
6.2.2  -  EQUILIBRIUM  AND  PLANNING 
Yurovskii  wrote  a  long  article  in  1926  entitled  'K  probleme 
plana  i  ravnovesiya  v  sovetskoi  khozyaistvennoi  sistema' 
published  in  Vestnik  finansov,  in  which  he  examines  the  question 
of  economic  equilibrium  in  relation  to  the  type  of  plans  and 
planning  methodology  being  adopted  in  planning  organs  such  as 
Gosplan.  He  begins  by  stating  that: 
The  methodology  of  planned  economy  and  the 
significance  of  the  plan  must  clearly  depend  on  the 
particularity  of  the  economic  system  for  which  it  is 
composed.  An  economic  plan  composed  in  1926/7  is 
something  principally  different  to  the  typeof  plan 
which  we  had  in  mind  to  compose  in  1920... 
Despite  the  fact  that  all  plans  have  some  similar  features, 
Yurovskii  notes  that  this  problem  is  not  given  sufficient 
attention  in  current  documents.  It  is  clear  from  these  statements 
that  Yurovskii  believed  that  planning  per  se  was  not  a  type  of 
economic  system,  and  that  the  question  of  what  constitutes 
planning  is  at  least  somewhat  divorced  from  the  question  of  what 
constitutes  an  economic  system.  This  means  that  it  would 
theoretically  be  possible  to  have  some  form  of  planning  in  all 
types  of  economic  system,  and  that  the  presence  or  absence  of 
231 planning  in  an  economic  system  is  not  necessarily  its  defining 
feature.  Thus  a  capitalist  system  could  contain  planning,  and  as 
an  extreme  example  planning  might  be  absent  from  a  socialist 
system. 
Yurovskii  continues  by  outlining  that  since  in  current 
Soviet  conditions  a  large  part  of  means  of  production  are  held  by 
the  Soviet  state  and  are  used  in  state  enterprises,  it  is 
necessary  for  the  state  to  compose  programmes  of  work  for  these 
enterprises.  Hence  economic  plans,  such  as  a  production  plan,  a 
transport  plan  etc,  are  composed.  Since  also  the  state  has  a 
foreign  trade  monopoly,  an  export  and  import  plan  is  required  in 
order  to  satisfy  the  demand  for  foreign  goods.  Thus  the  state 
budget  has  to  be  composed  with  all  these  factors  in  mind,  and 
Yurovskii  explains  that  this  'flows  from  the  fact  that  the  state 
owns  the  greater  part  of  the  country's  productive  forces'.  94 
From  this  it  is  clear  that  Yurovskii  is  arguing  that 
property  relations  are  a  key  defining  feature  of  an  economic 
system,  and  determine  whether  and  to  what  extent  and  type 
planning  occurs.  This  is  confirmed  by  a  statement  that  the 
necessity  of  planning  flows  from  the  unprecedented  concentration 
of  means  of  production  and  other  material  resources  into  the 
hands  of  the  state.  However,  Yurovskii  continues  by  noting  that 
not  all  such  plans  can  and  must  be  composed  on  the  same 
principles,  rather  flexibility  is  required  to  assist  in 
integration  into  the  economic  surroundings. 
Yurovskii  then  moves  on  to  discuss  equilibrium.  Since  the 
plan  for  state  economy  must  be  a  plan  for  expanded  reproduction, 
the  equilibrium  involved  must  be  of  the  moving  variety.  Citing 
Bukharin's  dictum  that  'outside  of  equilibrium  society  cannot 
live  long',  Yurovskii  comments  that  the  term  'long'  remains 
undefined  in  this  context.  Equilibrium  in  relation  to  the  law  of 
formation  of  market  price  is  disturbed  and  restored  very  quickly, 
whereas  equilibrium  in  relation  to  the  law  of  costs  of  production 
is  restored  very  slowly.  Equilibrium  disturbed  by  an  economic 
crisis  is  restored  at  an  even  slower  pace.  Consequently  an 
economic  system  can  exist  if  not  for  a  'long'  time,  then  for  a 
known  period  in  disequilibrium  following  a  disturbance.  Yurovskii 
notes  that  while  in  a  capitalist  economy  equilibrium  is  broken 
232 and  restored  spontaneously,  in  the  Soviet  system  equilibrium  can 
be  disturbed  by  a  mistaken  composition  or  implementation  of  a 
plan,  and  thus  must  subsequently  be  restored  by  conscious 
measures.  95  Thus  according  to  Yurovskii  the  control  figures  must 
fulfil  two  main  functions:  to  enable  expanded  reproduction  of 
state  economy  and  to  preserve  and/or  restore  dynamic  equilibrium 
in  the  economic  system. 
Yurovskii  then  goes  on  to  examine  the  Gosplan  control 
figures  for  1926/7  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  principles 
involved  in  their  construction.  In  the  matter  of  finding 
resources  on  which  new  construction  can  be  based,  Yurovskii  notes 
that  the  1926/7  figures  are  incomparably  more  cautious  than  those 
of  1925/6,  especially  in  relation  to  possibilities  for  state  bank 
emission.  He  then  asks  if  these  figures  can  secure  economic 
equilibrium,  and  answers  in  the  negative.  Equilibrium  is  already 
disrupted,  but  the  control  figures  are  not  configured  to  restore 
equilibrium,  and  thus  are  in  error.  Although  the  control  figures 
mention  disproportions  in  various  areas,  eg  between  agriculture 
and  industry,  they  are  not  devised  to  repair  these 
disproportions.  The  control  figures  speak  of  the  divergence  of 
prices  inside  the  country  with  world  prices  as  one  of  the  main 
obstacles  for  development  of  foreign  commodity  turnover,  but  they 
do  not  set  out  these  divergences  in  figures  and  do  not  attempt  to 
resolve  them.  96 
Yurovskii  outlines  various  disproportions  which  he  sees  in 
the  current  Soviet  economy.  Firstly,  there  is  a  disproportion 
between  the  speed  of  restoration  of  agricultural  and  industrial 
production  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  speed  of  restoration  of 
foreign  trade  on  the  other.  According  to  Yurovskii  foreign  trade 
lags  behind  production  by  several  decades,  and  at  an  absolute 
level  it  has  reached  the  levels  of  the  1880s.  97  Furthermore  the 
argument  that  since  potentially  exportable  goods  could  be  sold  on 
internal  markets,  perhaps  even  at  a  greater  profit  than  if 
exported,  they  therefore  should  not  be  exported,  is  not  correct, 
as  goods  are  exported  not  for  profit  but  in  order  to  facilitate 
the  import  of  foreign  goods  such  as  machinery.  Yurovskii  stresses 
that  countries  do  not  export  their  absolute  surplus,  but  their 
relative  surplus,  ie  they  export  goods  which  are  profitable  in 
233 terms  of  an  exchange  for  foreign  currency  which  in  turn  can  buy 
foreign  goods,  and  this  principle  was  used  for  Soviet  export 
plans.  Moreover,  Yurovskii  claims  that  in  countries  which  lack 
import/export  plans,  where  trade  is  conducted  for  profit  through 
the  price  mechanism,  the  principle  of  exchange  of  the  relative 
surplus  finds  its  expression  in  the  structure  of  internal  and 
world  prices,  ie  is  realised  spontaneously.  98  The  criteria  for 
deciding  whether  a  good  can  form  part  of  the  relative  surplus  is 
that  its  presence  in  the  union  should  be  less  necessary  than  the 
foreign  import. 
Yurovskii  counters  arguments  against  exports  as  follows. 
Firstly,  if  exports  are  reduced  then  the  amount  of  imports  will 
fall  also,  and  this  will  leave  inadequate  resources  for  the 
development  of  the  Soviet  economy.  Secondly,  if  imports  are 
reduced,  the  demand  for  such  imports  will  remain  unsatisfied. 
Since  imports  are  bought  with  dollars  and  pounds  rather  than  with 
rubles  this  lack  of  supply  of  imported  goods  will  increase  demand 
for  foreign  currency,  and  so  disrupt  the  equilibrium  between 
supply  and  demand  for  foreign  currency.  Yurovskii  notes  that 
licensing  orders  for  foreign  trade  are  a  very  powerful  tool  for 
regulating  the  demand  for  foreign  currency,  and  consequently  the 
course  of  exchange  rates.  He  continues  by  discussing  the 
distribution  plan  of  currency  resources  adopted  by  the  state. 
This  distribution  plan  formally  restores  the  equilibrium  between 
supply  and  demand,  in  the  sense  that  those  who  do  not  receive 
currency  in  the  plan  do  not  produce  demand,  and  in  this  plan 
outlay  must  be  covered  by  income.  However,  according  to  Yurovskii 
such  equilibrium  is  already  disrupted,  and  if  the  programme  of 
foreign  trade  was  reviewed  in  the  context  of  other  economic 
programmes,  then  new  difficulties  would  be  discovered.  99 
Another  type  of  disruption  of  equilibrium  which  Yurovskii 
outlines  is  a  rupture  between  commodity  prices  or  the  purchasing 
power  of  the  chervonets  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  parity  of  the 
currency  on  the  other.  Prices  increase  without  regard  for  gold 
parity,  and  hence  according  to  Yurovskii  a  whole  series  of 
branches  of  export  are  non-profitable  or  insufficiently 
profitable.  He  notes  that  the  purchasing  power  of  the  chervonets 
was  high  in  the  first  months  after  its  issue,  higher  than  the 
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to  fall.  It  never  regained  its  original  level.  '00 
Another  disproportion  which  Yurovskii  mentions  is  that 
between  wholesale  and  retail  prices,  and  also  between 
state/cooperative  prices  and  prices  on  private  markets.  In  this 
latter  case  Yurovskii  notes  the  existence  of  a  dual  price 
structure  (dvoinogo  urovnya  tsen)  which  is  a  feature  of  current 
Soviet  life.  Fully  unified  prices  are  in  general  impossible  to 
achieve,  but  the  divergences  which  became  apparent  in  1924  grew 
further  in  1925/6  to  a  level  so  large  that,  according  to 
Yurovskii,  they  should  not  be  included  in  price  indices.  The 
existence  of  a  dual  price  structure  signifies  that  at  the  lower 
price  level  it  would  be  impossible  to  satisfy  all  demand,  and  the 
phenomenon  of  goods  shortages  became  aggravated  in  1925/6  in 
relation  to  goods  such  as  tissue  paper,  flax,  some  types  of  iron, 
butter  etc.  Yurovskii  points  out  clearly  that  all  this  means  that 
prices  are  not  fulfilling  their  function  as  equilibriators  of 
supply  and  demand,  and  thus  implies  that  this  function  should  be 
reinstated  in  order  to  bring  back  economic  equilibrium. 
101  In 
this  case  it  is  apparent  that  Yurovskii  conceives  of  a  market  as 
a  place  where  supply  and  demand  are  balanced  through  price. 
After  examining  disruptions  in  economic  equilibrium, 
Yurovskii  goes  on  to  examine  the  nature  of  the  Soviet  economic 
system.  In  the  Soviet  system  equilibrium  is  necessary,  but  what 
type  of  equilibrium  and  in  what  particular  areas?  Is  equilibrium 
necessary  in  price  formation,  or  is  such  equilibrium  an  obsolete 
economic  category  to  be  replaced  by  planned  regulation?  Is  it 
necessary  to  balance  supply  and  demand  on  markets?  Experience 
gives  sufficient  material  for  a  positive  answer  to  these 
questions. 
Yurovskii  then  turns  to  a  discussion  of  Preobrazhenskii's 
book  Novaya  ekonomika,  which  he  describes  as  an  interesting 
attempt  at  theoretical  understanding  of  the  Soviet  economy.  In 
his  concrete  description  of  the  new  Soviet  economy,  Yurovskii 
believes  that  Preobrazhenskii  is  absolutely  correct  in  a  whole 
series  of  cases.  102  However,  Yurovskii  seems  less  keen  on  the 
theoretical  aspects  of  the  work,  particularly  the  idea  that  the 
law  of  value  is  being  replaced  in  contemporary  Soviet  economy. 
235 Yurovskii  writes  that  'the  law  of  value  acts  everywhere  where 
there  is  the  market  and  commodities'.  103  Even  if,  as  is  the  case, 
there  are  large  organisations  of  a  monopoly  type,  and  even  if  the 
state  acts  to  strengthen  or  weaken  certain  economic  branches.  If 
the  market  remains  under  these  conditions,  then  the  law  of  value 
acts.  Concrete  price  formation  conditions  can  still  differ,  for 
example  fish  prices  in  small  seaside  settlements  can  differ  from 
prices  in  large  consumer  centres,  but  the  law  of  value  acts  in 
this  case  if  markets  are  preserved.  Yurovskii  stresses  that  there 
is  no  basis  to  assert  that  it  does  not  act  in  monopolistic 
conditions.  Preobrazhenskii's  law  of  primitive  socialist 
accumulation  can  alter  the  conditions  in  which  the  law  of  value 
acts,  but  it  does  not  abolish  the  law  itself.  104 
In  Novaya  ekonomika  Preobrazhenskii  has  a  special  section  on 
the  law  of  value  in  monopoly  capitalism,  in  which  he  asserts  that 
the  law  of  value  was  being  undermined  by  the  development  of 
monopoly  in  capitalism  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
Furthermore,  Preobrazhenskii  claims  that  the  fullest 
manifestation  of  the  law  of  value  is  possible  only  in  conditions 
of  fully  free  commodity  turnover  inside  and  outside  the  country. 
According  to  Yurovskii  this  idea  is  incorrect.  Monopoly  trusts  do 
not  aspire  to  abolish  the  law  of  value,  rather  to  utilise  it  as  a 
factor  of  price  formation.  Yurovskii  is  also  sceptical  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  'law  of  primitive  socialist  accumulation'.  It  is  of 
course  possible  for  the  state  to  accumulate  resources  for  the 
purposes  of  socialism  using  various  techniques,  eg  tax  policy, 
but  can  this  process  be  called  a  law?  Does  this  law  govern  the 
process  of  price  formation  in  the  sense  of  a  zakonomernost'? 
According  to  Yurovskii  the  laws  of  value  and  of  primitive 
socialist  accumulation  do  not  in  fact  contradict  each  other,  as 
for  example  the  law  of  value  and  the  law  of  concentration  of 
production  in  capitalism. 
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Yurovskii  goes  on  to  outline  how  Preobrazhenskii  speaks  not 
only  of  the  struggle  against  the  law  of  value,  but  also  against 
commodity  economy  itself,  not  only  of  overcoming  the  logic  of 
price  formation  under  free  competition,  but  also  of  overcoming 
all  regularities  of  commodity  economy  and  all  markets.  Yurovskii 
notes  that  the  antipode  of  the  law  of  value  can  only  be  the  law 
236 of  planned  distribution  of  all  productive  forces  and  all 
products,  and  Preobrazhenskii  implies  this  in  his  book.  Variation 
in  price  ceases  to  be  the  main  regulator  of  production 
priorities,  rather  'methods  of  calculating  mass  demand'  replace 
it.  However,  Yurovskii  disputes  that  the  law  of  value  can  be 
contradicted  by  the  law  of  primitive  socialist  accumulation, 
since  this  latter  law  should  be  contrasted  to  a  law  of  capitalist 
accumulation.  The  question  of  the  logic  of  accumulation  is 
separate  to  the  contradiction  between  the  law  of  value  and 
administrative  methods  and  measures.  The  aim  of  administrative 
measures  can  be  to  accumulate  resources,  or  it  could  be  (as 
during  the  civil  war)  primary  socialist  spending  of  the  previous 
epoch's  material  resources.  Thus  the  method  used  to  achieve  a 
certain  goal  should  not  be  confused  with  the  goal  itself.  106 
Planned  regulation  of  production  and  distribution  implies 
for  Yurovskii  the  abolition  of  the  law  of  value  and  also  the 
abolition  of  free  consumption,  ie  the  rejection  of  the  right  of 
consumers  to  chose  which  products  to  consume.  If  the  structure  of 
demand  is  decided  by  planners,  then  consumers  cannot  exercise 
freedom  of  choice.  107  In  such  a  fully  planned  system  there  will 
act  only  one  regulator,  a  regulator  which  currently  does  not  act. 
Yurovskii  stresses  that  such  a  regulator  is  presently  not  seen 
because  the  form  of  planning  which  the  state  now  uses  aspires  to 
calculate  solvent  demand  (platezhesposobnyi  spros),  ie  market 
demand  dependant  on  value  relations.  The  existing  system, 
according  to  Yurovskii,  should  not  be  understood  as  of  mixed 
composition,  as  a  mixture  of  the  past  and  the  future,  rather  it 
is  a  system  of  commodity  economy  with  planned  elements.  These 
planned  elements  do  not  liquidate  commodity  economy  in  any 
way.  108 
For  example,  the  state  can  compose  an  ideal  plan  of  grain 
storage  for  export  and  to  supply  the  internal  market,  but  this 
does  not  negate  the  phenomenon  of  prices.  There  will  still  be 
markets,  commodities,  and  commodity  economy,  and  also  planned 
economy;  but  not  the  type  of  planning  which  replaces  the  market. 
If  all  grain  was  collected  by  a  single  agency  and  distributed 
between  consumers  according  to  established  principles,  then 
planned  economy  would  oust  commodity  economy.  Thus  Yurovskii 
237 notes  that  he  uses  the  term  'planned  economy'  (planovoe 
khozyaistvo)  in  two  sense,  dependent  on  the  system  for  producing 
the  plan:  in  the  first  sense  it  means  planning  alongside  the 
market,  in  the  second  sense  it  means  planning  that  replaces  the 
market.  Since  Yurovskii  believes  it  is  the  former  type  of 
planning  which  currently  exists  in  the  Soviet  Union,  he  states 
that: 
Our  economic  system  is  a  system  of  commodity-money 
economy  and  planned  economy,  a  planned  economy  based 
still  on  value  principles...  do  not  consider  that 
value  principles  liquidate  industrial  or  other 
monopolies. 
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A  commodity-socialist  system  obliges  the  following  conditions: 
equilibrium  between  supply  and  demand  on  markets,  and  the 
coordination  of  prices  with  costs  of  production. 
Yurovskii  notes  that  the  Soviet  state  can,  in  its  capacity 
as  a  monopolist,  introduce  a  policy  of  increasing  prices  on 
products  produced  by  state  enterprises,  and  reduce  prices  paid  by 
state  enterprises,  even  below  cost  of  production.  Thus  the  Soviet 
state  can  alter  prices  from  what  they  would  be  under  free 
competition,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  the  law  of  value  is 
overcome.  Yurovskii  outlines  the  various  goals  the  state  could 
pursue  in  its  control  of  prices  as  follows.  It  could  maximise 
socialist  accumulation,  set  prices  so  as  to  achieve  maximum 
quantity  of  goods,  maximise  pure  profit,  obtain  average  profit, 
supply  consumers  with  the  cheapest  goods,  or  even  supply  free 
goods.  In  setting  the  question  as  he  does  Yurovskii  implies  that 
such  aims  may  be  contradictory,  ie  it  would  not  be  possible  to 
simultaneously  maximise  profits  and  to  provide  the  best  quality 
goods.  However,  which  ever  of  the  above  goals  the  state  decided 
to  pursue,  according  to  Yurovskii  this  would  not  mean  that  the 
law  of  value  was  being  negated.  Thus  all  the  above  cases  follow 
not  a  generalisation  which  relates  to  price  formation  in 
conditions  of  free  competition,  but  another  regularity  of 
commodity  economy:  that  costs  of  production,  which  are  the 
essence  of  prices,  are  one  way  or  another  covered.  Moreover, 
whether  an  aspiring  monopolist  means  to  maximise  price  or  whether 
the  state  is  content  with  low  prices,  in  all  cases  the  degree  of 
238 demand  must  be  considered  in  order  for  assigned  prices  on  markets 
to  establish  equilibrium. 
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Equilibrium  conditions  for  the  state  are  connected  to  a 
maximum  selling  price,  since  it  cannot  establish  a  price  with 
which  ten  percent  of  goods  remain  unsold.  There  is  also  a  minimum 
price  beyond  which  demand  would  exceed  supply.  Yurovskii  stresses 
that  the  proletarian  state  monopoly  sets  itself  an  absolutely 
different  task  to  that  which  all  other  monopolists  set,  although 
he  does  not  outline  the  specifics  of  this  task.  He  does  note  that 
while  the  mechanisms  of  price  formation  in  the  case  of  free 
competition  differs  from  the  mechanism  for  monopoly,  this  does 
not  mean  that  no  regularities  govern  monopoly  price  formation. 
For  example  on  markets  where  the  state  is  a  monopsonist,  lower  or 
higher  prices  can  be  set.  But  lower  prices  signal  for  reduced 
sowing,  and  higher  prices  for  increased  sowing,  thus  the  price  to 
be  set  is  governed  by  criteria  apart  from  pure  profit.  In  the 
case  of  the  grain  market  where  the  state  dominates  but  is  not  yet 
a  monopolist,  in  the  matter  of  reducing  prices  the  state  is 
limited  by  the  presence  of  private  dealers  who  would  re-sell 
grain  to  consumers  at  a  profit  after  buying  it  from  the  state. 
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Regulation  of  the  national  economy  (so  called  state 
intervention)  which  limits  free  competition  thus  does  not  oust 
commodity  economy,  but  only  replaces  one  type  by  another.  If  a 
capitalist  state  carries  out  a  policy  of  stimulating  a  particular 
industrial  branch  by  encouraging  private  capital  into  it,  then  in 
this  case  the  law  of  value  is  not  overcome.  The  capitalist  system 
remains  a  commodity  economy  even  though  the  state  intervenes  in 
economic  life  and  negates  free  competition.  Similarly  in  the 
Soviet  case.  Even  though  such  regulation  is  incomparably  greater 
in  the  USSR,  and  this  leads  to  a  qualitative  change  in  the  nature 
of  the  system,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  law  of  value  no  longer 
acts.  Yurovskii  agrees  that  a  current  particular  aim  of  the 
Soviet  state  may  be  socialist  accumulation.  However,  through  what 
means  is  this  policy  pursued?  According  to  Yurovskii  it  is 
achieved  through  an  economic  plan  to  enforce  higher  prices  on 
state  industrial  products,  higher  taxation  of  commodity  turnover 
etc,  ie  through  markets  and  prices,  in  order  that  the  state  will 
increase  its  quantity  of  goods  on  the  market.  For  Yurovskii  this 
239 implies  the  violation  of  free  competition,  but  not  the  ousting  of 
the  law  of  value. 
112  Yurovskii  thus  concludes  that 
Preobrazhenskii  is  incorrect  to  speak  of  a  'struggle  with 
commodity  economy'  or  of  a  struggle  between  the  planning 
principle  and  the  law  of  value.  In  fact  the  planning  principle 
enters  into  commodity  economy. 
However,  Yurovskii  stresses  that  there  is  a  difference 
between  regulation  in  capitalism  and  in  Soviet  conditions.  A 
capitalist  state  can  only  use  indirect  means  to  achieve  a  goal, 
eg  the  use  of  export  premiums  to  guide  exports,  whereas  the 
Soviet  state  can  use  more  direct  methods,  eg  the  export-import 
plan.  In  this  case  regulation  occurs  not  by  the  stimuli  of 
capitalism  (profit),  but  by  the  direct  supply  coordination  of  the 
state.  In  this  respect  the  Soviet  economy  is  essentially 
different  from  a  commodity  economy.  Yurovskii  contrasts  the 
capitalist  method  for  protection  of  machine  construction  - 
customs  duties,  subsidies,  encouraging  an  influx  of  new  capital  - 
with  the  current  method;  including  the  construction  of  new 
equipment  factories  in  the  plan  for  capital  construction. 
However,  while  this  direct  planning  occurs  in  relation  to 
construction,  Yurovskii  notes  that  when  the  plant  begins 
functioning  it  will  be  judged  by  profit  criteria. 
113  The  law  of 
value  is  still  obligatory  in  this  case  because  a  plan  for  factory 
production  in  which  the  value  of  produced  goods  was  lower  than 
prime  costs  would  be  a  mistaken  plan. 
If  the  state  pursues  a  goal  of  redistributing  means  of 
production  or  means  of  consumption,  then  such  a  redistribution 
can  be  economically  profitable  or  non-profitable.  According  to 
Yurovskii  the  state  must  use  values  to  determine  this  question. 
Even  if  the  state  decides  to  undertake  measures  which  are 
according  to  short-term  criteria  unprofitable,  it  has  conducted 
the  calculation  in  terms  of  prices,  and  thus  commodity  economy 
remains. 
114  Noting  that  Preobrazhenskii  outlines  various  cases  of 
price  formation  in  conditions  of  Soviet  economy,  Yurovskii 
stresses  that  such  planned  calculation  stands  on  prices  which 
already  exist  and  which  the  state  can  influence.  Thus  it  stands 
on  commodity  economy.  Even  in  the  case  when  the  state  is  a 
monopoly  producer  and  buyer,  it  is  incorrect  to  say  that  the 
240 price  category  has  a  purely  formal  character.  In  this  case  the 
state  establishes  prices  in  relation  to  costs  of  production,  ie 
on  quantities  connected  with  the  market  conjuncture  for  all 
goods-115  Thus  Yurovskii  stresses  the  importance  of  markets  and 
prices  to  economic  calculation  in  the  Soviet  context. 
In  the  next  section  of  this  article  Yurovskii  discusses  the 
tasks  of  planning  in  the  current  economic  system.  The  general 
task  is  to  encourage  the  growth  of  productive  forces  while 
maintaining  equilibrium  in  the  various  parts  of  the  economic 
system.  In  a  commodity-money  economy  this  equilibrium  must  be 
market  equilibrium.  Observance  of  dynamic  equilibrium  means  the 
creation  of  a  smooth  curve  of  economic  growth,  and  not  a  curve 
which  indicates  periods  of  fast  increases  followed  by  crisis  and 
depression.  Thus  Yurovskii  implies  that  at  least  some  types  of 
cyclical  fluctuations  must  be  overcome.  He  then  outlines  his 
theory  as  to  the  causes  of  economic  crises.  At  the  basis  of  all 
economic  crises  lie  disproportions.  There  are  two  basic  types  of 
disproportions  which  cause  crisis  in  capitalist  economy.  In  the 
first  type  there  is  a  lack  of  coordination  in  the  degree  of 
production  of  consumer  goods  with  solvent  demand  for  them.  In  the 
second  type  there  is  a  lack  of  coordination  between  accumulation 
of  material  resources  or  the  speed  of  new  capital  formation  with 
the  speed  of  development  of  the  economy,  ie  the  speed  of  growth 
of  capital  outlay.  Yurovskii  does  not  exclude  the  possibility 
that  these  two  disproportions  have  a  common  root,  but  decides  not 
to  investigate  this  question  in  this  article. 
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Yurovskii  states  that  he  does  not  think  that  currently  in 
the  USSR  it  is  possible  to  predict  sooner  or  more  accurately  the 
possibility  of  the  approach  of  a  goods  crisis  as  compared  to  a 
capitalist  system.  However,  once  the  possibility  of  a  threat  to 
smooth  reproduction  had  been  established  the  state  in  a 
commodity-socialist  system  could  more  easily  suspend  growth  of 
production  or  reduce  it  than  a  state  in  a  capitalist  system. 
Moreover,  in  a  capitalist  economy  crisis  tends  to  spread 
spontaneously  through  the  economy,  and  localising  the  damage 
becomes  impossible.  In  the  Soviet  system  the  state  can  and  must 
limit  damage  and  prevent  spreading,  and  it  absorbs  the  loss  by 
241 distributing  it  throughout  the  entire  economy,  something  which  a 
capitalist  enterprise  cannot  do.  117 
Yurovskii  continues  by  discussing  the  consequences  of 
disproportions  and  two  views  on  the  nature  of  economic  plans. 
Planning  measures  under  state  regulation  can  have  as  their 
consequence  the  disruption  of  equilibrium  if  calculations  are 
incorrect.  The  disruption  of  equilibrium  between  the  rate  and  the 
purchasing  power  of  the  chervonets  is  not,  according  to 
Yurovskii,  caused  accidentally,  rather  it  is  the  result  of 
planning  measures  which  aim  to  maximise  use  of  the  credit  system 
for  increasing  economic  construction,  but  which  fail  to  consider 
the  effects  this  may  have  on  prices  and  equilibrium  in  the  export 
field.  Moreover,  this  disrupted  equilibrium  has  a  tendency 
towards  self-growth.  Insufficient  exports  limit  currency  receipt 
and  this  leads  to  limiting  imports  of  ready-made  goods  for  the 
internal  market.  This  in  turn  leads  to  increases  in  prices  for 
such  goods,  and  further  restricts  exports.  The  absence  of 
equilibrium  between  supply  and  demand  on  goods  markets  gives  rise 
to  many  inconveniences  which  are  all  well  known.  Yurovskii 
supports  the  policy  of  reducing  grain  procurement  prices,  but 
stresses  that  this  must  be  accompanied  by  a  reduction  in  the 
grain  selling  price,  ie  the  market  price,  to  prevent  further 
disproportions  emerging. 
118 
Yurovskii  further  notes  that  unsatisfied  demand  for  goods 
leads  to  consumer  willingness  to  pay  prices  higher  than  the  fixed 
state  price,  and  consequently  to  private  traders  taking  advantage 
of  this  fact.  A  considerable  quantity  of  goods  'leak'  from  the 
state  sector  onto  private  markets,  thus  creating  two  markets  and 
two  price  levels.  If  price  differentials  between  the  two  markets 
are  small,  then  major  problems  will  not  arise.  But  if  there  are 
large  differentials,  then  'arbitration'  between  the  two  levels 
becomes  a  job  for  a  certain  type  of  person.  There  are  also  two 
levels  of  interest  rate  on  loan  capital,  the  rate  of  Gosbank  and 
the  Joint-stock  banks  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  rate  on  the 
private  money  market  on  the  other.  This  means  that  it  is  possible 
to  make  profit  from  the  difference  in  the  rate  on  different 
markets,  and  this  stems  from  the  absence  of  equilibrium  in  the 
commodity-money  system.  From  the  point  of  view  of  state  economy 
242 this  means  that  it  must  limit  its  advantageously  priced  loans  to 
the  state  sector.  119  Generally  Yurovskii  believes  that  rate 
differentials  impair  the  distribution  of  credit  and  undermine 
trust  in  the  stability  of  the  monetary  system. 
Yurovskii  notes  that  it  is  very  tempting  to  try  to  restore 
equilibrium  through  non-market  means,  ie  through  'planned 
distribution'  or  rationing.  He  argues  that  in  fact  it  would  be 
better  to  have  goods  shortages  on  the  market  rather  than  state 
imposed  rationing.  He  gives  the  example  of  the  evolution  of 
regulation  in  the  grain  market.  The  attempt  to  impose  limits  on 
prices  and  a  tax  on  retail  trade  will  inevitably  lead,  given  the 
absence  of  equilibrium  on  grain  markets,  to  a  monopoly  of  grain 
distribution  through  rationing.  Legal  prices  lag  further  and 
further  behind  actual  prices,  thus  depriving  legal  prices  of  all 
significance,  and  finally  the  step  to  free  grain  distribution  is 
taken.  Yurovskii  believes  that  there  is  an  internal  logic  to  this 
process.  Thus  the  state  grain  monopoly  can  lead  to  the  regulation 
of  markets  in  line  with  equilibrium  or  can  remove  and  liquidate 
markets  altogether. 
120 
Yurovskii  explains  that  the  bifurcation  of  goods  and  money 
markets  which  he  speaks  of  can  be  considered  as  the  result  of  a 
struggle  of  the  planning  principle  with  the  spontaneous  principle 
in  the  Soviet  economy.  The  planning  principle  constructs  a  system 
emancipated  from  the  law  of  value,  and  with  such  a  principle 
disproportions  need  not  raise  concern,  since  they  are 
contradictions  through  which  the  economy  must  travel  in  order  to 
reach  a  moneyless  and  marketless  system.  However,  Yurovskii 
disagrees  with  this  point  of  view,  rather  he  supports  the  idea 
that  disproportions  are  essentially  a  painful  sign  of  sickness 
which  require  treatment.  The  task  is  to  overcome  the  dual  price 
structure  and  establish  equilibrium  on  markets  so  that  prices  can 
fulfil  their  function  of  balancing  supply  and  demand-121  This 
would  stop  speculative  trade  on  state  products  and  destroy  one 
source  of  accumulation  for  private  trading  capital. 
The  question  then  arises  of  at  what  price  level  and  currency 
rate  equilibrium  is  to  be  found.  Yurovskii  answers  that  it  should 
be  found  at  the  price  level  which  the  state  currently  wishes  to 
have  in  its  sector  of  the  economy,  and  consequently  this  means 
243 reducing  prices.  A  policy  of  increasing  prices  would  be  incorrect 
because  the  state  would  have  to  compensate  workers  by  increasing 
wages,  and  this  would  strengthen  the  division  between  the  rate 
and  the  purchasing  power  of  the  currency.  Disproportions  must  be 
overcome  by  moving  to  a  price  level  which  coordinates  chervonets 
parity,  ie  a  reduced  level.  122  However,  Yurovskii  stresses  that 
such  a  goal  can  only  be  accomplished  through  a  whole  series  of 
measures  which  act  on  the  composition  of  supply  and  demand  and  on 
credit  policy.  Imposed  price  reductions  decreed  by  force  with  the 
absence  of  goods  to  saturate  markets  simply  widens  disproportions 
and  thus  has  no  relation  to  the  resolution  of  these  problems.  123 
Currency  emission  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  disruption  of 
equilibrium,  and  thus  credit  and  money  policy  must  have  a 
decisive  role  to  play  in  the  restoration  of  equilibrium. 
Yurovskii  implies  that  he  favours  strict  controls  on  currency 
emission. 
This  article  shows  that  Yurovskii  was  concerned  to  ensure 
that  equilibrium  was  restored  in  the  Soviet  economy  by  such  means 
as  reducing  prices  and  strict  control  over  currency  and  credit. 
It  also  shows  that  he  believed  that  the  major  role  of  prices  was 
to  balance  supply  and  demand  on  markets,  ie  he  had  a  purely 
classical  understanding  of  prices  and  markets  in  this  respect.  As 
regards  the  socialist  element  in  the  Soviet  economy  he  saw  state 
regulation  as  this  element,  although  he  stressed  that  this  did 
not  mean  that  the  law  of  value  had  been  overcome.  However,  since 
he  agreed  that  the  Soviet  economy  in  the  1920s  was  in  a 
transitional  phase  of  development,  it  is  clear  that  this 
transition  had  to  lead  somewhere,  but  Yurovskii  does  not  outline 
how  he  sees  the  future  development  of  the  economy  after  the 
transitional  phase  was  over.  Whether  a  full  socialist  society 
would  contain  markets  and  prices  is  uncertain.  Since  it  is 
apparent  that  Yurovskii  believed  that  the  price  mechanism  was  an 
extremely  useful  economic  tool,  perhaps  it  would.  However,  what 
is  clear  is  that  Yurovskii  opposed  administrative  dictate  at  this 
time. 
244 6.2.3  -  CURRENCY  REFORM 
Yurovskii  was  closely  involved  in  the  monetary  reform  of 
1924,  and  he  analysed  his  experience  of  this  reform  in  a  book 
entitled  Denezhnaya  politika  sovetskoi  vlasti.  He  also  published 
a  book  in  English  on  this  topic  called  Currency  Problems  and 
Policy  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  1925.  In  this  work  Yurovskii  states 
that  the  change  from  War  Communism  to  NEP  implied  that  the 
peasant  held  the  right  of  private  property  over  the  product  of 
his  labour,  along  with  the  right  to  bring  this  product  on  to  the 
market. 
124  Furthermore,  enterprises  were  put  on  a  commercial 
basis  -  the  state  declined  to  guarantee  enterprises  the  means 
necessary  for  their  operation  and  excluded  them  from  the  state 
budget,  although  profits  still  had  to  be  handed  over  to  the 
state. 
125  On  3  November  1921  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars 
officially  devalued  the  ruble  so  that  one  ruble  of  the  new  issue 
was  worth  10,000  rubles  of  the  old  notes. 
Yurovskii's  explanation  of  the  effects  of  currency  emission 
rate  changes  during  this  period  is  interesting.  He  notes  that 
there  was  a  steady  increase  in  the  total  volume  of  money  in 
circulation  in  the  eighteen  months  prior  to  the  introduction  of 
NEP,  but  that  from  the  beginning  of  NEP  there  was  a  sudden  rapid 
rise  to  an  eighteen  times  increase  in  the  first  half  of  1922. 
This  monetary  issue  caused  an  increase  in  the  general  price 
level,  but  not  as  great  an  increase  as  that  which  occurred  during 
War  Communism.  In  1920/1  there  was  a  five  times  increase  in  the 
quantity  of  money  in  circulation  and  a  ten  times  increase  in  the 
price  level,  whereas  in  1921/2  there  was  a  hundred  and  thirty  six 
times  increase  in  the  quantity  of  money  and  only  a  seventy  two 
times  increase  in  prices.  Yurovskii's  explanation  for  this  is 
that  prior  to  1921  new  issue  came  upon  a  shrinking  market, 
whereas  after  1921  markets  were  expanding.  Thus  he  is  using  the 
quantity  theory  to  explain  this  phenomenon-126 
In  relation  to  the  need  for  stable  valuta,  Yurovskii  relates 
how  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars  first  stipulated  that  the 
budget  be  fixed  in  pre-war  rubles.  In  order  to  determine  the 
current  price  of  any  article  expressed  in  pre-war  rubles,  the 
current  price  was  divided  by  the  official  exchange  rate 
245 established  by  Narkomfin,  which  began  at  60,000  in  November  1921 
and  reached  200,000  in  March  1922.  The  use  of  pre-war  rubles  was 
widespread  by  the  beginning  of  1922,  but  in  March  of  that  year 
they  were  officially  discontinued,  and  there  was  thus  an  urgent 
need  for  a  new  measure  of  value. 
127  Yurovskii  relates  how  at  this 
time  there  was  debates  between  those  who  favoured  a  goods  ruble 
and  those  who  favoured  a  gold  ruble.  Those  who  favoured  the  gold 
ruble,  including  Yurovskii,  argued  that  it  was  essential  for  the 
new  currency  to  be  linked  to  world  markets,  and  that  the  only  way 
of  achieving  this  was  to  back  the  currency  with  gold.  128  Once  the 
chervonets  came  into  existence  no  definite  rate  was  set  between 
it  and  the  ordinary  ruble,  but  the  gold  currency  was  made  equal 
to  one  zolotnik  seventy  eight  dolyas  of  pure  gold,  ie  the  ten 
ruble  gold  coin  of  pre-war  mintage.  The  law  provided  for  one 
quarter  actual  gold  cover,  and  the  rest  was  covered  by  short-term 
bills  of  exchange.  129 
Yurovskii  relates  how  the  question  of  authorising  the  State 
Bank  to  issue  notes  was  raised  soon  after  its  creation  in  1921. 
In  May  1922  it  was  resolved  that  it  should  become  the  bank  of 
issue,  and  the  new  notes  were  to  be  issued  in  a  new  denomination 
called  chervonets.  The  actual  issue  of  chervonets  began  in 
November  1922,  and  by  January  1923  there  were  only  356,000  in 
circulation.  Yurovskii  presents  the  following  data  on  chervonets 
cover  between  January  1923  and  March  1924:  130 
246 Jan  '23  April  July  October  Jan  '24  March 
-0-  metal  --a-  foreign  -t'  total 
He  also  presents  the  following  data  on  the  exchange  rate  of  the 
chervonets  in  relation  to  the  pound  and  the  dollar  between 
January  1923  and  February  1924:  131 
CHERVONETS  EXCHANGE  RATE 
$&£  official  and  free 
I  )24 
247 
CHERVONETS  COVER  IN  PERCENT 
Precious  metals  and  foreign  notes 
-f  Free  $  -i-  Free  £ 
-t-  Official  $  -3--  Official  £ Yurovskii  relates  that  although  the  chervonets  was  linked  to 
gold,  since  the  gold  market  in  the  USSR  was  very  restricted  the 
price  of  gold  did  not  have  major  consequences  for  the  Soviet 
economy,  and  thus  it  was  not  enough  to  define  officially  the  gold 
value  of  the  new  currency.  Thus  the  State  Bank  set  itself  the 
task  of  creating  and  maintaining  conditions  in  which  one 
chervonets  could  purchase  a  pound  sterling,  and  for  1923  the 
average  exchange  rate  was  1.01  chervonets  to  the  pound.  132  In 
order  to  maintain  this  rate  the  State  Bank  accumulated  foreign 
currency  and  intervened  on  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Such 
intervention  took  the  following  form. 
Suppose  that  the  State  Bank  desired  a  rate  of  181  rubles  to 
the  chervonets  on  the  grounds  that  the  value  of  the  pound  on  the 
open  market  was  187  rubles.  The  Bank  could  guide  the  value  of  the 
pound  to  1.033  chervonets  by  offering  sterling  at  that  price,  or 
by  purchasing  chervonets  in  the  open  market  at  the  rate  of  181 
rubles.  Thus  in  its  attempt  to  maintain  intervaluta  parity  the 
State  Bank  made  use  of  foreign  currency  and  Soviet  money  tokens, 
although  the  money  tokens  were  discarded  in  1924.133 
Yurovskii  outlines  the  various  stages  of  the  1924  monetary 
reform  as  follows.  The  first  stage  was  a  decree  of  5  February 
1924  on  the  issue  of  new  Treasury  notes.  This  decree  did  not 
explicitly  associate  these  with  Soviet  notes  or  chervonets,  and 
the  new  notes  were  issued  in  denominations  of  five,  three,  and 
one  gold  rubles.  However,  the  value  of  this  gold  ruble  soon 
became  identical  to  the  value  of  the  chervonets.  The  second  stage 
was  a  decree  of  14  February  1924  on  discontinuing  the  printing  of 
Soviet  money  tokens.  The  third  stage  was  a  decree  of  22  February 
1924  on  the  minting  of  silver  and  copper  coins,  and  the  fourth 
stage  was  a  decree  of  7  March  1924  which  fixed  the  rate  of 
redemption  of  Soviet  money  tokens.  134  Thus  the  order  of 
replacement  of  a  fastly  depreciating  currency  with  a  new  more 
stable  one  was  as  follows.  Firstly  the  new  currency  was  issued  in 
small  amounts  and  was  backed  by  gold  and  foreign  currency,  and 
the  State  Bank  intervened  to  maintain  an  exchange  rate  of  one  to 
one  with  sterling.  Secondly  over  a  year  later  a  decree 
withdrawing  all  the  old  depreciating  currency  was  enacted.  Thus 
for  some  time  the  new  money  existed  alongside  the  old. 
248 In  Denezhnaya  pol  i  tika  sovetskoi  vlasti  Yurovskii  relates 
how  parallel  with  the  monetary  reform  other  measures  were 
adopted,  for  example  measures  to  reduce  prices.  A  decree  of  STO 
on  22  February  1924  gave  Narkomvnutorg  the  right  to  regulate 
prices  'on  all  commodities  circulating  on  internal  markets  of  the 
USSR'  and  in  particular  to  establish  'price  limits  for  wholesale, 
wholesale-retail,  and  retail  sales  and  purchases,  and  to  allow  no 
deviations  from  these  limits,.  135  Further  declarations  followed 
concerning  price  reductions  on  state  and  cooperative  goods,  and 
Yurovskii  notes  that  this  February  1924  campaign  was  the  second 
large  campaign  for  price  regulation  during  NEP,  the  first  being 
in  the  autumn  of  1923.  Yurovskii  then  goes  on  to  discuss  the 
principles  and  practical  significance  of  price  regulation  itself. 
The  Soviet  state  is  the  manager  of  a  majority  of  enterprises 
in  transport,  industry,  foreign  trade  etc,  and  the  fact  that  the 
manager  of  an  enterprise  establishes  the  prices  of  the  goods  sold 
in  that  enterprise  is  natural.  Part  of  what  is  seen  as  price 
regulation  is  therefore  unavoidable  given  state  ownership,  and  it 
would  be  incorrect  to  suppose  that  prices  established  in  this  way 
are  necessarily  different  to  those  which  would  have  been  created 
on  markets  if  ownership  had  been  private.  However,  the  Soviet 
state  as  a  monopolist  can  establish  equilibrium  between  supply 
and  demand  on  various  levels.  It  can  set  prices  within  the  limits 
of  unprofitable  production  and  unsatisfied  demand,  ie  in  relation 
to  market  conditions,  or  it  can  ignore  market  conditions 
altogether  and  disrupt  equilibrium  by  fixing  a  price  from  other 
criteria.  Yurovskii  states  that  these  two  types  of  regulation 
underlie  two  absolutely  different  systems,  as  the  first  is  normal 
in  a  particular  type  of  commodity-economy,  while  the  second  leads 
to  the  elimination  of  commodity-economy  as  seen  between  1917  and 
1920.136  These  are  the  theoretical  outlines.  Practically  various 
views  of  price  regulation  can  intertwine,  and  Yurovskii  notes 
that  the  Autumn  1923  price  regulation  occurred  in  general 
according  to  the  first  type  outlined  above,  ie  to  create  prices 
which  responded  to  market  conditions. 
Yurovskii  then  illustrates  what  effects  changes  in  supply 
and  demand  have  on  free  and  regulated  markets.  On  free  markets  a 
faster  growth  in  demand  over  supply  results  in  price  increases. 
249 On  markets  were  all  prices  are  fixed,  increased  demand  is 
expressed  not  in  increased  prices,  but  in  goods  shortages. 
Currently  many  Soviet  prices  are  partially  regulated,  and  thus 
increased  demand  leads  partially  to  price  increases  and  partially 
to  goods  shortages.  137  Thus  it  is  clear  that  for  Yurovskii  free 
markets  were  somewhat  regulated  in  the  USSR  at  this  time,  but 
that  this  regulation  was  not  totally  anti-market  in  nature. 
6.3  -  CONCLUSION 
It  is  apparent  from  the  above  presentation  of  the  views  of 
Sokol'nikov  and  Yurovskii  that  they  both  had  a  classical 
understanding  of  the  market  and  associated  notions  (eg  the 
quantity  theory  of  money  and  the  purchasing  power  parity  theory 
of  exchange  rates),  and  that  this  was  somewhat  divorced  from  the 
conventional  Bolshevik  view.  They  criticised  the  attempt  to  use 
administrative  force  to  control  the  market,  rather  they  suggested 
that  financial  policy  should  be  conducted  in  harmony  with  the 
market.  In  the  transitional  commodity-socialist  system  market 
levers  such  as  taxes,  credit  etc  should  be  used  to  influence 
production,  instead  of  imperative  economic  plans. 
However,  they  also  seemed  to  be  favourably  disposed  to 
socialism,  and  agreed  that  in  the  1920s  the  USSR  was  in  a 
transitional  stage  towards  a  more  fully  developed  socialism.  This 
can  be  seen  to  be  contradictory,  since  if  the  market  was  such  a 
useful  mechanism  for  organising  production,  why  replace  it  some 
time  in  the  future?  This  fundamental  ambiguity  pervades  much  of 
the  financial  literature  of  the  time,  and  no  doubt  was  present  in 
Narkomfin  itself.  In  a  sense  by  agreeing  that  the  current  use  of 
the  market  in  Soviet  society  was  only  transitional,  those  at 
Narkomfin  prepared  the  way  for  their  own  abolition. 
Yurovskii's  study  of  price  theory  shows  that  he  was  well 
versed  in  the  development  of  the  marginal  utility  approach. 
However,  although  Yurovskii  analyses  the  neo-classical  approach 
of  Marshall  and  Walras,  he  is  also  greatly  concerned  with 
problems  elaborated  by  classical  economists  such  as  Smith, 
Ricardo,  etc.  For  instance,  although  he  does  discuss  marginal 
utility,  more  space  is  devoted  to  specifying  various  types  of 
250 price  such  as  average  market  price,  natural  price,  dynamic 
equilibrium  price  etc.  This  latter  approach  comes  from  classical, 
not  neo-classical  theory.  It  is  thus  clear  that  while  in  Europe 
and  the  USA  by  the  1920s  neo-classical  economic  theory  had 
triumphed  over  classical,  in  Russia  the  framework  of  classical 
theory  still  held  great  sway  at  this  time. 
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1  Sokol'nikov,  Denezhnaya  reforma  (Moscow,  1925),  p.  62. 
2  Ibid,  p.  63. 
3  Ibid,  p.  128/9. 
4  Sokol'nikov,  Finansovaya  politika  revolyutsii  (Moscow: 
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NKF,  1926),  vol.  2,  p.  167. 
Ibid,  p.  176. 
6  Ibid,  p.  177. 
7  Grain  loans  were  actually  issued  in  1923.  This  section 
was  written  by  Sokol'nikov  in  February  1923.  The  following 
table  lists  the  bonds  which  were  issued  by  the  Soviet  state  up 
until  1927: 
TABLE  OF  STATE  LOANS  1922  -1926 
NAME  OF  LOAN  DATE  OF  ISSUE 
1)  First  internal  short-  20  May  1922 
term  state  grain  loan 
2)  State  lottery  loan  31  October  1922 
3)  Payment  bond  NKF  7  February  1923 
4)  Second  internal  short-  22  March  1923 
term  grain  loan 
5)  Transport  certificates  26  July  1923 
6)  Short-term  sugar  loan  15  November  1923 
7)  State  8%  internal  loan  15  February  1924 
8)  First  peasant  lottery  19  March  1924 
loan 
9)  Second  state  lottery  16  April  1924 
loan 
10)  Short-term  5%  internal  23  February  1925 
loan 
11)  Peasant  lottery  loan  15  April  1925 
second  issue 
12)  Internal  loan  for  14  August  1925 
economic  reconstruction 
13)  Second  peasant  lottery  2  October  1925 
14)  Second  state  8%  4  June  1926 
internal  loan 
15)  State  lottery  loan  3  September  1926 
NOMINAL  VALUE 
10  million  poods 
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rubles 
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50  million  rubles 
100  million 
rubles 
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rubles 
300  million 
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256 CHAPTER  SEVEN  -  CHAYANOV 
7.1  -  INTRODUCTION 
Alexander  Vasil'evich  Chayanov  (1888-1939)  studied  at  the 
Moscow  Agricultural  Institute,  and  his  teachers  included  D.  N. 
Pryanishnikov  and  A.  F.  Fortunatov.  In  April  1917  he  was  one  of 
the  founders  of  the  League  for  Agrarian  Reform,  and  became  a 
'non-party  socialist'  member  of  the  Main  Land  Committee  which 
supervised  land  reform.  He  was  also  appointed  as  assistant  to  the 
Minister  for  Agriculture  in  the  last  Provisional  Government. 
During  the  1920s  he  cooperated  critically  with  the  Bolshevik 
party  and  outlined  his  own  type  of  'cooperative  collectivisation' 
which  would  allow  elements  of  planning  to  be  introduced  into 
peasant  economy.  Between  1922  and  1930  he  served  as  Director  of 
the  Institute  of  Agricultural  Economics  of  the  Timiryazev 
Academy.  He  was  arrested  in  1930  and  died  in  a  prison  camp. 
Chayanov  was  chosen  because  since  market  elements  were  strongest 
in  the  peasant  sector  of  the  NEP  economy,  analysing  a  theorist 
concerned  primarily  with  the  peasantry  should  be  valuable  from 
the  point  of  view  of  understanding  conceptions  of  the  market. 
7.2  -  ECONOMIC  SYSTEMS 
A  good  place  to  begin  analysing  Chayanov's  theory  is  an 
article  entitled  'On  the  Theory  of  Non-Capitalist  Economic 
Systems'  of  1924.  In  this  work  Chayanov  claims  that  the  key  to 
understanding  economic  life  in  capitalism  is  the  following 
formula: 
GI  -  (ME  +  WC)  >  C.  a/100 
where  GI  =  gross  income,  ME  =  material  expenditure,  WC  =  wage 
costs,  C=  constant  and  circulating  capital,  and  a=  the  interest 
rate. 
1  By  this  equation  an  enterprise  is  considered  profitable 
when  its  gross  income,  minus  material  expenditure  and  wage  costs, 
is  equal  to  or  greater  than  the  amount  of  interest  the  capital 
could  have  yielded  during  the  particular  period  in  question.  This 
drive  for  profit  is,  according  to  Chayanov,  the  essential  feature 
257 of  capitalist  production,  and  it  clearly  requires  a  way  of 
numerically  comparing  different  economic  decisions.  This 
universal  quantifier  is  the  market,  which  allows  national  and 
international  comparison  of  profit  yields. 
Chayanov  argues  that  the  economic  theory  of  modern 
capitalist  society  is  a  complex  system  of  economic  categories  - 
price,  capital,  wages,  interest,  rent  -  inseparably 
interconnected  and  mutually  determining.  In  the  absence  of  any 
one  of  these  categories,  all  the  others  lose  their  specific 
character.  With  this  argument  Chayanov  is  able  to  limit  the 
essential  feature  of  capitalism  (the  drive  for  profit)  to  only 
those  economic  systems  where  all  such  categories  exist. 
In  relation  to  peasant  farms,  Chayanov  argues  that  one  of 
these  categories  (wages)  is  missing,  and  the  absence  of  a  labour 
market  leads  to  the  principles  on  which  peasant  farms  are  managed 
being  different  to  those  on  which  a  capitalist  enterprise  would 
be  run.  Peasant  farms  are  overwhelmingly  family  labour  farms,  and 
thus  hired  labour  was  a  rarity.  However,  if  the  labour  market  was 
absent,  then  other  markets  still  functioned  in  this  context,  for 
example  the  land  market,  commodity  markets  etc,  and  thus  while 
Chayanov  was  eliminating  a  specifically  capitalist  structure  from 
family  labour  farms,  he  was  not  excluding  markets  from  playing  an 
important  role.  This  clearly  reveals  that,  according  to  Chayanov, 
markets  functioned  separately  from  capitalism  and  had  existed 
prior  to  it.  If  capitalism  is  taken  to  mean  a  system  in  which  the 
overriding  principle  is  the  calculation  of  the  highest  possible 
profit  in  a  given  market  situation,  which  is  how  Chayanov  sees 
it,  then  it  is  logically  possible  to  substitute  another  principle 
for  'maximise  profit'  whilst  still  functioning  with  markets. 
2 
Thus  for  Chayanov  markets  are  separate  from  capitalism. 
The  question  then  arises:  what  principle(s)  are  the  family 
farm  based  on?  Chayanov  answers  that  the  degree  of  labour 
performed  is  determined  by  an  equilibrium  between  family  demand 
satisfaction  and  the  drudgery  (tyagostnost')  of  labour  itself.  3 
Since  the  drudgery  of  labour  is  a  subjective  category,  Chayanov 
is  utilising  a  non-Marxist  approach.  To  illustrate  the  different 
principles  which  capitalism  and  the  family  labour  farm  are  based 
upon,  Chayanov  writes: 
258 ...  a  capitalist  business  can  only  increase  its 
intensity  above  the  limit  of  its  optimum  capacity  if 
the  changed  market  situation  itself  pushes  the 
optimum  in  the  direction  of  greater  intensity.  In  the 
family  labour  unit,  intensification  can  also  take 
place  without  this  change  in  the  market  situation, 
simply  from  pressure  of  the  unit's  internal  forces, 
mostly  as  a  consequence  of  family  size  ... 
4 
Chayanov  does  not  relate  this  theory  to  questions  of  optimality 
in  this  context,  rather  he  is  only  concerned  to  show  the 
differing  principles  at  work.  In  relation  to  the  market  as 
determining  production  priorities,  Chayanov  writes  that  in 
relation  to  the  family  labour  farm: 
...  the  objective  arithmetic  calculation  of  highest 
possible  net  profit  in  the  given  market  situation 
does  not  determine  whether  or  not  to  accept  any 
economic  action,  nor  does  it  determine  the  whole 
activity  of  the  family  economic  unit;  this  is  done  by 
the  internal  economic  confrontation  of  subjective 
evaluations. 
5 
The  farm  attempts  to  maximise  its  'standard  of  well-being',  which 
may  or  may  not  coincide  with  a  capitalist's  attempt  to  maximise 
profit.  Instead  of  the  category  'net  profit',  which  is  what 
remains  after  capitalists  have  completed  their  accounts,  the 
family  labour  farm  has  a  'labour  product'  which  cannot  be 
disaggregated  into  constituents.  This  family  labour  product  is 
the  only  possible  category  of  income  for  a  peasant  family  labour 
farm. 
In  relation  to  price  determination  Chayanov  gives  the 
following  interesting  example.  What  determines  the  land  price  on 
peasant  farms?  Farms  which  already  have  an  amount  of  land  which 
allows  them  to  utilise  the  whole  family's  labour  power  need  not 
lease  or  buy  further  amounts  of  land,  since  this  will  appear 
irrational.  However,  farms  which  do  not  possess  an  amount  which 
allows  them  to  utilise  all  their  labour  power  will  be  interested 
in  buying  land,  and  thus  the  principle  follows  that  the  more  the 
peasant  farm  will  be  ready  to  pay  for  land,  the  less  it  owns 
already,  and  therefore  the  poorer  it  is.  6  Thus  the  price  of  land 
will  depend  on  the  extent  and  urgency  of  land  demand  among 
peasants  with  little  land,  and  the  level  of  supply  of  land. 
259 Chayanov  notes  that  other  economic  categories,  such  as  the  market 
rate  of  interest,  behave  analogously.  An  interesting  result  of 
this  theoretical  postulation  is  a  follows.  Chayanov  claims  that 
from  the  peasant  emancipation  (1861)  to  the  revolution  (1917), 
both  the  family  labour  farm  and  capitalist  large-scale 
enterprises  existed.  This  led  to  the  destruction  of  capitalism 
because  the  peasants,  relatively  short  of  land,  paid  higher  rates 
for  the  land  than  the  capitalised  rent  in  capitalist  agriculture. 
Thus  this  led  to  the  sale  of  large  landed  property  to  peasants 
and  the  ousting  of  capitalism  by  peasant  economy.  7  Chayanov  also 
discusses  in  this  article  a  system  where  commodity  exchange  is 
absent  and  consequently  there  is  no  category  of  market  price.  In 
such  a  system  the  economic  equilibrium  between  demand 
satisfaction  and  drudgery  of  labour  still  plays  the  determining 
role,  but  price  is  not  a  mediating  category  which  enters  into 
calculation.  According  to  Chayanov  demographic  factors  are  very 
important  in  this  case. 
8 
Chayanov  then  discusses  the  slave  system  and  determination 
of  the  market  price  in  such  a  system.  The  market  price  for  a 
slave  tends  to  an  amount  similar  to  the  capitalised  rent  of  the 
marginal  slave.  This  would  be  the  demand  price,  whilst  the  prime 
cost  of  slave  production  forms  the  supply  price.  Chayanov 
distinguishes  between  two  systems  of  slave  economy  -  where  slaves 
are  captured  through  war  and  plunder,  and  where  slaves  are 
reproduced  within  the  slave  family.  In  the  former  case  the  prime 
cost  of  slave  production  is  the  cost  of  capture,  in  the  latter 
case  it  is  the  cost  of  raising.  Chayanov  writes: 
... 
the  slave  price,  as  a  phenomenon  subject  to  the 
laws  of  the  market,  is  an  objective  category  which 
determines  slave  production...  the  slave  economic  unit 
...  can  appear  advantageous  only  as  slave  production 
yields  a  net  product  that  does  not  amount  to  less 
than  the  slave  rent  that  exists.  .  .  and,  through  the 
market,  is  realised  in  the  slave  price. 
9 
Thus  Chayanov  implies  that  the  market  and  market  price 
determination  functioned  in  slave  society.  In  general  it  is  clear 
that  Chayanov  sees  the  market  and  capitalism  as  not  identical, 
and  thus  a  market  economy  and  a  capitalist  economy  could  be  two 
260 different  systems.  Markets  can  exist  outside  of  capitalism, 
although  capitalism  would  require  markets  to  function. 
In  this  article  on  comparative  economic  systems  Chayanov 
also  discusses  communism,  or  state  collectivism.  In  this  system 
all  the  economic  fundamentals  of  capitalism  -  capital,  interest, 
wages,  rent  -  are  completely  eliminated,  and  thus  exchange  and 
price  drop  out  of  the  system.  Manufactured  products  cease  to  be 
values  in  a  money  or  exchange  sense,  rather  they  are  goods 
distributed  according  to  a  state  consumption  plan: 
The  exertion  of  social  labour  power  is  here, 
obviously,  as  in  the  family  unit,  taken  to  a  point 
where  the  equilibrium  between  drudgery  of  labour  and 
social  demand  satisfaction  has  been  reached.  This 
point  is,  obviously,  fixed  by  those  state  organs 
which  work  out  the  state  production  and  consumption  10 
plans... 
Here  Chayanov  seems  to  be  implying  that  the  state  planners  will 
aggregate  the  entire  population's  drudgery  of  labour  and  demand 
satisfaction  curves,  and  where  these  two  curves  meet  will  be  the 
point  to  which  labour  is  taken.  This  may  be  disaggregated  at 
branch  or  republic  level,  but  the  interesting  point  is  that 
Chayanov  is  implying  that  communist  planners  will  use  tools  of 
economic  analysis  developed  by  the  marginal  utility  school. 
11  It 
is  clear  that  Chayanov  gave  no  role  to  markets  in  communism. 
Chayanov  notes  that,  in  contrast  to  all  the  systems  he  has 
discussed  previously  and  which  exist  purely  automatically,  a 
communist  economic  order  requires  continuous  social  exertion  and 
a  number  of  economic  and  non-economic  sanctions  to  prevent  the 
rise  of  economic  activity  not  intended  by  the  state  plan. 
12  By 
what  means  are  the  individual  workers  to  be  driven  to  labour  so 
that  the  input  expected  of  them  by  the  plan  is  actually  carried 
out  in  practice?  Chayanov  writes  that  the  theorists  of  communism 
have  yet  to  solve  this  problem. 
Chayanov's  conception  of  the  feudal  economic  system  is 
interesting  in  relation  to  price  determination.  According  to 
Chayanov  the  feudal  economy  is  a  symbiosis  of  the  natural  labour 
economy  of  tribute-paying  peasants  and  the  monetary  and  exchange 
economy  of  the  commodity-trading  feudal  lords.  Therefore  it  has 
two  systems  of  economic  categories  intertwined.  A  fief  system  is 
261 a  special  form  of  feudal  economy  in  which  the  basic  stratum  of 
primary  producers  pay  tributes  to  the  feudal  lords  in  kind,  while 
the  recipients  of  these  tributes  realise  them  as  commodities  on 
distant  markets.  In  this  system: 
...  the  economic  activities  of  the  feudal  lord  and  his 
intervention  on  the  market  is  almost  always  condemned 
to  be  passive.  The  prices  of  his  goods  are  not 
connected  with  their  production  and  are  wholly 
determined  by  the  receptiveness  of  the  market...  13 
Excluding  the  cost  of  production  element  from  price  determination 
thus  produces  a  peculiar  system  of  price  formation  specific  to 
this  type  of  feudal  economy.  The  distinction  between  market  maker 
and  market  taker  is  thus  used  by  Chayanov  to  assist  in  explaining 
the  feudal  economic  system  and  the  type  of  price  formation  which 
occurs  in  it. 
7.3  -  PEASANT  ECONOMY  AND  MARKET  STRUCTURE 
One  of  Chayanov's  major  works  was  his  Organizatsiya 
krest'yanskogo  khozyaistva  of  1925.  This  work  was  intended  to 
explore  in  detail  the  family  labour  farm  and  the  organisational 
principles  upon  which  it  was  based.  However,  before  going  into 
the  detail  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  basic  ideas  of  this  work 
were,  according  to  Chayanov,  put  forth  as  early  as  1912,  and 
these  ideas  were  brought  forth  by  the  deep  changes  which  occurred 
after  the  1905  revolution. 
14  Thus  its  relevance  to  NEP  Russia  is 
debatable.  However,  since  many  Marxists  such  as  Kritsman  took 
Chayanov's  work  seriously  during  NEP  and  subjected  it  to  detailed 
criticism,  it  seems  clear  that  the  issues  which  Chayanov 
discusses  were  of  direct  relevance  to  this  period. 
Chayanov  places  the  development  of  an  internal  market  for 
agricultural  produce  in  Russia  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth 
century.  From  this  point  market  relations  and  the  commodity 
nature  of  peasant  farming  rapidly  developed.  15  However,  this  does 
not  necessarily  mean  that  the  family  labour  farm  is  being  eroded, 
since  this  type  of  farm  can  enter  into  various  different  economic 
systems.  It  can  be  the  basis  of  a  natural  economy  or  a  feudal 
262 economy,  and  at  present  it  is  being  drawn  into  the  system  of  the 
capitalist  commodity  market. 
16 
Chayanov  outlines  the  process  by  which  scattered  peasant 
farms  are  brought  into  a  market  system  as  follows.  It  need  not 
involve  the  creation  of  large-scale  capitalistically  organised 
production  units,  but  rather  trading  capital  draws  masses  of 
isolated  peasant  farms  into  its  sphere  of  influence  and  binds 
these  producers  to  the  market.  These  trading  links  convert  the 
natural  family  farm  into  a  small  commodity  producer  and  thus  open 
the  path  for  the  penetration  of  capitalist  relations  into  the 
countryside: 
Through  these  connections  every  small  peasant 
undertaking  becomes  an  organic  part  of  the  world 
economy..  . 
is  powerfully  directed  in  its  organisation 
by  the  capitalist  world's  economic  demands,  and  in 
its  turn,  together  with  millions  like  it,  affects  the 
whole  system  of  the  world  economy.  7 
Chayanov  notes  that  the  system  of  the  local  rural  bazaar,  at 
which  the  peasant  sells  his  harvest  and  buys  what  he  needs,  has 
been  little  studied.  This  bazaar  is  the  'primary  cell'  of  market 
infrastructure  which  connects  the  various  parts  of  the  general 
economic  organism.  G.  I.  Baskin  studied  grain  sales  in  Samara 
guberniya,  and  came  up  with  the  network  of  trading  links  shown 
overleaf. 
Observations  of  local  life  show  that  the  bazaar  site  is  a 
concentration  of  all  local  trading,  cooperative,  business,  and 
even  spiritual  life  for  its  catchment  area,  since  the  area's 
inhabitants  are  united  by  the  bazaar  where  they  invariably  meet. 
In  turn,  the  local  bazaars  are  connected  to  larger  centres  of 
wholesale  trade,  and  through  this  network  a  national  economic 
whole  is  constructed  from  dispersed  peasant  farms.  Chayanov  notes 
five  basic  steps  taken  by  the  commodity  in  this  trading  network: 
1)  the  commodity,  scattered  among  individual  producers,  is 
collected  by  jobbing  buyers  and  dealers  and  is  concentrated 
into  their  hands; 
2)  commodities  collected  by  the  buyers  are  roughly  sorted  and 
transported  to  local  wholesale  trade  centres; 
3)  in  these  wholesale  centres  commodities  are  sorted  and 
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7.  k distributed  for  onward  transmission; 
4)  commodities  collected  are  sorted  and  transferred  to  local 
consumer  wholesale  centres; 
5)  from  these  local  wholesale  centres  commodities  are  distributed 
with  the  help  of  the  trade  distribution  network  -  local 
stallholders  and  traders. 
This  is  the  general  scheme,  but  according  to  the  particular 
commodity  the  scheme  can  change  form  and  take  on  individual 
features.  Chayanov  compares  the  hay,  meat,  and  flax  markets.  The 
organisation  of  the  hay  market  is  simple,  since  the  greater  part 
of  the  commodity  passes  directly  from  producer  to  consumer.  This 
is  illustrated  as  follows:  18 
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The  meat  market,  however,  is  more  complex.  Before  the  war 
livestock,  fattened  on  landowners'  or  peasant  farms,  was  bought 
up  locally  by  dealers  and  then  taken  to  the  next  market  in 
Moscow.  At  this  market  the  livestock  passed  into  the  hands  of 
large-scale  traders,  and  these  traders  sold  the  livestock  to 
slaughterers,  who  cut  up  the  animal  into  parts.  Different  parts 
were  sent  to  different  places,  for  example  the  offal  went  to 
gelatin  and  other  factories  and  the  meat  went  to  butchers  and 
canning  factories.  This  structure  is  shown  as  follows:  19 
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Hides,  flax,  cotton,  and  other  similar  commodities  give  a  still 
more  complicated  picture.  Chayanov  notes  that  this  market 
structure  varies  according  to  region.  For  example  in  the  Western 
flax-producing  areas  which  serve  the  world  market  there  are  many 
middlemen  and  a  complex  web  of  market  relations  exists.  Flax 
brought  to  the  bazaar  by  the  peasant  falls  into  the  hands  of 
small-scale  buyers,  who  after  sorting  sell  to  local  town  traders 
or  foreign  export  agents.  Arriving  in  Western  Europe  the  flax 
again  passes  from  hand  to  hand  until  it  finally  reaches  the  mill. 





Frequently  this  trading  machinery,  concerned  about  quality 
standards,  actively  interferes  in  the  organisation  of  production. 
It  may  lay  down  technical  conditions,  issue  seed,  or  determine 
the  rotation  of  crops. 
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nFAI  FRS This  quite  detailed  breakdown  of  market  structure  by 
Chayanov  shows  that  the  'place'  meaning  of  the  market  was  very 
important  to  Russian  agricultural  analysis  in  the  first  part  of 
the  twentieth  century.  In  a  sense  it  can  be  regarded  as  the  base 
meaning  which  other  conceptions  are  built  upon,  since  without 
concrete  markets  where  products  are  exchanged  the  notion  of  the 
market  determining  production  priorities  would  not  make  sense. 
However,  Chayanov  does  not  link  the  'place'  conception  to  any 
other  conception,  nor  does  he  examine  the  notion  of  a  market 
mechanism  in  any  detail.  The  idea  of  maximising  profit  is  present 
in  his  work,  but  how  this  leads  to  certain  production  priorities 
being  chosen,  or  whether  these  priorities  are  rational,  are  not 
questions  which  Chayanov  poses  in  this  particular  work.  As  I  show 
further  on,  he  does  discuss  these  questions  in  other  works. 
In  a  work  entitled  Osnovye  idei  i  formy  organizatsii 
sel'skokhozyaistvennoi  kooperatsii  of  1927,  which  was  a  revised 
and  supplemented  edition  of  a  book  first  published  in  1919, 
Chayanov  discusses  market  structure  in  relation  to  peasant 
cooperatives.  This  work  was  partly  a  practical  guide  to 
cooperative  organisation,  and  in  it  Chayanov  writes: 
The  size  and  breadth  of  the 
important  preconditions  for 
cooperative  principles.  We 
cooperative  organisation  of 
product  will  be  easier,  the 
capacity  of  its  market. 
20 
market  is  one  of  the  most 
its  organisation  on 
may  assert  that  the 
the  marketing  of  any 
greater  the  absorptive 
In  a  small  market  where  demand  can  be  satisfied  very  rapidly,  the 
fortuitous  accumulation  of  a  product  will  overload  the  market  and 
lead  to  a  fall  in  prices.  Chayanov  gives  the  example  of  the  fresh 
milk  market  in  a  small  town.  At  first  the  market  is  found  to  be 
adequate,  but  as  the  cooperative  business  develops  the  market 
becomes  saturated  with  milk  and  the  cooperative  has  to  change 
over  to  supplying  butter  -a  product  with  a  wider  market. 
Apart  from  the  capacity  of  the  market,  much  depends  on  the 
degree  of  flexibility  in  consumption  of  the  product.  Neither  a 
rise  in  price  nor  a  decline  in  well-being  can  lead  to  any  drastic 
change  in  the  consumption  of  grain  products.  A  different  state  of 
affairs  prevails  in  relation  to  sugar  or  cotton  markets,  where 
266 consumption  rates  are  highly  flexible.  In  this  latter  case  a  high 
elasticity  in  consumption  rate  exists.  Chayanov  declares  that  the 
greater  the  flexibility  of  consumption  of  a  product  the  greater 
the  capacity  of  the  market  for  that  product  will  be.  The  social 
composition  of  consumers  affects  market  capacity  also.  If  a 
product  is  consumed  only  be  the  prosperous  stratum  of  society  (eg 
expensive  fruits,  silk  etc)  then  the  market  will  have  only  a 
small  capacity.  Hence  the  greater  the  number  of  consumers  the 
greater  the  market's  absorptive  capacity. 
Apart  from  market  capacity  the  successful  cooperative 
organisation  of  marketing  depends  on  the  conditions  of  the 
commercial  organisation  of  the  market  itself,  and  on  the  kind  of 
trade  routes  the  commodity  travels.  For  example  the  nature  of  the 
market's  financial  and  credit  structure  is  of  great  importance 
for  the  organisers  of  cooperative  marketing.  When  studying  market 
organisation  the  following  points  should  be  kept  in  mind: 
1)  to  what  extent  monopoly  conditions  exist  and  how  sharp  is  the 
competition  between  buyers  and  sellers.  An  increase  in  the 
number  of  buyers  and  sellers  will  tend  to  favour  cooperative 
marketing; 
2)  the  extent  of  credit  settlements  on  the  market.  Where 
cooperatives  are  entering  the  market  as  wholesalers  the  work 
will  be  easier  the  more  widespread  is  the  practise  of  cash 
settlements; 
3)  the  organisation  of  the  market  on  cooperative  principles  will 
be  easier  the  lower  the  levels  of  capital  being  used  by 
private  traders; 
4)  the  speed  of  travel  through  the  market  affects  the  relative 
monetary  weakness  of  cooperatives; 
5)  cooperative  marketing  will  be  most  successful  where  trading 
techniques  are  the  most  elementary. 
21 
Chayanov  relates  that  a  cooperative  organiser  who  hopes  to 
replace  the  existing  commercial  apparatus  has  to  ascertain  what 
function  is  performed  by  each  component  of  this  apparatus,  and 
has  to  decide  what  kind  of  cooperative  organ  will  undertake  this 
function.  The  local  cattle-dealer  will  be  replaced  by  the  local 
cooperative.  The  local  wholesale  trader  will  be  replaced  by  the 
local  territorial  association,  and  the  export  office  by  this 
267 association  at  a  higher  level.  Chayanov  relates  this  structure 
diagrammatically  as  follows:  22 
Regional  co  operatives  ý"` 
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Cooperative  organisers  should  not  slavishly  imitate  the 
commercial  apparatus,  but  should  adapt  this  apparatus  to  its  own 
requirements.  Organisational  forms  are  also  affected  by  the 
fundamental  difference  in  nature  between  cooperative  and  private 
trade.  Cooperatives  never  conduct  purely  commercial  operations, 
that  is  they  never  purchase  with  a  view  to  re-selling  at  a  higher 
price.  Cooperative  purchasing  must  provide  the  peasantry  with 
good  quality  products  at  the  lowest  possible  prices. 
The  organisation  of  the  market  over  time  is  also  very. 
important  to  the  organisation  tasks  of  cooperation.  Different 
agricultural  products  are  produced  in  peasant  households  at 
different  times,  and  these  products  are  delivered  to  the  market 
with  varying  degrees  of  rapidity.  For  example  existing  data 
indicates  that  the  peak  periods  of  delivery  are  August  and 
September  in  the  case  of  grain,  December  and  January  for  flax, 
and  May  and  June  for  fresh  milk  in  Moscow.  Delivery  of  meat 
varies  according  to  the  fodder  base  used:  in  the  case  of 
grasslands  deliveries  are  greatest  in  the  summer,  in  the  case  of 
sugar  beet  deliveries  are  greatest  in  winter. 
23 
The  problem  of  determining  the  selling  price  of  a  good  sold 
cooperatively  is  the  problem  of  determining  the  highest  price  at 
which  the  good  can  be  sold  on  the  market.  The  basis  for  price 
calculation  is  the  valuation  given  to  the  goods  when  they  are 
accepted  by  the  selling  cooperative,  combined  with  the  overhead 
268 trading  expenses  borne  by  the  cooperative  apparatus.  These  two 
amounts  added  together  represent  the  limit  below  which  prices 
must  not  be  allowed  to  fall.  However,  this  is  only  the  lower 
limit,  and  the  whole  art  of  cooperative  selling  is  to  try  to 
raise  the  price  as  much  as  possible  above  this  level.  Chayanov 
notes  that  only  a  central  organisation  which  can  follow  the  state 
of  the  markets  is  capable  of  finding  the  correct  price  level.  24 
The  analysis  of  markets  found  in  Osnovnye  idei  shows  that 
Chayanov's  theoretical  conception  of  the  market  as  outlined  in 
Organizatsiya  krest'yanskogo  khozyaistva  was  also  of  use  when  it 
came  to  the  practical  task  of  organising  agricultural 
cooperatives.  The  breakdown  of  market  structure  allowed  Chayanov 
to  recommend  that  cooperatives  should  try  to  imitate  the 
configuration  of  private  trade  in  some  respects,  and  the  analysis 
of  market  capacity  was  a  method  by  which  cooperatives  could 
tailor  their  supply  to  the  demands  of  consumers.  These  practical 
conceptions  of  the  market  contrast  quite  strongly  with  the  more 
theoretical  view  of  the  market  as  an  optimality  mechanism,  a 
conception  which  Chayanov  does  not  mention  in  his  work  on  peasant 
cooperatives. 
Within  Chayanov's  family  labour  farm  system  pride  of  place 
in  determining  the  amount  of  production  undertaken  is  given  to 
the  labour-consumer  balance  -  work  is  undertaken  until  the 
farmers  subjective  evaluation  of  the  drudgery  of  the  marginal 
labour  expended  outweighs  his  subjective  evaluation  of  the  gain 
obtained  by  the  marginal  good. 
25  However,  this  was  not  the  only 
determining  factor.  Chayanov  writes: 
Among...  differences  in  the  farm's  organisational 
plan,  the  most  basic  one  which  determines  the  whole 
character  of  the  farm's  structure  is  the  degree  to 
which  the  farm  is  linked  with  the  market  -  the 
development  of  commodity  production  in  it.  26 
This  may  be  seen  as  a  concession  to  his  critics,  who  had  accused 
him  of  neglect  of  this  aspect  of  economic  life.  27  The  market 
influences  peasant  production,  according  to  Chayanov,  by  allowing 
the  farm  to  neglect  production  of  certain  products  which  can 
easily  be  obtained  on  the  market,  and  thus  to  concentrate  on 
goods  which  yield  a  healthy  return.  Geographical  locality  plays  a 
269 very  important  role  in  this  process  -  farms  close  to  trading 
centres  can  afford  to  specialise  more  than  farms  situated  at  a 
distance  from  such  centres.  The  following  table  shows  the 
percentage  of  in  kind  and  in  money  incomings  and  outgoings  for 
various  areas  of  Russia:  28 
INCOMINGS  OUTGOINGS 
UEZDS  in  kind  in  money  in  kind  in  money 
Volokolamsk  55.8  44.2  52.7  47.3 
Gzhatsk  65.6  34.4  64.8  35.2 
Porech'e  75.8  24.2  76.0  24.0 
Sychevka  62.7  37.3  63.0  37.0 
Vel'sk  72.2  27.8  42.0  58.0 
Chayanov  takes  two  extreme  cases  -a  Tot'ma  farm  where  22%  of  the 
budget  is  in  money,  and  a  Volokolamsk  farm  where  61%  is  in  money 
-  and  shows  that  this  affects  the  types  of  produce  cultivated  on 
the  farms.  In  the  former  case  87%  of  the  produce  is  prepared  for 
in-farm  consumption,  whereas  in  the  latter  case  this  figure  is 
39.6%.  Commodity  type  farms  are  also  distinguished  from 
nonmonetary  farms  by  the  character  of  the  economic  calculation 
they  use.  In  the  nonmonetary  farm  qualitative  calculation 
predominates  -  it  is  necessary  to  obtain  that  amount  of  produce 
which  satisfies  the  internal  needs  of  the  farm.  In  this  type  of 
farm  questions  such  as  whether  it  is  more  advantageous  to  sow  rye 
or  mow  hay  would  not  arise,  since  they  could  not  replace  each 
other  and  could  not  be  quantitatively  evaluated  through  market 
price. 
29  In  a  monetarised  farm  concern  with  quantity  becomes 
paramount  -  concern  for  maximising  the  price  obtained  for 
products  sold.  As  the  degree  of  monetarisation  grows,  the  farmers 
become  less  concerned  with  what  they  actually  produce,  and  more 
concerned  that  what  they  produce  obtains  a  good  market  price. 
Thus  the  market  conjuncture  affects  their  decisions  about  which 
crops  to  grow.  According  to  Chayanov  this  is  the  internal 
organisational  and  economic  meaning  of  the  transition  from  a 
nonmonetary  farm  to  a  commodity  one. 
30 
Chayanov  actually  advocated  using  the  market  to  calculate 
which  crops  are  the  most  advantageous  and  thus  to  plan  farm 
development.  Long-term  changes  in  conjuncture  alter  the 
270 comparative  advantage  of  various  crops,  and  institutes  of  market 
forecasting,  observing  these  shifts: 
...  ought  in  future  to  be  responsible  for  a  constant 
watch  on  the  probable  profitability  of  different 
crops,  and  by  this  comparative  analysis  give  a 
pointer  to  the  practical  workers  in  agriculture  as  to 
the  selection  of  the  annual  direction  of  their 
economic  work. 
31 
This  idea  cuts  across  a  simple  opposition  of  plan  to  market, 
rather  it  implies  that  the  market  can  be/is  used  as  a  form  of 
planning.  This  assumes  that  the  market  gives  a  rational  and 
correct  evaluation  of  the  needs  of  consumers,  and  thus  conflicts 
with  the  Marxist  notion  of  the  market  as  being  irrational  and 
contrary  to  human  need.  Chayanov  does  not  seem  to  link  the  market 
with  exploitation,  and  thus  his  conception  of  the  market  in  this 
context  is  of  an  economic  mechanism  for  evaluating  the 
comparative  advantages  of  various  crops.  This  corresponds  to  the 
neo-classical  view  which  argues  that  the  market  achieves  optimal 
resource  allocation,  and  thus  Marxists  who  accused  Chayanov  of 
being  close  the  Austrian  school  were  not  totally  incorrect.  These 
assumptions  are  implicit  in  Chayanov's  work  rather  than  being 
explicitly  stated. 
It  is  worth  examining  how  Chayanov  theorised  the  difference 
between  family  labour  farms  and  capitalist  farms  in  more  detail. 
A  key  aspect  of  the  labour  farm  was  that  the  person  who  decided 
what  to  produce  from  the  supply  side  and  the  person  who  decided 
how  much  was  required  for  consumption  from  the  demand  side  was 
united  into  a  single  figure  -  the  head  of  the  farm.  Thus  it  was  a 
question  of  balancing  these  two  requirements.  Chayanov  theorised 
this  as  the  labour-consumption  balance,  in  which  necessary  goods 
produced  are  weighed  against  the  drudgery  of  labour  required  to 
produce  them. 
However,  since  the  internal  composition  of  the  family  farm 
did  not  remain  static  during  its  existence,  the  equilibrium  point 
would  shift  in  relation  to  family  size.  Chayanov  constructed  a 
model  of  family  dynamics  from  budget  studies  in  which  a  surviving 
child  is  born  every  third  year  into  a  young  family  that  has  just 
been  established,  and  where  the  cycle  of  existence  lasts  twenty 
271 five  years.  32  From  this  model  Chayanov  deduced  that  in  the  first 
years  of  the  family's  existence  it  becomes  ever  more  burdened 
with  children  unable  to  work,  and  there  is  consequently  a  rapid 
increase  in  the  proportion  of  consumers  to  workers.  In  the 
fifteenth  year,  however,  children  begin  coming  on-line  as 
workers,  and  thus  the  consumer-worker  ratio  begins  to  fall.  From 
this  point  onwards  the  ratio  falls  consistently  as  more  children 
grow  up  and  begin  working.  Chayanov  represents  this  process 
graphically  as  follows: 
CONSUMER-WORKER  RATIO 
Years  of  family's  existence 
-}  CONSUM.  f  WORKER.  -*-  C/W  RAT. 
Clearly  this  model  is  based  on  a  number  of  simplifying 
assumptions  which  may  not  be  met  in  reality,  but  the  important 
point  which  Chayanov  draws  from  this  model  is  that  each  family, 
depending  on  its  age  and  thus  its  consumer-worker  ratio,  will  be 
a  completely  distinct  labour  machine  as  regards  labour  force  and 
intensity  of  demand,  and  thus  the  point  of  labour-consumption 
balance  will  vary  depending  on  family  composition.  Chayanov 
writes: 
Since  the  labour  family's  basic  stimulus  to  economic 
activity  is  the  necessity  to  satisfy  the  demands  of 
its  consumers.  .  .  we  ought  to  expect  the  family's 
272 volume  of  economic  activity  to  quantitatively 
correspond  more  or  less  to  these  basic  elements  of 
family  composition. 
33 
Thus  what  drives  the  family  farm  is  not  maximising  profit,  but 
maximising  family  demand  satisfaction. 
So,  how  is  all  this  related  to  the  market?  Chayanov  has 
constructed  a  theory  which  shows  why  peasant  farmers  will  behave 
differently  to  capitalist  farmers  on  the  market.  An  important 
example  which  Chayanov  gives  of  this  differing  behaviour, 
confirmed  by  direct  observation,  is  as  follows.  If,  as  a  result 
of  an  improvement  in  the  market  situation  or  a  more  advantageous 
farm  location,  each  labour  unit  begins  to  yield  greater  earnings, 
the  total  earnings  of  the  farm  will  of  course  increase,  but  not 
at  the  speed  at  which  the  productivity  of  a  labour  unit 
increases.  Consequently,  the  number  of  labour  units  sold  falls. 
In  this  example  the  peasant  is  making  use  of  the  favourable 
market  conjuncture  by  reducing  the  number  of  hours  worked,  thus 
reducing  drudgery  of  labour,  despite  the  tendency  of  a  capitalist 
farmer  to  increase  production  in  such  a  favourable  market 
situation.  34  This  is  a  clear  example  how  the  logic  of  the 
situation  for  a  peasant  on  a  family  labour  farm  differs  from  that 
of  an  entrepreneur  on  a  capitalist  farm. 
This  reveals  a  very  important  point.  While  markets  may  have 
existed  prior  to  capitalism  or  even  commodity  production,  this 
does  not  mean  that  economic  subjects  behaved  identically  to 
subjects  in  a  capitalist  system  on  these  markets.  Behavioural 
diversity  on  markets  is  caused  by  the  structure  of  the  economic 
units  in  which  particular  subjects  are  embedded.  35  Again  this 
reveals  Chayanov's  separation  of  markets  from  capitalism  implicit 
throughout  his  works.  It  would  be  possible  to  argue  that 
behavioural  differences  on  markets  are  caused  by  the  relation  of 
producer  and  consumer  in  an  economic  system.  In  capitalism  the 
entrepreneur  is  separated  from  the  worker,  thus  allowing  the 
principle  'maximise  profit'  to  be  implemented  without  regard  for 
workers'  drudgery  of  labour.  However,  in  the  family  labour  farm 
the  producer  and  consumer  are  united,  thus  forcing  a  balance 
between  satisfaction  of  demand  and  drudgery  of  labour.  This  type 
of  analysis  seems  also  to  be  implicit  in  Chayanov's  theory. 
273 Chayanov  was  also  concerned  in  his  theorising  of  peasant 
economy  with  the  question  of  the  optimal  size  of  agricultural 
enterprises.  He  first  published  an  essay  on  this  topic  in  1922, 
and  revised  this  work  to  form  Optimal  'nye  razmery  sei  'skogo- 
khozyaistvennikh  predpriyatii  of  1928.  The  question  of  the 
optimal  size  of  farms  Chayanov  considered  to  be  the  problem  of 
finding  such  a  size  of  farm  land  on  which  the  prime  cost  of 
produce  would  be  minimised. 
36  This  also  corresponds  to  the  point 
at  which  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  small  and  large 
scale  farms  are  equalised.  Chayanov  plotted  prime  cost  per  unit 
against  farm  size,  and  the  minima  on  the  aggregate  cost  curve 
corresponded  to  the  point  of  optimal  size.  He  disaggregated  this 
curve  into  three  components:  a)  those  elements  whose  costs 
decrease  under  increasing  farm  size,  such  as  costs  of  machinery, 
utilisation  of  buildings,  and  administrative  expenses,  the  curve 
of  which  declines  with  increasing  size;  b)  those  elements  which 
have  increasing  costs  in  relation  to  farm  size,  such  as  inter- 
farm  transport  and  losses  from  less  intense  supervision,  the 
curve  of  which  ascends  with  increasing  farm  size;  c)  those 
elements  which  do  not  change,  the  curve  of  which  is  a  horizontal 
straight  line.  Aggregating  these  elements  produces  the  total  cost 
curve. 
However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  costs  of  such 
elements  are  likely  to  change  with  the  market  conjuncture. 
Chayanov  recognised  this,  and  showed  that  in  relation  to  the 
industrial/agricultural  price  axis,  an  increase  in  the  price  of 
industrial  machinery  would  increase  the  costs  of  agricultural 
production  and  consequently  reduce  the  optimal  farm  size.  This 
reasoning  reveals  that  the  optimum  which  Chayanov  was  examining 
was  a  relative  optimum,  relative  to  market  conjuncture.  Such  an 
analysis  does  not  show,  or  claim  to  show,  that  a  market  system  of 
agriculture  produces  optimal  (or  non-optimal)  results.  Most 
Soviet  agrarian  studies  at  this  time  were  concerned  with  the 
question  of  differentiation  in  relation  to  the  development  of 
capitalism  in  agriculture,  or  with  the  level  of  'exploitation' 
(labour  market)  which  had  developed.  The  question  of  whether 
capitalism  was  optimal  in  any  sense  may  have  seemed  somewhat 
absurd  in  relation  to  the  extremely  poor  working  conditions 
274 suffered  by  many  workers,  and  thus  may  not  have  been  taken 
seriously  at  this  time. 
7.4  -  FORMS  OF  OWNERSHIP 
Before  the  1917  revolution  Chayanov  had  been  a  leading 
member  of  the  League  of  Agrarian  Reform,  a  body  which  argued  for 
change  in  agricultural  forms  of  production.  In  a  work  called  Chto 
takoe  agrarnyi  vopros?  of  1917,  which  bore  the  imprint  of  the 
League  for  Agrarian  Reform,  Chayanov  outlined  various  reform 
scenarios.  He  argued  that  a  reform  of  land  utilisation  is 
unthinkable  without  a  restructuring  of  economic  organisation, 
which  meant  resurveying,  land  improvement,  agronomical  reform, 
and  production  and  credit  reforms. 
37  Thus  land  reform  must  occur 
not  by  a  non-organised  path,  but  on  the  basis  of  a  state  plan  for 
rural  reconstruction,  elaborated  on  the  basis  of  the  social  and 
economic  features  of  various  regions. 
38  Chayanov  then  outlines 
the  basic  types  of  state  resolution  of  the  agrarian  question. 
The  most  distinct  from  the  existing  agrarian  order  is  the 
idea  of  socialisation  (sotsializatsiya)  of  land.  With  this  idea 
land  becomes  all-people's  property  (obshchenarodnym  dostoyaniem), 
and  it  is  possessed  (dostoyaniem)  but  not  owned 
(sobstvennost'yu).  39  For  the  organisation  of  this  the  peasantry 
are  united  on  the  basis  of  organs  of  land  self-management 
(obshchiny)  into  the  hands  of  which  the  state  transfers  land. 
Because  the  land  is  free  it  cannot  become  property 
(sobstvennost'),  it  cannot  posses  value,  and  it  is  utilised  free 
of  charge.  State  and  local  taxes  are  levied  on  farms,  but  not  on 
land. 
A  completely  different  theoretical  possibility  is  the  idea 
of  nationalisation  (natsionalizatsiya)  of  land.  In  this  case 
value  is  not  ousted  as  a  social  category,  and  land  rent  is  paid 
since  land  still  remains  property.  However,  in  this  case  the 
property  lies  with  a  single  owner  -  the  state. 
40  The  state  as 
owner  receives  the  following  rights: 
1)  the  right  to  all  land  rent  for  use  as  a  source  of  state 
finance; 
275 2)  the  right  to  direct  land  use  in  the  interests  of  the  state. 
Using  these  rights  the  state  leases  out  land  to  working  farms, 
who  in  turn  pay  the  state  an  agreed  sum.  One  of  the  forms  of 
nationalisation,  under  which  local  land  is  directed  by  local 
organs  of  land  self-management  the  rights  of  which  are  limited 
only  by  all-state  laws  on  land,  is  municipalisation 
(munitsipalizatsiya)  of  land.  In  this  case  land  rent  is  paid  to 
the  local  organs  of  self-management.  These  are  the  basic  ideas  of 
land  construction  which  are  most  discussed  in  socialist 
circles.  41 
An  especially  interesting  idea  is  that  to  solve  the  agrarian 
problem  state  reorganisation  of  the  existing  system  of  land  use 
is  not  required,  rather  what  is  needed  is  the  creation  of  such 
conditions  under  which  spontaneous  processes  of  national-economic 
evolution  themselves  would  establish  the  ideal  forms.  This  idea 
has  received  the  most  attention  by  several  economists  in  the 
formula  of  a  system  of  state  regulation  of  land  ownership.  42 
Under  this  scheme  private  ownership  is  not  destroyed,  but  the 
right  to  freely  buy  and  sell  land  is  curtailed.  The  land  market 
is  regulated  by  the  state,  and  thus  the  state  controls  use  of 
this  land.  To  accelerate  the  transition  of  privately-owned  farms 
into  labour  farms  a  system  of  discriminatory  land  taxes  would  be 
devised.  43 
Another  idea  is  for  the  establishment  of  a  unified  land  tax. 
This  is  sufficient  for  solving  the  agrarian  problem  since  land, 
deprived  of  rent,  loses  its  value  and  consequently  its  attraction 
for  capital.  Capitalist  landowners  establish  only  those  farms 
which  intensity  and  rationality  authorise  them  to  exist,  and 
which  under  a  tax  yield  equal  rent. 
44  Thus  the  system  of  a 
unified  tax  differs  from  socialisation  or  nationalisation. 
Comparing  the  various  systems  of  land  reconstruction,  Chayanov 
notes  that  the  main  difference  between  them  lies  more  in  the 
plane  of  justification  than  in  the  plane  of  concrete  conditions 
of  land  use.  These  ideas  show  how  land  will  be  used  after  the 
reform,  but  do  not  show  the  path  to  be  taken  to  achieve  the 
ideals.  45 
It  is  clear  from  this  discussion  that  Chayanov  separated  the 
question  of  ownership  from  the  question  of  the  economic 
276 mechanism.  Reform  scenarios  are  proposed  which  alter  property 
relations,  but  no  argument  is  made  for  development  of  'the 
market'.  The  idea  of  regulating  specific  markets  is  proposed,  but 
no  argument  from  'the  market'  as  such  is  made.  It  is  apparent 
that  arguments  in  the  1990s  about  the  need  for  a  simultaneous 
reform  of  property  relations  and  the  economic  mechanism  adopt  a 
different  approach  than  that  of  Chayanov  in  this  work. 
7.5  -  NON-MONETARY  ACCOUNTING 
In  1920,  in  the  spirit  of  War  Communism,  Chayanov  wrote  a 
work  entitled  Metody  bezdenezhnogo  ucheta  khozyaistvennikh 
predpriyatii  which  examined  non-economic  methods  of  accounting. 
This  addressed  the  problem  of  the  methods  to  be  used  in  socialist 
economy  to  determine  what  products  to  produce.  In  a  capitalist 
economy,  which  Chayanov  represented  in  a  diagram  shown  overleaf: 
Market  prices,  wages,  rent,  and  other  categories  of 
capitalist  economy  arise  as  a  result  of  a  multitude 
of  socio-economic  relations  representative  of  a 
complex  apparatus  generated  by  huma 
6  society  and 
still  not  fully  studied  by  science. 
This  explanation  of  capitalism,  and  the  structure  of  Chayanov's 
diagram  which  represents  it,  shows  that  Chayanov  perceived  of 
capitalism  as  an  economic  system  without  a  central  coordinating 
body  which  focuses  and  directs  economic  activity,  ie  is  a 
polycentric  organisational  system  which  functions  spontaneously. 
In  contrast  to  this,  Chayanov  represents  a  socialist  economy  by  a 
diagram  (also  shown  overleaf)  which  clearly  possesses  a  central 
body  which  focuses  and  coordinates  economic  life.  In  this  economy 
there  is  a  unified  production  plan,  and  all  products  are 
distributed  between  consumers  by  the  state,  ie  by  the  central 
body.  47  Such  a  system  is  clearly  monocentric  in  nature.  Chayanov 
notes  this  difference,  but  does  not  further  analyse  it.  He  does 
warn  of  the  dangers  that  monocentrism  may  cause  in  terms  of  free 
choice,  something  which  is  stressed  in  much  current  literature  on 
planning  versus  the  market. 
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.  TcxHM  ecK"c-  annaPaThi Chayanov  presents  a  table  of  the  differences  between  the  old 
capitalist  calculation  and  the  new  socialist  type  of  calculation, 
which  is  shown  as  follows:  48 
TASKS  OF  CALCULATION 
OLD  NEW 
A)  Full  calculation  of  turnover  A)  Full  calculation  of  turnover 
of  products,  materials  and  of  products,  materials  and 
their  values  their  values 
B)  Categories: 
1)  pure  profit 
2)  rent 
3)  interest 
B)  Categories: 
1)  productivity  of  labour 
2)  measure  of  utilisation  of 
buildings,  stock,  fuel 
C)  Accumulation  and  processing 
of  material  for  organisat- 
ional  accounting 
C)  Accumulation  and  processing 
of  material  for 
organisational  accounting 
This  table  shows  that,  while  the  categories  used  in  the  two  forms 
of  accounting  were  different,  the  basic  processes  which  were  to 
be  calculated  were  the  same.  While  calculation  occurs  in  both 
types  of  system,  Chayanov  is  clear  that  the  nature  of  this 
calculation  differs  fundamentally,  since  'the  capitalist  market 
gives  automatically  what  the  centre  of  socialist  production  must 
calculate'. 
49  Chayanov  compares  socialist  forms  to  pre-capitalist 
types  of  economy: 
...  socialist  calculation  organises  material 
calculation  of  things  in  natura,  because  prices  as 
such  are  absent  from  a  socialist  natural  economy. 
50 
Instead  of  the  old  economic  form  of  accounting,  a  new  technical 
form  must  be  devised  which  incorporates  a  completely  new 
conception  of  profit.  The  type  of  accounts  table  which  Chayanov 
presents  corresponding  to  this  form  is  shown  as  follows:  51 
DEBIT 
Record  on  composition  of  number  days  worked  qualif-  work 
credit  workforce  ication  units 
State  administration  1  305  3  915 
services  1  305  3  915 
Narkomtrud  constant  work  1  4  1200  2  2400 
constant  work  2  6  1800  1  1800 
daily  500  1  500 
TO  TAL  6530 
278 This  shows  that  Chayanov  advocated  using  a  system  of  time 
balances  for  labour  accounting  with  a  coefficient  for  more 
qualified  labour,  and  he  called  it  a  labour  invoice  (rabota 
nakladniya)  system. 
In  a  general  form  Chayanov  contrasts  capitalist  and 
socialist  accounting  as  follows.  The  scheme  for  capitalist 
calculation  is: 
DEBIT  CREDIT 
outlays:  rubles  receipts  rubles 
use  of  buildings  a 
use  of  equipment  b 
general  expenses  c  sales  p 
labour  of  people  d 
labour  of  horses  e 
seed  f 
manure  i 
k 
x  [=  p-  k] 
total  pp 
The  equivalent  table  for  socialist  accounting  is  given  by 
Chayanov  as  follows:  52 
DEBIT  natural  units  CREDIT 
outlays  :  b  e  1  t  m  p  m 
u  q  a  r  a  r  a 
i  u  b  a  t  o  n 
1  i  o  c  e  d  u 
d  p  u  t  r  u  r 
i  m  r  0  i  c  e 
n  e  r  a  t 
g  n  s  1 
s  t  s 
use  of  buildings  al  -  d2  -  n1  -  - 
use  of  equipment  -  bl  d3  -  n2  -  - 
general  expenses  a2  b2  d4  e2  n3  -  - 
labour  of  people  -  -  dl  -  n4  fl  - 
labour  of  horses  -  -  d3  el  n5  f2  - 
seed  -  -  -  -  -  f3  - 
manure  -  -  -  -  -  -  i 
total  a  b  d  e  n  f  i 
natural  units 
receipts  p 
P 
279 In  this  type  of  accounting  instead  of  calculation  in  money, 
natural  units  are  used,  and  the  balance  approach  can  be  seen 
clearly.  Coefficients  of  the  various  inputs  and  outputs  can  be 
obtained  by  dividing  each  subtotal  with  the  total,  for  example 
ax  =  a/p,  bx  =  b/p  etc.  In  capitalist  calculation  the  monetary 
value  of  the  total  sales  minus  the  sum  of  costs  gives  profit. 
However,  in  socialist  calculation  the  total  credits  and  debits, 
expressed  in  natural  units,  cannot  be  subtracted  to  give  a  figure 
for  the  total  balance.  53  In  socialist  accounting  it  is  only 
possible  to  calculate  the  quantity  of  received  product  for  the 
labour  outlays  and  means  of  production  used  as  inputs,  a  ratio 
which  Chayanov  calls  the  success  coefficient  and  which  is  the 
socialist  equivalent  of  profit.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that 
Chayanov  considers  profit  to  be  an  extremely  useful  and  essential 
category  of  capitalism  which  is  used  to  determine  production 
levels,  and  thus  tries  to  find  a  replacement  for  it  in  socialist 
accounting.  Equating  profit  with  exploitation  is  not  something 
which  Chayanov  pursues  in  this  work. 
7.6  -  DIFFERENTIATION 
During  the  1920s  there  was  much  discussion  about  ways  of 
measuring  differentiation  in  the  countryside,  with  V.  S.  Nemchinov 
and  L.  N.  Kritsman  being  two  examples  of  people  who  pursued  this 
topic  vigourously.  Chayanov  also  entered  into  discussion  in  this 
area,  although  it  was  not  an  area  in  which  his  primary  concerns 
layed.  From  the  point  of  view  of  this  thesis,  such  work  is  useful 
since  it  reveals  what  conceptions  of  capitalism  were  prevalent  in 
this  period,  and  this  may  throw  some  light  on  the  area  of  the 
market  in  relation  to  other  categories  of  capitalist  production. 
In  Byudzhetnie  issledovaniya:  istoriya  i  metody  of  1929 
Chayanov  discusses  the  work  of  Nemchinov,  Groman,  Kritsman,  G.  I. 
Baskin,  and  A.  I.  Khryashcheva  on  this  topic.  According  to 
Nemchinov's  conception  the  basic  features  which  determine  the 
class  structure  of  the  countryside  and  the  capitalistic  processes 
within  it  are: 
1)  the  separation  of  the  means  of  production  from  labour  power; 
2)  the  appropriation  of  surplus  value. 
54 
280 The  first  of  these  features  requires  the  development  of  markets 
for  labour  power  and  for  means  of  production.  The  basic  signs  of 
the  development  of  capitalism  can  thus  be  seen  as: 
a)  the  relation  of  earnings  to  the  sale  of  labour  in  total 
income; 
b)  the  relation  of  hired  labour  to  this. 
Using  this  type  of  conception  Groman  composed  a  system  of  socio- 
economic  farm  types  in  1900  which  had  seven  basic  categories  as 
follows:  1)  capitalist-entrepreneurial  not  alienating  labour;  2) 
capitalist-entrepreneurial  alienating  labour;  3)  independent 
producers  not  alienating  labour;  4)  independent  producers 
alienating  labour,  but  in  such  a  quantity  that  sale  of  labour  is 
only  a  secondary  part  of  earnings;  5)  independent  producers 
hiring  out  labour,  where  sale  of  labour  equals  income  from 
independent  production;  6)  pure  hired  labour;  7)  hired  workers 
having  secondary  independent  enterprises.  55  However,  it  was  not 
until  1913  that  the  statistical  material  was  available  to 
complete  a  detailed  study  -  from  Mokshanski  uezd  -  and  at  this 
time  Groman  utilised  a  five-fold  grouping  of  farms  as  follows:  1) 
farms  which  have  hired  labour  >15%  -  entrepreneurial;  2)  farms 
which  have  hired  labour  <15%  -  transitional  to  entrepreneurial; 
3)  farms  without  hired  labour  -  independent;  4)  farms  which  hire 
out  <15%  of  all  their  labour  -  transitional  to  hired  workers;  5) 
farms  which  hire  out  >15%  of  all  their  labour  -  hired  workers. 
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Thus  in  Groman's  conception  the  hiring  of  labour  is  the  key 
indicator  to  the  development  of  capitalism,  and  thus  the  labour 
market  is  the  key  market  which  capitalism  requires. 
Also  in  1913  G.  I.  Baskin  produced  a  study  of  Stavropol'skaya 
uezd  utilising  the  following  basic  social-economic  divisions:  a) 
according  to  the  kind  of  received  income  -  sown  and  non-sown;  b) 
according  to  labour  organisation  -  with  yearly  and  period 
workers,  with  day  labour,  piece  work,  without  hired  labour;  c) 
according  to  extra-farm  employment  -  with  or  without  earnings 
from  handicrafts;  d)  according  to  the  presence  or  absence  of 
trade-industrial  enterprises.  Using  this  divisional  scheme  Baskin 
produced  sixteen  groups  and  five  basic  social-economic  types.  The 
most  prevalent  group  were  farms  using  only  their  own  family 
labour,  with  56%.  Second  most  prevalent  were  farms  hiring  day 
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2%.  57 
In  1925  A.  I.  Khryashcheva  presented  a  series  of  schemes  at 
the  Sixth  All-Union  Statistical  Conference  which  divided  types  of 
economy  according  to  production  type,  the  presence  of  hired 
labour,  and  position  of  handicrafts.  However,  in  1926  Nemchinov 
criticised  such  conceptions,  and  suggested  that  the  greatest 
degree  of  differentiation  in  peasant  farms  could  be  detected  not 
by  analysing  hired  labour  but  by  examining  livestock  and 
equipment. 
58  The  agrarian  section  of  the  Communist  Academy  thus 
produced  the  following  scheme: 
1)  those  who  hire  workers  for  more  than  50  days;  with  sale  of 
labour  power  more  than  20  days  and  with  hire  of  livestock  more 
than  20  days  or  hire  of  large  equipment  for  more  than  10  days; 
2)  sale  of  labour  power  from  20  to  50  days;  hire  of  livestock 
more  than  20  days  or  hire  of  large  equipment  more  than  10 
days; 
3)  hire  of  labour  and  livestock  up  to  20  days,  equipment  up  to  10 
days;  lease  of  land  more  than  2  desyatins; 
4)  with  hired  labour  power  from  20  to  50  days,  livestock  more 
than  20  days;  equipment  more  than  10  days;  trade  income  from 
250  to  1000  rubles; 
5)  with  hired  labour  over  50  days;  trade  income  over  1000 
rubles. 
59 
This  scheme  thus  includes  the  market  for  livestock  and  equipment 
as  a  measure  of  the  degree  of  differential  development. 
In  1927  Nemchinov  produced  a  classification  scheme  which 
attempted  to  synthesise  all  known  group  types,  shown  below:  60 
CONDITIONS  AND  MEANS  ON  ITS  FARM  PEASANT'S  OWN  MEANS 
OF  PRODUCTION  OF  PRODUCTION  ON 
OTHER'S  OWN  ANOTHER'S  FARM 
1  Land 
2  Fixed  capital  - 
animals,  stock, 
buildings  etc 
3  Circulating 
capital  -  seed, 
fodder,  manure 
4  Labour  power 
Entrepreneurial  Independent  Dependent 
Dependent  Independent  Entrepreneurial 
Dependent  Independent  Entrepreneurial 
Entrepreneurial  Independent  Dependent 
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a  situation  where  its  own  means  of  production  are  impregnated  by 
other  labour  power,  and  'dependent'  to  a  situation  in  which  alien 
means  of  production  are  worked  by  its  own  labour  power.  61 
Nemchinov  gives  the  following  figures  for  the  percentage  of  farms 
in  the  various  categories  for  Troitski  okrug,  Ural  oblast: 
1  Farms  with  dependent  elements  greater  than  50%  9.7% 
2  Farms  with  dependent  elements  from  15  to  50%  13.05% 
3  Farms  with  dependent  elements  from  2.5%  to  15%  9.7% 
4  Farms  with  dependent  elements  up  to  2.5%  52.93% 
5  Farms  with  entrepreneurial  elements  from  2.5%  to  15%  12.1% 
6  Farms  with  entrepreneurial  elements  greater  than  15%  2.5% 
Working  under  the  theoretical  influence  of  Kritsman,  Ya. 
Anisimov,  I.  Vermenichev,  and  K.  Naumov  used  the  following 
breakdown  of  social-economic  types  of  peasant  farms: 
a)  capitalist,  predominantly  small-capitalist  farms; 
b)  farms  in  embryonic  capitalist  form,  evolving  on  the  capitalist 
path; 
c)  farms  of  small-commodity  producers  of  middle  peasants; 
d)  semi-proletarian  farms; 
e)  proletarian  farms  with  land  holdings.  62 
Kritsman  uses  the  relation  of  percentage  of  owned  means  of 
production  to  owned  labour  as  a  measure  of  the  degree  of 
development  of  capitalism  and  as  a  measure  of  proletarianisation. 
In  his  work  Klassovoe  rassloenie  sovetskoi  derevni  of  1926 
Kritsman  had  concluded  that  there  were  two  basic  types  of 
capitalist  being  engendered  in  the  Soviet  countryside.  Until  now 
the  basic  expanding  form  of  capitalist  agriculture  has  been  based 
on  the  hiring  out  of  working  livestock  and  agricultural  stock: 
...  under  which  the  hidden  capitalist  appears  as  a 
worker,  working  on  someone  else's  farm  with  his  own 
livestock,  and  the  hidden  proletarian  appears  as  an 
owner  without  working  livestock  hiring  the  ossessor 
of  these  indispensable  means  of  production. 
°3 
As  well  as  such  'hidden'  capitalists  there  was  also  the  'usual 
type'  of  capitalism,  based  on  the  hiring  of  wage  workers,  plus 
283 trading  and  usury  capital.  Kritsman  notes  that  the  tax  policy  of 
the  state  apparatus  operates  in  the  same  direction  as  trading, 
usury,  and  manufacturing  capital  and  forces  the  poor  to  bring 
their  labour  power  to  market.  64 
This  shows  that  as  well  as  the  usual  identification  of  the 
development  of  the  labour  market  with  the  development  of 
capitalism,  many  Marxists  in  the  1920s  thought  that  the 
development  of  hire  and  sale  markets  for  livestock  and 
agricultural  equipment  was  an  equally  important  indicator  of  the 
advancement  of  capitalist  relations.  Thus  Kritsman  concluded  his 
1926  study  of  rural  differentiation  by  stating  that  'the  growth 
of  class  stratification  does  not  occur  as  the  stratification  by 
land,  but  as  stratification  by  working  livestock'.  65  This 
switched  emphasis  from  the  land  market  to  the  market  for 
agricultural  means  of  production. 
According  to  Chayanov,  the  following  equations  were  used  by 
the  Kritsman  school  for  calculating  the  degree  of  capitalist 
development: 
xn  =  (a  -  v)/a 
where  a=  the  value  of  all  means  of  production  consumed  in  a 
budget  year,  and  v=  the  value  of  alien  means  of  production  used 
on  the  farm.  This  gives  an  expression  for  the  relation  between 
owned  and  hired  means  of  production.  A  similar  measure  for  labour 
power  was  given  by: 
yn  =  d/9 
where  d=  the  value  of  its  labour  power  employed  on  its  farm,  and 
g=  the  value  of  all  labour  power  utilised  on  the  farm. 
Multiplying  xn  by  yn  and  multiplying  by  100  we  receive  a 
percentage  of  use  of  its  own  labour  power  on  its  means  of 
production.  Similarly  it  is  possible  to  calculate  a  figure 
representing  the  amount  of  alien  labour  used  on  its  own  farm: 
xk  =  a/  (a  -  b) 
where  b=  the  value  of  its  means  of  production  used  on  alien 
farms,  and: 
284 yk  =  d/g 
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As  a  result  two  peasant  indicators  are  created:  the  first 
characterises  the  elements  of  proletarianisation  by  expressing 
the  dependence  of  the  farm,  the  second  the  degree  of  development 
of  capitalism  by  expressing  the  percentage  use  of  alien  means  of 
production  on  its  own  land.  66  Five  categories  are  then  obtained 
as  follows.  For  percentage  of  proletarian  character:  1)  >50.1%; 
2)  between  20%  and  50%;  3)  <20%:  and  for  percentage  of  capitalist 
character:  4)  <20%;  5)  between  20%  and  50%. 
According  to  Chayanov  there  is  in  the  countryside  two 
absolutely  different  phenomena:  bonded  forms  of  exploitation,  and 
the  farmer  type  of  entrepreneurial  farm  constructed  in 
significant  measure  on  the  exploitation  of  hired  labour.  These 
two  types  are  phenomena  of  different  social  and  historical  forms, 
and  thus  in  elaborating  budget  materials  this  has  to  be  taken 
into  account. 
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As  is  apparent  from  the  above,  the  debate  on  this  question 
was  posed  in  terms  of  the  indicator(s)  to  be  used  as  a  measure  of 
differentiation.  Zemstvo  statisticians  had  used  'natural' 
indicators  as  a  measure  of  differentiation,  for  example  farm 
size,  sown  area,  or  number  of  working  animals  owned.  Lenin  had 
utilised  this  material  in  his  Development  of  Capitalism  in  Russia 
of  1899.  Kritsman  argued  that  such  natural  indicators  were 
indirect  indicators,  and  a  more  realistic  assessment  could  be 
made  if  qualitative  indicators  such  as  hired  labour  and  type  of 
production  were  used.  Nemchinov  also  argued  that  qualitative 
indicators  were  superior,  and  in  his  study  of  the  Urals  peasantry 
he  used  the  hire  and  sale  of  labour  power,  rent,  lease  of 
animals,  stock  and  land,  and  credit  transactions  involving  money 
and  seed  as  measures. 
One  feature  of  this  work  on  rural  differentiation  is  the 
marked  absence  of  the  market  in  its  general  sense  or  as  a 
mechanism.  Kondrat'ev's  view  that  the  market  is  a  precondition 
for  differentiation  is  not  mentioned.  Although  specific  markets 
such  as  the  labour  market  are  mentioned,  there  is  no  mention  of 
the  market  as  a  mechanism  through  which  the  law  of  value 
operates,  or  through  which  production  priorities  are  determined. 
It  is  not  absolutely  clear  why  this  is  so.  68  The  question  of  the 
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studies  either. 
7.7  -  POPULATION  AND  THE  MARKET 
An  interesting  note  on  the  ability  of  the  market  occurs  in 
Chayanov's  Ocherki  po  ekonomike  trudovogo  sel'skogo  khozyaistvo 
of  1924.  In  a  section  on  economic  geography  he  asks  the  question: 
what  is  determined  by  the  market?  He  answers  that  the  market 
conjuncture  of  a  market  system  exclusively  determines  the 
development  of  the  population  density  (naselennost')  of  a 
country. 
69  He  also  notes  that  in  a  given  market  conjuncture 
expressed  in  a  system  of  prices,  for  each  farm  coming  from  its 
spatial  position  in  relation  to  markets,  soil,  and  climatic 
conditions,  there  will  be  an  optimal  level  of  intensity  of  farm 
production.  By  optimal  intensity  Chayanov  understands  that  level 
in  which,  given  prices  for  agricultural  products  and  means  of 
production,  the  difference  between  costs  and  income  will  be 
highest.  He  shows  this  graphically  as  follows: 
In  this  diagram  the  curved  line  represents  the  value  of  crops 
with  respect  to  output,  and  the  straight  line  the  value  of 
factors  with  respect  to  output.  The  optimum  will  occur  when  the 
difference  between  the  two  is  greatest. 
7°  Such  a  manner  of 
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COSTS  VS  INCOME º  presenting  this  argument  clearly  corresponds  to  the  modern  form, 
in  which  profit  maximisation  occurs  when  the  (vertical)  distance 
between  the  total  revenue  and  the  total  cost  curves  are 
maximised,  although  Chayanov  does  not  go  on  to  derive  marginal 
revenue  and  cost  curves.  Chayanov  concludes  that: 
Capitalistically  organised  farms  under  all  degrees  of 
population  density...  will  always  strive  for  the 
optimal  level  of  intensity,  because  under  a  given 
market  conjuncture  only  optimal  intensity  gives  the 
highest  pure  income  per  unit  of  ground... 
Thus  Chayanov  is  clearly  arguing  that  the  profit  maximisation 
principle  in  a  pure  capitalist  system  leads  to  production  being 
taken  to  optimal  levels.  Such  an  argument  is  not  Marxist  in 
spirit. 
In  this  work  Chayanov  adopts  an  original  method  of 
presenting  price  data  for  given  regions,  which  he  calls  an  iso- 
price  chart,  and  an  example  is  shown  as  follows: 
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The  use  of  this  method  shows  that  price  levels  were  not  unified 
throughout  a  given  region,  and  thus  that  one  of  the  key 
characteristics  of  markets  -  uniformity  of  price  -  was  absent 
during  this  time.  However,  this  may  be  an  error  in  simplistic 
accounts  of  markets,  since  transportation  costs  to  different 
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goods. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  Kritsman,  in  his  short  preface  to 
this  work,  argues  that  Chayanov's  theory  is  based  upon 
psychological  and  physiological  foundations  which  do  not  fit  with 
Marxist  theory.  Optimisation  when  profits  are  maximised  only 
makes  sense  for  optimisation  of  satisfaction  of  human  need  if 
markets  correctly  represent  human  wants,  which  are  psychological 
in  nature.  Thus  Kritsman  seems  to  be  saying  that  Chayanov  does 
assume  this.  72  If  this  is  the  case,  then  Chayanov  clearly  falls 
into  the  mainstream  of  neo-classical  economic  thought. 
An  interesting  discussion  of  differentiation  by  Chayanov 
occurs  in  an  article  entitled  '0  differentsiatsii  krest'yanskogo 
khozyaistva',  published  in  Puti  sel'skogo  khozyaistvo  in  1927.  In 
this  article  Chayanov  is  concerned  to  distinguish  between  types 
of  differentiation,  and  he  lists  four  types  as  follows.  At  the 
end  of  the  nineteenth  century  differentiation  was  understood  as  a 
process  parallel  with  the  concentration  of  production  and 
industry,  ie  the  struggle  of  large,  medium,  and  small  enterprises 
in  conditions  of  increasing  superiority  of  large-scale 
enterprises. 
73  The  fading  away  of  medium  and  small  enterprises 
and  their  proletarianisation  -  this  is  the  process  understood  by 
the  classical  understanding  of  differentiation.  Another  type  of 
differentiation  is  the  differentiation  of  the  agricultural 
population  as  elements  of  it  split  off  to  form  the  trading 
population.  A  third  type  is  linked  to  agrarian  repopulation  in 
conditions  of  the  family  obshchina,  since  this  creates  conditions 
for  the  development  of  bond  forms  of  exploitation,  and  there  is 
also  differentiation  in  terms  of  the  development  of  the  division 
of  labour.  74  However,  Chayanov  notes  that  in  current  times  most 
attention  should  be  given  to  the  first  type  of  differentiation, 
ie  the  restructuring  of  family  labour  farms  into  American  large- 
scale  farmer-type  farms  which  employ  hired  labour.  75 
Another  interesting  point  in  this  article  is  Chayanov's  use 
of  the  market  to  explain  population  dynamics  in  a  capitalist 
system.  According  to  Chayanov  the  iso-price  chart  determines  the 
distribution  of  agricultural  types  and  thus  the  quantity  of 
agricultural  labour  required  in  a  given  area.  In  a  capitalist 
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highest  and  thus  creates  conditions  for  the  movement  of  labour  to 
such  areas.  It  also  determines  where  commodity  prices  are 
highest.  Consequently  there  should  be  a  coordination  of  the 
highest  prices  on  an  iso-price  chart  and  the  density  of 
population. 
76  However,  this  is  not  the  case  in  the  USSR.  The 
highest  bread  prices  are  in  the  Baltic  states,  the  Black  Sea 
region,  and  the  Moscow  industrial  regions,  and  the  lowest  prices 
are  in  Siberia.  It  would  be  correct  to  assume,  according  to 
Chayanov,  that  population  density,  if  it  was  distributed  under 
commodity  economy,  would  be  coordinated  with  the  highest  iso- 
prices.  However,  the  most  condensed  population  actually  occurs  in 
a  region  of  low  iso-prices,  and  this  discrepancy  is  basic  to  the 
history  of  the  Russian/Soviet  economy. 
77 
Thus  according  to  this  argument  the  market  cannot  be  fully 
developed  in  the  Soviet  Union.  If  correlation  of  population 
density  with  price  is  a  feature  of  a  market  system,  as  Chayanov 
claims,  and  this  correlation  is  absent  from  the  USSR,  the 
conclusion  must  follow  that  the  market  is  also  absent,  unless 
another  reason  can  be  given  for  the  non-correlation.  Chayanov 
does  not  provide  such  an  alternative  explanation,  and  so  the  only 
conclusion  is  that  Chayanov  believed  that  the  absence  of  the 
market  explained  this  discrepancy. 
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7.8  -  CONCLUSION 
It  is  apparent  that  Chayanov  held  a  fairly  orthodox  neo- 
classical  conception  of  market  mechanics,  but  simultaneously 
shared  some  socialist  doubts  about  the  morality  of  the  market. 
Thus  he  resented  the  universalisation  of  historically  specific 
capitalist  categories  such  as  the  labour  market.  However,  he  did 
not  conflate  the  market  with  capitalism,  rather  he  conceived  of 
markets  existing  within  non-capitalist  social  formations. 
In  the  period  of  War  Communism  Chayanov  contrasted 
capitalist  and  socialist  forms  of  economy  in  a  stark  manner,  and 
found  parallels  between  natural  and  socialist  economic  forms. 
During  NEP  Chayanov  analysed  the  'place'  conception  of  the  market 
in  some  detail,  and  distinguished  between  diverse  market 
structures.  He  believed  that  cooperative  forms  of  trade  could 
compete  with  and  even  replace  private  trade  by  studying  market 
structure  and  by  organising  cooperatives  along  similar  lines  to 
private  trading  firms.  However,  the  idea  of  the  market  as  the 
carrier  of  the  law  of  value  was  not  discussed  by  him,  in  fact  he 
never  used  the  phrase  'law  of  value'  at  all.  This  may  show  that 
he  did  not  believe  that  this  Marxist  conception  of  the  market  was 
of  any  practical  use. 
The  debates  on  differentiation  reveal  that  there  were  two 
views  as  to  what  markets  were  required  for  capitalism  to  exist. 
Some  thought  that  the  labour  market  was  necessary,  others  that 
the  market  for  agricultural  machinery  and  livestock  was 
essential.  This  correlates  with  Chayanov's  view  that  markets  can 
exist  outside  of  capitalism.  Chayanov's  use  of  'iso-price'  charts 
as  a  way  of  showing  market  area  was  highly  original,  and  he  used 
this  method  to  demonstrate  that  the  correlation  of  population 
density  and  price  which  was  characteristic  of  capitalism  was 
absent  in  the  Soviet  Union.  This  implies  that  Chayanov  believed 
that  the  USSR  was  developing  non-capitalistically. 
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293 CHAPTER  EIGHT  -  BLYUMIN 
8.1  -  INTRODUCTION 
One  of  the  most  detailed  analyses  of  'bourgeois'  political 
economy  to  emerge  from  NEP  was  entitled  Sub"yektivnaya  shkola  v 
politicheskoi  ekonomii  by  I.  G.  Blyumin  and  was  published  fully  in 
1928,  although  parts  of  this  work  appeared  in  VKA  in  1927.1  It 
appeared  first  in  book  form  in  two  parts  in  1928,  then  was 
reprinted  in  1931,  and  formed  part  of  a  three  volume  collection 
published  after  the  author's  death  in  1962.  I  have  checked  the 
latter  reprint  for  alterations,  and  since  I  discovered  none  all 
references  are  to  the  1962  edition. 
Izrail'  Grigor'evich  Blyumin  (1897-1959)  served  in  the  Red 
Army  from  1919  to  1921,  and  graduated  from  Moscow  university  in 
1924.  His  life's  work  was  a  critique  of  all  forms  of  'bourgeois' 
political  economy,  including  after  WWII  Keynesianism  and  theories 
of  economic  growth. 
2  Later  works  included  Kritika  sovremennoi 
burzhuaznoi  pol  i  ti  cheskoi  ekonomi  Anglii  of  1953  and  Ocherki 
ekonomicheskoi  mysli  v  Rossi  iv  pervoi  pol  ovine  XIX  veka  of  1940. 
Professor  Blyumin  taught  in  the  economics  faculty  of  Moscow  State 
University,  and  his  lectures  given  between  1951-1955  were 
published  in  1961  under  the  title  Istoriya  ekonomicheskikh 
ucheni  i. 
Sub"yektivnaya  shkola  is  truly  heroic  in  scope  and  intention. 
It  attempts  a  critical  survey  of  virtually  all  the  important  neo- 
classical  economists  whose  work  had  been  published  from  1870  to 
the  1920s,  including  Walras,  Devons,  Marshall,  Cournot,  Gossen, 
Cassel,  Pareto,  Bohm-Bawerk,  Clark,  Menger,  Pigou,  Schumpeter,  as 
well  as  showing  knowledge  of  lesser  theorists  such  as  Wieser, 
Barone,  Wicksell,  Bailey,  Edgeworth,  Mitchell,  Gonnard,  and 
Bortkevitch.  Blyumin  himself  survived  the  1930s  and  went  on  to 
write  other  economic  works,  including  a  continuation  of  this  work. 
Blyumin  is  of  course  fundamentally  critical  of  the  neo-classical 
economics  which  he  surveys.  However,  his  criticisms  are  not 
without  some  merit,  and  he  attempts  to  place  the  development  of 
'bourgeois'  economics  after  J.  S.  Mill  into  a  theoretical  framework 
which  has  at  least  historical  interest.  Thus  in  this  chapter  I 
294 will  survey  and  discuss  elements  of  Blyumin's  work  which  relate  to 
the  market  and  market  economics. 
8.2  -A  GENERAL  ANALYSIS  OF  SUBJECTIVISM 
Blyumin  begins  by  stating  that  the  subjective  school  of 
political  economy  is  a  variety  of  the  vulgar  political  economy 
discussed  by  Marx,  an  economy  which  is  apologetic  in  nature  and 
which  seeks  to  analyse  only  the  surface  of  capitalist  society. 
Historically  Blyumin  notes  that  as  the  contradictions  of 
capitalism  grew,  political  economy  became  more  and  more  apologetic 
in  nature. 
3  Blyumin  outlines  the  following  difference  between  the 
'old'  and  the  'new'  subjectivists.  While  it  was  possible  to  find 
in  the  old  subjectivists  a  split  between  the  theory  of  supply  and 
demand  and  the  theory  of  costs,  the  new  subjectivists  attempt  to 
overcome  this  divergence  by  arguing  that  the  law  of  costs  of 
production  represents  only  a  part  of  a  more  universal  law  of 
supply  and  demand.  4  Blyumin  argues  that  the  subjective  school  is 
based  on  four  ideas:  1)  static  analysis,  ie  analysis  where 
population,  needs,  and  technique  remain  constant;  2)  the  scarcity 
(redkost')  of  elementary  productive  goods;  3)  the  supply-demand 
function;  and  4)  the  imputation  of  value  into  finished  goods  by 
factors  participating  in  their  production  on  the  basis  of  marginal 
productivity. 
5 
Blyumin  divides  the  representatives  of  the  subjective  school 
into  various  currents.  The  basic  division  is  as  follows: 
















According  to  Blyumin  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  the  Austrian  school  had  established 
295 itself  as  the  most  influential  economic  school  in  German 
universities.  However,  its  influence  was  significantly  less  in 
Roman  and  Anglo-Saxon  countries  where  it  competed  with  the 
mathematical  and  Anglo-American  schools.  After  WW1  the  influence 
of  the  Austrian  school  generally  began  to  decline.  Blyumin  states 
that  Walras  is  the  founder  of  the  mathematical  school  and  Marshall 
the  founder  of  the  Anglo-American  school.  The  greatest  follower  of 
Walras  is  Pareto,  who  came  to  the  conclusion  that  price  theory  can 
be  based  on  indifference  functions.  The  most  well-known  follower 
of  Marshall  in  England  is  Pigou,  who  attempted  to  elaborate  a 
theory  of  cycles.  6 
Blyumin  then  proceeds  to  analyse  the  basic  general  features 
of  these  schools.  Only  the  Austrian  school  can  be  called  a 
subjective  school  in  the  full  meaning  of  the  word,  since  they  base 
all  economic  categories  on  a  single  subjective  factor  -  marginal 
utility.  The  mathematical  and  Anglo-American  schools  view 
subjective  and  objective  factors  as  equal,  and  hence  their 
approach  can  be  called  dualistic.  In  relation  to  the  historical 
development  of  economic  thought  Blyumin  argues  that  in  the  first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century  (approximately  until  1870)  there 
existed  a  sharp  split  in  bourgeois  political  economy.  In  England 
the  objective  theory  of  value  dominated  in  the  form  of  either  the 
labour  theory  or  the  costs  of  production  theory,  whereas  on  the 
continent  the  subjective  theory  in  the  form  of  marginal  utility  or 
supply  and  demand  dominated.  According  to  Blyumin  this  difference 
reflected  the  differing  conditions  of  economic  development.  In 
England  a  fast  and  dynamic  capitalism  which  ousted  old  forms  of 
economy  at  speed,  whereas  on  the  continent  a  much  slower 
development  leaving  a  still  not  insubstantial  influence  of  natural 
economy.?  After  1870  a  tendency  to  create  a  single  theoretical 
conception  came  into  being,  thus  allowing  use  of  the  general  term 
'subjective  school'. 
The  theoretical  roots  of  the  subjective  school  are  found  in 
the  motivations  of  individual  subjects.  According  to  subjectivists 
it  is  the  psychological  desires  of  the  various  participants  in  the 
economy  which  determine  the  social  order,  and  not  visa  versa. 
Blyumin  clearly  believes  in  exactly  the  opposite  point  of  view.  He 
notes  that  the  mathematical  school  has  the  greatest  theoretical 
296 interest,  since  it  is  an  intermediate  school  transitional  from 
Austrians  to  Anglo-Americans.  The  mathematicians  actually  show 
that  the  conclusions  of  the  Austrians  are  mistaken  from  within 
their  own  point  of  view.  While  the  Austrians  view  the  demand  for 
each  good  in  isolation,  the  mathematicians  examine  the 
interrelation  of  the  demand  for  many  goods,  and  argue  that  the 
demand  for  a  single  good  can  only  be  adequately  explained  through 
this  method.  8 
A  key  element  of  Blyumin's  analysis  of  the  subjective  school 
is  the  difference  which  he  sees  between  causal  and  functional 
analysis.  According  to  the  mathematical  and  Anglo-American  schools 
the  attempt  to  construct  a  single  final  basis  for  price  is  a 
chimera  based  on  ignorance.  In  reality  there  exists  only  the 
interrelation  of  autonomous  factors  which  influence  one  another 
independently.  Thus  causal  dependence  between  economic  phenomena 
in  which  one  factor  is  said  to  be  the  primary  cause  of  another  is 
replaced  by  functional  dependence  in  which  various  equally 
important  phenomena  interact,  thus  continuously  changing  each 
other. 
9  Mathematically  this  latter  type  of  reasoning  is 
represented  by  a  function  of  the  type  f(x,  y,  z),  and  thus  the 
replacement  of  causal  analysis  by  functional  is  aided  by  the  use 
of  mathematics.  Pareto  was  especially  adamant  about  the  use  of 
functional  reasoning,  and  even  criticised  Walras  for  trying  to 
view  marginal  utility  as  the  cause  of  price.  Blyumin  notes  that 
this  argument  is  supported  by  the  'Russian  bourgeois  economist' 
Yurovskii.  10 
Blyumin  then  proceeds  by  differentiating  between  two  senses 
of  the  idea  of  maximum  utility:  relative  and  absolute.  Assume  a 
definite  price  structure  exists  on  markets.  Buyers  respond  by 
constructing  a  definite  consumption  plan  which  attempts  to  obtain 
maximum  utility  from  the  purchasing  power  available.  However,  this 
maximum  is  dependent  on  the  price  structure,  and  changes  if  this 
structure  changes.  Hence  such  a  maximum  is  only  relative.  Assume 
now  that  a  definite  supply  of  goods  exists  at  the  disposal  of 
society,  which  attempts  to  distribute  these  goods  between  members 
so  as  to  obtain  the  greatest  total  utility.  This  maximum  would  not 
depend  on  price,  and  hence  it  can  be  called  absolute. 
11  Blyumin 
argues  that  the  mathematicians  confuse  these  two  understandings, 
297 for  example  Gossen  considers  that  prices  are  established  at  a 
level  in  which  total  utility  is  maximised.  Jevons  and  Walras  also 
attempt  to  show  that  utility  is  maximised  under  free  competition. 
Blyumin  points  out  that  for  capitalism  to  be  a  rational 
organisation  of  production  maximum  utility  cannot  be  dependent  on 
the  price  level,  rather  it  must  determine  it.  According  to  Blyumin 
this  leads  to  a  dualism  in  the  mathematical  school.  On  the  one 
hand  they  use  a  theory  of  supply  and  demand  to  explain  prices,  on 
the  other  they  try  to  show  that  maximum  utility  determines  the 
price  structure.  Blyumin  implies  that  these  two  approaches  are 
contradictory. 
12  Furthermore,  arguing  that  maximum  utility  is 
achieved  by  capitalism  implies  that  the  market  has  been 
substituted  by  organised  distribution,  which  in  fact  is 
incompatible  with  capitalist  production.  Thus  for  Blyumin 
arguments  which  attempt  to  show  capitalism  to  be  optimal  grate 
with  his  theoretical  idea  of  how  capitalism  functions,  ie 
spontaneously.  For  him  this  must  mean  that  such  optimality 
arguments  are  false. 
Turning  to  the  Austrians,  Blyumin  analyses  the  regulating 
role  of  the  marginal  unit.  Suppose  the  utility  of  a  given  goods 
determines  the  upper  limit  on  price  fluctuation.  If  the  utility  of 
the  nth  unit  equals  a,  and  utility  falls  with  increasing  supply, 
then  the  price  of  every  good  (assuming  integrated  markets)  cannot 
be  higher  than  a.  If  the  price  exceeded  a  then  the  marginal  unit 
would  not  be  purchased. 
13  Hence  Blyumin  clearly  understands  the 
regulating  role  of  marginal  utility  in  Austrian  theory.  After 
analysing  the  general  basis  of  the  subjectivists,  Blyumin  turns  to 
each  one  of  them  in  turn.  I  shall  begin  with  Cournot  as  he  is 
chronologically  the  earliest. 
8.3  -  COURNOT 
In  Vestnik  kommunisticheskoi  akademii  in  1927  there  appeared 
a  long  two-part  article  by  Blyumin  called  'Teorii  Kurno',  which 
analysed  the  economic  theory  of  Cournot  in  relation  to  the 
mathematical  school  of  Walras,  Devons  etc,  and  in  relation  to  the 
Russian  mathematical  economist  V.  K.  Dmitriev.  This  article  is 
interesting  for  what  it  reveals  about  conceptions  of  market 
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monopoly,  and  it  was  later  published  as  part  of  Blyumin's 
Sub"yektivnaya  shkola.  Cournot  was  one  of  the  first  economists  to 
use  mathematical  methods  for  the  study  of  monopoly,  and  to  try  to 
determine  how  prices  are  formed  in  this  particular  economic  form. 
Blyumin's  article  is  both  a  presentation  of  Cournot's  theory  and  a 
criticism  of  it  from  a  Marxist  perspective. 
Blyumin  begins  by  attempting  to  differentiate  Cournot  from 
later  members  of  the  mathematical  school  like  Walras  and  Jevons. 
This  he  does  by  arguing  that  Cournot  places  great  emphasis  on 
exchange  value,  the  totality  of  exchange  values  being  the  wealth 
of  a  society.  14  Cournot  shows  that  the  movement  of  use  and 
exchange  value  can  be  in  opposite  directions,  and  thus  the  process 
of  increasing  utility  can  occur  simultaneously  with  the  process  of 
declining  exchange  value.  However,  after  this  brief  attempt  to 
give  Cournot  some  credibility  in  Marxist  eyes,  Blyumin  turns 
straight  to  the  details  of  Cournot's  theory  of  monopoly. 
Blyumin  relates  that  Cournot  begins  his  analysis  with  the  law 
of  demand  -  demand  increases  when  price  declines  -  expressed  as  D 
=  F(p).  15  Cournot's  system  (expressed  in  a  series  of  formulae)  is 
related  to  various  different  economic  conditions  -  full  monopoly, 
limited  monopoly,  and  free  competition.  Blyumin  notes  that  for 
Cournot  the  key  to  elucidating  all  the  laws  of  the  market 
mechanism  can  be  found  in  conditions  of  full  monopoly.  Qualitative 
differences  in  economic  systems  (ie  monopoly  and  competition)  can 
be  reduced  to  quantitative  differences  in  the  expression  of  one  or 
other  of  these  laws.  According  to  Blyumin  this  central  notion  of 
Cournot's  is  the  source  of  all  his  mistakes.  16 
Cournot  begins  with  the  case  of  monopoly,  which  in  the 
simplest  case  is  where  the  production  of  goods  is  totally  in  the 
hands  of  one  unit.  Blyumin  notes  that  Walras  had  begin  his 
analysis  from  the  opposite  end  of  the  scale,  ie  with  pure 
competition,  but  he  claims  that  Walras  exaggerates  the  difference 
between  himself  and  Cournot.  Blyumin  argues  that  in  fact  the 
difference  between  Walras  and  Cournot  was  not  that  the  former 
began  with  competition,  but  that  he  began  with  natural  monopoly  as 
opposed  to  Cournot's  artificial  monopoly.  This  stems  from 
Cournot's  narrow  understanding  of  the  term  'monopoly',  which  he 
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demonstrate  at  this  point  that  Cournot  stressed  the 
incommensurability  of  the  utilities  of  individual  goods.  How  can 
the  happiness  of  an  Alpine  herd  be  compared  to  that  of  a 
Manchester  worker?  This  is  another  area  in  which  Cournot  differs 
from  other  economists  such  as  the  Austrian  school.  17 
In  relation  to  the  law  of  demand  Cournot  stresses  that  if  100 
units  of  a  good  sell  for  20  francs  each,  there  is  no  basis  to 
conclude  that  200  units  will  sell  for  10  francs.  The  proposition 
of  the  proportional  dependence  between  changes  in  demand  and  in 
price  is  based  on  an  absolutely  arbitrary  presupposition  that  the 
total  sum  of  money  spent  on  the  purchase  of  any  single  good  is 
constant.  The  graphical  representation  of  this  as  a  straight  line 
is  equally  incorrect.  According  to  Blyumin  Cournot  is  absolutely 
correct  to  assert  the  idea  that  the  rate  of  change  in  demand  and 
price  are  not  necessarily  identical.  Cournot  distinguishes  between 
two  types  of  good  in  this  respect,  the  first  of  which  satisfy 
consumer  necessities,  the  second  are  luxury  goods.  In  the  second 
group  Cournot  puts  tea,  sugar  etc,  and  for  this  group  it  is 
generally  the  case  that  actual  demand  changes  at  a  faster  rate 
than  a  simple  inverse  proportionality  to  price  would  suggest.  In 
the  first  group  (necessities)  changes  in  demand  are  slower  than  a 
simple  inverse  proportionality.  Blyumin  notes  that  in  this  way 
Cournot  had  engendered  the  theory  of  elasticity  of  demand 
(elastichnosti  sprosa),  which  has  undergone  a  detailed  development 
by  Marshall.  Cournot  also  gives  cases  in  which  a  price  reduction 
can  reduce  demand,  for  instance  diamonds.  If  new  techniques 
allowed  diamonds  to  be  crystalised  from  carbon  at  low  cost,  then 
since  they  fulfil  mainly  a  decorative  function  demand  for  them  may 
well  decline.  But  Cournot  considers  such  a  case  exceptional,  as  in 
general  demand  increases  when  the  price  falls.  18 
Blyumin  then  turns  to  the  form  of  functional  analysis  used  by 
Cournot,  D=  ap.  He  emphasises  that  given  such  a  function  it  is 
not  possible  to  speak  of  the  nature  of  the  causal  dependence 
between  a  and  p,  ie  it  is  not  possible  to  specify  the  cause  of  the 
change,  D  or  p.  This  type  of  formula  allows  only  the  establishment 
of  a  quantitative  relation  between  D  and  p,  ie  if  one  of  the 
variables  is  given  then  the  other  may  be  calculated.  The 
300 difference  between  dependent  and  independent  variable  is  very 
important,  but  this  judgement  cannot  be  made  using  functional 
analysis  alone.  D=  F(p)  can  be  written  p=  F(D),  but  this 
transformation  may  not  be  justified  by  the  actual  workings  of  the 
phenomenon  in  question. 
Blyumin  then  turns  to  the  substance  of  Cournot's  analysis. 
The  first  case  which  Cournot  examines  is  a  monopolist  who  has  no 
costs  of  production,  for  example  the  owner  of  a  source  of  mineral 
water.  The  owner  can  influence  price  by  regulating  supply.  Since 
it  is  in  the  interests  of  the  owner  to  obtain  maximum  income 
(quantity  sold  multiplied  by  price),  he  will  want  to  find  that 
amount  of  supply  (and  hence  the  price)  which  yields  this  maximum. 
To  determine  the  price  which  the  owner  desires  it  is  necessary  to 
differentiate  the  expression  pF(p)  and  set  the  first  derivative 
equal  to  zero.  Then  the  price  can  be  determined  on  the  basis  of 
the  equation: 
F(p)  +  pF'(p)  =0  (1) 
This  expression  will  be  correct  if  the  given  function  has  a 
maximum,  ie  if  the  second  derivative  is  negative.  In  other  words 
2F'(p)  +  pF"(p)  <0  must  apply.  Thus  not  all  price  increases  are 
profitable  for  the  monopolist,  because  in  increasing  the  price  p 
to  p+  dp  demand  falls  from  D  to  D-  dD.  The  profitability  or 
otherwise  of  a  price  increase  depends  on  the  relations  dD/dp  <  D/p 
or  dD/dp  >  D/p.  19  In  the  first  case  it  will  be  profitable  to 
increase  the  price,  in  the  second  case  not.  Graphically  this  can 
be  presented  in  the  usual  form  of  a  curve.  One  axis  represents  the 
price,  the  other  axis  demand.  To  obtain  the  maxima  the  point  is 
found  on  the  demand  curve  where  the  abscissa  and  the  ordinate  are 
greatest.  According  to  Blyumin  formula  number  one  above  is  of 
great  theoretical  interest,  since  it  facilitates  the  determination 
of  the  price  of  a  monopoly  product,  according  to  the  equation 
given  below: 
P=  F(p)/-F'(p) 
301 In  other  words  the  price  of  such  a  good  is  exclusively  dependent 
on  the  demand  function.  20 
After  presenting  this  analysis  by  Cournot,  Blyumin  then  turns 
to  some  points  of  criticism.  Although  Cournot  begins  with  the  case 
of  full  monopoly,  this  cannot  be  called  an  absolute  monopoly, 
since  it  is  a  monopoly  in  relation  to  one  good  only.  Competition 
between  different  spheres  of  production  is  not  ruled  out,  some 
type  of  market  competition  may  occur,  and  it  is  therefore  a  mixed 
regime.  According  to  Blyumin  an  absolute  monopoly  would  only  exist 
if  all  production  was  monopolised  by  one  monopolist  (individual  or 
collective)  who  owned  all  the  means  of  production.  Absolute 
monopoly  supposes  the  total  elimination  of  competition  between 
different  spheres  of  production  and  different  national  economies. 
It  also  requires  that  aggregate  demand  be  equal  to  total  wages, 
therefore  making  aggregate  demand  a  fixed  quantity,  and  that  money 
plays  the  role  of  a  coupon  with  which  workers  receive  products 
from  the  monopolist.  The  latter  would  calculate  the  needs  of  its 
workers  with  a  production  plan,  and  this  task  is  in  fact 
concomitant  with  the  creation  of  a  socialist  society. 
21 
In  this  fashion  Blyumin  links  monopoly  with  socialism.  He 
conceives  of  a  socialist  system  as  being  controlled  by  a  single 
supermonopolist,  who  calculates  the  requirements  of  workers  and 
who  plans  production  to  fulfil  these  requirements.  However,  he 
stresses  that  his  notion  of  absolute  monopoly  does  not  correspond 
with  Cournot's  analysis  of  full  monopoly.  According  to  Blyumin  the 
cardinal  mistake  of  Cournot  is  that  he  places  his  system  of 
monopoly  on  the  same  footing  as  his  system  of  competition.  Blyumin 
stresses  that  monopoly  differs  fundamentally  from  commodity 
economy,  since  it  represents  not  anarchy  but  organisation.  Hence 
formula  one  above  will  not  be  applicable  to  absolute  monopoly  as 
conceived  by  Blyumin. 
Blyumin  then  points  out  that  if  the  case  of  limited  rather 
than  absolute  monopoly  is  taken,  then  formula  one  needs 
modification.  Demand  for  a  given  good  depends  not  only  on  the 
price  of  this  good,  but  on  the  prices  of  a  whole  series  of  goods: 
Da  =  Fa  (Pa.  Pb'  PC....  ) 
302 Thus  demand  could  change  even  if  pa  remains  constant.  It  is 
sufficient  that  another  good  plays  an  important  part  in  the  budget 
of  a  significant  part  of  the  population,  and  that  its  price  is 
altered.  22  This  criticism  was  probably  taken  by  Blyumin  from 
Walras,  as  Walras's  system  stresses  this  point  often.  If  this 
modification  is  made,  it  is  clear  that  a  particular  monopolist 
will  have  less  influence  over  his  income  than  suggested  by 
Cournot,  since  price  changes  of  goods  not  manufactured  by  the 
monopolist  are  outside  his  sphere  of  influence.  According  to 
Blyumin  this  limits  the  rationality  principle  within  monopoly. 
Blyumin  is  also  keen  to  point  out  that  Cournot  significantly 
overestimates  the  possibility  of  the  type  of  monopolist  which  he 
describes  rationally  influencing  market  processes.  Moreover 
bourgeois  economists  who  speak  of  the  possibility  of  the  removal 
of  crises  by  creating  powerful  capitalist  organisations  which  lead 
the  economy  underestimate  the  role  and  significance  of  spontaneous 
processes.  Cournot's  error  in  this  respect  leads  him  to 
incorrectly  represent  the  psychology  of  the  monopolist.  According 
to  Blyumin  Cournot  presents  the  monopolist  as  outlining  a 
production  plan  in  conditions  where  all  relevant  data  and 
conditions  are  known,  including  the  demand  function,  and  thus  all 
that  is  necessary  is  to  determine  the  optimal  price.  In  fact, 
argues  Blyumin,  in  reality  there  are  many  unknowns,  including  the 
demand  curve  for  the  goods  of  the  monopolist  which  is  liable  to  be 
capricious  and  unstable. 
23  Thus  Blyumin  argues  that  Cournot's 
formulae  for  determining  prices  in  specific  economic  conditions 
are  unusable,  as  relevant  data  for  input  cannot  be  accurately 
found.  Another  argument  which  Blyumin  brings  against  Cournot,  this 
time  a  technical  economic  argument,  is  that  some  goods  in  the  same 
sphere  of  production  compete  with  each  other  as  they  satisfy  the 
same  requirement  (eg  coal  and  oil),  and  thus  price  increases  for 
one  such  good  can  lead  to  it  being  replaced  on  a  major  scale  by  a 
competing  good.  Where  this  argument  applies,  the  possibility  of 
monopolistic  price  regulation  is  within  narrower  limits  than 
suggested  by  Cournot. 
Blyumin  then  moves  on  to  examine  Cournot's  analysis  of  cases 
where  costs  of  production  are  not  zero.  In  this  case  the  maximum 
price  is  not  related  to  pF(p),  but  to  pF(p)  -  Y(D),  where  Y(D) 
303 signifies  costs  required  for  the  production  of  D  units.  In  this 
case  it  is  necessary  to  find  the  first  derivative  of  the  latter 
formula  and  set  it  equal  to  zero: 
D+  [dD/dp][p  -  dY(D)/dD]  =0  (2) 
Blyumin  points  out,  however,  that  Y(D)  is  a  quantity  which  depends 
on  the  prices  of  raw  material  goods  and  labour  power,  and 
therefore  the  formula  pF(p)  -  Y(D)  includes  many  prices  and  hence 
many  unknowns.  Blyumin  concludes  that  this  formula  is  therefore 
indeterminate.  24  In  his  Elements  Walras  gives  the  following  scheme 
illustrating  Cournot's  formula: 
PRICE  OF  DEMAND  GROSS  COSTS  (2  francs  PURE  INCOME 
ONE  UNIT  p  D  INCOME  pD  per  unit)  Y(D)  pD  -  Y(D) 
100  0  0  0  0 
50  10  500  20  480 
20  50  1000  100  900 
5  1000  5000  2000  3000 
3  2500  7000  5000  2500 
2  5000  10000  10000  0 
1  12000  12000  24000  -12000 
0.5  20000  10000  40000  -30000 
0  50000  -  100000  -100000 
If  costs  of  production  are  excluded,  the  optimal  price  will  be  one 
franc  per  unit,  since  this  price  maximises  pD.  However,  if  costs 
of  production  are  included,  five  francs  will  be  the  optimal  price, 
since  this  price  maximises  pD  -  Y(D).  However,  this  only  applies 
to  monopoly.  With  free  competition  the  price  will  be  established 
at  two  francs,  ie  it  must  equal  costs  of  production.  Thus  the 
monopoly  system  limits  supply  to  1000  units,  thereby  increasing 
the  price  and  pure  income.  25 
Blyumin  then  moves  on  to  discuss  the  question  whether  formula 
one  applies  to  the  monopoly  of  means  of  production.  According  to 
Blyumin  the  answer  to  this  question  depends  on  the  nature  of  the 
functional  dependence  between  price  changes  for  means  of 
production  and  finished  products.  Two  cases  apply.  In  the  first 
increased  prices  for  means  of  production  are  reflected  in  the 
prices  of  finished  goods,  in  the  second  they  are  not.  In  the  first 
case  a  means  of  production  price  change  must  provoke  a  change  in 
demand  for  finished  goods,  and  therefore  alter  demand  for  means  of 
304 production.  In  the  second  case  the  means  of  production  price 
increase  is  absorbed  by  producers  of  finished  goods,  an  act  which 
lowers  their  average  profit  rate  but  does  not  necessarily 
influence  demand.  However,  it  may  cause  producers  of  finished 
goods  to  alter  their  production  methods,  and  in  this  way  to 
influence  demand  for  means  of  production.  26 
Blyumin  is  concerned  to  apply  Cournot's  formulae  to  goods 
with  different  elasticities  of  demand,  and  thus  to  show  the 
limitations  of  these  constructions.  In  the  field  of  production  of 
means  of  consumption  which  are  necessities,  there  is  a  definite 
limit  to  monopolistic  price  control.  According  to  Blyumin 
increasing  prices  for  necessities  leads  only  to  increases  in 
wages,  as  workers  refuse  to  suffer  reduced  living  standards  in 
this  respect.  This  logic  applies  to  highly  inelastic  demand  for 
goods  and  thus  Cournot's  formulae  should  be  modified  to  take 
account  of  this.  Blyumin  argues  that  formula  one  is  most  relevant 
where  demand  is  highly  elastic,  ie  luxury  goods  and  non- 
necessities.  Price  changes  for  these  goods  are  unlikely  to  provoke 
changes  in  wage  levels,  but  are  likely  to  provoke  changes  in 
demand.  Therefore  the  search  for  a  maximum  in  relation  to  price 
and  demand  here  is  very  relevant.  Thus  an  error  which  Cournot 
makes  is  to  universally  apply  a  formula  which  is  relevant  to  one 
type  of  good  only,  goods  with  high  elasticities  of  demand.  27 
Blyumin  gives  a  summary  of  the  criticisms  of  Cournot  which  he 
is  offering  in  relation  to  monopoly  as  follows.  Firstly  he 
overestimates  the  possibility  of  prediction  and  planning  by  the 
monopolist;  secondly  he  assumes  that  demand  depends  on  the  price 
of  the  good  in  question  only,  whereas  in  fact  the  prices  of  many 
goods  may  influence  this  demand;  thirdly  he  applies  a  formula 
applicable  to  goods  with  high  demand  elasticities  to  goods  with 
all  types  of  demand  elasticities. 
28  These  criticisms  are  quite 
revealing.  Two  out  of  the  three  are  purely  technical  economic 
criticisms  which  could  be  made  from  a  purely  neo-classical 
viewpoint.  Only  the  first  criticism  could  be  seen  in  any  way 
linked  to  a  Marxist  framework,  although  it  is  conceivable  that  a 
non-Marxist  economist  could  advance  this  argument.  Thus  while 
Blyumin  is  keen  to  criticise  Cournot,  he  seems  less  keen  to  use 
Marx  or  Lenin  to  accomplish  this  task. 
305 Blyumin  then  moves  on  to  analyse  costs  of  production  Y(D)  in 
more  detail.  Cournot  views  costs  as  a  function  of  the  quantity  of 
produced  goods,  and  as  a  general  formulation  this  position  is 
correct.  With  an  increasing  quantity  of  production  (given 
unchanging  technical  conditions)  costs  of  production  grow. 
However,  the  cost  function  can  have  a  different  character,  and 
therefore  the  derivative  of  this  function  Y'(D)  can  obey  various 
laws.  It  is  generally  the  case  that  Y'(D)  must  be  positive, 
because  it  would  be  absurd  to  propose  that  absolute  costs  fall  as 
production  increases.  It  is  known  also  that  it  is  inevitable  that 
p>  dY(D)/dD,  since  dD  is  an  increase  in  production,  dY(D)  an 
increase  in  costs,  and  pd(D)  an  increase  in  gross  income,  and 
producers  always  stop  if  the  increase  in  outlay  exceeds  the 
increase  in  income  as  regards  further  production.  However,  this 
derivative  Y'(D)  =  dY(D)/dD  can  increase  or  decrease  with 
increasing  production,  in  other  words  the  second  derivative  Y"(D) 
can  be  positive  or  negative.  Thus  relative  costs  usually  decline 
with  increasing  production,  or  with  increasing  D,  Y'(D)  will 
decline.  Cournot  also  analyses  cases  were  costs  are  constant 
relative  to  production.  This  can  be  represented  by  the  formula  D+ 
(dD/dp)(p  -  g)  =  0,  where  g  represents  a  constant  Y'(D).  When 
costs  remain  unaltered  over  different  production  levels,  D+ 
(dD/dp)p  holds.  29  Blyumin  notes  that  these  cases  coordinate  with 
various  laws  of  productivity  change:  declining  Y'(D)  with  the  law 
of  increasing  productivity,  increasing  Y'(D)  with  the  law  of 
declining  productivity,  and  constant  Y'(D)  with  the  law  of 
constant  productivity. 
Having  established  basic  formulae  for  monopoly,  Cournot  then 
moves  onto  the  case  of  limited  competition,  ie  where  2,3,...  n 
competitors  exist,  and  here  the  first  case  to  be  examined  is  two 
competitors.  They  both  produce  goods  of  identical  quality  and 
supply  the  same  market,  prices  are  identical,  and  D1  +  D2  =  D. 
Ignoring  costs  of  production,  income  is  expressed  through  pDl  and 
pD2,  and  both  competitors  will  attempt  to  increase  this  income. 
Instead  of  the  function  D=  F(p),  Cournot  uses  p=  F(D),  hence  p= 
F(D1  +  D2),  and  the  income  of  the  competitors  will  be  DnF(D1  + 
D2).  A  price  change  in  this  case  occurs  because  of  a  change  in 
supply,  and  here  is  the  essential  difference  from  the  case  of 
306 monopoly.  An  entrepreneur  in  this  case  can  only  influence  supply 
on  part  of  the  market.  Cournot  assumes  that  every  entrepreneur 
considers  his  competitors  supply  at  a  given  moment  to  be  constant, 
and  the  task  of  each  entrepreneur  is  to  calculate  an  optimal  price 
under  this  constant  supply  from  the  competition.  Analytically  this 
task  leads  to  differentiating  DnF(D1  +  D2),  which  gives: 
F(D1  +  D2)  +  DnF'(D1  +  D2)  =0 
If  it  is  supposed  for  simplicity  that  D1  =  D2,  then  F(D)  +  DnF'(D) 
=0  is  obtained.  Combining  the  derived  expressions  for  D1  and  D2 
gives  2F(D)  +  DF'(D),  which  can  be  rearranged  to  give: 
D+  2p(dD/dp)  =0 
This  equation  shows  the  maximum  profit  which  can  be  extracted  by 
competitors  together,  under  the  assumption  that  each  considers  the 
others  supply  constant. 
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On  the  basis  of  this  equation  the  quantity  p  can  be 
established  as  follows: 
P=  F(P)/-2F'(P) 
If  this  is  compared  to  the  price  in  the  monopolist  case  p=  F(p)/- 
F'(p),  it  is  clear  that  because  there  are  now  two  entrepreneurs 
competing  on  the  market,  the  price  of  the  good  in  question  has 
fallen  by  half.  This  means  also  that  the  profit  level  would  be 
correspondingly  lower.  In  fact  for  cases  with  3,4,5,...  n 
competitors,  the  general  equation  is: 
D+  np(dD/dp)  =0  (3) 
This  is  the  basic  equation  for  the  case  of  limited  competition 
without  costs  of  production.  Having  established  this  formula, 
Cournot  moves  on  to  include  costs  of  production.  Costs  are 
represented  by  Y1(D1),  Y2(D2),...  Yn(Dn),  and  the  following  set  of 
equations  are  obtained: 
307 F(D)  +  D1F'  (D)  -  Y1(D1)  =0 
F(D)  +  D2F'  (D)  -  Y2(D2)  =0 
F(D)  +  DnF'  (D)  -  Yn(Dn)  =0 
On  combining  all  these  equations  the  following  expression  is 
obtained: 
D+  (dD/dp)[np  -  SYn'(Dn)]  =0  (4) 
This  formula  gives  the  most  general  expression  for  maximum  profit 
in  the  case  of  limited  competition  with  costs  of  production 
greater  than  zero.  If  this  formula  is  compared  with  the 
corresponding  formula  for  monopoly,  two  differences  are  found: 
firstly  n  (the  number  of  competitors),  which  causes  a  reduction  in 
price,  is  absent  from  the  monopoly  case,  and  secondly  costs  of 
production  equal  SYn'(Dn)  as  opposed  to  Y'(D).  According  to 
Cournot  these  differences  act  in  contradictory  directions.  31 
Cournot  argues  that  not  only  is  the  sum  of  competitors  costs 
Yn'(Dn)  greater  than  the  monopolists  costs  Y'(D),  but  that  also 
the  average  competitors  cost  is  greater  than  Y'(D),  ie  the 
inequality  [SYn'(Dn)]/n  >  Y'(D)  applies.  Cournot  makes  the 
following  argument  concerning  lower  costs  of  production  for 
monopoly.  Owners  of  monopoly  will  prefer  to  exploit  sources  which 
demand  less  outlay  than  competitors  would. 
32  A  capitalist  holding 
a  monopoly  of  productive  property  would  operate  by  preference  the 
plants  of  which  the  operation  is  the  least  costly,  leaving  others 
idle  if  necessary.  However  the  least  favoured  competitor  will  not 
decide  to  close  a  plant  so  long  as  any  profit,  however  modest,  can 
be  obtained. 
33 
At  this  point  Blyumin  criticises  Cournot  for  not  taking 
adequate  note  of  the  difference  between  static  and  dynamic  points 
of  view.  For  a  static  system  Cournot  is  incorrect  in  assuming  a 
uniform  technical  level.  As  regards  a  dynamic  system  Cournot  fails 
to  see  the  advantages  of  competition.  Competition  represents  one 
of  the  most  important  levers  of  technical  progress  in  commodity- 
capitalist  economy,  as  various  enterprises  develop  new  techniques 
in  order  to  gain  the  competitive  edge  over  opponents  and  increase 
their  profits.  Monopoly,  on  the  contrary,  is  capitalism  in  its 
highest  and  most  corrupt  and  decaying  form.  Therefore  Blyumin 
implies  that  Cournot  is  incorrect  to  argue  that  monopoly  is  in  any 
308 way  more  efficient  in  utilising  resources  than  competition,  and 
seems  to  be  defending  free  competition  against  monopoly.  34  This 
approach  is  obviously  taken  from  Marx,  who  perceived  early 
capitalism  to  be  dynamic  and  relatively  progressive. 
The  last  stage  of  Cournot's  theory  is  unlimited  competition. 
This  differs  from  limited  competition  in  that  individual 
production  Dk  is  not  only  sensitive  to  total  production  D=  F(p), 
but  also  to  the  derivative  F'(p),  so  that  partial  production  Dk 
could  be  reduced  from  D  without  supporting  a  change  in  the  price 
of  a  good.  Suppose  that  we  have  a  very  large  number  of 
competitors,  the  formula  for  maximum  profit  will  be  F(D)  +  DkF'(D) 
-  Yk'(D)  =  0.  Substitute  p  for  F(D)  and  divide  by  F'(D)  =  dp/dD, 
the  following  equation  is  obtained: 
Dk  +  LP  -  Yk'(Dk))  dD/dp  =0 
For  the  case  of  unlimited  competition  it  is  possible  to  disregard 
the  first  Dk  and  dD/dp,  and  conclude  that: 
P-  Yk'(Dk)  =4  (5) 
In  other  words  p=  Yk'(Dk),  which  means  the  price  is  equal  to  the 
first  derivative  of  the  cost  function,  ie  the  cost  of  the  last 
unit  or  the  marginal  cost.  For  cases  with  constant  productivity 
Yk'(Dk)  will  be  a  constant,  and  the  price  of  the  good  will  equal 
its  cost  of  production.  For  cases  of  increasing  or  declining 
productivity  costs  will  not  be  constant,  and  therefore  the  price 
must  equal  the  cost  of  the  marginal  unit. 
Blyumin  then  proceeds  to  criticise  Cournot.  According  to 
Blyumin  the  theory  of  marginal  productivity  is  the  theory  of  costs 
of  production  in  its  most  absurd  (nelepoi)  form.  Cournot  has 
achieved  a  formula  for  price  in  unlimited  competition  on  the  basis 
of  an  analysis  of  monopoly  price  theory.  The  mistake  lies  in  the 
methodology  adopted.  Yk'(Dk)  expresses  a  functional  dependence  on 
the  level  of  production  costs  in  a  given  enterprise  k.  In  other 
words  it  expresses  the  level  of  individual  costs  of  production  or, 
in  Marx's  terminology,  individual  prices  of  production  (tsenu 
proizvodstva).  Meanwhile  Cournot  equates  these  prices  with  market 
prices,  and  thus  transforms  data  on  individual  costs  of 
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regulator  of  market  price.  This  absurd  conclusion  is  obtained  by 
Cournot,  according  to  Blyumin,  because  he  has  failed  to  establish 
an  understanding  of  socially-necessary  production  costs.  The 
latter  are  established  in  the  process  of  competition,  which  is 
thrown  at  the  reader  by  Cournot  only  in  the  final  formula.  The 
formula  p=  Yk'(Dk)  is  concluded  from  the  formula  F(D)  +  DF(D)  - 
Y'  (D)  =  0,  ie  from  the  price  formula  for  a  monopolist.  But  for  the 
monopolist  individual  and  socially-necessary  costs  coincide,  since 
one  producer  controls  all  the  production  of  a  good.  Hence 
Cournot's  ideas  are  related  not  to  spontaneously  regulated 
production,  but  to  consciously  planned  production.  He 
illegitimately  transfers  them  to  free  competition,  with  the 
consequence  that  he  erroneously  equates  individual  with  socially- 
necessary  costs. 
35 
Another  criticism  which  Blyumin  puts  is  that  the  theory  of 
marginal  productivity  can  be  applied  only  to  a  limited  number  of 
cases  where  there  are  specific  conditions  of  production.  These 
specific  conditions  are  that  differentials  between  various 
enterprises  within  a  particular  sphere  should  be  constant  rather 
than  temporary.  This  is  connected  with  the  limited  possibility  of 
increasing  production  under  given  technical  conditions  in  the  best 
enterprises. 
36  According  to  Blyumin  the  basic  logical  defect  with 
Cournot's  theory  is  the  precondition  that  every  competitor  assumes 
the  supply  of  his  opponents  to  be  constant.  Blyumin  quotes  an 
article  from  the  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics  by  Irving  Fisher 
which  questions  this  assumption. 
37  Blyumin  argues  that  Cournot 
incorrectly  confuses  the  psychology  of  the  monopolist  entrepreneur 
with  the  competitor  entrepreneur,  and  thus  the  results  obtained 
are  false.  Every  competitor  entrepreneur  in  fact  calculates  the 
possibility  of  increased  production  by  competitors,  and  desires  to 
extract  the  greatest  profit  from  'seizing  the  moment'  by 
increasing  his  own  production.  In  production  with  2,3,  or  more 
competitors,  the  limits  to  production  which  Cournot  indicates 
cannot  be  guarantied.  If  production  is  taken  to  the  level  D+  np 
(dD/dp)  =  0,  greater  production  might  still  occur,  since 
competitors  might  decide  to  attempt  to  steal  profits  from 
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decline,  but  the  profit  of  one  competitor  could  increase.  38 
Blyumin  relates  that  for  the  case  where  costs  of  production 
are  zero,  the  limit  to  this  increase  will  be  reached  when  prices 
reach  zero  and  total  profit  vanishes.  Thus  clearly  Cournot's 
formula  leads  to  the  logical  absurdity  that  the  basic  law  of 
competition,  the  law  of  price,  leads  to  the  abolition  of  price. 
39 
Blyumin  further  argues  that  the  very  idea  of  an  optimal  price  for 
every  competitor  is  internally  contradictory.  The  existence  of  an 
optimal  price  for  a  monopolist  is  rational  because  of  the  limited 
nature  of  production  and  the  possibility  of  forecast  and  planning. 
An  optimal  price  exists  because  the  demand  for  a  given  good  is  a 
function  only  of  its  price.  However,  with  competition  things  are 
different.  Supply  can  occur  at  various  prices  and  in  relation  to 
other  entrepreneurs.  Since  price  in  competition  is  determined  by  a 
whole  series  of  factors  independent  of  the  given  entrepreneur,  an 
optimal  price  cannot  exist  for  an  individual  entrepreneur.  Profit 
rises  and  falls  in  relation  to  an  infinite  number  of  factors,  and 
therefore  a  rational  maximum  cannot  exist  in  this  system. 
40 
Blyumin  then  continues  by  turning  to  the  work  of  Dmitriev  on 
Cournot.  Dmitriev  argues  that  if  the  assumption  of  an 
instantaneous  increase  in  production  in  allowed,  then  there  will 
be  no  difference  between  the  most  profitable  volume  of  supply  for 
monopolists  or  for  competitors.  With  n  competitors  all  of 
Cournot's  formulae  take  the  form: 
d[{D/n}F(D)]/d(D/n)  =0 
where  D=  total  supply,  n=  the  number  of  competitors,  and  D1  =  D2 
=  D3  =  D/n.  Transforming  this  we  obtain:  1/n  d[DF(D)]  =  0,  or 
multiplying  by  n:  d  [DF(D)]  =  0,  which  yields  on  differentiation: 
F(p)  +  pF'(p)  =  0.  Blyumin  argues  that  Dmitriev  ignores  all 
economic  struggle  between  competitors,  and  transforms  them  into 
members  of  a  single  joint-stock  company.  Further  Dmitriev  acts  as 
if  the  volume  of  total  production  of  a  good  was  regulated 
consciously  by  a  social  organisation.  Blyumin  then  turns  to  the 
assumption  of  instantaneous  supply  increase.  This  removes  the 
possibility  of  a  temporary  super-profit  from  either  increased 
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is  incorrect.  41 
In  general  Blyumin  concludes  that  Dmitriev  makes  the  same 
mistakes  as  Cournot,  as  they  both  employ  a  similar  method.  This 
method  leads  to  ignoring  the  economic  content  of  various 
phenomena,  and  to  erroneously  equating  monopoly  with  free 
commodity  production.  The  basic  tendency  of  mathematical 
economists  is  to  rationalise  commodity  economy  by  asserting  the 
existence  of  a  maximum  at  the  margin,  and  it  is  clear  that  Blyumin 
believes  that  this  exercise  is  apologetic  in  nature.  42 
It  is  interesting  to  analyse  what  Blyumin  leaves  out  of  his 
account  of  Dmitriev's  essay  on  Cournot.  Blyumin  is  concerned  to 
show  that  Dmitriev  and  Cournot  have  the  same  methodological  base, 
and  thus  arrive  at  similar  conclusions.  In  fact,  however,  Dmitriev 
had  criticised  Cournot  explicitly,  and  arrived  at  completely 
different  conclusions  than  Cournot.  Dmitriev's  major  work  was  his 
Ekonomicheskie  ocherki:  opyt  organicheskago  sinteza  trudovoi 
teorii  tsennosti  i  teorii  predel  'noi  poleznosti,  which  contains 
essays  on  Ricardo,  Cournot,  and  marginal  utility  in  general,  and 
was  first  published  complete  in  1904.  In  the  second  essay, 
entitled  Teoriya  konkurrentsii  Dr.  Kurno,  Dmitriev  critically 
analyses  Cournot's  work.  After  presenting  Cournot's  theory  in  a 
highly  mathematical  manner,  Dmitriev  turns  to  criticising  it.  His 
basic  criticism  is  that  Cournot  ignores  the  inefficiencies  which 
accompany  production  under  free  competition.  According  to  Dmitriev 
when  monopoly  prevails  the  national  economy  as  a  whole  loses 
nothing.  What  is  taken  from  consumers  over  and  above  necessary 
production  costs  is  at  the  disposal  of  the  monopolist  as  a 
particularly  high  monopoly  profit: 
...  conversely,  when  free  competition  prevails,  the 
entire  sum  paid  by  consumers  over  and  above  necessary 
production  costs  is  lost  without  trace  to  the  national 
economy,  by  its  expenditure  on  non-productive  costs 
(costs  which  do  not  increase  the  sum  total  of  benefit). 
Therefore  the  thesis  that  free  competition  ensures  the 
greatest  productivity  of  existing  means  of 
production...  is  simply  based  on  the  incorrect 
assumption  that  free  competition  is  capable  of  reducing 
the  price  of  products  to  the  necessary  production  costs 
under  all  conditions  of  production  and  use,  and  that  it 
falls  as  these  costs  fall.  43 
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entrepreneurs  build  up  completely  unnecessary  stock,  dead  stock 
which  raises  the  total  costs  of  the  enterprise,  costs  which  have 
to  be  passed  on  to  the  consumer.  The  reason  for  this  dead  stock  is 
that  entrepreneurs  are  in  constant  fear  that  a  competitor  may 
suddenly  increase  his  supply,  thus  increasing  his  market  share  and 
overall  profit,  even  though  the  price  of  the  good  may  decline 
because  of  this.  In  order  to  ensure  that  this  does  not  happen  each 
entrepreneur  must  carry  extra  stock  as  evidence  to  his  competitors 
that  he  could  retaliate  in  like  fashion,  and  thus  wipe  out  his 
competitors  extra  profit.  It  would  be  advantageous  to  each 
competitor  to  liquidate  this  dead  stock,  but  only  if  all  other 
competitors  did  likewise.  Dmitriev  makes  an  analogy  with 
armaments.  In  an  arms  race  if  one  side  only  disarmed  (destroyed 
dead  stock),  then  opponents  could  count  on  victory  if  battle 
commenced  (could  count  on  extra  profit  when  supply  was 
enlarged). 
44  From  this  Dmitriev  concludes  that  non-productive 
costs  are  incurred  by  enterprises  in  free  competition,  costs  which 
raise  the  equilibrium  price  above  necessary  costs,  and  which  show 
free  competition  to  be  non-optimal. 
Dmitriev  further  shows  that  this  conclusion  is  not  the  result 
of  an  assumption  of  equally  favourable  situations  for  the 
competitors.  When  the  conditions  of  individual  entrepreneurs  are 
not  equally  favourable,  for  additional  non-productive  costs  to  be 
incurred  it  is  sufficient  that  the  necessary  production  costs  of  a 
unit  of  the  good  in  question  should  be  lower  for  the  entrepreneur 
to  whom  it  seems  advantageous  to  lower  the  market  price  below  that 
which  maximises  total  gross  revenue.  Put  another  way,  for 
additional  costs  to  be  common  it  is  sufficient  that  average  costs 
should  be  less  than  the  price  at  which  the  greatest  sum  is  taken 
from  consumers  (Pmax)"  According  to  Dmitriev  this  latter  condition 
currently  holds  in  all  the  most  important  and  extensive  industrial 
branches.  Moreover,  the  greater  is  the  need  the  product  satisfies 
and  the  more  advanced  is  the  technique  used  for  its  manufacture, 
the  greater  is  the  probability  that  non-productive  costs  for  the 
storage  of  speculative  stock  will  be  incurred.  45  Dmitriev  also 
states  that  even  when  a  good  is  transferred  directly  from  producer 
to  consumer,  non-productive  costs  are  still  possible  under 
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capacity: 
The  occurrence  of  non-productive  costs  will  become 
impossible  only  when  consumer  and  producer  merge  in  the 
same  person  (even  if  a  corporate  body),  ie  when  an 
exchange  economy  is  once  again  converted  into  a  natural 
economy. 
46 
It  is  apparent  that  Blyumin  chose  to  ignore  this  aspect  of 
Dmitriev's  analysis  of  Cournot  at  this  point,  even  though  it  was 
plainly  critical  of  free  competition.  It  is  impossible  to  be  sure 
why  this  is  so,  but  it  may  be  because  Dmitriev  tried  to  show  the 
non-optimality  of  free  competition  from  within  its  own  theoretical 
framework,  ie  gave  an  internal  critique.  Marxists  generally  have 
tended  to  reject  the  framework  of  neo-classical  economics 
altogether  as  being  purely  apologetic,  and  have  preferred  to  give 
external  critiques,  ie  critiques  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
labour  theory  of  value.  Dmitriev's  stated  aim  for  his 
Ekonomicheskie  ocherki  was  to  attempt  a  synthesis  of  the  labour 
theory  of  value  with  marginal  utility,  a  proposal  which  can  only 
be  rejected  by  orthodox  Marxists.  Because  of  this  Blyumin  was  not 
keen  to  be  seen  legitimising  Dmitriev's  work,  and  thus  tried  to 
associate  him  with  the  type  of  analysis  conducted  by  Cournot  and 
Walras.  However,  this  does  a  disservice  to  Dmitriev.  47 
After  examining  Blyumin's  analysis  of  an  early  precursor  of 
the  neo-classical  school,  I  turn  to  the  'big  three'  who  make  up 
the  first  wave  of  neo-classical  economics  proper:  Marshall, 
Devons,  and  Walras.  In  many  ways  these  economists  did  not  invent 
totally  new  concepts,  rather  they  rediscovered  already-existing 
ones  and  applied  them  in  new  ways.  Hence  there  is  some  overlap 
between  Cournot  and  (for  example)  Devons.  Since  Marshall  is 
perhaps  the  most  well-known  of  the  three,  I  begin  with  Blyumin's 
account  of  him. 
8.4  -  MARSHALL 
According  to  Marshall  in  political  economy  there  are  three 
basic  variants  of  the  theory  of  value:  the  theory  of  supply  and 
demand,  in  which  price  is  determined  by  their  relation;  the  theory 
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theory  of  costs  of  production,  in  which  price  is  determined  by 
production  costs.  Blyumin  notes  that  Marshall  attempts  to  unify 
these  three  variants  in  his  own  theory  of  price.  48  According  to 
Blyumin  supply  and  demand  plays  the  main  role  in  Marshall's  theory 
of  equilibrium.  According  to  Marshall  when  supply  equals  demand 
there  is  equilibrium,  and  no  changes  in  the  level  of  production 
occur.  Blyumin  argues  that  this  principle  is  incorrect.  Changes  in 
supply  and  demand  affect  the  market  price  only,  and  cause  the 
market  price  to  deviate  from  the  value  or  from  price  of 
production.  When  supply  equals  demand  goods  exchange  according  to 
value. 
49  Thus  Blyumin  is  clearly  using  the  categories  developed  by 
Marx  to  criticise  Marshall's  theory. 
Blyumin  presents  Marshall's  development  of  the  idea  of 
elasticity.  The  elasticity  of  demand  is  expressed  in  the  character 
of  the  demand  curve.  The  more  elastic  is  the  demand,  the  greater 
is  the  gradient  of  the  demand  curve.  A  line  at  45°  to  the  axis 
would  show  demand  to  be  unit  elastic. 
50  Marshall  discusses  the 
elasticity  of  various  goods  as  follows.  Demand  for  some  goods  is 
inelastic  due  to  their  very  low  price,  eg  salt.  Elasticity  of 
demand  can  be  different  for  the  same  good  in  different  sections  of 
the  population  which  have  different  purchasing  powers,  for  example 
demand  for  meat,  milk,  and  tobacco  is  highly  elastic  for  workers 
but  less  so  for  the  wealthy  classes. 
51  Blyumin  notes  that  the 
American  economist  H.  L.  Moore  has  attempted  to  define 
quantitatively  formulae  for  the  demand  of  various  goods  on  the 
basis  of  partial  elasticity.  For  example  for  rye: 
y=0.94  -  1.0899x  +  0.02391x2 
On  differentiating  dx/dy  =  1/1.0899  =  -0.92.52  Thus  Blyumin  is 
clearly  aware  of  the  concept  of  elasticity  and  of  ways  to  quantify 
it. 
Blyumin  notes  that  Marshall's  theory  of  demand  is  distinct 
from  Walras's.  Walras  begins  from  the  amount  of  money  available  to 
subjects,  their  needs  and  desires,  and  market  prices.  On  the  basis 
of  the  second  law  of  Gossen  subjects  distribute  their  money  for 
the  purchase  of  various  goods  in  order  to  equalise  their  marginal 
utilities.  Since  all  goods  are  bought  in  a  definite  quantity,  the 
315 level  of  demand  for  various  goods  can  be  established.  According  to 
Blyumin  Marshall's  determination  of  the  level  of  demand  is 
different.  If  the  market  price  of  a  good  equals  an  then  various 
units  of  this  good  have  different  utilities  for  a  given  subject. 
If  this  is  expressed  in  prices,  then  a  falling  series  of  prices 
a1,  a2,  a3,  an-1,  an,  an+1  is  obtained.  From  Marshall's  point  of 
view  the  subject  agrees  to  buy  only  that  quantity  of  goods  the 
latter  units  of  which  will  have  utility  not  less  than  the  market 
price,  ie  n  units.  Blyumin  states  that  if  this  interpretation  is 
correct  then  Walras  gives  a  more  accurate  method  of  calculating 
the  quantity  of  demand.  Marshall's  presupposition  that  the  utility 
of  the  last  purchased  unit  cannot  be  greater  than  its  price  has  an 
absolutely  arbitrary  nature.  Moreover  Marshall  abstracts  from  the 
interdependence  of  all  goods,  unlike  Walras,  and  hence  is 
methodologically  in  error. 
53  Marshall  gives  a  partial  equilibrium 
analysis  whereas  Walras  attempts  a  general  equilibrium  analysis, 
and  thus  on  this  point  Blyumin  favours  Walras  over  Marshall. 
Blyumin  then  turns  his  attention  to  Marshall's  idea  of  the 
consumer  surplus.  Suppose  a  consumer  would  buy  one  pound  of  tea  at 
twenty  shillings,  two  pounds  at  fourteen  shillings,  three  pounds 
at  ten  shillings,  four  pounds  at  six,  five  pounds  at  four,  six 
pounds  at  three,  and  seven  pounds  at  two.  According  to  Marshall  he 
would  not  gain  if  he  bought  one  pound  for  twenty  shillings,  since 
the  marginal  utility  of  this  pound  would  equal  its  price.  If 
however  the  price  is  fourteen  shillings,  the  consumer  would  buy 
two  pounds  for  twenty  eight  shillings.  The  total  utility  obtained 
would  be  20  +  14  =  34,  whereas  the  price  was  only  twenty  eight, 
and  hence  the  consumer  gains  34  -  28  =  6.  This  gain  represents  the 
surplus  of  total  utility  over  price  and  is  called  the  consumer 
surplus  by  Marshall.  54  According  to  Blyumin  this  analysis  is 
incorrect.  Marshall  makes  the  mistake  of  merging  utility  with 
price,  making  the  two  totally  commensurable.  In  fact  Blyumin 
states  that  they  are  only  partially  connected,  as  they  are  two 
qualitatively  different  series.  Blyumin  highlights  the  absurdity 
of  this  idea  by  showing  how  it  would  be  possible  for  £100  =  £1000 
if  a  subject  possessed  £100  but  purchased  goods  which  left  a 
consumer  surplus  of  £1000.55  This  is  as  absurd  as  stating  that  a= 
ma  where  a  and  m  are  not  zero,  and  results  from  Marshall's 
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category  of  utility. 
Blyumin  then  turns  to  Marshall's  analysis  of  long  and  short 
periods.  For  Marshall  the  general  logic  of  price  determination 
necessitates  analysis  of  the  time  periods  involved,  since  the  role 
of  supply  and  demand  is  not  identical  in  short  and  long  periods. 
Marshall  gives  the  following  rule  on  the  relation  between  price 
formation  and  time  periods:  the  shorter  the  period  the  more 
influence  demand  will  have  on  price,  and  the  longer  the  period  the 
greater  the  influence  of  costs  of  production.  Marshall  relates  the 
existence  of  three  basic  periods:  1)  very  short,  such  as  one  day, 
in  which  the  equilibrium  between  supply  and  demand  is 
instantaneous;  2)  medium  term,  such  as  one  year,  when  it  is 
possible  to  increase  production  is  response  to  demand  within  the 
capacity  of  existing  plant  and  with  fixed  worker  skill  levels  and 
fixed  levels  of  basic  capital;  3)  the  long  period  of  several 
years,  when  it  is  possible  to  increase  all  productive  resources 
including  labour  and  capital.  These  three  periods  relate  to  three 
types  of  prices:  a)  market  prices;  b)  normal  prices  for  the  short 
period;  c)  normal  prices  for  the  long  period.  The  laws  regulating 
these  three  categories  of  price  are  different.  56 
Only  in  a  stationary  economy  where  the  general  conditions  of 
production  and  consumption  remain  unchanged  does  the  market  price 
equal  the  normal  for  short  and  long  periods.  Market  prices  in  non- 
stationary  economies  are  determined  predominantly  by  demand.  The 
short  period  normal  price  is  influenced  by  demand,  but  not 
predominantly.  Since  it  is  possible  only  to  partially  increase 
production  in  the  medium  term,  the  short  period  normal  price  may 
be  higher  than  the  long  period  normal  price  if  demand  exceeds 
supply.  However,  the  limit  to  which  a  short  period  normal  price 
may  fall  is  determined  by  the  level  of  costs  of  production. 
57  The 
latter  Marshall  divides  into  two  categories:  prime  and 
supplementary  costs.  Hence  costs  of  production  also  influence  the 
short  period  normal  price.  For  the  long  period  normal  price  costs 
of  production  have  the  predominant  influence.  Marshall  gives  the 
example  of  fishing.  If  demand  for  fish  increases  long  term,  then 
fish  prices  will  only  change  if  this  extra  demand  influences  costs 
of  production,  ie  if  the  production  cost  against  production  level 
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demand  over  the  short  and  long  period  is  the  relevant  cost 
elasticity  of  production. 
58 
According  to  Blyumin  this  analysis  by  Marshall  is  nothing 
new.  Classical  bourgeois  economists  recognised  that  the  law  of 
value  can  only  be  manifest  over  the  long  term,  and  Ricardo  was 
critical  of  economists  who  thought  that  prices  were  determined 
exclusively  by  supply  and  demand.  The  law  of  value  can  act  only 
when  there  is  free  reproduction  and  free  movement  of  capital  and 
labour,  ie  only  in  the  long  term.  Thus  Marshall's  attempt  to 
delineate  between  short  and  long  period  prices  was  not  original. 
Blyumin  then  conducts  an  examination  of  Marshall's  analysis 
of  the  three  laws  of  productivity.  The  influence  of  demand  on  the 
normal  price  can  be  eliminated,  according  to  Marshall,  if  the 
production  of  the  good  in  question  follows  the  law  of  constant 
productivity,  ie  if  costs  of  production  per  unit  remain  constant 
when  production  levels  are  increased.  However,  since  rising  or 
falling  costs  are  also  possible  -  the  laws  of  decreasing  or  rising 
productivity  respectively  -  this  is  not  always  so.  When  the  laws 
of  decreasing  or  rising  productivity  apply,  the  level  of  costs  of 
production  change  in  relation  to  changing  demand,  and  hence  the 
normal  price  will  be  influenced  by  demand  through  the  level  of 
costs  of  production. 
59  Marshall  establishes  the  following  rule:  in 
the  case  of  declining  productivity  increased  demand  increases  the 
price,  and  visa  versa.  Hence  it  follows  that  the  influence  of 
taxation  on  price  levels  will  depend  on  which  law  of  productivity 
applies  to  the  good  in  question.  60  In  the  case  of  a  good  which 
obeys  the  law  of  falling  productivity  increasing  the  price  by  a 
tax  will  provoke  a  fall  in  demand  (assuming  demand  to  be  unit 
elastic)  and  therefore  a  fall  in  production,  which  in  turn  will 
lower  costs  of  production  and  thus  exert  downward  pressure  on 
prices.  The  reverse  applies  in  the  case  of  the  law  of  rising 
productivity.  Demand  will  fall  causing  production  levels  to  fall, 
but  this  will  force  costs  of  production  higher  thus  putting 
further  upward  pressure  on  prices.  Hence  Marshall  comes  to  the 
conclusion  that  taxes  on  goods  obeying  the  law  of  rising 
productivity  have  negative  effects. 
61  However,  as  I  noted  above 
318 this  reasoning  depends  on  demand  being  unit  elastic,  which  in  many 
cases  it  is  not. 
Blyumin  then  turns  his  attention  to  Marshall's  analysis  of 
costs  of  production.  The  basic  task  of  book  five  of  the  Principles 
consist  of  showing  that  prices  are  identical  with  costs  of 
production  only  under  certain  circumstances.  These  circumstances 
are  related  to  the  time  period  involved  and  to  the  level  of 
production,  which  in  turn  depends  on  the  level  of  demand.  The 
indirect  influence  of  demand  occurs  in  those  cases  where  the  law 
of  falling  productivity  applies.  According  to  Marshall  the  costs 
of  production,  the  intensity  of  demand,  the  limits  to  production, 
and  the  price  of  products  are  interconnected  and  regulate  one 
another:  there  is  no  logical  circle  in  the  position  that  every  one 
of  the  parts  are  regulated  by  other  parts  without  a  final  cause 
uncaused. 
62  Marshall  states  that  the  following  elements  are 
constituents  of  costs  of  production  of  a  good:  the  prices  of  the 
raw  materials;  interest  on  the  capital;  wages;  profit;  costs  of 
administration.  However,  Blyumin  notes  that  all  these  constituents 
are  in  fact  prices,  and  thus  Marshall  is  arguing  that  price  is 
determined  by  costs  of  production  (in  special  circumstances)  which 
are  in  turn  determined  by  prices. 
Blyumin  states  that  the  difference  between  Marx  and  Marshall 
in  this  respect  is  not  that  the  former  denies  that  costs  of 
production  influence  and  determine  prices,  but  rather  in  the 
manner  in  which  these  costs  are  explained.  For  Marx  costs 
represent  the  value  form  of  expended  factors  of  production,  value 
in  this  case  meaning  the  quantity  of  abstract  social  labour  rather 
than  the  marginal  utility.  Therefore  the  real  difference  lies  with 
the  theory  of  value,  not  with  costs.  Marshall  delineates  between 
two  understandings  of  costs  -  real  and  monetary.  The  first  type  of 
costs  do  not  have  a  monetary  character,  and  relate  to  the 
difficulty  encountered  when  producing  a  good.  The  second  type 
relates  to  the  monetary  outlays  required  to  compel  people  to 
overcome  the  difficulty.  Marshall  criticises  some  economists  (eg 
Mill)  for  not  indicating  precisely  what  meaning  they  have  in 
mind. 
63 
According  to  Blyumin  what  differentiates  Marx  from  the 
marginalists  is  that  the  latter  see  real  costs  coming  from  two 
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capitalists.  However,  Marshall  substitutes  the  word  'waiting' 
(ozhidanie)  for  'abstinence'  (vozderzhanie).  In  contrast  Marx 
bases  his  theory  on  the  notion  that  only  labour  creates  value. 
However,  the  analysis  of  Cairnes  uses  three  basic  elements: 
labour,  abstinence,  and  risk.  Blyumin  shows  that  Marshall  uses  the 
labour  and  waiting  analysis  of  real  costs  in  his  price  theory.  The 
final  basis  of  price  is  the  quantity  of  demand  and  the  costs  of 
production,  the  latter  being  determined  by  the  quantity  of  labour 
and  waiting  involved.  64  Blyumin  then  shows  how  Cassel  criticised 
all  non-monistic  explanations  of  price,  including  Marshall's. 
Cassel  argued  that  all  dualistic  or  other  non-monistic  theories 
are  incorrect  because  of  the  impossibility  of  summing  the  various 
factors  determining  price.  In  Marshall's  case  labour  and  waiting 
are  two  qualitatively  different  factors  and  hence  are  totally 
incommensurable.  Blyumin  states  that  it  would  be  possible  to 
establish  a  quantitative  relation  between  them  only  by  making  the 
transition  from  material  content  to  value  expression,  but  this 
means  turning  from  a  costs  of  production  approach  to  a  labour 
theory  approach. 
65 
Blyumin  relates  that  the  theory  of  real  costs  plays  only  a 
subsidiary  role  in  Marshall's  system.  The  decisive  role  in 
Marshall's  theory  is  played  by  monetary  costs.  The  supply  price 
depends  directly  on  monetary  costs,  and  real  costs  influence  the 
supply  price  only  in  so  far  as  they  regulate  the  level  of  monetary 
costs.  In  relation  to  labour  and  waiting,  the  higher  the  marginal 
displeasures  (predel'naya  nepriyatnost')  of  these  factors  the 
higher  will  be  the  stimuli  required  to  overcome  the  displeasure, 
ie  the  higher  the  wages  and  the  interest  rate  respectively. 
However,  Blyumin  asks:  are  these  marginal  displeasures  factors 
which  regulate  the  level  of  monetary  costs  of  production?  Can 
monetary  costs  be  viewed  as  adequate  reflections  of  the  strength 
of  desires  of  capitalists  and  workers?  Blyumin  states  that 
Marshall  must  give  a  negative  answer  to  this  question. 
66  According 
to  Blyumin  Marshall  at  this  point  falls  into  the  mistake  common  to 
bourgeois  economists  of  letting  the  value  of  a  good  be  dependent 
on  wages,  profit,  and  rent.  Therefore  for  Marshall  in  order  to 
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it  is  necessary  to  operate  with  a  theory  of  distribution.  67 
In  regards  to  the  labour  theory  of  value,  Blyumin  notes  that 
Marshall  agrees  that  value  is  proportional  to  the  amount  of 
expended  labour  only  under  certain  specific  circumstances:  ceteris 
paribus  that  labour  is  equally  qualified  and  consequently  receives 
equal  wages,  equal  quantity  of  capital,  identical  turnover 
periods,  and  equal  profit  norms.  Once  various  levels  of 
qualification  are  introduced,  then  commensurability  is  lost.  68  In 
terms  of  the  price  of  labour  power,  Blyumin  notes  that  Marshall 
favours  the  demand  approach  rather  than  the  costs  of  reproduction 
approach.  Demand  prices  for  labour  power  are  determined  by  the 
marginal  productivity  of  labour,  not  by  the  costs  of  reproducing 
the  labour  power  in  terms  of  subsistence  needs  of  the  family.  69 
Thus  Blyumin  is  disagreing  with  Marshall  on  this  point. 
In  conclusion  Blyumin  states  that  Marshall's  economic  theory 
is  based  on  two  contradictory  propositions:  the  regulating  role  of 
supply  and  demand,  and  the  fact  that  the  quantity  of  primary 
productive  factors  (labour  and  waiting)  are  not  fixed,  but 
variable.  The  first  puts  Marshall  with  the  subjectivists,  the 
second  with  vulgar  classical  political  economy.  70  Blyumin  argues 
that  because  of  this  Marshall's  theory  can  be  seen  as  a  new  stage 
in  the  development  of  the  vulgar  school,  a  stage  which  attempts  to 
unite  a  supply  and  demand  approach  with  a  costs  of  production 
approach.  The  unification  occurs  through  Marshall's  use  of  various 
time  periods  and  the  various  laws  of  productivity.  In  the  short 
period  demand  is  more  significant  than  in  the  long  period,  and  in 
the  case  of  the  law  of  constant  productivity  the  influence  of 
demand  is  weaker  than  in  cases  of  rising  or  falling 
productivity.  71  Thus  Blyumin  thinks  that  Marshall  evades  the 
question  of  what  is  the  final  determinant  of  price,  and  his  method 
of  combining  supply  and  demand  with  costs  is  unclear  and  eclectic. 
8.5  -  JEVONS 
Blyumin  begins  this  analysis  by  stressing  the  difference 
between  Jevons  and  the  Austrian  school. 
72  Although  Jevons  declares 
that  political  economy  must  be  based  fully  on  utility,  in  actual 
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marginal  utility  depends  on  price.  Thus  price  is  seen  as  one  of 
the  factors  influencing  the  level  of  supply  and  demand,  whereas 
the  Austrians  view  utility  as  the  sole  basis  of  price. 
Furthermore,  according  to  Blyumin  the  theory  of  utility  plays  in 
Jevons  a  different  role  than  in  the  Austrians.  Utility  theory  is 
necessary  for  Devons  in  order  to  determine  the  quantity  of  demand 
using  the  first  and  second  laws  of  Gossen.  73  Utility  is  viewed  as 
a  function  of  quantity  of  supply,  ie  if  there  is  a  known  supply  of 
a  good  the  utility  of  every  different  unit  will  differ  according 
to  the  first  law  of  Gossen.  Analytically  this  is  expressed  by  u= 
f(x),  where  u  is  utility  and  x  is  the  quantity  of  the  good  in  the 
given  supply.  The  task  is  to  determine  the  utility  of  various 
units,  given  the  total  utility.  It  cannot  be  determined  by  simply 
dividing  the  total  utility  u  by  the  number  of  constituent  parts  x, 
since  individual  utility  changes  with  supply. 
Blyumin  continues  by  showing  how  Devons  derives  an  expression 
for  determining  the  utility  at  every  point  on  the  supply  curve. 
Suppose  that  a  curve  PQ  is  an  expression  of  the  total  utility 
function.  When  supply  x=  oa,  then  the  utility  of  all  supplies 
will  equal  the  corresponding  ordinate  ac.  If  total  supply 
increases  by  a  small  amount  (aal),  then  total  utility  also 
increases  by  the  amount  blcl.  In  order  to  understand  the 
constituent  units  in  the  interval  aal  it  would  be  necessary  to 
divide  the  increase  in  utility  b1c1  by  the  increase  in  supply  aal, 
or  in  general  du  by  dx,  or: 
du/dx  =  [f(x  +  dx)  -  f(x)]/dx 
However,  this  expression  does  not  give  an  exact  representation  of 
the  quantity  of  utility  at  every  point.  The  difference  between  the 
various  units  will  be  smaller,  the  smaller  is  the  length  taken.  If 
we  suppose  that  the  increase  in  supply  dx  is  infinitely  small  then 
the  inexactitude  disappears,  and  an  expression  for  the  utility  at 
every  point  in  relation  to  supply  is  obtained.  This  is  the  first 
322 derivative  of  the  given  function  according  to  x.  Hence  it  is 
possible  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  utility  of  every 
different  unit  of  supply  is  the  first  derivative  of  total  utility 
viewed  as  a  function  of  the  quantity  of  supply.  74 
However,  in  reality  total  utility  of  a  whole  complex  of 
various  goods  depends  not  only  on  x,  but  also  on  the  supply  of  y, 
z,  etc.  From  this  point  of  view  to  define  the  utility  function  of 
one  good  apart  from  others  is  very  difficult,  since  every  good 
influences  total  utility.  In  such  a  case  u=  f(x)  is  replaced  by  u 
=  f(x,  y,  z),  and  the  partial  derivative  is: 
dxim 
[f(x  +  dx,  y,  z)  -  f(x,  y,  z)]/dx  =  df(x,  y,  z)/dx 
Blyumin  notes  that  Pareto  also  defines  the  marginal  utility  (in 
his  terminology  1  'ophelimite  elementaire)  as  the  first  partial 
derivative  of  the  general  utility  of  supply  of  various  goods. 
Blyumin  explains  that  on  analogy  with  the  mechanical 
interpretation  of  the  first  derivative  it  can  be  understood  as  the 
rate  in  relation  to  time.  Blyumin  further  notes  that  such  a 
mathematical  interpretation  of  marginal  utility  has  a  highly 
modest  theoretical  significance.  Its  role  is  only  to  allow  the 
calculation  of  the  utility  of  an  infinitely  small  part  of  a  given 
supply  of  goods,  and  thus  is  a  measurement  tool  for  concrete 
utility.  Moreover,  the  process  of  differentiation  of  the  utility 
function  presupposes  that  this  function  is  continuous 
(neprerivnyi)  and  can  be  infinitely  divided.  1/1000  of  a  loaf  of 
bread  may  have  a  physical  significance  but  it  does  not  carry  any 
utility  for  a  person  who  eats  it,  and  therefore  for  subjects  this 
microscopic  piece  of  bread  does  not  exist.  In  so  far  as  value  is 
only  attached  to  goods  with  utility,  this  means  that  the  infinite 
division  of  value  is  impossible.  Hence  Blyumin  is  arguing  that  the 
application  of  differentiation  to  this  problem  is  an  error. 
75 
However,  Blyumin  also  argues  that  the  method  of  taking  the 
limit  used  by  Jevons  transforms  the  category  of  concrete  utility 
into  a  qualitatively  different  category.  It  is  a  feature  of  the 
law  of  decreasing  utility  that  at  any  point  on  the  utility  curve 
the  marginal  utility  will  not  coincide  with  the  average  utility 
calculated  by  dividing  the  total  utility  by  its  constituent  parts. 
323 With  declining  supply  the  difference  between  these  two  categories 
falls.  With  an  infinitely  small  portion  of  supply  the  difference 
is  infinitely  small,  and  hence  this  process  gradually  overcomes 
the  first  law  of  Gossen.  Together  with  the  latter  goes  a  process 
of  gradual  relaxation  of  the  subjective  phenomenon  of  utility,  and 
the  merging  of  it  with  objective  phenomena.  As  a  result  the 
category  of  concrete  utility  changes  its  nature  in  this  process. 
76 
Blyumin  relates  how  Jevons  tries  to  base  the  use  of  the 
infinitely  small  division  on  society  as  a  whole.  For  Devons  the 
infinitely  small  part  of  supply  acquires  a  meaning  if  society  is 
used  rather  than  individuals.  In  relation  to  individuals  it  would 
clearly  be  meaningless,  but  in  relation  to  the  nation  as  a  whole 
consumption  can  be  represented  as  increasing  or  decreasing  in 
infinitely  small  portions  compared  to  the  total  level  of 
consumption.  Laws  which  are  therefore  concluded  by  means  of 
assuming  infinitely  small  divisions  can  be  viewed  theoretically 
true  for  individuals  but  actually  correct  in  relation  to  the 
production  and  consumption  of  the  whole  nation.  However,  Blyumin 
implies  that  such  reasoning  seems  rather  out  of  place  from  a  group 
of  theorists  who  view  the  individual  subject  as  the  primary  unit 
on  which  all  reasoning  must  be  based.  77 
Blyumin  is  again  concerned  to  show  that  Devons'  analysis, 
like  that  of  all  the  subjective  school,  is  based  on  circular 
reasoning.  Market  price  is  both  used  by  economists  as  an  indicator 
of  the  subjective  desires  of  individuals,  and  is  itself  supposed 
to  be  determined  by  the  subjective  wants  of  subjects.  Subjective 
perception  is  at  one  time  viewed  as  the  cause  of  market  price  and 
another  time  as  its  consequence.  However,  Blyumin  here  provides  a 
way  out  of  this  circular  reasoning  by  distinguishing  between  two 
different  meanings  of  'to  determine'.  When  economists  say  that 
prices  are  determined  by  the  marginal  utility  of  a  good  they  mean 
utility  is  the  basis  from  which  prices  are  formed,  ie  there  is  a 
causal  link  from  utility  to  price.  But  when  they  say  that  utility 
can  be  determined  on  the  basis  of  price  'to  determine'  here  means 
to  calculate  the  quantity  of,  not  that  there  is  a  causal  link  from 
price  to  utility. 
78  While  this  seems  a  quite  perceptive  analysis 
by  Blyumin,  he  then  dismisses  it  as  'unsolvable'  and  proceeds  to 
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obtain  a  precise  quantitative  representation  of  desire. 
Turning  now  to  Jevons'  mathematical  expression  of  the 
proportionality  of  price  to  marginal  utility,  Blyumin  relates  that 
if  v1(a  -  x)  is  the  marginal  utility  of  grain  for  consumer  A  and 
v2(x)  the  corresponding  function  for  B,  and  if  u1(y)  is  the 
marginal  utility  of  meat  for  A  and  u2(b  -  y)  the  analogous 
function  for  A,  A  will  be  satisfied  only  if:  79 
vl(a  -  x)  dx  =  ul(y)  dy 
This  equations  signifies  the  equality  of  the  utility  of  the  last 
increment  of  goods  for  A  and  B.  From  this  formula  Devons  comes  to 
the  conclusion  that  marginal  utility  is  proportional  to  price. 
However,  according  to  Blyumin  this  is  mistaken.  All  that  can  be 
concluded  from  the  second  law  of  Gossen  is  that  at  the  moment  the 
deal  is  concluded  the  utilities  obtained  from  the  marginal  goods 
exchanged  are  equal.  The  conclusion  relating  marginal  utility  to 
price  requires  a  further  assumption  in  contradiction  with  the  law 
of  falling  utility. 
80 
Blyumin  argues  that  the  proportionality  of  price  to  marginal 
utility  applies  only  in  very  special  circumstances.  These  are  as 
follows:  a)  the  marginal  utility  of  goods  being  equal;  b)  the 
possibility  of  infinite  division  of  desires  and  needs;  c) 
abstraction  from  the  law  of  falling  utility  for  small  supplies  of 
goods;  d)  developed  exchange;  e)  for  cash  exchange;  f)  only  for 
buyers,  but  not  for  sellers. 
81  In  the  case  of  the  last 
circumstance  Blyumin  argues  as  follows.  The  second  law  of  Gossen 
supposes  that  buyers  can  always  choose  on  the  market  that 
combination  of  consumer  goods  which  they  evaluate  as  maximally 
useful.  The  initiative  of  choice  is  always  with  the  buyer,  and 
sellers  have  to  adapt  to  the  needs  and  wishes  of  buyers. 
Consequently  Gossen's  second  law  supposes  that  sellers  are  not 
interested  in  the  marginal  utility  of  the  goods  they  sell,  rather 
to  them  the  exchange  value  is  of  prime  importance.  In  this  case 
the  level  of  supply  is  determined  by  demand  and  goods  are  produced 
exclusively  for  sale  on  markets.  The  consumption  of  the  sellers 
does  not  play  a  decisive  role,  and  hence  marginal  utility  is 
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-  namely  for  buyers.  82 
The  method  Jevons  uses  to  determine  the  exchange  ratio  is 
further  criticised  by  Blyumin  as  follows.  Jevons  first  views  one 
of  the  subjects  as  the  buyer,  and  exchange  is  taken  to  the  point 
when  marginal  utility  equals  price.  But  here  the  second  subject 
has  no  influence  on  the  level  of  supply,  he  merely  fulfils  the 
demand  of  the  first  subject.  But  then  Jevons  relegates  the  first 
subject  to  passivity,  and  makes  the  second  subject  the  active 
agent  determining  supply.  From  this  process  two  relations  are 
obtained:  for  the  first  subject  marginal  utility  equals  price,  and 
for  the  second  subject  likewise.  However,  this  is  done  by  ignoring 
the  role  the  other  subject  has  when  supply  levels  are  determined, 
and  thus  for  Blyumin  this  method  is  incorrect.  83 
Suppose  that  the  formula  of  proportionality  given  by  Devons 
is  correct.  Does  this  allow  price  to  be  explained?  According  to 
Blyumin: 
For  Jevons  the  regulatory  role  of  the  marginal  unit 
applies  only  when  analysing  the  theory  of  exchange. 
Marginal  utility  allows  the  establishment  of  the  limits 
to  which  exchange  is  taken,  and  shows  only  from  the 
hedonistic  point  of  view  the  distribution  of  income  of 
given  subjects. 
84 
The  proportionality  formula  does  not  explain  the  formation  of 
given  prices,  rather  it  arises  from  the  existence  of  given  prices. 
Hence  proportionality  is  not  a  theory  of  price,  rather  a  theory  of 
exchange.  And  if  it  takes  prices  as  given  it  cannot  claim  to  show 
that  the  given  price  structure  is  optimal,  since  it  does  not 
attempt  to  explain  this  price  structure.  Thus  Blyumin  argues 
against  the  idea  that  marginal  utility  shows  capitalism  to  be 
optimal,  and  shows  that  Jevons  uses  an  exchange  optimum  in 
isolation  rather  than  in  association  with  a  production  optimum. 
Blyumin  notes  that  the  formula  of  proportionality  is  given  by 
Devons  as  follows: 
(dul/dx)(dx/d11)  =  (dug/dy)(dy/d12) 
This  allows  the  calculation  of  the  quantity  of  labour  which 
producers  must  lay  out  for  the  production  of  various  goods.  From 
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individual  economy  is  determined  by  two  factors:  the  utility  of 
various  goods  and  the  labour  outlays  required  to  produce  them.  For 
Jevons  the  most  rational  combination  of  various  products  will  be 
that  for  which  marginal  utility  is  proportional  to  labour  outlays 
or  labour  costs  of  production.  85  According  to  Blyumin  these 
equations  are  correct  for  natural  economy  alone,  since  in 
commodity  economy  other  factors  are  also  at  work. 
8.6  -  WALRAS 
According  to  Blyumin  Walras  is  undoubtedly  the  greatest 
representative  of  the  mathematical  school,  and  his  system  was  much 
copied  by  other  members  of  this  school.  However,  Walras's  method 
differs  from  that  of  Jevons  or  Gossen  in  that  he  tries  to  deduce 
the  theory  of  marginal  utility  (which  he  calls  rarete)  from  the 
theory  of  supply  and  demand.  86  Blyumin  argues  that  the  method  of 
constructing  a  supply  curve  used  by  Walras  is  based  on  a  confusing 
of  material  with  value  phenomena.  When  Walras  speaks  of  the 
quantity  of  demand  he  always  means  a  definite  quantity  of 
(material)  goods,  but  when  he  turns  to  defining  the  quantity  of 
supply  his  material  quantity  of  demand  turns  into  a  value 
quantity.  Hence  the  curve  illustrating  the  movement  of  supply  and 
demand  expresses  two  incommensurable  phenomena. 
87 
Blyumin  states  that  the  basic  mistake  of  Walras  is  that  by 
changing  supply  he  understands  a  changing  distribution  of  existing 
goods  between  subjects,  and  not  a  changing  supply  of  goods  caused 
by  changing  production  levels: 
For  mathematicians  the  composing  of  equilibrium  means 
not  a  tendency  to  proportional  distribution  between 
various  spheres,  as  a  result  of  which  stimuli  to 
transfer  labour  and  capital  from  one  sphere  to  another 
declines,  but  rather  proportional  distribution  of 
already  existing  supplies,  as  a  result  of  which  stimuli 
to  redistribute  existing  supplies  decline.  88 
Further  Walras's  assumption  that  all  prices  could  stimulate  supply 
is  erroneous.  He  tries  to  generalise  from  a  specific  case  to 
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intersects  the  demand  curve  at  three  points:  89 
The  normal  equilibrium  logic  applies  if  supply  is  established  on 
the  right  of  B'  or  B".  This  will  mean  that  supply  exceeds  demand, 
provoking  a  fall  in  prices  and  thus  reducing  supply.  The  reverse 
is  true  if  supply  is  to  the  left  of  B  and  B".  In  these  cases  the 
non-coordination  between  supply  and  demand  provokes  a 
counteracting  tendency  which  restores  the  disrupted  equilibrium. 
This  process  Walras  call  a  stable  equilibrium. 
However,  a  very  different  picture  emerges  if  supply  is 
established  at  point  B.  In  this  case  if  equilibrium  is  disrupted, 
then  this  non-coordination  will  grow.  Instead  of  approaching 
towards  equilibrium  a  movement  away  from  it  will  occur.  This 
happens  because  of  the  shape  of  the  supply  curve.  In  this  case  a 
price  rise  provokes  a  reduction  of  supply,  and  here  Walras 
attempts  to  show  an  example  where  prices  do  not  fulfil  the  role  of 
a  regulator  restoring  equilibrium.  This  process  Walras  calls 
unstable  equilibrium.  However,  Blyumin  is  concerned  to  show  that 
this  special  case  applies  only  in  very  restricted  circumstances: 
in  an  economy  where  natural  elements  are  strong  and  where  only  the 
surplus  of  (for  example)  grain  is  placed  on  the  market-90  Blyumin 
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Intersecting  at  B',  B,  &  B" argues  that  this  means  that  capitalism  must  be  being  introduced 
externally,  ie  the  natural  economy  is  being  transformed  under 
foreign  influence.  In  this  case  the  growth  of  marketability  is 
linked  to  the  rise  of  capitalist  elements  in  the  economy.  91 
Moving  on  to  Walras's  theory  of  production,  Blyumin  outlines 
how  Wairas  constructed  a  theory  of  two  markets:  a  productive 
services  market  and  a  product  market.  On  the  first  type  of  market 
entrepreneurs  organising  production  act  as  purchasers,  and  they 
buy  land  services,  labour  services,  and  capital.  These  deals  are 
conducted  in  the  normal  fashion,  obeying  the  conventional  laws  of 
market  exchange.  In  series  with  these  services  markets  exist 
product  markets,  where  entrepreneurs  act  as  sellers.  The  system  of 
prices  on  service  markets  is  expressed  in  costs  of  production 
(prix  de  revient  en  services  producteurs)  and  on  product  markets 
in  selling  prices  of  goods  (prix  de  vente  des  produits).  Between 
these  two  systems  agreement  is  expressed  through  the  law  of  costs 
of  production,  where  prices  of  goods  must  equal  their  cost  of 
production. 
92  Blyumin  notes  that  Walras  usually  divides  the  owners 
of  enterprises  into  two  types:  owners  and  entrepreneurs.  According 
to  Blyumin  by  doing  this  Walras  abstracts  from  the  fact  that 
entrepreneurs  are  frequently  the  same  as  capitalists. 
Blyumin  states  that  Walras's  production  prices  and  consumer 
services  are  regulated  by  the  same  principles  as  goods  prices,  ie 
through  the  law  of  supply  and  demand.  However,  Walras  combines  a 
theory  of  supply  and  demand  with  costs  of  production  as  follows. 
On  the  one  hand  prices  of  all  consumer  goods  equal  their  cost  of 
production.  But  these  costs  of  production  (or  the  prices  of 
productive  goods)  are  determined  by  the  supply  and  demand  for 
them.  Consequently  supply  and  demand  plays  the  decisive  role,  as 
the  costs  of  production  which  explain  finished  consumer  goods  are 
in  turn  determined  by  supply  and  demand.  Through  the  theory  of 
costs  of  production  to  the  theory  of  supply  and  demand  -  this  is 
the  most  important  thread  of  Walras's  approach.  Blyumin  comments 
that  this  theory  is  more  logical  than  Marshall's,  which 
mechanically  attempts  to  combine  costs  and  demand  as  two  equally 
valid  methods  of  explaining  price.  For  Marshall  demand  and  costs 
explain  the  price  level  with  equal  correctness;  for  Walras  costs 
are  explained  on  the  basis  of  supply  and  demand.  93  Thus  Blyumin 
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costs  to  demand,  rather  than  one  which  relates  costs  and  demand 
functionally  and  which  does  not  choose  one  as  fundamental. 
8.7  -  PARETO 
According  to  Blyumin  the  theory  of  Vilfredo  Pareto  represents 
the  logical  completion  of  that  evolution  which  was  observed  in  the 
mathematical  school.  Pareto  distinguishes  between  two  types  of 
exchange,  called  types  I&  II.  By  the  first  type  Pareto 
understands  such  an  exchange  where  participants  aspire  only  to 
expedient  satisfaction  of  their  needs,  accepting  the  existence  of 
prices  as  given.  In  the  second  type  the  participants  in  exchange 
attempt  directly  to  influence  the  level  of  market  prices,  eg  a 
powerful  banking  company  acting  on  currency  markets.  94 
Actually  Pareto  gives  a  third  type  of  exchange  -  type  III  - 
in  which  the  entire  economic  system  is  arranged  in  such  a  way  that 
maximum  welfare  is  obtained  for  all  those  who  participate:  this  is 
a  collectivist  organisation  of  society. 
95  It  is  revealing  that 
Blyumin  omits  this  third  type,  since  Pareto  argues  that  in  order 
to  obtain  maximum  ophelimity  (utility)  the  collectivist  state 
would  have  to  equalise  the  various  net  interests  and  determine  the 
coefficients  of  production  in  the  same  way  as  free  competition 
determines  them.  96  However,  Pareto  was  neutral  about  what 
prescriptions  pure  economics  gave  for  social  organisation,  stating 
that  economics  alone  does  not  give  a  truly  decisive  criterion  for 
deciding  between  an  organisation  of  society  based  on  private 
property  and  a  socialist  organisation. 
97 
Returning  to  Blyumin,  he  continues  his  analysis  of  Pareto  by 
noting  that  one  of  the  most  powerful  arguments  against  marginal 
utility  theory  is  the  impossibility  of  exact  measurement  of 
desires.  In  order  to  overcome  this  problem  Pareto  makes  use  of  the 
difference  between  ordinal  and  cardinal  ranking  in  his  theory  of 
the  indifference  curve.  While  it  may  not  be  possible  to  give  an 
exact  quantitative  expression  to  desire,  it  may  be  possible  to 
rank  desires  in  order  of  strength.  In  the  case  of  a  consumer  of 
two  goods  -  wheat  and  wine  -  it  would  be  possible  to  construct  an 
indifference  curve  which  illustrated  how  much  of  one  good  the 
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other  good,  and  visa  versa.  For  example:  98 
Wheat  1.6  1.4  1.2  1.0  0.8  0.6 
Wine  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.4  1.8 
However,  Blyumin  argues  that  Pareto  actually  makes  the  same 
mistake  of  confusing  ordinal  with  cardinal  quantities.  99  Pareto 
recommends  that  the  concrete  act  of  choice  be  taken  as  the  basis 
for  theoretical  study.  Every  participant  in  exchange  decides 
between  competing  goods,  and  their  choice  in  this  respect  reveals 
their  preferences.  However,  Blyumin  criticises  Pareto  for  taking 
these  preferences  as  given,  and  not  investigating  what  determines 
them.  According  to  Blyumin  it  is  the  general  character  of  the 
given  economic  structure  which  causes  preferences  to  be  what  they 
are,  and  thus  in  a  commodity  economy  the  key  factor  is  the 
exchange  value.  Subjects  are  indifferent  to  given  combinations 
because  under  equal  market  values  they  provide  equal  utility,  and 
hence  price  plays  an  important  role. 
100  In  Pareto's  own  example  of 
wine  and  wheat  it  is  necessary  to  suppose  that  the  prices  of  the 
various  combinations  are  identical,  which  means  that  prices  and 
utilities  always  coincide.  Such  a  coincidence  means  that  total 
utility  must  be  proportional  to  price,  an  idea  absent  from  the 
theory  of  marginal  utility.  Furthermore,  if  various  combinations 
have  the  same  price  and  the  same  utility,  it  follows  that  utility 
must  always  equal  price,  a  conclusion  which  contradicts  the  first 
law  of  Gossen  -  that  marginal  utility  falls  with  increasing 
amounts  of  the  good  in  question. 
101 
Blyumin  argues  that  Pareto  in  fact  has  a  dualistic 
understanding  of  utility.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  the  aspect  of  the 
good  which  satisfies  desire,  as  understood  by  the  Austrians  and 
Walras.  On  the  other  the  amount  of  utility  a  thing  possesses  is 
deduced  from  the  act  of  choice,  and  here  utility  acts  as  the 
evaluator  of  the  worth  of  a  good.  Utility  in  the  first  case  is  a 
factor  influencing  price,  in  the  second  it  is  a  derivative 
quantity  influenced  by  price.  According  to  Blyumin  the  struggle 
between  the  two  senses,  between  utility  theory  and  choice  theory, 
is  an  expression  of  the  struggle  between  causal  and  functional 
methods  of  investigation.  102  Thus  for  Blyumin  Pareto's  use  of 
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and  clear  basis  for  utility. 
8.8  -  DMITRIEV 
As  already  examined  Dmitriev  was  discussed  by  Blyumin  in  his 
chapter  on  Cournot.  However,  Blyumin  further  devotes  an  entire 
chapter  to  Dmitriev.  According  to  Blyumin  Dmitriev  is  undoubtedly 
the  greatest  representative  of  the  bourgeois  mathematical  school 
in  Russia.  His  main  work  was  entitled  Ekonomicheskie  ocherki  and 
for  Blyumin  the  main  interest  lies  in  the  first  two  parts  of  this 
book  where  the  author  discusses  Ricardo  and  monopoly.  Dmitriev 
presents  a  number  of  highly  original  conclusions,  not  the  least  of 
them  being  that  free  competition  leads  to  prices  rising  above 
costs  of  production  on  the  basis  of  the  law  of  demand.  Despite  the 
fact  that  Dmitriev's  conclusions  have  not  obtained  general 
currency  among  economist-mathematicians,  his  methodology  has  many 
similarities  with  the  methodology  of  the  mathematical  school,  for 
example  the  primacy  of  functional  over  causal  analysis. 
103 
It  is  well-known  that  different  opinions  exist  over  the 
interpretation  of  Ricardo's  theory  of  value.  Some  say  he  was  a 
supporter  of  the  labour  theory,  others  the  costs  of  production 
approach.  Dmitriev  adopts  the  second  position.  According  to 
Blyumin  it  is  also  well-known  that  the  basic  defect  of  the  costs 
of  production  approach  is  its  circular  reasoning,  as  revealed  by 
Bohm-Bawerk.  On  the  one  hand  prices  are  determined  by  costs  of 
production,  ie  wages,  average  profit,  raw  materials,  but  the 
prices  of  these  in  turn  are  determined  by  costs  of  production,  and 
hence  price  determines  price.  Dmitriev  tries  to  overcome  this 
problem  by  composing  such  a  system  of  equations  which  would  be 
sufficient  to  determine  the  price  of  all  goods  based  on  the  theory 
of  costs.  The  basic  fact  of  dependence  of  price  on  costs  Dmitriev 
expresses  as  follows: 
XA  =  (nAaxa  +  nlaxa  +  n2axa  +...  nmaxa)  +  (yA  +  yl  +  y2  +...  ym) 
where  XA  is  the  price  of  product  A;  nA...  nm  is  the  number  of 
working  days  expended  directly  in  producing  A  and  in  the 
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product  in  question  consumed  by  workers  in  a  day;  xa  is  the  price 
of  a;  yA...  ym  is  the  profit  obtained  in  making  product  A. 
Blyumin  further  relates  how  Dmitriev  gives  an  equation  for 
the  determination  of  the  total  quantity  of  labour  directly  and 
indirectly  expended  on  a  product  A.  The  quantity  of  labour 
directly  consumed  in  production  =  nA;  let  several  kinds  of 
'technical  capital'  K1...  Km  be  involved  in  production;  let  there 
be  consumed  in  production  1/mM  of  the  capital  KM;  let  the  amount 
of  labour  directly  and  indirectly  expended  on  the  production  of 
the  capital  K1  be  N1;  in  this  case  the  total  sum  of  labour 
expended  on  the  production  of  a  unit  of  A  will  be: 
NA  =  nA  +  (1/ml)  N1  +  (1/m2)  N2  +...  (1/mM)  NM 
Here  NA,  N1...  NM  are  unknowns. 
104  Blyumin  criticises  this  approach 
by  noting  that  Dmitriev  eliminates  outlays  on  constant  capital 
(c),  rather  all  cost  are  viewed  as  wages  or  variable  capital 
(v).  105  According  to  Blyumin  in  so  far  as  labour  in  capitalist 
society  is  divided  into  necessary  and  surplus,  so  all  value 
produced  by  labour  must  be  divided  into  variable  capital  and 
surplus  value.  Dmitriev's  position  would  be  correct  only  under 
definite  circumstances:  that  labour  in  all  phases  of  the 
production  process  creates  new  value,  but  is  not  transposed  on  a 
product  of  value  created  by  antecedent  labour,  ie  there  is  only 
variable  capital.  However,  since  most  production  does  utilise 
constant  capital  Blyumin  states  that  Dmitriev's  attempt  is 
erroneous. 
106 
Blyumin  then  proceeds  to  give  an  account  of  determining 
socially  necessary  labour.  The  latter  can  be  determined  only  on 
the  basis  of  established  market  values.  No  commodity  producer  can 
say  that  only  socially  necessary  labour  was  expended  on  his 
product.  To  know  this  it  is  necessary  to  know  the  conditions  of 
social  production  and  have  information  about  the  evolution  of 
technique  on  a  social  scale: 
Thus  the  quantity  of  socially  necessary  labour  can 
only  be  determined  post  factum,  only  on  the  basis  of 
the  results  of  exchange.  And  in  this  there  is  no 
paradox  or  contradiction,  since  it  expresses  the 
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basic  exchange  proportions  are  established 
independently  from  the  wishes  of  producers.  107 
However,  by  stating  that  socially  necessary  labour  can  only  be 
determined  post  factum  and  on  the  basis  of  market  values,  Blyumin 
can  be  criticised  for  exactly  the  same  error  as  the  one  he  accuses 
the  subjective  school  of  making.  If  socially  necessary  labour 
determines  price,  but  can  only  be  calculated  on  the  basis  of 
price,  then  this  analysis  is  based  on  a  logical  circle  and  on 
functional  reasoning.  Blyumin  thus  employs  circular  reasoning  to 
explain  socially  necessary  labour. 
8.9  -  CASSEL 
In  the  chapter  on  Cassel  Blyumin  gives  his  own  account  of 
what  he  thinks  socialist  exchange  will  be.  According  to  Blyumin 
socialist  exchange  is  a  relation  which  exists  between  individual 
consumers  and  the  totality  of  producers,  ie  the  social 
organisation  of  all  producers  and  consumers.  Socialist  exchange  is 
an  expression  not  of  the  relations  between  atomised  individuals 
but  between  the  individual  and  society.  Therefore  there  are  no 
antagonisms  between  the  participants  in  socialist  exchange.  Price 
in  socialist  exchange  is  not  a  tool  to  subordinate  subjects  to  the 
strongest  participant,  rather  a  mechanism  to  achieve  the  most 
rational  distribution  of  products  between  subjects. 
108  The  laws 
which  govern  price  in  capitalist  economy  differ  however  from  those 
which  would  apply  to  socialist  exchange.  For  example  in  the  case 
of  a  growth  of  social  demand  for  a  product  the  socialist  organs  of 
distribution  would  not  be  obliged  to  increase  the  price  of  the 
good,  rather  with  sufficient  reserves  socialist  organs  would 
satisfy  the  increased  demand  without  disturbing  the  existing 
distributive  norms. 
Blyumin  gives  this  account  to  show  that  Cassel's  argument 
that  the  socialist  distributive  mechanism  would  be  identical  to 
the  capitalist  one  is  incorrect.  The  latter  aims  to  achieve  the 
greatest  profit,  the  former  rational  distribution  of  production. 
The  latter  changes  with  every  shift  in  market  conjuncture,  the 
former  only  when  methods  of  production  change. 
109  Blyumin  further 
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economy  is  rational,  ie  aspires  to  obtain  the  most  useful  effect 
with  given  outlays.  According  to  Blyumin  this  principle  can  only 
exist  under  socialism-110  Thus  Blyumin  argues  that  optimality  is 
not  achieved  in  capitalism,  but  will  be  achieved  in  socialism.  In 
this  he  has  some  similarity  to  Walras,  who  argued  that  optimal 
price  formation  was  a  theoretical  ideal. 
8.10  -  CONCLUSION 
Blyumin's  work  is  clearly  the  most  detailed  examination  of 
neo-classical  economics  which  occurred  during  NEP.  However,  no 
attempt  is  made  by  Blyumin  to  relate  any  of  this  theory  to 
economic  problems  faced  in  the  USSR,  or  even  to  suggest  how  any  of 
it  may  be  relevant.  The  notion  of  elasticity  is  an  example  of  an 
idea  which  could  have  been  used  to  help  policy  making  at  this  time 
in  relation  to  the  question  of  what  price  structure  would 
encourage  the  peasants  to  produce  high  yields  of  necessary  crops. 
As  regards  conceptions  of  the  market  it  is  apparent  that 
Blyumin  was  very  critical  of  those  economists  who  tried  to  show 
that  market  production  and  exchange  was  in  any  way  optimal.  This 
is  rational  from  a  Marxist  perspective,  since  if  capitalism 
achieved  optimal  production  and  distribution  of  resources  the 
impetus  to  overthrow  it  is  made  redundant.  However,  it  is  worth 
pointing  out  that  Blyumin  was  the  only  economist  from  the  NEP 
period  who  actually  attempted  to  refute  market  optimality. 
Yurovskii  seemed  to  agree  with  this  idea  theoretically,  although 
he  did  point  out  that  it  may  not  apply  in  practise,  while  Marxists 
like  Preobrazhenskii  or  Strumilin  did  not  bother  to  raise  the 
issue  explicitly.  Blyumin  was  thus  unique  is  his  approach  to  neo- 
classical  economics. 
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338 CHAPTER  NINE  -  RESULTS  AND  CONCLUSION 
9.1  -  INTRODUCTION 
NEP  was  a  transitional  period  in  the  Soviet  economy,  and 
perhaps  it  would  be  expected  that  this  was  reflected  in  the 
nature  of  the  economic  theory  written  during  this  period.  It  is 
certainly  the  case  that  there  was  many  diverse  currents  which 
flowed  through  NEP,  and  this  multiplicity  of  approaches  is 
mirrored  in  the  attitudes  of  economists  towards  the  market  and 
market  economics  examined  in  this  thesis. 
As  regards  a  general  normative  appraisal  of  the  market, 
three  basic  groups  can  be  distinguished:  Preobrazhenskii, 
Strumilin,  and  Blyumin  were  clearly  anti-market;  Yurovskii, 
Sokol'nikov,  and  Oparin  were  pro-market  to  a  quite  large  degree; 
Bukharin,  Bazarov,  Groman,  Kondrat'ev,  and  Chayanov  were 
prepared  to  accept  the  use  of  the  market  in  the  transition 
period  on  pragmatic  grounds,  but  their  attitude  towards  the 
market  in  principle  was  less  obvious  and  somewhat  contradictory. 
However,  while  Preobrazhenskii  and  Strumilin  were  clearly  anti- 
market  in  principle,  they  both  accepted  the  quantity  theory  of 
money  in  some  form  and  Strumilin  even  used  marginal  principles 
in  his  work  on  education.  Blyumin  was  the  only  economist  to 
carry  out  a  thorough  and  complete  critique  of  neo-classical 
economics  from  an  anti-market  perspective,  although  he  did  not 
build  any  new  theoretical  schemes  upon  the  Marxist  framework. 
Bazarov's  analysis  of  the  market  was  highly  original  and 
employed  a  unique  methodology.  It  is  certainly  the  case  that  one 
approach  did  not  dominate  economic  theory  during  NEP. 
In  chapter  three  I  showed  that  Marxist  economic  theory 
written  before  NEP  implied  that  as  free  markets  had  long  since 
disappeared  from  capitalist  production,  they  could  safely  be 
ignored  when  it  came  to  making  the  transition  to  socialism.  The 
instruments  developed  by  monopoly  capitalism  would  be  used  to 
socialise  production  and  distribution,  and  thus  'the  market'  was 
not  a  topic  which  was  greatly  discussed  in  Marxist  theory  up 
until  1921.1  However,  the  Bolshevik  experience  soon  forced  a 
revision  of  this  attitude. 
339 The  question  was  raised  in  the  introduction  to  this  thesis 
if  there  was  any  change  in  attitude  towards  the  market  exhibited 
by  economic  theorists  as  a  result  of  the  experience  of 
involvement  with  a  semi-market  economy.  The  economic  theory 
which  I  examined  points  to  a  negative  response  to  this  question. 
It  seems  generally  to  have  been  the  case  that  whatever  technical 
and  normative  appraisal  of  the  market  a  particular  theorist  held 
before  NEP,  this  was  retained  until  its  demise.  However,  some 
minor  exceptions  to  this  could  be  noted.  Strumilin  and 
Preobrazhenskii  both  seemed  to  have  more  positive  views  of  the 
market  right  at  the  start  of  NEP  than  they  held  once  NEP  was  in 
full  swing.  In  Preobrazhenskii's  case  Ot  nepa  k  sotsializmu  of 
1921  is  far  more  positive  and  optimistic  in  tone  than  almost  all 
his  later  works,  and  in  Strumilin's  case  his  views  on  planning 
before  NEP  are  much  less  rigid  than  those  which  developed 
towards  the  end  of  NEP.  Bukharin's  right  turn  after  War 
Communism  is  well-known  and  does  not  need  to  be  outlined  here. 
Apart  from  these  cases,  the  other  theorists  examined  in  this 
thesis  seem  to  have  retained  their  attitude  towards  the  market 
and  planning  consistently  throughout  the  decade. 
9.2  -  CONCEPTIONS  OF  THE  MARKET 
It  is  at  this  point  that  the  answers  to  the  questions 
outlined  in  the  introductory  chapter  should  be  given.  The  two 
specific  questions  which  I  asked  were:  what  does  x  think  the 
market  (and  market  economics)  is,  and  what  has  this  to  do  with 
socialism?  It  what  follows  I  summarise  the  answers  I  have 
obtained  to  these  questions  throughout  this  thesis. 
Bukharin's  pre-NEP  conception  of  market  economics  was 
heavily  influenced  by  the  Austrian  school  and  Bohm-Bawerk  in 
particular.  For  Bukharin  the  law  of  supply  and  demand  was  Bohm- 
Bawerk's  law  of  marginal  pairs,  and  his  main  critique  of  the 
Austrian  school  was  that  subjective  value  theory  was  based  on 
circular  logic.  During  NEP  however  Bukharin  stressed  some  of  the 
positive  aspects  of  the  market,  for  example  that  it  can  drive 
firms  to  be  more  efficient,  and  hence  his  appraisal  of  the 
340 market  went  through  a  re-evaluation.  This  reappraisal  was 
supported  theoretically  by  a  number  of  Bukharinites  such  as 
Aikhenval'd  and  Stetskii.  In  relation  to  the  debates  on 
industrialisation,  Bukharin  stresses  the  importance  of  market 
capacity,  a  'demand'  conceptualisation  of  markets.  This  view  can 
be  seen  in  the  economic  balance  constructed  by  Popov,  although  I 
argued  that  Popov  viewed  this  balance  not  as  a  replacement  for 
the  market  but  as  a  way  of  analysing  it.  Bukharin  believed 
during  NEP  that  socialism  would  be  achieved  through  market 
relations,  and  thus  the  market  was  linked  to  socialism  by  him. 
However,  it  is  clear  he  was  not  a  market  socialist. 
Preobrazhenskii's  technical  view  of  the  market  as  shown  by 
his  use  of  the  quantity  theory  was  not  very  different  from 
'bourgeois'  economics.  In  contrast  it  is  clear  that  at  the 
height  of  NEP  his  normative  view  was  negative,  and  that  for  him 
the  market  could  not  be  related  to  socialism  in  any  respect. 
This  is  demonstrated  by  his  categorical  opposition  of  the  law  of 
value  with  the  law  of  primitive  socialist  accumulation.  However, 
I  argued  that  right  at  the  start  of  NEP  Preobrazhenskii  had  a 
somewhat  less  negative  attitude  towards  the  market,  and  even 
implied  that  socialism  (but  not  communism)  could  include  the 
market.  It  is  revealing  to  note  that  Preobrazhenskii  attempted 
to  analyse  the  transitional  Soviet  economy  of  the  1920s  using 
the  theoretical  concepts  originated  by  Marx  in  his  reproduction 
schemes,  and  thus  that  Preobrazhenskii  was  one  of  the  few 
economists  from  NEP  to  take  Marx's  conceptualisation  of  a 
capitalist  economy  seriously.  The  work  analysed  in  this  thesis 
shows  that  Marx's  particular  economic  tools  were  not  utilised  a 
great  deal  in  the  economic  theory  of  the  NEP  period.  Bukharin 
did  raise  the  question  of  the  equilibrium  conditions  for 
expanded  reproduction  in  the  USSR,  but  did  not  really  elaborate 
any  new  ideas  in  this  respect. 
Strumilin  viewed  the  market  as  a  mechanism  for  revealing 
consumer  demand,  and  tried  to  develop  planning  as  a  replacement 
for  this  type  of  mechanism.  His  normative  appraisal  of 
subjective  value  theory  was  negative,  but  he  used  the  concept  of 
the  margin  in  his  work  on  education.  Strumilin  attempted  to 
analyse  the  formation  of  prices  in  the  USSR  using  value 
341 categories,  but  I  argued  that  this  attempt  was  without  much 
success.  Although  both  Bazarov  and  Groman  also  supported  the 
introduction  of  planning  into  the  Soviet  economy,  the  way  they 
cognised  the  market  differed  from  Strumilin.  Bazarov  in 
particular  developed  an  original  analysis  of  market  mechanics 
based  on  analogy  with  natural  phenomena.  It  is  apparent  that 
Strumilin  gave  no  role  to  the  market  in  socialism,  but  that 
Bazarov  and  Groman  were  less  categorical  in  their  criticisms  of 
market  economics.  However,  Bazarov  agreed  that  full  planning  was 
incompatible  with  commodity  markets. 
The  Conjuncture  Institute's  main  task  was  the  analysis  of 
market  conjuncture.  Oparin's  theorisation  of  this  conjuncture 
owed  a  great  deal  to  Western  economics  such  as  the  Harvard 
Business  School,  and  thus  his  technical  conception  of  the  market 
was  almost  identical  with  particular  types  of  'bourgeois' 
economic  theory.  However,  his  normative  appraisal  of  the  market 
recognised  that  boom  and  slump,  crisis  and  depression  was  an 
integral  part  of  market  mechanics,  and  thus  he  prescribed 
planning  to  overcome  these  difficulties.  Even  so  he  viewed 
planning  as  working  alongside  the  market,  and  thus  he  believed 
that  there  was  a  place  for  elements  of  market  mechanics  within  a 
socialist  system.  Kondrat'ev  argued  that  planning  techniques 
must  take  into  account  the  reality  of  market  capacity,  and  thus 
also  allowed  a  place  for  the  market  (viewed  in  a  specific  way) 
within  planning. 
Sokol'nikov  and  Yurovskii  in  Narkomfin  both  stressed  the 
need  for  financial  restraint  in  the  debates  on  planning,  and 
adopted  a  'balanced  budget'  approach  to  financing  growth.  They 
believed  that  the  financing  of  growth  through  loose  credit 
policy  would  lead  to  inflation,  which  would  have  a  negative 
influence  on  economic  development.  This  type  of  argument  was 
based  theoretically  on  the  quantity  theory  of  money. 
2  However, 
while  they  supported  arguments  taken  directly  from  market 
economics,  both  Sokol'nikov  and  Yurovskii  agreed  that  the  USSR 
was  on  the  path  to  socialism,  and  that  this  was  to  be  supported. 
This  can  be  seen  to  be  contradictory.  Yurovskii's  analysis  of 
Walras  and  marginal  productivity  shows  that  he  understood  both 
the  production  and  the  exchange  optima  conceptions  of  the 
342 market,  but  that  he  was  critical  of  the  idea  that  these 
theoretical  optima  were  obtained  by  capitalism  in  practise. 
Sokol'nikov's  work  on  public  finance  written  at  the  end  of  the 
1920s  shows  that  he  was  conversant  with  'bourgeois'  conceptions 
of  the  role  of  taxation,  credit,  the  budget  etc  in  a  market 
economy,  and  to  a  large  extent  supported  these  conceptions  as 
being  correct  in  the  Soviet  context. 
Chayanov  analysed  the  'place'  meaning  of  the  market  in  some 
detail,  and  related  his  proposals  for  peasant  cooperatives  to 
market  structure.  However,  he  did  not  use  the  spacial  approach 
to  market  location  pioneered  by  Thunen,  and  was  more  concerned 
with  the  mechanics  of  market  trade  rather  than  theorising  the 
extent  of  the  supply  region  served  by  a  market.  Chayanov  was 
also  concerned  with  optimality  arguments,  and  to  show  that 
optima  are  system-dependent.  He  did  use  some  aspects  of  neo- 
classical  economic  theory,  but  his  theory  of  peasant  farms  was 
constructed  on  original  presuppositions.  His  analysis  of  various 
types  of  ownership  shows  that  he  believed  this  question  to  be 
important,  and  that  ownership  forms  had  to  be  taken  into  account 
when  analysing  economic  systems.  His  normative  evaluation  of  the 
market  was  ambiguous  as  he  recognised  that  markets  were  required 
for  peasant  cooperatives,  but  also  that  markets  can  lead  to 
rural  differentiation. 
Blyumin  attempted  a  thorough  critique  of  neo-classical 
economics  using  a  basic  division  between  causal  and  functional 
analysis.  This  approach  was  original,  although  some  of  the 
specific  criticism  was  repetitive  in  that  it  stressed  the 
supposed  circular  reasoning  of  'bourgeois'  economists,  an  idea 
which  Bukharin  had  used  in  his  1914  study  of  Bohm-Bawerk.  In  his 
analysis  of  Jevons  Blyumin  criticised  the  'exchange  optima'  view 
of  the  market,  and  argued  that  this  applies  only  in  very 
restricted  circumstances.  It  is  revealing  that  Blyumin  did  not 
analyse  production  optima,  and  thus  has  only  a  partial  view  of 
the  optimality  conception  of  the  market.  Blyumin  also  attempted 
to  criticise  marginalism  by  employing  the  labour  theory  of  value 
and  Marxist  concepts  such  as  constant  and  variable  capital. 
Blyumin's  work  shows  that  Soviet  economists  had  detailed 
knowledge  of  recent  developments  in  Western  economic  theory, 
343 even  if  they  did  not  make  use  of  it  in  their  work  on  economic 
policy. 
One  conception  of  the  market  noticeably  absent  from  the 
economic  theory  of  NEP  is  the  Mises/Hayek  view  of  the  market  as 
a  conveyor  of  information.  Historically  this  is  not  surprising, 
since  this  view  was  not  widespread  anywhere  in  the  1920s.  3 
However,  this  does  have  substantive  theoretical  implications. 
Those  economists  from  NEP  who  had  a  straightforward  'demand' 
conception  of  the  market  (eg  Strumilin)  thought  that  the 
function  of  revealing  consumer  demand  could  be  easily  replaced 
by  a  type  of  planning.  In  fact  if  you  accept  the  information 
carrier  conception  of  the  market,  planning  has  to  accomplish  far 
more  than  the  simple  calculation  of  consumer  demand  if  it  is  to 
successfully  replace  the  market  as  an  economic  system.  Thus  it 
would  be  possible  to  argue  that  the  simplistic  conceptions  of 
the  market  held  by  some  in  NEP  allowed  them  to  be  overly 
optimistic  as  far  as  the  function  and  capacity  of  planning  was 
concerned.  Perhaps  the  only  economist  from  NEP  to  even 
tangentially  raise  this  problem  was  Kondrat'ev,  as  he  cautioned 
that  planning  would  have  to  be  far  less  all-encompasing  than  the 
plans  that  were  then  being  attempted. 
Another  result  which  emerges  from  this  thesis  is  that 
Marx's  view  that  supply  and  demand  explains  nothing  about  the 
regularities  of  a  capitalist  economy  was  not  stressed  or 
expanded  during  NEP.  Blyumin  criticised  subjective  value  theory 
for  its  functionalism  and  Bukharin  argued  that  the  'price 
explaining  price'  approach  was  tautological,  but  as  far  as  I  can 
discern  no  theorist  took  up  the  idea  that  an  understanding  of 
supply  and  demand  was  totally  superfluous  to  explaining  the 
movement  of  concepts  like  the  organic  composition  of  capital  and 
the  rate  of  surplus  value.  It  could  be  argued  that  Marx's  view 
on  this  question  was  simply  accepted  without  question,  but  even 
so  it  is  revealing  that  this  idea  was  not  expanded.  Yurovskii 
explored  the  various  classical  and  neo-classical  categories  of 
price  (eg  natural  price,  equilibrium  price  etc),  but  not  from  a 
Marxist  perspective.  Perhaps  the  Marxist  economists  in  NEP 
thought  that  Marx  had  said  all  that  was  possible  to  say  on  this 
topic. 
344 In  the  theoretical  framework  I  examined  commercial  law  in 
the  NEP  period.  This  examination  showed  that  this  law  was  not 
fundamentally  different  from  the  commercial  law  which  prevailed 
in  capitalist  economies,  although  forms  of  regulation  did  exist 
which  may  not  have  existed  outside  of  the  USSR  at  this  time. 
Nevertheless  it  is  clear  that  the  conception  of  the  legal 
framework  which  would  accompany  a  market  economy  was  very 
similar  in  both  the  Soviet  and  non-Soviet  cases.  In  this  respect 
at  least  Soviet  theorists  did  not  offer  an  alternative  view  of 
the  market. 
A  noticeable  absence  in  relation  to  concepts  linked  to  the 
market  can  be  detected  as  regards  the  idea  of  the  entrepreneur. 
Bukharin  did  mention  this  notion,  but  only  as  a  way  to  criticise 
subjectivism.  An  inevitable  concomitant  of  allowing  free  markets 
to  exist  is  the  growth  of  private  traders  and  small-scale 
capitalists.  However,  in  the  USSR  during  NEP  this  fact  was 
viewed  in  terms  of  'class  struggle'  and  exploitation,  not  in 
terms  of  encouraging  personal  initiative  and  entrepreneurship. 
The  idea  that  markets  could  stimulate  the  creative  faculties  of 
those  who  functioned  in  them  was  not  a  connotation  which 
economic  theorists  from  NEP  could  readily  conceive. 
4 
9.3  -  CONCEPTIONS  OF  ECONOMIC  SYSTEMS 
In  what  follows  I  will  attempt  to  situate  each  theorist  I 
have  examined  in  Wiles's  spectrum  of  Central  Command  to  Full 
Market  presented  in  chapter  one.  Strumilin  and  Preobrazhenskii 
conceived  of  communism  as  CC,  where  consumer  consumption  and 
labour  allocation  are  totally  planned.  At  the  other  end  of  the 
scale  Oparin,  Kondrat'ev,  Yurovskii,  and  Sokol'nikov  conceived 
of  socialism  as  somewhere  between  CM  and  RM,  although  for 
example  Oparin's  specific  conception  of  the  combination  of 
markets  and  planning  does  not  fit  exactly  into  the  spectrum  as 
designed  by  Wiles.  Bukharin  perceived  the  NEP  economy  as 
somewhere  between  CM  and  RM,  but  still  adhered  to  the  idea  that 
markets  would  be  abolished  in  communism.  Thus  Bukharin's  idea  of 
345 communism  in  this  respect  was  identical  with  Strumilin's  and 
Preobrazhenskii's. 
Chayanov  had  an  original  idea  of  socialism  which  included  a 
strong  emphasis  on  peasant  cooperatives.  However,  as  I 
demonstrated  Chayanov  recommended  that  the  market  structure  of 
these  cooperatives  should  mimic  much  of  the  structure  of  private 
trade,  and  thus  it  would  be  reasonable  to  argue  that  Chayanov's 
idea  of  socialism  included  markets  in  this  specific  way.  Wiles's 
spectrum  takes  no  account  of  the  nature  of  the  firm  embedded  in 
the  economic  system,  so  Chayanov's  particularity  cannot  be 
encompassed  in  this  scheme.  Blyumin,  Bazarov,  and  Groman  were 
not  concerned  to  outline  their  views  in  detail  of  the  best 
economic  system,  rather  were  concerned  mainly  with  theoretical 
questions  relating  to  doctrine  (Blyumin)  or  current  Soviet 
reality  (Bazarov  and  Groman).  However,  it  is  apparent  that 
Bazarov  and  Groman  supported  the  general  idea  of  a  planned 
economy,  and  that  they  gave  a  role  to  markets  within  it. 
It  is  clear  that  each  theorist  I  examined  had  their  own 
particular  conception  of  the  economic  system  which  would  be 
socialism.  However,  it  would  be  wrong  to  impose  ideas  which 
developed  only  after  NEP  (eg  market  socialism)  onto  those 
theorists  who  gave  a  role  to  markets  in  socialism,  as  (for 
example)  Oparin's  equilibrium  scheme  approach  has  no 
straightforward  parallel  in  contemporary  economics.  Had  such 
approaches  been  allowed  to  develop  I  believe  important  original 
contributions  to  economic  theory  could  have  resulted. 
9.4  -  CRITIQUES  OF  THE  MARKET 
As  to  the  types  of  critique  of  the  market  prevalent  during 
NEP,  there  were  both  internal  and  external  critiques  and 
criticisms  for  inefficiency  and  immorality.  Bukharin  and  Blyumin 
both  accused  subjective  value  theory  of  being  based  on  circular 
reasoning  and  thus  failing  to  explain  price,  this  being  an 
internal  critique.  Both  also  argued  that  only  the  labour  theory 
of  value  could  explain  price  satisfactory,  and  thus  invoked  an 
external  comparison.  Oparin's  critique  of  market  mechanics  was 
346 much  more  practically  orientated,  and  revolved  around  the  idea 
that  entrepreneurs  who  base  their  activity  purely  on  market 
signals  are  bound  to  make  incorrect  decisions,  since  these 
signals  do  not  give  the  foresight  required.  This  type  of 
criticism  is  based  on  the  inefficiency  of  the  market  as  an 
economic  system. 
Sokol'nikov  gave  no  detailed  criticism  of  the  market  as  far 
as  I  could  discover,  and  thus  it  must  be  assumed  that  he 
favoured  the  market  at  least  to  some  extent.  However  his  1930 
work  was  noticeably  more  concerned  with  'class  struggle'  than 
work  from  the  mid-1920s,  and  so  it  must  be  assumed  that  he 
followed  the  general  movement  away  from  the  market  which 
occurred  at  the  end  of  NEP  to  some  extent.  Yurovskii  was  also 
pro-market  in  practise,  but  did  criticise  Walras's  theoretical 
implication  that  a  market  system  was  optimal.  However,  Yurovskii 
argued  that  Walras's  theoretical  presuppositions  were  not 
achieved  in  reality,  and  thus  this  critique  is  external  in 
nature.  Chayanov  criticised  market  economics  for  universalising 
historically  specific  economic  categories  such  as  the  labour 
market,  and  based  his  theory  of  the  family  labour  farm  on  the 
idea  that  market-determined  behaviour  is  inappropriate  to 
explain  the  decisions  taken  by  the  heads  of  such  farms.  Such  a 
critique  is  also  external  in  nature.  Kondrat'ev  criticised 
conceptions  of  planning  which  failed  to  take  into  account  human 
fallibility  and  which  attempted  to  plan  in  too  much  detail,  and 
stressed  that  planners  should  take  account  of  market 
possibilities.  This  reveals  that  he  viewed  the  market  in  a 
positive  light  in  this  respect,  since  he  favoured  it  over  human 
prognosis.  Bazarov's  original  attempt  to  model  market  mechanics 
gives  no  indication  as  to  his  normative  appraisal  of  the  market, 
although  he  use  of  the  word  'spontaneous'  may  suggest  that  he 
adhered  to  the  same  criticisms  which  were  held  generally.  Again 
many  different  types  of  criticism  of  the  market  were  prevalent 
during  NEP. 
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In  a  survey  which  I  conducted  of  Russian  economists  in  1991 
it  is  clear  that  neo-classical  conceptions  of  the  market  are 
currently  triumphant.  5  It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that 
approximately  half  of  the  respondents  believed  that  there  was  an 
alternative  Bukharinite  path  after  1929,  and  half  believed  there 
was  not.  Given  the  huge  practical  problems  associated  with  the 
attempted  transition  to  the  market,  it  seems  unlikely  that 
Russian  economists  in  the  1990s  will  spend  their  time  thinking 
up  new  conceptions  of  the  market  or  analysing  the  history  of 
Russian  economic  thought.  Nevertheless  this  history  is  a  rich 
and  varied  one  which  pays  dividends  to  those  investigating  it. 
I  hope  that  what  emerges  from  this  study  is  a  realisation 
and  appreciation  of  the  plurality  of  conceptions  of  the  market 
which  existed  in  the  USSR  during  NEP,  but  which  were  prevented 
from  further  development  by  the  imposition  of  Stalin's  dull 
monolithic  approach  to  economic  theory  in  the  1930s.  The  USSR 
was  probably  the  greatest  and  most  important  economic  experiment 
ever  attempted  in  human  history,  but  unfortunately 
contemporaneous  theorisation  of  this  development  is  sorely 
lacking.  The  thesis  attempted  to  examine  economic  theory  just 
before  the  'great  break',  and  to  demonstrate  that  blame  for  the 
poor  quality  of  Soviet  economic  doctrine  developed  after  1929 
cannot  be  placed  on  those  economists  who  should  have  laid  the 
ground  for  further  development.  Economic  theory  from  NEP  was  as 
rich  and  diverse  as  could  be  expected  from  the  economic  position 
of  Soviet  Russia  at  that  time. 
348 NOTES 
1  More  sophisticated  accounts  of  monopoly  and  the  difference 
between  fixprice  and  flexprice  markets  did  not  really  gain 
wide  circulation  in  Western  economics  until  the  1930s. 
Chamberlin's  Theory  of  Monopolistic  Competition  of  1933  had 
appeared  in  thesis  form  in  1927,  but  NEP  theorists  were 
unlikely  to  have  had  access  to  it  in  the  Harvard  University 
Library.  Cournot's  account  of  monopoly  was  probably  one  of  the 
more  sophisticated  accounts  which  NEP  theorists  could  be 
expected  to  be  familiar  with.  See  Edward  Chamberlin,  'The 
Origin  and  Early  Development  of  Monopolistic  Competition 
Theory',  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  November  1961.  Of  the 
eight  hundred  or  so  pages  of  Marshall's  Principles  only  twenty 
are  devoted  directly  to  monopoly.  2  It  is  ironic  that  in  Britain  in  the  1920s  the  treasury  view  on 
sound  money  was  also  under  attack,  in  this  case  from  Keynes. 
See  Peter  Clarke,  The  Keynesian  Revolution  in  the  Making  1924- 
1936  (Oxford:  Clarendon,  1988),  p.  47-69. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  in  his  1922  work  Die  Gemeinwirtschaft: 
Untersuchungen  uber  den  Sozialismus  von  Mises  was  already 
arguing  that  the  narrow  'technicist'  conception  of  the  market 
which  was  prevalent  among  many  socialists  was  inadequate,  and 
thus  that  market  socialism  was  not  feasible.  See  Ludwig  von 
Mises,  Socialism  (Indianapolis:  Liberty  Classics,  1981), 
p.  119-123.  The  only  Marxist  to  acknowledge  this  type  of 
critique  from  Mises  was  Bukharin,  who  as  I  noted  in  chapter 
two  called  Mises  'one  of  the  most  learned  critics  of 
communism'. 
4  As  regards  the  sources  and  origins  of  the  conceptions  of  the 
market  exhibited  by  the  economic  theorists  examined  in  this 
thesis,  it  would  not  be  too  great  a  distortion  of  the  truth  to 
say  that  little  could  be  traced  directly  to  Russian  economists 
such  as  Struve  or  Dmitriev.  A  possible  exception  to  this  is 
Chayanov,  whose  interest  in  peasant  cooperation  may  partly  be 
indebted  to  Tugan-Baranovskii's  Sotsial'nye  osnovy  kooperatsii 
of  1916.  Kondrat'ev  reveiwed  this  work  of  Tugan-Baranovskii's 
in  Vestnik  Evropy,  no.  6  1916,  p.  352-354,  so  some  influence  is 
not  out  of  the  question  with  regards  to  Kondrat'ev  also.  In 
Struve's  case  it  is  clear  why  no  Marxists  directly  built  upon 
his  work,  although  the  reason  for  his  relative  neglect  is  less 
clear  in  cases  of  non-Marxists  such  as  Yurovskii  and  Oparin. 
In  Khozyaistvo  i  tsena  of  1913  Struve  argued  that  historically 
social  regulation  of  prices  has  had  little  success,  and  that 
price  actually  resists  rational  social  arrangement.  See 
Richard  Pipes,  Struve:  Liberal  on  the  Right,  1905-1944 
(Harvard,  1980),  p.  149. 
5  Vincent  Barnett,  'Conceptions  of  the  Market  Among  Russian 
Economists:  A  Survey',  Soviet  Studies,  vol.  44  no.  6,  November 
1992,  p.  1087-1098.  In  this  article  I  relate  that  95%  of 
Russian  economists  who  completed  the  questionnaire  agreed  with 
the  proposition  that  'the  market  is  the  best  mechanism  to 
regulate  economic  life'  (p.  1089). 
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